Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2013.804645.

We investigated motor resonance in children using a priming paradigm. Participants were asked to judge the weight of an object shortly primed by a hand in an action-related posture or a non action-related one . The hand prime could belong to a child or to an adult. We found faster response times when the object was preceded by a grasp hand posture . More crucially, participants were faster when the prime was a child’s hand, suggesting that it could belong to (...) their body schema, particularly when the child’s hand was followed by a light object . A control experiment helped us to clarify the role of the hand prime. To our knowledge this is the first behavioral evidence of motor simulation and motor resonance in children. Implications of the results for the development of the sense of body ownership and for conceptual development are discussed. (shrink)

Fin dalle origini la filosofia occidentale ha cercato di liberare il pensiero dall'enorme scandalo rappresentato dal nulla assoluto, proibendo persino di nominarlo (Parmenide), oppure volgendo lo sguardo da un'altra parte (ad esempio Platone e Heidegger, verso la differenza rispettivamente ontica e ontologica), o mostrandone la auto-negazione (Severino). Questo libro propone un modo nuovo di avvicinarsi al "non-essere" e alla sua aporia: un modo che, invece di eliminarlo dal pensiero, afferma la libertà del nulla da ogni forma di negazione. Si tratta, (...) certo, di raddoppiare lo scandalo, tanto da mettere in questione anche il linguaggio stesso, dove già solo la parola nulla si costituisce "via negationis (nec-ulla)". Ma il presente saggio indica un ripensamento radicale del legame tra il nulla e la negazione proprio per tentare di risolvere l'aporia, articolandola attraverso una struttura diversa da quella tradizionale, sebbene la forma dell'argomentazione resti fondata sulla logica della non contraddizione -/- [dalla prefazione di Emanuele Severino] «Nei miei scritti l’assolutamente innegabile è chiamato “struttura originaria” […] Appartengono alla struttura originaria anche le aporie che sorgono al suo interno […] Anche queste aporie non possono che essere apparenti, ma, anche qui, la loro presenza e la loro risoluzione accresce la concretezza - non l’innegabilità! - dell’assolutamente innegabile. Il libro di Marco Simionato, che sono lieto di presentare, appartiene a questa forma di discorso aporetico, che viene da lui sviluppato con lucidità e grande perizia, capace com’è di muoversi in mezzo a tematiche di complessità e difficoltà quanto mai rilevanti». (shrink)

A historical and philosophical reassessment of the impact of Aristotle and early-modern Aristotelianism on the development of Kant’s transcendental philosophy. Kant and Aristotle reassesses the prevailing understanding of Kant as an anti-Aristotelian philosopher. Taking epistemology, logic, and methodology to be the key disciplines through which Kant’s transcendental philosophy stood as an independent form of philosophy, Marco Sgarbi shows that Kant drew important elements of his logic and metaphysical doctrines from Aristotelian ideas that were absent in other philosophical traditions, such (...) as the distinction of matter and form of knowledge, the division of transcendental logic into analytic and dialectic, the theory of categories and schema, and the methodological issues of the architectonic. Drawing from unpublished documents including lectures, catalogues, academic programs, and the Aristotelian-Scholastic handbooks that were officially adopted at Königsberg University where Kant taught, Sgarbi further demonstrates the historical and philosophical importance of Aristotle and Aristotelianism to these disciplines from the late sixteenth century to the first half of the eighteenth century. (shrink)

Terms of service of on-line platforms too often contain clauses that are potentially unfair to the consumer. We present an experimental study where machine learning is employed to automatically detect such potentially unfair clauses. Results show that the proposed system could provide a valuable tool for lawyers and consumers alike.

According to a widely shared interpretation, research employing spontaneous-response false belief tasks demonstrates that infants as young as 15 months attribute (false) beliefs. In contrast with this conclusion, I advance an alternative reading of the empirical data. I argue that infants constantly form and update their expectations about others’ behaviour and that this ability extends in the course of development to reflect an appreciation of what others can and cannot see. These basic capacities account for infants’ performance in spontaneous-response false (...) belief tasks without the need to assume the existence of a cognitive module specific for mental state attribution. My proposal suggests a plausible explanatory strategy for the problem of the representational format of the information processed in spontaneous-response false belief tasks. (shrink)

O presente artigo propõe uma interpretação deflacionista para a doutrina da essência absolutamente considerada , apresentada por Tomás de Aquino no opúsculo "De ente et essentia". O norte do trabalho é a análise das expressões reduplicativas que são constantemente utilizadas pelo Doutor Angélico para designar as EAC's. Portanto, pretendo mostrar que a EAC é a consideração dos predicados essenciais, que se predicam das expressões reduplicadas, diferentemente da noção acidental de existência. Por isso, a EAC não existe nem no intelecto nem (...) na realidade, o que, dito em outras palavras, significa apenas que "existir no intelecto" e "existir na realidade" são predicados acidentais em relação às essências apreendidas abstrativamente pela mente. This paper proposes a deflationist interpretation of the doctrine of the Nature as such, which Thomas Aquinas exposes in his work "De ente et essentia". The aim of this paper is to provide an analysis of reduplicative expressions used by Aquinas to refer nature as such. Hence, I will show that the nature as such is the consideration of the essential properties predicated by the reduplicative expressions, diverse from the accidental notion of 'existence'. Consequently, nature as such does not exist in the intellect and do not exist in reality, for in other words 'existing in the intellect' and 'existing in the reality' are accidental predicates when attributed to essences grasped by the mind. (shrink)

According to a widely shared view, experience plays only a limited role in children's acquisition of the capacity to pass the false belief test: at most, it facilitates or attunes the development of mindreading abilities from infancy to early childhood. Against the facilitation—and also the maturation—hypothesis, I report empirical data attesting that children and even adults never come to understand false beliefs when deprived of proper social and linguistic interaction. In contrast to the attunement hypothesis, I argue that alleged mindreading (...) abilities in infancy differ significantly from those required to pass the false belief test at age four. I conclude that children's success in the false belief test reflects the acquisition of a novel psychological competence, and argue that social experience in the form of conversation about mental states teaches children to exploit belief reports to predict intelligent behaviour, and induces their acquisition of a capacity to recognize and track others' beliefs across contexts. (shrink)

If the definition of a scientific discipline depends on the definition of its object of investigation, the unity of psychology should depend on the unitarian description of the mind. However, the mind is anything but a unitarian concept. Its common sense definition is subject to temporal and geographical variation because the mental is also a cultural construct; and the variety of psychological disciplines nowadays existing proposes several definitions of the mental. The epistemology of psychology investigates the definition of the mental (...) by assuming the pluralism of the psychological disciplines as a fact, rather than as a problem, and it invites psychologists to reason about the epistemological bases of their empirical research. (shrink)

O artigo examina como Heidegger pensa, a partir da natureza, o “produzir” técnico e artístico, tendo como referência certas noções centrais da história do pensamento, desde o registro inaugural dos termos gregos techné, poiesis e physis, e seus desdobramentos por meio da tradução latina, até seu reordenamento na metafísica da época moderna.

In the framework of contemporary cosmology, the age-old aspiration to inquire the outer limits of the universe translates into our effort to observe the initial stages of cosmic history. Thanks to a fortunate combination of astronomical circumstances, and pushing mm-wave technology to its limits, today we are able to image the early universe in great detail, back at a time when cosmic age was only 0.0027% of its present value. The state of the art in the field has been set (...) by the ESA Planck mission, launched in 2009, dedicated to precision measurements of the cosmic microwave background. Planck observed the full sky for 4 years in a wide frequency range, reaching μK sensitivity both in temperature and polarization. The latest results, published by the Planck Collaboration in 2018, are in exquisite agreement with the simplest 6-parameter ΛCDM model and constrain the main cosmological parameters with percent-level accuracy. Furthermore, the Planck data yield insight on the very early universe, opening the way to a new generation of experiments searching for the possible signatures of primordial gravitational waves in the CMB polarization pattern. (shrink)

This paper replies to objections that have been raised against my operational-Kantian account of thought experiments by Fehige 2012 and 2013. Fehige also sketches an alternative Neo-Kantian account that utilizes Michael Friedman’s concept of a contingent and changeable a priori. To this I shall reply, first, that Fehige’s objections not only neglect some fundamental points I had made as regards the realizability of TEs, but also underestimate the principle of empiricism, which was rightly defended by Kant. Secondly, in opposition to (...) what he states, my account does not differ in a very essential way from the empiricist solutions either as regards the power of TEs to predict something new about empirical reality, or as regards the criteria for telling apart good from bad TEs. Thirdly, in the light of the Kantian definition of the a priori, Friedman’s corresponding notion is contrary both to the spirit and to the letter of Kant’s philosophy; moreover, from a theoretical point of view, a material a priori is theoretically untenable since, counter to Friedman’s own intentions, it leads to relativism. -/- . (shrink)

Embodiment and embeddedness define an attractive framework to the study of cognition. I discuss whether theory of mind, i.e. the ability to attribute mental states to others to predict and explain their behaviour, fits these two principles. In agreement with available evidence, embodied cognitive processes may underlie the earliest manifestations of social cognitive abilities such as infants’ selective behaviour in spontaneous-response false belief tasks. Instead, late theory-of-mind abilities, such as the capacity to pass the (elicited-response) false belief test at age (...) four, depend on children’s ability to explain people’s reasons to act in conversation with adults. Accordingly, rather than embodied, late theory-of-mind abilities are embedded in an external linguistic practice. (shrink)

Why, for such a long time, has there been no Kantian point of view among the most influential theories about thought experiments? The primary historical reason – the main trends in the philosophy of science have always rejected the existence of a priori knowledge – fits a theoretical reason. Kant oscillated between two very different views about the a priori: on the one hand, he attributed to it a particular content, whereas on the other hand he insisted on its purely (...) formal character. The first interpretation of the a priori was one-sidedly developed by Ørsted and led to his untenable notion of thought experiment. The other interpretation, however, can be further developed into new Kantian theories of thought experiments in the natural sciences and in philosophy. (shrink)

The operational perspective here defended permits a reflexive-transcendental point of view that sharply distinguishes the two concepts, while, at the same time, maintaining the connection between them. On the one hand, simply imagining that the experimental apparatus, counterfactually anticipated in a thought experiment, has really been constructed is sufficient to erase any difference between thought and real experiments. On the other hand, this very ‘imagining’, this capacity of the mind to assume every real entity as a possible entity, underpins the (...) difference in principle – a properly transcendental difference – between thought and real experiments. This difference, however, implies the intimate association between experiment and thought experiment: All thought experiments must be thought of as translatable into real ones, and all real experiments as realisations of thought ones. What thought experiments have over and above real experiments is the mere fact that they exist in a purely hypothetical sphere; what real have over and above thought experiments is the mere fact that they overstep the sphere of the possible, in the experiment’s real execution. (shrink)

This unique collection of essays will be invaluable to students and scholars as well as to architects and art historians for the range of issues it covers and the depth of analysis it provides.

Greek ancient and early modern geometry necessarily uses diagrams. Among other things, these enter geometrical analysis. The paper distinguishes two sorts of geometrical analysis and shows that in one of them, dubbed “intra-confgurational” analysis, some diagrams necessarily enter as outcomes of a purely material gesture, namely not as result of a codifed constructive procedure, but as result of a free-hand drawing.

This article addresses Maurice Mandelbaum's criticism of anti-essentialism in Wittgensteinian-oriented art. Mandelbaum criticizes the common position of Paul Ziff, Morris Weitz and Willian Kennick according to which the definition of the concept of art cannot be established in essentialist terms. According to Mandelbaum, the anti-essentialist thesis fails because it is based on observable properties to claim that there is no necessary and sufficient property that runs through the set of all works of art. In this sense, the definition of the (...) concept of art could be established through relational properties. Mandelbaum's attack focuses on the notion of family resemblance developed by Ludwig Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations. In his interpretation of that notion, Mandelbaum assumes that Wittgenstein would be referring to directly displayed properties. However, the article argues that Mandelbaum's critique is not justified as it ignores the distinction between seeing and seeing as that Wittgenstein himself performs in passage XI of his mentioned work. (shrink)

The paper discusses Baatz’s work (2018) published in a recent issue of this journal. It first considers the proposed framework of justice within which to evaluate instruments for adaptation finance; it then develops the framework’s criteria of fairness and feasibility further; finally, it proposes an option for increasing the capacity of Baatz’s framework to ensure that instruments for adaptation finance operate in a just way.