Epistemic deontology is the view that the concept of epistemic justification is deontological: a justified belief is, by definition, an epistemically permissible belief. I defend this view against the argument from doxastic involuntarism, according to which our doxastic attitudes are not under our voluntary control, and thus are not proper objects for deontological evaluation. I argue that, in order to assess this argument, we must distinguish between a compatibilist and a libertarian construal of the concept of voluntary control. If we (...) endorse a compatibilist construal, it turns out that we enjoy voluntary control over our doxastic attitudes after all. If, on the other hand, we endorse a libertarian construal, the result is that, for our doxastic attitudes to be suitable objects of deontological evaluation, they need not be under our voluntary control. (shrink)

Although it is not yet officially recognized as a clinical entity which is diagnosable, Internet Gaming Disorder (IGD) has been included in section III for further study in the DSM-5 by the American Psychiatric Association (APA, 2013). This is important because there is increasing evidence that people of all ages, in particular teens and young adults, are facing very real and sometimes very severe consequences in daily life resulting from an addictive use of online games. This article summarizes general aspects (...) of IGD including diagnostic criteria and arguments for the classification as an addictive disorder including evidence from neurobiological studies. Based on previous theoretical considerations and empirical findings, this paper examines the use of one recently proposed model, the Interaction of Person-Affect-Cognition-Execution (I-PACE) model, for inspiring future research and for developing new treatment protocols for IGD. The I-PACE model is a theoretical framework that explains symptoms of Internet addiction by looking at interactions between predisposing factors, moderators, and mediators in combination with reduced executive functioning and diminished decision making. Finally, the paper discusses how current treatment protocols focusing on Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy for Internet addiction (CBT-IA) fit with the processes hypothesized in the I-PACE model. (shrink)

After briefly discussing the relevance of the notions computation and implementation for cognitive science, I summarize some of the problems that have been found in their most common interpretations. In particular, I argue that standard notions of computation together with a state-to-state correspondence view of implementation cannot overcome difficulties posed by Putnam's Realization Theorem and that, therefore, a different approach to implementation is required. The notion realization of a function, developed out of physical theories, is then introduced as a replacement (...) for the notional pair computation-implementation. After gradual refinement, taking practical constraints into account, this notion gives rise to the notion digital system which singles out physical systems that could be actually used, and possibly even built. (shrink)

A general class of labeled sequent calculi is investigated, and necessary and sufficient conditions are given for when such a calculus is sound and complete for a finite -valued logic if the labels are interpreted as sets of truth values. Furthermore, it is shown that any finite -valued logic can be given an axiomatization by such a labeled calculus using arbitrary "systems of signs," i.e., of sets of truth values, as labels. The number of labels needed is logarithmic in the (...) number of truth values, and it is shown that this bound is tight. (shrink)

Humans are creatures of articulation: an essential part of our form of life is the expression of what appears to us significant in what we experience and how we behave. The aim of this volume is to proceed from this realisation to an integrative anthropology that not only takes into account the uniqueness of our form of life, but also our evolutionary context. This has important consequences for our understanding of our corporeality, actions, language, consciousness and morals.

We give examples of calculi that extend Gentzen’s sequent calculusLKby unsound quantifier inferences in such a way that derivations lead only to true sequents, and proofs therein are nonelementarily shorter thanLK-proofs.

The question whether a constitutive linguistic norm can be prescriptive is central to the debate on the normativity of meaning. Recently, the author has attempted to defend an affirmative answer, pointing to how speakers sporadically invoke constitutive linguistic norms in the service of linguistic calibration. Such invocations are clearly prescriptive. However, they are only appropriate if the invoked norms are applicable to the addressed speaker. But that can only be the case if the speaker herself generally accepts them. This qualification (...) has led critics to argue that if an addressed speaker’s acceptance is a necessary condition for legitimate prescriptions (and reproach for failure to adhere to them), then the account becomes unable to underwrite actual normativity. Moreover, critics argue, a danger of vicious circularity arises from the calibration account. This paper shows that once a vantage point within the calibration practice is accepted, the criticisms lose their force. It then explores why a theorist might reject such a perspective and suggests, as a plausible candidate, implicit Humean assumptions about the proper explanation of (linguistic) action. The paper ends by sketching a way forward for the debate on the normativity of meaning in light of this diagnosis. (shrink)

Freges Kontextprinzip "Nur im Zusammenhange eines Satzes bedeuten die Wörter etwas" hat auch nach der von ihm vollzogenen Angleichung von Behauptungssätzen an Eigennamen Gültigkeit für die formale Sprache der "Grundgesetze". Der Bedeutungsvollständigkcitsbeweis, den er für sein Logiksystem anstrebt, schließt eine unmittelbare Anwendung dieses Prinzips nicht nur auf die unvollständigen Funktionsausdrücke, sondern auch auf die leerstellenfreien Wertverlaufsnamen ein. Wahrheitsnamen (Sätze) zeichnen sich vor anderen symbolsprachlichen Eigennamen in mehrfacher Hinsicht, insbesondere durch ihre semantische Selbständigkeit aus. Wertverlaufsnamen haben nur im Zusammenhang eines Wahrheitswertnamens (...) eine Bedeutung. Ihre Bedeutung besteht in ihrem Beitrag zur Bestimmung der Bedeutung von Wahrheitswertnamen, in denen sie vorkommen. (shrink)

In this paper, I critically discuss Frege’s philosophy of geometry with special emphasis on his position in The Foundations of Arithmetic of 1884. In Sect. 2, I argue that that what Frege calls faculty of intuition in his dissertation is probably meant to refer to a capacity of visualizing geometrical configurations structurally in a way which is essentially the same for most Western educated human beings. I further suggest that according to his Habilitationsschrift it is through spatial intuition that we (...) come to know the axioms of Euclidean geometry. In Sect. 3, I argue that Frege seems right in claiming in The Foundations, §14 that the synthetic nature of the Euclidean axioms follows from the fact that they are independent of one another and of the primitive laws of logic. If the former were dependent on the latter, they would be analytic in Frege’s sense of analyticity. But then they would not be independent of one another and due to their mutual provability would lose their status as axioms of Euclidean geometry, since according to Frege an axiom of a theory T is per definitionen unprovable in T. I further argue that only by invoking pure spatial intuition can Frege “explain” the epistemological status of the axioms of Euclidean geometry completely: their synthetic a priori nature. Finally, I argue that his view about independence in The Foundations, §14 seems to clash with his conception of independence in his mature period. In Sect. 4, I scrutinize Frege’s somewhat vague, but unduly neglected remarks in The Foundations, §26 on space, spatial intuition and the axioms of Euclidean geometry. I argue that for the sake of coherence Frege should have said unambiguously that space is objective, that it is independedent not only of our spatial intuition, but of our mental life altogether including our judgements about space, instead of encouraging the possible conjecture that in his view it contains an objective and a subjective component. I further argue that for Frege the objectivity of both space and the axioms of Euclidean geometry manifests itself in our universal and compulsory acknowledgement of the Euclidean axioms as true. I conclude Sect. 4 by arguing that there is a conflict between the subjectivity of our spatial intuitions as stressed in The Foundations, §26 and Frege’s thesis in his dissertation that the axioms of Euclidean geometry derive their validity from the nature of our faculty of intuition. To resolve this conflict, I propose that in the light of his avowed realism in The Foundations Frege could have replaced his early thesis by saying that although we come to know the axioms of Euclidean geometry through spatial intuition and are justified in acknowledging them as true on the basis of geometrical intuition, their truth is independent not only of the nature of our faculty of intuition and singular acts of intuition, but of our mental processes and activities in general, including the inner mental act of judging. In Sect. 5, I argue that Frege most likely did not adopt Kant’s method of acquiring geometrical knowledge via the ostensive construction of concepts in spatial intuition. In contrast to Kant, Frege holds that the axioms of three-dimensional Euclidean geometry express state of affairs about space obtaining independently of our spatial intuition. In Sect. 6, I conclude with a summarized assessment of Frege’s philosophy of geometry. (shrink)

Freges Kontextprinzip "Nur im Zusammenhange eines Satzes bedeuten die Wörter etwas" hat auch nach der von ihm vollzogenen Angleichung von Behauptungssätzen an Eigennamen Gültigkeit für die formale Sprache der "Grundgesetze". Der Bedeutungsvollständigkcitsbeweis, den er für sein Logiksystem anstrebt, schließt eine unmittelbare Anwendung dieses Prinzips nicht nur auf die unvollständigen Funktionsausdrücke, sondern auch auf die leerstellenfreien Wertverlaufsnamen ein. Wahrheitsnamen (Sätze) zeichnen sich vor anderen symbolsprachlichen Eigennamen in mehrfacher Hinsicht, insbesondere durch ihre semantische Selbständigkeit aus. Wertverlaufsnamen haben nur im Zusammenhang eines Wahrheitswertnamens (...) eine Bedeutung. Ihre Bedeutung besteht in ihrem Beitrag zur Bestimmung der Bedeutung von Wahrheitswertnamen, in denen sie vorkommen. (shrink)

1. Logik und Philosophie der Mathematik.--2. Logik und Sprachphilosophie.--3. Logik und Semantik.

Definition of the problemStaff and patients in institutions of organized health care experience and express a variety of adverse conditions of these organizations. Within a theoretical framework of institutional pathology we can explain some of these “miserable conditions” as effects of the activities of organizations belonging to the political system (health policy) and to the economic system (health economy). Clinical ethics committees (CECs) cannot effectively handle such adversities or even address them properly. Standard organizational ethics can address them but cannot (...) handle them effectively.ArgumentsI propose to strengthen organizational ethics by a theory of institutional pathology. Basic nosological distinctions such as disease, illness and sickness, whose primary reference is to biological organisms and persons, can be analogically extended to socially constituted entities (e.g. hospitals) in terms of functional deficiency, miserable conditions, and need for reform of such entities. A very promising focus for analysis are organizational disorders of responsibility allocation. This group of institutional pathological disorders engenders, amongst other kinds of miserable conditions, specifically morally relevant miserable conditions.ConclusionThe institutional pathology paradigm, oriented to concrete institutions and organizations, can help “clinical” organizational ethics to considerably expand, in theoretical ethics as well as in ethically guided practice e.g. for members of CECs and organizational ethics advisors, the capacities for observing, evaluating and, if necessary, amending disturbed relations of responsibility. (shrink)

The concept of quantity (Größe) plays a key role in Frege's theory of real numbers. Typically enough, he refers to this theory as ?theory of quantity? (?Größenlehre?) in the second volume of his opus magnum Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (Frege 1903). In this essay, I deal, in a critical way, with Frege's treatment of the concept of quantity and his approach to analysis from the beginning of his academic career until Frege 1903. I begin with a few introductory remarks. In Section (...) 2, I first analyze Frege's use of the term ?source of knowledge? (?Erkenntnisquelle?) with particular emphasis on the logical source of knowledge. The analysis includes a brief comparison between Frege and Kant's conceptions of logic and the logical source of knowledge. In a second step, I examine Frege's theory of quantity in Rechnungsmethoden, die sich auf eine Erweiterung des Größenbegriffes gründen (Frege 1874). Section 3 contains a couple of critical observations on Frege's comments on Hankel's theory of real numbers in Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Frege 1884). In Section 4, I consider Frege's discussion of the concept of quantity in Frege 1903. Section 5 is devoted to Cantor's theory of irrational numbers and the critique deployed by Frege. In Section 6, I return to Frege's own constructive treatment of analysis in Frege 1903 and succinctly describe what I take to be the quintessence of his account. (shrink)

In this essay, I critically discuss Dale Jacquette's new English translation of Frege's work Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik as well as his Introduction and Critical Commentary (Frege, G. 2007. The Foundations of Arithmetic. A Logical-Mathematical Investigation into the Concept of Number . Translated with an Introduction and Critical Commentary by Dale Jacquette. New York: Longman. xxxii + 112 pp.). I begin with a short assessment of Frege's book. In sections 2 and 3, I examine several claims that Jacquette makes in (...) his Introduction and Critical Commentary and put matters in the right perspective. In sections 4-7, I analyse errors and shortcomings in Jacquette's (and Austin's) translation(s) and show how they can be avoided. In this context, I consider several issues of interest for Frege's logic and philosophy of arithmetic. I conclude with general remarks. (shrink)

This paper argues that throughout his intellectual career, Hobbes remains unsatisfied with his own attempts at proving the invariant advisability of contract-keeping. Not only does he see himself forced to abandon his early idea that contractual obligation is a matter of physical laws. He also develops and retains doubts concerning its theoretical successor, the doctrine that the obligatoriness characteristic of contracts is the interest in self-preservation in alliance with instrumental reason - i.e. prudence. In fact, it is during his work (...) on Leviathan that Hobbes notes the doctrine's main shortcoming, namely the limitation of its dialectical potential to cases in which contract-breakers are publicly identifiable. This essay shows Hobbes's doubts about his Leviathan's treatment of contractual obligation by way of a close reading of its central 15 th chapter and an analysis of some revealing shifts between the English Leviathan and the Latin edition. The paper ends by suggesting that Hobbes's awareness of the flaws at the heart of his political philosophy helps account for some striking changes in his latest writings. (shrink)

A foundationalist account of the justification of our empirical beliefs is committed to the following two claims: (1) Sense experience is a source of justification. (2) Some empirical beliefs are basic: justified without receiving their justification from any other beliefs. In this paper, I will defend each of these claims against an objection. The objection to (1) that I will discuss is due to Donald Davidson. He writes: The relation between a sensation and a belief cannot be logical, since sensations (...) are not beliefs or other propositional attitudes. What then is the relation? The answer is, I think, obvious: the relation is causal. Sensations cause some beliefs and in this sense are the basis or ground of those beliefs. But a causal explanation of a belief does not show how or why the belief is justified. [1] There are two important thoughts in this passage. The first of these is explicitly expressed, the second implied: (3) Sense-experiential states are devoid of propositional content. (4) Necessarily, if a mental state can play the role of a justifier, it has propositional content. (3) and (4) entail that a sense-experiential state cannot play the role of a justifier. If that is true, then (1) is false. This, in any case, seems to me to be Davidson's argument. In response to it, I accept (4) but reject (3). This is an unusual move for foundationalists, who tend to accept (3) and deny (4). Nevertheless, it is what I take to be the right move. (shrink)

In “Agreeing to Disagree” [1], Robert Aumann proves that a group of agents who once agreed about the probability of some proposition for which their current probabilities are common knowledge must still agree, even if those probabilities reflect disparate observations. Perhaps one saw that a card was red and another saw that it was a heart, so that as far as that goes, their common prior probability of 1/52 for its being the Queen of hearts would change in the one (...) case to 1/26, and in the other to 1/13. But if those are indeed their current probabilities, it cannot be the case that both know them, and both know that both know them, etc., etc. (shrink)

This article investigates the concept and the construction of judicial discretion. The strengths and weaknesses of both Dworkin and Hart are analysed, and in view of these, it is argued that a full picture of judicial discretion is between the two extremes. Thus, a moderate theory of judicial discretion is maintained which is based on achievements by Robert Alexy (2002b). The article develops a balancing model of discretion and relates it to the theory of legal argumentation. The limits of discretion (...) and the relation between structural (strong) and epistemic (weak) discretion are addressed in detail, both with illustrations from the jurisdiction of the German Federal Constitutional Court. (shrink)

According to Kant our cognitive capacities result from synthetic functions _a priori, forming a complete and invariable system implemented into the human mind. From a Darwinian perspective such capacities are to be understood as genetic traits favored by selection, thus they are the variable components of contingent systems only. Kant intermingles two kinds of apriority: (1) Apriority as a result of inborn traits--judgments on this ground have only probability, not necessity; (2) Apriority as a result of the intentional construction of (...) closed systems--judgments on this ground have necessity, but they are not universal constituents of the human mind. (shrink)

The first part of the essay tries to show that Davidson's explanation of irrationality in terms of a fragmentation of the mind is not compatible with interpretationist premises of his own theory. Instead of adopting the conception of two semi-autonomous departments of the mind, I argue for an explanation of strong forms of irrationality based on two kinds of contentful mental states: functionally individuated representational states and states whose content depends on a rationalizing interpretation. Akrasia – as a form of (...) irrationality caused by mental states that are not propositionally transparent – seems to fit neatly into that picture. (shrink)

In this three-part essay, I investigate Frege’s platonist and anti-creationist position in Grundgesetze der Arithmetik and to some extent also in Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik. In Sect. 1.1, I analyze his arithmetical and logical platonism in Grundgesetze. I argue that the reference-fixing strategy for value-range names—and indirectly also for numerical singular terms—that Frege pursues in Grundgesetze I gives rise to a conflict with the supposed mind- and language-independent existence of numbers and logical objects in general. In Sect. 1.2 and 1.3, (...) I discuss the non-creativity of Frege’s definitions in Grundgesetze and the case of what I call weakly creative definitions. In Part II of this essay, I first deal with Stolz’s and Dedekind’s (intended) creation of numbers. In what follows, I focus on Grundgesetze II, §146, where Frege considers a potential creationist charge in relation to the stipulation that he makes in Grundgesetze I, §3 with the purpose of partially fixing the references of value-range names. I place equal emphasis on the related twin stipulations that he makes in Grundgesetze I, §10. In §10, Frege identifies the truth-values with their unit classes in order to fix the references of value-range names (almost) completely. He does so in a piecemeal fashion. Although in Grundgesetze II, §146 Frege refers also to Grundgesetze I, §9 and §10 in this connection, he does not explain why he thinks that the transsortal identifications in §10 and also the stipulation that he makes in §9 regarding the value-range notation may give rise to a creationist charge in addition to or in connection with the stipulation in §3, and if so, how he would have responded to it. The two main issues that I discuss in Part II are: (a) Has Frege created value-ranges in general in Grundgesetze I, §3? (b) Has he created the unit classes of the True and the False in §10? In Part III, I discuss, inter alia, the question of whether in developing the whole wealth of objects and functions that arithmetic deals with from the primitive functions of Grundgesetze by applying the formation rules Frege creates special value-ranges and special functions. This procedure is fundamentally different from the reference-fixing strategy regarding value-range names that Frege pursues in Grundgesetze I, §3, §10–12. It is just another aspect of his anti-creationism. In Grundgesetze II, §147, Frege makes a concession to an imagined creationist opponent which might suggest that he was fully convinced neither of the defensibility of his anti-creationist position regarding the syntactic development of the subject matter of arithmetic nor of his actual defence in §146 of the non-creativity of the introduction of value-ranges via logical abstraction in Grundgesetze I, §3 and the twin stipulations in §10. I argue that not only in Grundgesetze II, §146 but also in Grundgesetze II, §147 Frege falls short of defending his anti-creationist position. I further argue that on the face of it his creationist rival gains the upper hand in the envisioned debate in more than one respect. (shrink)

In the academic world, Joseph Margolis is best known as the proponent of a particular combination of radical historicism and robust relativism. In his publications, he argues that “humankind is the measure of all things” with regard to aesthetics, history, natural and social sciences, and philosophy. In doing so, he effortlessly interacts with authors from the continental, pragmatist, and analytic traditions. His book Three Paradoxes of Personhood is a collection of the three Venetian lecture...

Der vorliegende Band ist der zweite Teil einer Sammlung zentraler Arbeiten von Matthias Baltes. Den Hauptteil bilden neuere Aufsätze zur antiken Philosophie, insbesondere zu Platon und zum Platonismus sowie zu Epikur, von denen einige bisher unveröffentlicht sind. Ein kleinerer Teil umfasst frühere Arbeiten zur homerischen Dichtung. Beide Sammlungen bieten einen nahezu vollständigen Überblick über die Forschungsarbeiten von Matthias Baltes, vor allem zu dem Gebiet, dem er sich Zeit seines Lebens intensiv gewidmet hat: dem geistesgeschichtlichen Phänomen des Platonismus. Er (...) behandelt neben philologischen Einzelfragen auch übergreifende philosophische und theologische Aspekte dieser für die Antike wie für die Moderne wichtigen Gedankenwelt. (shrink)

Menschen bedürfen des Zeugnisses der Anderen, um sich zu vergewissern, was und wer sie sind oder was und wozu sie denken, reden und handeln - soweit eine gemeinhin unstrittige These. Doch gilt dies auch für die Zeug*innenschaft an Orten und in Momenten, in denen Menschen Opfer von extremem Unrecht, massiver Gewalt, Hass oder Diskriminierung werden? Lässt sich das Unsagbare eigentlich bezeugen? Matthias Käser plädiert mithilfe interdisziplinärer Zeug*innenschaftsdiskurse gegen das Unbeschreibliche und für das Ethos des Erzählens. Er zeigt auf, dass (...) Erfahrungen um der Betroffenen willen versuchsweise bezeugt werden müssen - so gebrochen oder lückenhaft sie auch sein mögen. (shrink)

Das Gerucht, Gott sei tot, scheint ubertrieben gewesen zu sein. An dessen Verbreitung haben die Naturwissenschaften einen wesentlichen Anteil gehabt. Gegenwartig fuhren dagegen gerade sie Gott wieder im Munde. Massgeblichen Anteil daran hat die Entdeckung des Phanomens der Feinabstimmung Wenn Naturkonstanten, die die Gestalt unseres Universums bestimmen, nur wenig andere Werte angenommen hatten, hatte es bewusstes Leben nie gegeben. Matthias Schleiff entwickelt daraus das teleologische Feinabstimmungsargument. In der Nachfolge traditioneller Gottesbeweise, aber mit den wissenschaftlichen Einsichten unserer Zeit, argumentiert er (...) dafur, dass sich die Annahme eines kosmischen Schopfers auf rationale Grunde stutzen kann. Er setzt sich dabei intensiv mit alternativen Erklarungshypothesen auseinander - etwa der Erklarung durch den Zufall, das Anthropische Prinzip oder die Theorie des Multiversums - und bringt so Naturwissenschaften, Philosophie und Theologie wieder in ein Gesprach uber den Anfang der Welt. (shrink)

Philosophie ist der Versuch, durch überzeugendes und durchsichtiges Argumentieren bestimmte Fragen zu lösen. Philosophische Grundthemen sind Fragen nach dem Verständnis der Welt im Ganzen und unserer Stellung in ihr. Diese Fragen können prinzipiell nur kontrovers beantwortet werden. Die Reihe Grundthemen Philosophie möchte der Diskussion solcher philosophischen Grundthemen einen Ort geben. Anstelle einer umfassenden einführenden Darstellung werden in den einzelnen Bänden in Auseinandersetzung mit ausgewählten historischen Positionen die jeweiligen Probleme analysiert und Lösungsmöglichkeiten diskutiert. Dabei setzt der Verfasser/die Verfasserin eigene Akzente und (...) bezieht Stellung, so dass sich nicht bloß ein Blick auf die Geschichte der Philosophie, sondern zugleich auch ein systematischer Beitrag zur Problemdiskussion ergibt. Zur Zeit sind weitere Bände zu den Themen Beziehungen, Kultur, Wissenschaft und Moralbegründung geplant. Die Bände der Reihe richten sich gleichermaßen an Studierende der Philosophie und anderer Fächer sowie an professionelle Philosophen. Außerdem wendet sich die Reihe an alle, die an Grundthemen der Philosophie interessiert sind. (shrink)

Although Ross & Spurrett (R&S) successfully fend off the threat of Kim's “supervenience argument” by showing that it conflates different notions of causation, their proposal for a dynamic systems answer to the mind-body problem is itself yet another supervenience claim in need of an explanation that justifies it. The same goes for their notion of “multiple supervenience.”.