Iris Marion Young presents a social connection model on which those, and only those, who participate in structural processes that produce injustice have a forward-looking responsibility to redress the resulting injustice by challenging the structures that produce it. In Young's view, this is an all-things-considered, albeit discretionary, responsibility. I argue that participation in a structural process that produces injustice is neither necessary nor sufficient for having political responsibilities, and that therefore the social connection model must be rejected. A subtler model (...) is needed, one that depicts participation in a structural process that produces injustice as sufficient for having pro tanto forward-looking responsibilities to redress the process, unless the participating agent satisfies certain excusing conditions. I suggest the intuitive force of the thought that mere participation gives us political responsibilities can be explained by more fundamental considerations. Hastily, we might conclude that all participants have political responsibilities simply because most of them satisfy at least one of the following conditions: they cause injustice to continue, they are morally responsible for injustice, they benefit from injustice, they have communal ties with the victims of injustice, or they have the capacity to redress injustice. (shrink)

psychiatric diagnoses such as attention deficit hyperactivity disorder is a rapidly growing and globally increasing phenomenon, not least in different educational contexts such as in family and in school. Children and youths labelled as ADHD are challenging normative claims in terms of nurturing and education, whereas those labelled as ADHD are considered a risk for society to handle. The dominant paradigm regarding ADHD is biomedical, where different levels of attention and activity-impulsivity are perceived as neurobiological dys/functions within the brain best (...) managed by means of an individual diagnosis and instrumental pedagogy. The majority of those labelled as having ADHD encounter a dominant educational model in the form of what is referred to in this article as neurobehaviorism, which is based on onto-epistemological violence. As opposed to this act of violence against being—and against the psychiatrized subject—a less violent educational model is proposed, based on French philosopher Alain Badiou’s ontological examination of being and his concept of love as a truth procedure. In terms of the latter, the focus is on the potential of the encounter as a ‘Two scene of love’. Here, the encounter is a place where it is possible to create new truths and subjects, instead of taking the individual diagnosis as an axiom which only leads to individuals having fixed identities codified in a hierarchical order. This argument is drawn from the ‘mathematical’ formula 1 + 1 = ♥, which originates from an online forum for people who have come into contact with ADHD in one way or another. (shrink)

While many philosophers have agreed that evidence of disagreement is a kind of higher-order evidence, this has not yet resulted in formally precise higher-order approaches to the problem of disagreement. In this paper, we outline a simple formal framework for determining the epistemic significance of a body of higher-order evidence, and use this framework to motivate a novel interpretation of the popular “equal weight view” of peer disagreement—we call it the Variably Equal Weight View (VEW). We show that VEW differs (...) from the standard Split the Difference (SD) interpretation of the equal weight view in almost all cases of peer disagreement, and use our formal framework to explain why SD has seemed attractive but is in fact misguided. A desirable feature of VEW, we argue, is that it gives rise to plausible instances of synergy—an effect whereby the parties to a disagreement should become more (or less) confident in the disputed proposition than any of them were prior to disagreement. Lastly, we show how VEW may be generalized to cases of non-peer disagreement. (shrink)

Nietzsche vs. Kant? Der siebzehnte Aphorismus aus dem ersten Teil von Menschliches, Allzumenschliches schliesst mit der korrosiven Bemerkung, das Ding an sich [sei] eines homerischen Gelachters werth. Aufgrund dieser Passage nun aber zu vermuten, Nietzsche habe diesen von Kant stammenden Terminus einfach so ad acta gelegt, ware jedoch ubereilt, denn die Auseinandersetzung mit der Unterscheidung zwischen Erscheinung und Ding an sich lasst sich als Konstante durch Nietzsches gesamtes Werk verfolgen. Mattia Riccardi widmet sich in seiner Studie den verschiedenen Positionen, (...) die Nietzsche im Zusammenhang mit dieser Problematik eingenommen hat: von der im Hintergrund der Geburt der Tragodie prasenten Artisten-Metaphysik bis zur radikalen Infragestellung des kantischen Denkmusters in den Jahren nach 1880. Riccardi beschrankt sich aber nicht auf eine historisch akkurate, direkte und indirekte Textquelle mit einbeziehender Rekonstruktion von Nietzsches kampferischer Lekturepraxis. Vielmehr stellen die wiederholt auftretenden Bezuge auf Kants Begrifflichkeit fur ihn ein geeignetes Instrument dar, um die Entfaltung von Nietzsches Denken in aller Scharfe sichtbar zu machen. Die Kritik an Kant wird auf diese Weise zum Ausgangspunkt einer differenzierten Interpretation von Nietzsches perspektivistischer Philosophie der Macht im Sinne einer relationalen Ontologie. Damit versteht sich das Buch auch als Beitrag zur - vor allem im englischsprachigen Raum sehr lebendigen - Debatte um das Verhaltnis Nietzsches zu Kant. (shrink)

There are many ways to advance our understanding of the human mind by studying different kinds of sociality. Our aim in this introduction is to situate claims about extended cognition within a broader framework of research on human sociality. We briefly discuss the existing landscape, focusing on ways of defending socially extended cognition. We then draw on resources from the recent literature on the socially extended mind, as well as the literature on collective intentionality, to provide a framework for thinking (...) about the social dimension of individual minds. We then turn to a brief overview of the individualistic approaches advanced by Ludwig and Spaulding in this volume. And we close with a discussion of the transformative role of the social mind in individual life presented by Kern and Moll, as well as the distributed approach to interacting systems defended by Goldstone and Theiner. (shrink)

Since the advent of drug regulation in 1962, regulatory agencies have been in the practice of using strict standards to test the safety and efficacy of medical treatments and products. Regulatory agencies, such as the FDA, demand two full-fledged Randomized Clinical Trials demonstrating the safety and effectiveness of drugs to grant its marketing authorization. On the contrary, surgical treatments are left completely unregulated. There are several reasons explaining this difference, and all of them point to the difficulty of conducting well-designed (...) RCTs in surgery. However, we argue that none of these arguments is decisive and that, under certain conditions, surgical RCTs can be morally justified and methodologically sound. Although ethical constraints restrict the number of testable surgical procedures, and surgical trials might not be as dependable as pharmaceutical RCTs, our analysis suggests that, in certain cases, it is possible to obtain high-quality evidence about the safety and efficacy of surgical procedures. Untested surgical treatments may prove to be ineffective and harm patients. Therefore, regulation of surgical procedures seems not only morally acceptable and able to provide reliable scientific evidence, but also desirable and justified from an ethical-political standpoint. (shrink)

Now that well-paying jobs in film criticism have largely evaporated, while blogs, message boards, and social media have given new meaning to the saying that "everyone's a critic," urgent questions have emerged about the critic's status and purpose. In Film Criticism in the Digital Age, ten scholars from across the globe, as well as critics and bloggers, come together to consider whether we are witnessing the extinction of serious film criticism or seeing the seeds of its rebirth in a new (...) form. (shrink)

Although Habermas has never worked out a conception of virtue and indeed criticizes this notion whenever he uses it, his theory crucially depends on the virtuous attitude of participants in discourse — be it in the realm of democracy and law or that of morality. In this paper, in which I deal only with the ethical foundations of morality, I argue first that the norms of discourse which are gained from a presuppositional analysis of speech as such have to be (...) complemented by the sensitive perception on the side of the recipients. Only when the claims are understood in their full significance for the speaker does the discourse live up to the ideal which is already anticipated in every speech act. This presuppositional analysis shows secondly that it is mainly the virtuous attitude that is morally relevant and not those capacities for acting morally that the agent already possesses. However, the virtuous attitude genuinely entails the obligation to strive to perfect all those capacities that enable us to sensitively understand the other's claim. A discussion of the capacities that have to be promoted leads to the singling out of sensitivity as contrasted to immediate empathy. It is the reflexive transcendence of the agent's evaluative patterns that allows this emotion to sit well with a post-conventional morality. Finally, I discuss a possible caveat of Wellmer and Habermas who might claim that the proposed conception of virtue would only be valid for participants in discourse, but not for agents acting in the life-world. However, because the discursive virtue is of wide latitude, it does not fall under this objection. (shrink)

This article is devoted to Roger Bacon’s understanding of perspectiva as “the first of all natural sciences.” After considering a few alternative medieval definitions and classifications of this discipline – such as al-Fārābī’s, Grosseteste’s and Kilwardby’s – the author turns to Bacon’s arguments for according to perspectiva so exceptional a role. He shows that Bacon’s arguments are grounded in his peculiar understanding of the visual process: according to Bacon, vision is indeed the only sense in which perception takes place “by (...) reasoning”. The author argues that this theory of perception also lays the foundations for Bacon’s – prima facie amiss – claim that “concerning vision alone, and no other sense, have philosophers developed a separate science.” The author explores this point by contrasting with one another Bacon’s conception of perspectiva and of music, and closes with some more general remarks on the implications of Bacon’s account of the visual process for his theory of knowledge. Based on his theory of a “vision by reasoning,” the author concludes that Bacon came to reinterpret perspectiva as the organon of visual knowledge. (shrink)

In this paper, we present a new semantic framework designed to capture a distinctly cognitive or epistemic notion of meaning akin to Fregean senses. Traditional Carnapian intensions are too coarse-grained for this purpose: they fail to draw semantic distinctions between sentences that, from a Fregean perspective, differ in meaning. This has led some philosophers to introduce more fine-grained hyperintensions that allow us to draw semantic distinctions among co-intensional sentences. But the hyperintensional strategy has a flip-side: it risks drawing semantic distinctions (...) between sentences that, from a Fregean perspective, do not differ in meaning. This is what we call the ‘new problem’ of hyperintensionality to distinguish it from the ‘old problem’ that faced the intensional theory. We show that our semantic framework offers a joint solution to both these problems by virtue of satisfying a version of Frege’s so-called ‘equipollence principle’ for sense individuation. Frege’s principle, we argue, not only captures the semantic intuitions that give rise to the old and the new problem of hyperintensionality, but also points the way to an independently motivated solution to both problems. (shrink)

What does it mean to enact a jazz beat as a creative performer? This article offers a critical reading of Iyer’s much-cited theory on rhythmic enaction. We locate the sonic environment approach in Iyer’s theory, and criticize him for advancing a one-to-one relationship between everyday perception and full-fledged aural competence of jazz musicians, and for comparing the latter with non-symbolic behaviour of non-human organisms. As an alternative, we suggest a Merleau-Ponty-inspired concept of rhythmic enaction, which we call the enactive communicative (...) approach. Key to this approach is the fact that jazz musicians play by ear, and that the beat emerges because of reciprocal, real-time aural communication. From this perspective, we outline the temporality of a jazz beat as a holistic and dialectical temporal structure. Throughout the discussions, we use John Coltrane’s ‘Trane’s Slo Blues’ as a point of reference. (shrink)

BackgroundTraditionally, palliative care has focused on patients suffering from life-threatening somatic diseases such as cancer or progressive neurological disorders. In contrast, despite the often chronic, severely disabling, and potentially life-threatening nature of psychiatric disorders, there are neither palliative care units nor clinical guidelines on palliative measures for patients in psychiatry.Main textThis paper contributes to the growing literature on a palliative approach in psychiatry and is based on the assumption that a change of perspective from a curative to a palliative approach (...) could help promote patient-centeredness and increase quality of life for severely ill patients in psychiatry as well as in somatic medicine. To exemplify this, we offer three different clinical scenarios: severe and enduring anorexia nervosa, treatment-refractory schizophrenia, and chronic suicidality and persistent self-injury in borderline personality disorder.ConclusionWe emphasize that many typical interventions for treatment-refractory psychiatric disorders may indeed be of a palliative nature. Furthermore, introducing traditional features of palliative care, e.g. so-called goals of care conversations, could aid even further in ensuring that caregivers, patients, and families agree on which treatment goals are to be prioritized in order to optimize quality of life in spite of severe, persistent mental disorder. (shrink)

According to the prevailing paradigm in social-cognitive neuroscience, the mental states of individuals become shared when they adapt to each other in the pursuit of a shared goal. We challenge this view by proposing an alternative approach to the cognitive foundations of social interactions. The central claim of this paper is that social cognition concerns the graded and dynamic process of alignment of individual minds, even in the absence of a shared goal. When individuals reciprocally exchange information about each other's (...) minds processes of alignment unfold over time and across space, creating a social interaction. Not all cases of joint action involve such reciprocal exchange of information. To understand the nature of social interactions, then, we propose that attention should be focused on the manner in which people align words and thoughts, bodily postures and movements, in order to take one another into account and to make full use of socially relevant information. (shrink)

A proof-theoretic test for paradoxicality was famously proposed by Tennant: a paradox must yield a closed derivation of absurdity with no normal form. Drawing on the remark that all derivations of a given proposition can be transformed into derivations in normal form of a logically equivalent proposition, we investigate the possibility of paradoxes in normal form. We compare paradoxes à la Tennant and paradoxes in normal form from the viewpoint of the computational interpretation of proofs and from the viewpoint of (...) proof-theoretic semantics. (shrink)

In collective harm cases, bad consequences follow if enough people act in a certain way even though no such individual act makes a difference for the worse. Global warming, overfishing and Derek Parfit’s famous case of the harmless torturers are some examples of such harm. Shelly Kagan argues that there is a threshold such that one single act might trigger harm in all collective harm cases. Julia Nefsky points to serious shortcomings in Kagan’s argument, but does not show that his (...) conclusion is incorrect. I argue that our best theories of vagueness (the epistemic view of vagueness, three-valued logic, and supervaluationism) entail that there is a threshold in all collective harm cases. However, my analysis points to another problem with Kagan’s argument: the thresholds are not necessarily perceptible. Given the assumption that only perceptible differences matter morally, passing such a threshold does not necessarily trigger morally relevant harm, pace Kagan. Last, I consider two variants of Kagan’s argument and find both problematic. One controversially assumes that observational relations like ‘cannot perceive the difference between’ are transitive. The other problematically assumes that so called triangulation always is possible. (shrink)

Abstract: Nietzsche’s famously wrote that “consciousness is a surface” (EH, Why I am so clever, 9: 97). The aim of this paper is to make sense of this quite puzzling contention—Superficiality, for short. In doing this, I shall focus on two further claims—both to be found in Gay Science 354—which I take to substantiate Nietzsche’s endorsement of Superficiality. The first claim is that consciousness is superfluous—which I call the “superfluousness claim” (SC). The second claim is that consciousness is the source (...) of some deep falsification—which I call the “falsification claim” (FC). I shall start by considering Nietzsche’s notion of consciousness. Here, I shall argue that the kind of consciousness he is concerned with is in fact self-consciousness and that he put forward a higher-order theory of it. Then, I shall address the two claims. Regarding (FC), my proposal will be that, according to Nietzsche, the content of (self-)conscious mental states is falsified in virtue of its being articulated propositionally. Regarding (SC), I shall claim that it is best read as a weak version of epiphenomenalism about conscious causation. In addressing both points, I shall discuss in particular the influential reading of Nietzsche’s theory of consciousness offered by Katsafanas (2005). (shrink)

The aim of the article is to introduce an approach to play based on semiotics of culture and, in particular, grounded in the works and ideas of Juri Lotman. On the one hand, it provides an overview of Lotman’s works dedicated to play and games, starting from his article on art among other modelling systems, in which the phenomenon of play is treated deeply, and mentioning Lotman’s articles dedicated to various forms of play forms, such as involving dolls and playing (...) cards. On the other hand, it applies a few Lotmanian theories and ideas to playfulness in order to shed some light on this highly debated, as well as intriguing, anthropic activity. Thus, the paper approaches some of the core questions for a play theory, such as the definition of play, the cultural role of toys and playthings, the importance of unpredictability, the position held by playfulness in the semiosphere and, finally, the differences and commonalities between play and art. Lotman’s theories and works, often integrated by other existing semiotic or ludologic perspectives offer an extremely insightful and fresh take on play and illustrate the great heuristic potential of semiotics of culture. (shrink)

Perspectives on Social Ontology and Social Cognition brings together contributions discussing issues arising from theoretical and empirical research on social ontology and social cognition. It is the first comprehensive interdisciplinary collection in this rapidly expanding area. The contributors draw upon their diverse backgrounds in philosophy, cognitive science, behavioral economics, sociology of science and anthropology. -/- Based largely on contributions to the first Aarhus-Paris conference held at the University of Aarhus in June 2012, the book addresses such questions as: If the (...) reference of concepts like money is fixed by collective acceptance, does it depend on mechanisms that are distinct from those which contribute to understanding the reference of concepts of other kinds of entity? What psychological and neural mechanisms, if any, are involved in the constitution, persistence and recognition of social facts? -/- The editors' introduction considers strands of research that have gained increasing importance in explaining the cognitive foundations of acts of sociality, for example, the theory that humans are predisposed and motivated to engage in joint action with con-specifics thanks to mechanisms that enable them to share others' mental states. The book also presents a commentary written by John Searle for this volume and an interview in which the editors invite Searle to respond to the various questions raised in the introduction and by the other contributors. (shrink)

Given the vast distances separating astronomical objects, multi-generational space travel may eventually become a practicable option in the future. Such an expedition would most likely include companion animals as well. Especially since they are deemed important in assisting humans to cope with stress and anxiety. However, just as with humans, extended periods of confinement would be detrimental to companion animals as well, resulting in psychological, physiological, and behavioural disorders. Already occurring to animals locked up in terrestrial households, it would be (...) an even bigger welfare problem during a life-long journey in a no-way-out confined spaceship. A conceivable solution could be to genetically enhance them to fit the spaceship environment. Assuming that companion animals will be part of future multi-generational space travels, this article aims at examining how such an experience would affect their welfare, even considering the implications of genetic adaptation. (shrink)

We refine the intuitively appealing idea that you are blameworthy for something if it happened because you did not care enough. More formally: you are blameworthy for X (where X may be an action, omission, or outcome) just in case there is the right causal-explanatory relation between your poor quality of will and X. First, we argue that blameworthiness for actions, omissions, and outcomes is concerned with negative differences: you are blameworthy for the fact that X occurred instead of X*, (...) where X is worse than X*. Second, we argue that the way in which your quality of will is poor has to fit what you are blameworthy for. With these refinements, the account already gives intuitively correct verdicts in cases of forgetting, making a negative difference to a nevertheless good result, and doing an action with runaway consequences. We then discuss what the right causal-explanatory relation is and suggest that it is simply causation, understood in the right way. Here, we draw on the account of causation developed in Touborg, The Dual Nature of Causation. According to this account, there are two necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for causation. Roughly, C causes E rather than E* iff (a) C is process-connected to E, and (b) C makes E more secure and E* less secure. With this account of causation, our account of blameworthiness now also gives correct verdicts in omission, pre-emption, and switching cases, Frankfurt-style cases, and collective harm cases. (shrink)

Titelbaum Oxford studies in epistemology, 2015) has recently argued that the Enkratic Principle is incompatible with the view that rational belief is sensitive to higher-order defeat. That is to say, if it cannot be rational to have akratic beliefs of the form “p, but I shouldn’t believe that p,” then rational beliefs cannot be defeated by higher-order evidence, which indicates that they are irrational. In this paper, I distinguish two ways of understanding Titelbaum’s argument, and argue that neither version is (...) sound. The first version can be shown to rest on a subtle, but crucial, misconstrual of the Enkratic Principle. The second version can be resisted through careful consideration of cases of higher-order defeat. The upshot is that proponents of the Enkratic Principle are free to maintain that rational belief is sensitive to higher-order defeat. (shrink)

It has now been more than a year since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. Yet, despite the colossal and unprecedented scientific effort that has been put into it, many claims are still opaque, and many issues must be solved. Among these, one deserves the attention of philosophers of science: the scientific controversy about the theories of SARS-CoV-2 transmission. In this short paper, I analyze the debate between the droplet theory and the airborne theory of viral transmission. I argue that (...) the acceptance of the droplet theory has been due to the philosophical commitments of the dominant scientific actors to a specific theory of evidence, which has become dominant in western democracies, and to a specific set of non-epistemic values, rather than to scientific considerations alone. (shrink)

La presente proposta – inserita nel quadro della ricerca di dottorato intitolata _Tonino Guerra sceneggiatore tra anni Cinquanta e Sessanta. Il lavoro con Antonioni e Rosi tra storia e inchiesta_ – si propone di illustrare la ricognizione archivistica condotta su alcune fonti di prima mano, relative al film _L’eclisse_ (1962) di Michelangelo Antonioni. Questi materiali preparatori inediti gettano luce su modelli sia interpretativi sia metodologici legati alla genetica testuale. In un’ottica storico-filologica, l’osservazione del metodo di lavoro di Guerra e Antonioni (...) consente di ampliare la portata ermeneutica del film in questione, soffermandosi su quello che Pierre-Marc de Biasi definisce il “divenire del testo”: dall’idea iniziale alla sua evoluzione fino alla versione definitiva, chiamando in causa materiali eterogenei. L’intervento si propone di spingere lo studio della sceneggiatura a dialogare con un più ampio concetto di materiali preparatori. (shrink)

El libro compilado por Manuel Tizziani y Joel Sidler presenta los resultados de un proyecto de investigación sobre la difusión, edición y recepción de la Ilustración y el liberalismo en España y el Río de la Plata, un trabajo financiado por la Universidad Nacional del Litoral (Argentina). Allí se desempeñan tanto sus coordinadores y la mayoría de sus autores, como su única autora, la profesora Ana Orecchia.

Artikkelen er en fenomenologisk og hermeneutisk betraktning av Trondheims minnepark for 22. juli-ofrene. Bakgrunnen ligger i et etisk moment av hermeneutisk selvkritikk, som utspilte seg i storsamfunnets reaksjoner på terroren, og som parken må sees i lys av. Artikkelen tar utgangspunkt i at flere av diktene som er slipt inn i minneparkens hvite betong, tematiserer behovet for mellommenneskelig anerkjennelse. Ved hjelp av kunstteoretikeren Bourriaud og filosofene Fichte og Hegel synliggjøres det hvordan dette temaet – mellommenneskelig anerkjennelse – kan sies å (...) være integrert i parkens helhetlige estetikk. Siste del drøfter ved hjelp av Gadamer hvordan anerkjennelse også er relevant for aktiviteten med å gå omkring og lese diktene i parken. Til sammen belyser artikkelen hvordan minneparken utgjør en sammenveving av det etiske og det estetiske, og hvordan ordet minne her har to betydninger. Med parken minnes vi ofrene for terroren i betydningen kollektiv hukommelse, eller in memoriam. Samtidig blir vi påminnet vår evne til å være i relasjon med andre mennesker, og til å vokse i relasjonelt samspill. Den siste betydningen er filosofisk, og spiller på betydningen gjenerindring. Nøkkelord: hermeneutisk selvkritikk, anerkjennelse, deltakelse, hverdagslighet, lesning English summary: "Becoming fully oneself by being seen." On the connection between ethics and aesthetics in Trondheim's Memorial Park for the July 22 victims This article presents a phenomenological and hermeneutical consideration of Trondheim's Memorial Park for the July 22 victims. The background evolves in an ethical and hermeneutical form of self-criticism, which emerged in Norway in the public reactions to the terror. The article observes the fact that several of the poems embedded in the white concrete of the Memorial Park promote the need for interpersonal recognition. Through considering ideas of Bourriaud, Fichte, and Hegel, the author demonstrates how this very theme of interpersonal recognition is integrated into the park's overall aesthetics. The author considers how recognition is also relevant to the activity of reading the poems in the park through evoking Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics. In sum, the article demonstrates how the Memorial Park constitutes a joining of the ethical and aesthetic dimensions and how the word memorial [Norwegian: minne] here gains two meanings. In the park we remember the victims of the terror in the sense of collective memory, or in memoriam. At the same time, we are reminded of our ability to be in relationship with other people and to grow in relational interaction. The latter sense is philosophical and draws on the meaning of recollection. Keywords: hermeneutical self-criticism, recognition, participation, everyday life, reading. (shrink)

According to many philosophers and scientists, human sociality is explained by our unique capacity to “share” attitudes with others. The conditions under which mental states are shared have been widely debated in the past two decades, focusing especially on the issue of their reducibility to individual intentionality and the place of collective intentions in the natural realm. It is not clear, however, to what extent these two issues are related and what methodologies of investigation are appropriate in each case. In (...) this article, I propose a solution that distinguishes between epistemic and ontological interpretations of the demand for the conditions of reduction of collective intentionality. While the philosophical debate has contributed important insights into the former, recent advances in the cognitive sciences offer novel resources to tackle the latter. Drawing on Michael Tomasello’s research in the ontogeny of shared intentionality in early instances of interaction based on joint attention, I propose an empirically informed argument of what it would take to address the ontological question of irreducibility, thus making a step forward in the naturalization of collective intentionality. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Nietzsche’s Ethics by Thomas SternMattia RiccardiThomas Stern, Nietzsche’s Ethics Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020. 69 pp. ISBN: 9781108713320. Paper, $22.00.Thomas Stern sets out his approach in this “Cambridge Element” on Nietzsche’s ethics in a bold and straightforward way: “My own intention is to stay very close to the texts, to read them in light of what we know about Nietzsche’s intellectual background, and to present the philosophical ideas (...) found in them as clearly, neutrally and thoroughly as possible” (3). As a result, Stern guesses, the “Nietzsche on display in these pages may seem, in places, dated, wrong-headed and extremely unappealing.” In my case, the guess is mostly correct. Fortunately, there are reasons to doubt that Stern’s Nietzsche is also the “real one,” contrary to what is claimed. (I don’t mean to suggest Nietzsche is never “dated,” “wrong-headed,” or “extremely unappealing.”)Stern, who focuses on the ethics of the late Nietzsche—roughly, from BGE onward—claims it consists of two basic claims. The first claim is a descriptive one—the “Life Theory”—to the effect that striving for power is an essential feature of life as such: “Living and power seeking cannot be pulled apart” (6). Power seeking, in turn, is manifested in behaviors that could be generically described as aggressive. A suggestive passage: “life itself is essentially a process of appropriating, injuring, overpowering the alien and the weaker, oppressing, being harsh, imposing your own form, incorporating, and at least, the very least, exploiting” (BGE 259; if not otherwise indicated, Nietzsche’s works are quoted from the Cambridge University Press translations). The second claim—the “Normative Command”—is directly derived from the descriptive one: “it is ethical to further the goals of Life and it is unethical to impede them” (11). On this reading, Nietzsche turns out to defend a version of metaethical realism: the very nature of (biological) reality gives us an objective criterion for what is ethical. As Stern puts it, “His ethics track what he takes to be a deep, fundamental fact about living things, the Life Theory, which applies at all times and in all places” (23). [End Page 226]In my view, there are many problems with this reading, both interpretive and conceptual. To start with, although Nietzsche often supplies characterizations of life like the one in BGE 259, it is not clear that they should be understood as (merely) descriptive. BGE 22 makes explicit that a claim to the effect that nature (considered here as the object of physics) is a “tyrannically ruthless and pitiless execution of power claims” cannot count as part of a description of the (physical) world. Of course, Nietzsche is not talking here about life. But that he explicitly classifies a will to power claim as “interpretation,” and not as part of (physical) nature’s “text,” should warn readers from taking such claims to be (merely) descriptive (even if they often look like that)—a point already made by Maudemarie Clark in Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy ([Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990], 222–23). A similar worry also applies to the idea, at the heart of the Normative Command, that life has certain goals. For although there are passages where Nietzsche talks of life’s goals, the problem is again whether they are about “goals” that “life” really has. Sometimes Nietzsche writes that nature lacks any goal whatsoever—it is “indifferent without measure, without purpose and regard” (BGE 9). And sometimes he writes that goals (and values) are a human product. (See, for instance, TI “Errors” 8: “We have invented the concept of ‘purpose’: there are no purposes in reality”; on values, see Z I “Thousand and One Goals.”) Thus, the very status of Nietzsche’s claims about the essence of life and its goals is not as straightforward as Stern suggests.Another kind of textual evidence points in the same direction. For although it is true that Nietzsche often describes life as such as power seeking, as in BGE 259, this is not always the case. In the very late writings from which Stern draws a great deal of the textual evidence to back up his... (shrink)

The financial crisis that began in the US real-estate market in 2007 and culminated in a global economic slump showed bluntly how wrong financial risk models can be. This state of affairs has triggered a number of reactions and observations at the level of the specification and use of models and at a more conceptual/fundamental level. This article focuses on the epistemic features of such models – namely the nature, source, conditions of validity, structure and limits of the knowledge that (...) ‘well-specified’ models generate – so as to assess models in a balanced way, giving due weight to the fundamental determinants of their output and warning against overestimation of their possibilities; clarify the conditions under which models can be validly applied to economic and social relationships; render intelligible why the degree of accuracy that successful models would require is intrinsically unattainable; better understand models’ failure as evidenced by the crisis; and comment on the policy steps being undertaken to prevent similar financial crisis in the future. The analysis applies the principal tenets of critical realism to the daily preoccupations of risk management professionals and financial regulators alike. It is not intended as an intervention into critical realism. It draws on the works of Tony Lawson and Roy Bhaskar, and revisits relevant aspects of John Maynard Keynes’s work, connecting dots amongst them and marrying economic and philosophical analysis with day-to-day financial risk management and regulatory issues. Content Type Journal Article Category Article Pages 462-486 DOI 10.1558/jcr.v11i4.462 Authors Mattia L. Rattaggi, UBS/Cambridge Social Ontology Group Journal Journal of Critical Realism Online ISSN 1572-5138 Print ISSN 1476-7430 Journal Volume Volume 11 Journal Issue Volume 11, Number 4 / 2012. (shrink)

It is a distinctive mark of normal conscious perception that perceived objects are experienced as actually present in one’s surroundings. The aim of this paper is to offer a phenomenologically accurate and empirically plausible account of the cognitive underpinning of this feature of conscious perception, which I shall call perceptual presence. The paper begins with a preliminary characterization of. I then consider and criticize the seminal account of proposed by Mohan Matthen. In the remainder of the paper I put forward (...) and defend my own attentional account. I first outline a simple version of the view by focusing on vision and then extend it to audition. After discussing the case of depersonalization, I consider some objections. The last objection, in particular, will motivate a refinement of the attentional account for the visual case. The paper ends with some remarks mainly about the specificity of the visual case vis-à-vis the auditory one. (shrink)

The traditional possible-worlds model of belief describes agents as ‘logically omniscient’ in the sense that they believe all logical consequences of what they believe, including all logical truths. This is widely considered a problem if we want to reason about the epistemic lives of non-ideal agents who—much like ordinary human beings—are logically competent, but not logically omniscient. A popular strategy for avoiding logical omniscience centers around the use of impossible worlds: worlds that, in one way or another, violate the laws (...) of logic. In this paper, we argue that existing impossible-worlds models of belief fail to describe agents who are both logically non-omniscient and logically competent. To model such agents, we argue, we need to ‘dynamize’ the impossible-worlds framework in a way that allows us to capture not only what agents believe, but also what they are able to infer from what they believe. In light of this diagnosis, we go on to develop the formal details of a dynamic impossible-worlds framework, and show that it successfully models agents who are both logically non-omniscient and logically competent. (shrink)