Hugely controversial on publication, this is an insightful and characteristically entertaining survey of animal behaviour and the evolution of aggression throughout the animal world.

Three parts of philosophical papers concerned with works, matters and traditions, respectively, present ways of dealing methodically with problems that arise while having and articulating experience. The contents range from philosophy in Antiquity as well as Buddhist to existentialism and analytic philosophy, from relating science and art to the antagonism between freedom and justice. By reflecting on the particular steps of argument the papers become samples of dialogical philosophy with respect both to subject matter and means of procedure.

What are the relationships between philosophy and the history of philosophy, the history of science and the philosophy of science? This selection of essays by Lorenz Krüger (1932-1994) presents exemplary studies on the philosophy of John Locke and Immanuel Kant, on the history of physics and on the scope and limitations of scientific explanation, and a realistic understanding of science and truth. In his treatment of leading currents in 20th century philosophy, Krüger presents new and original arguments for a (...) deeper understanding of the continuity and dynamics of the development of scientific theory. These result in significant consequences for the claim of the sciences that they understand reality in a rational manner. The case studies are complemented by fundamental thoughts on the relationship between philosophy, science, and their common history. (shrink)

"Presents, and in part develops, a systematic philosophy as the universal science, or the theorization of the unrestricted universe of discourse, explicitly including being as such and as a whole. Argues that complete exploration of the theoretical domain requires such a science"--Provided by publisher.

The Heythrop Journal, Volume 63, Issue 3, Page 425-437, May 2022.

This paper studies the Lockean thesis from the perspective of contemporary epistemic logic. The Lockean thesis states that belief can be defined as ‘sufficiently high degree of belief’. Its main problem is that it gives rise to a notion of belief which is not closed under conjunction. This problem is typical for classical epistemic logic: it is single-agent and static. I argue that from the perspective of contemporary epistemic logic, the Lockean thesis fares much better. I briefly mention that it (...) can successfully be extended from single-agent to multi-agent settings. More importantly, I show that accepting the Lockean thesis (and a more sophisticated version for conditional beliefs) leads to a significant and unexpected unification in the dynamic behavior of (conditional) belief and high (conditional) probability with respect to public announcements. This constitutes a methodological argument in favor of the Lockean thesis. Furthermore, if one accepts Baltag’s Erlangen program for epistemology, this technical observation has even stronger philosophical implications: because belief and high probability display the same dynamic behavior, it is plausible that they are indeed one and the same epistemic notion. (shrink)

Aristotle takes practical wisdom and arts or crafts to be forms of knowledge which, we argue, can usefully be thought of as ‘empiricist’. This empiricism has two key features: knowledge does not rest on grasping unobservable natures or essences; and knowledge does not rest on grasping logical relations that hold among propositions. Instead, knowledge rests on observation, memory, experience and everyday uses of reason. While Aristotle’s conception of theoretical knowledge does require grasping unobservable essences and logical relations that hold among (...) suitable propositions, his conception of practical and productive knowledge avoids such requirements and is consistent with empiricism. (shrink)

Hendrik Lorenz presents a comprehensive study of Plato's and Aristotle's conceptions of non-rational desire. They see this as something that humans share with animals, and which aims primarily at the pleasures of food, drink, and sex. Lorenz explores the cognitive resources that both philosophers make available for the explanation of such desires, and what they take rationality to add to the motivational structure of human beings. In doing so, he finds conceptions of the mind that are coherent and (...) deeply integrated with both philosophers' views about such topics as the relation between body and soul, or the nature of the virtues. (shrink)

"Dialogisches Handeln" ist eine Sammlung von philosophischen BeitrAgen zum dialogischen Konstruktivismus im Sinne von Kuno Lorenz, der Philosophie als eine Kommunikation mit Selbstreflexion versteht. Dabei umfaAt der Dialog in diesem Buch verschiedene Disziplinen der Philosophie - von der Anthropologie A1/4ber die Grundlagen von Logik und Sprachphilosophie bis hin zur Wissenschafts- und Erkenntnistheorie. Die Reflexion auf die kommunikativen Grundlagen wissenschaftlichen Austauschs schlieAt dabei Denkperspektiven verschiedener Wissenschaften - von der Psychologie bis zu Physik und Chemie - ebenso ein wie die philosophischen (...) Disziplinen. (shrink)

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Grundlagen einer Theorie der Wahrheit" verfügbar.

Although universities have undergone changes since the dawn of their existence, the speed of change started to accelerate remarkably in the 1960s. Spectacular growth in the number of students and faculty was immediately followed by administrative reforms aimed at managing this growth and managing the demands of students for democratic reform and societal relevance. Since the 1980s, however, an entirely different wind has been blowing along the academic corridors. The fiscal crisis of the welfare states and the neoliberal course of (...) the Reagan and Thatcher governments made the battle against budget deficits and against government spending into a political priority. Education, together with social security and health care, were targeted directly. As the eighties went on, the neoliberal agenda became more radical—smaller state and bigger market—attacking the public sector itself through efforts to systematically reduce public expenditure by privatizing public services and introducing market incentives. At the same time the societal relevance of the universities demanded by critical students was turned on its head to become economic relevance to business and industry in the knowledge society. (shrink)

This paper studies John Buridan's octagons of opposition for the de re modal propositions and the propositions of unusual construction. Both Buridan himself and the secondary literature have emphasized the strong similarities between these two octagons (as well as a third one, for propositions with oblique terms). In this paper, I argue that the interconnection between both octagons is more subtle than has previously been thought: if we move beyond the Aristotelian relations, and also take Boolean considerations into account, then (...) the strong analogy between Buridan's octagons starts to break down. These differences in Boolean structure can already be discerned within the octagons themselves; on a more abstract level, they lead to these two octagons having different degrees of Boolean complexity (i.e. Boolean closures of different sizes). These results are obtained by means of bitstring analysis, which is one of the key tools from contemporary logical geometry. Finally, I argue that this historical investigation is directly relevant for the theoretical framework of logical geometry, and discuss how it helps us to address certain open questions in this framework. (shrink)

I PSYCHOLOGY 5 The Probabilistic Revolution in Psychology--an Overview Gerd Gigerenzer 7 1 Probabilistic Thinking and the Fight against Subjectivity Gerd Gigerenzer 11 2 Statistical Method and the Historical Development of Research Practice in American Psychology Kurt Danziger 35 3 Survival of the Fittest Probabilist: Brunswik, Thurstone, and the Two Disciplines of Psychology Gerd Gigerenzer 49 4 A Perspective for Viewing the Integration of Probability Theory in Psychology David J. Murray 73 II SOCIOLOGY 101 5 The Two Empirical Roots of (...) Social Theory and the Probability Revolution Anthony Oberschall 103 III ECONOMICS 133 The Probabilistic Revolution in Economics--an Overview Mary S. Morgan 135 6 Why Was There No Probabilistic Revolution in Economic Thought? Claude Mènard 139 7 The Rise of Macroeconomic Calculations in Economic Statistics Robert A. Horváth 147 8 Statistics without Probability and Haavelmo’s Revolution in Econometrics Mary S. Morgan 171 IV PHYSIOLOGY 199 9 Experimental Physiology and Statistical Inference: The Therapeutic Trial in Nineteenth-Century Germany William Coleman 201 V EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY 227 The Probabilistic Revolution in Evolutionary Biology--an Overview John H. Beatty 229 10 Natural Selection as a Causal, Empirical, and Probabilistic Theory M. J. S. Hodge 233 11 Dobzhansky and Drift: Facts, Values, and Chance in Evolutionary Biology John H. Beatty 271 12 Random Genetic Drift, R. A. Fisher, and the Oxford School of Ecological Genetics John R. G. Turner 313 13 On the Prior Probability of the Existence of Life Bernd-Olaf Küppers 355 VI PHYSICS 371 The Probabilistic Revolution in Physics--an Overview Lorenz Krüger 373 14 Probabilistic Physics the Classical Way Jan von Plato 379 15 Max Born and the Reality of Quantum Probabilities Nancy Cartwright 409 16 Philosophical Problems of Quantum Theory: The Response of American Physicists Nancy Cartwright. (shrink)

For a set M, let \\) denote the set of all finite sequences which can be formed with elements of M, and let \ denote the set of all 2-element subsets of M. Furthermore, for a set A, let Open image in new window denote the cardinality of A. It will be shown that the following statement is consistent with Zermelo–Fraenkel Set Theory \: There exists a set M such that Open image in new window and no function Open image (...) in new window is finite-to-one. (shrink)

Several authors have recently studied Aristotelian diagrams for various metatheoretical notions from logic, such as tautology, satisfiability, and the Aristotelian relations themselves. However, all these metalogical Aristotelian diagrams focus on the semantic (model-theoretical) perspective on logical consequence, thus ignoring the complementary, and equally important, syntactic (proof-theoretical) perspective. In this paper, I propose an explanation for this discrepancy, by arguing that the metalogical square of opposition for semantic consequence exhibits a natural analogy to the well-known square of opposition for the categorical (...) statements from syllogistics, but that this analogy breaks down once we move from semantic to syntactic consequence. I then show that despite this difficulty, one can indeed construct metalogical Aristotelian diagrams from a syntactic perspective, which have their own, equally elegant characterization in terms of the categorical statements. Finally, I construct several metalogical Aristotelian diagrams that incorporate both semantic and syntactic consequence (and their interaction), and study how they are influenced by the underlying logical system’s soundness and/or completeness. All of this provides further support for the methodological/heuristic perspective on Aristotelian diagrams, which holds that the main use of these diagrams lies in facilitating analogies and comparisons between prima facie unrelated domains of investigation. (shrink)

In this paper, we consider certain cardinals in ZF (set theory without AC, the axiom of choice). In ZFC (set theory with AC), given any cardinals C and D, either C ≤ D or D ≤ C. However, in ZF this is no longer so. For a given infinite set A consider $\operatorname{seq}^{1 - 1}(A)$ , the set of all sequences of A without repetition. We compare $|\operatorname{seq}^{1 - 1}(A)|$ , the cardinality of this set, to |P(A)|, the cardinality of (...) the power set of A. What is provable about these two cardinals in ZF? The main result of this paper is that $ZF \vdash \forall A(|\operatorname{seq}^{1 - 1}(A)| \neq|\mathscr{P}(\mathscr{A})|)$ , and we show that this is the best possible result. Furthermore, it is provable in ZF that if B is an infinite set, then $|\operatorname{fin}(B)| <|\mathscr{P}(B)|$ even though the existence for some infinite set B* of a function f from $\operatorname{fin}(B^\ast)$ onto P(B*) is consistent with ZF. (shrink)

Duality in Logic and Language [draft--do not cite this article] Duality phenomena occur in nearly all mathematically formalized disciplines, such as algebra, geometry, logic and natural language semantics. However, many of these disciplines use the term ‘duality’ in vastly different senses, and while some of these senses are intimately connected to each other, others seem to be entirely … Continue reading Duality in Logic and Language →.

This paper explores the interplay between logic-sensitivity and bitstring semantics in the square of opposition. Bitstring semantics is a combinatorial technique for representing the formulas that appear in a logical diagram, while logic-sensitivity entails that such a diagram may depend, not only on the formulas involved, but also on the logic with respect to which they are interpreted. These two topics have already been studied extensively in logical geometry, and are thus well-understood by themselves. However, the precise details of their (...) interplay turn out to be far more complicated. In particular, the paper describes an elegant and natural interaction between bitstrings and logic-sensitivity, which makes perfect sense when bitstrings are viewed as purely combinatorial entities. However, when we view bitstrings as semantically meaningful entities (which is actually the standard perspective, cf. the term ‘bitstring semantics’!), this interaction does not seem to have a full and equally natural counterpart. The paper describes some attempts to address this situation, but all of them are ultimately found wanting. For now, it thus remains an open problem to capture this interaction between bitstrings and logic-sensitivity from a semantic (rather than merely a combinatorial) perspective. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: I II III IV V.

For \(n\in \omega \), the weak choice principle \(\textrm{RC}_n\) is defined as follows: _For every infinite set_ _X_ _there is an infinite subset_ \(Y\subseteq X\) _with a choice function on_ \([Y]^n:=\{z\subseteq Y:|z|=n\}\). The choice principle \(\textrm{C}_n^-\) states the following: _For every infinite family of_ _n_-_element sets, there is an infinite subfamily_ \({\mathcal {G}}\subseteq {\mathcal {F}}\) _with a choice function._ The choice principles \(\textrm{LOC}_n^-\) and \(\textrm{WOC}_n^-\) are the same as \(\textrm{C}_n^-\), but we assume that the family \({\mathcal {F}}\) is linearly orderable (...) (for \(\textrm{LOC}_n^-\) ) or well-orderable (for \(\textrm{WOC}_n^-\) ). In the first part of this paper, for \(m,n\in \omega \) we will give a full characterization of when the implication \(\textrm{RC}_m\Rightarrow \textrm{WOC}_n^-\) holds in \({\textsf {ZF}}\). We will prove the independence results by using suitable Fraenkel-Mostowski permutation models. In the second part, we will show some generalizations. In particular, we will show that \(\textrm{RC}_5\Rightarrow \textrm{LOC}_5^-\) and that \(\textrm{RC}_6\Rightarrow \textrm{C}_3^-\), answering two open questions from Halbeisen and Tachtsis (Arch Math Logik 59(5):583–606, 2020). Furthermore, we will show that \(\textrm{RC}_6\Rightarrow \textrm{C}_9^-\) and that \(\textrm{RC}_7\Rightarrow \textrm{LOC}_7^-\). (shrink)

Preface to Volumes 1 and 2 Lorenz Krüger xv Introduction to Volume 1 Lorraine J. Daston 1 I Revolution 1 What Are Scientific Revolutions? Thomas S. Kuhn 7 2 Scientific Revolutions, Revolutions in Science, and a Probabilistic Revolution 1800-1930 I. Bernard Cohen 23 3 Was There a Probabilistic Revolution 1800-1930? Ian Hacking 45 II Concepts 4 The Slow Rise of Probabilism: Philosophical Arguments in the Nineteenth Century Lorenz Krüger 59 5 The Decline of the Laplacian Theory of Probability: (...) A Study of Stumpf, von Kries, and Meinong Andreas Kamlah 91 6 Fechner’s Indeterminism: From Freedom to Laws of Chance Michael Heidelberger 117 7 The Saint Petersburg Paradox 1713-1937 Gerard Jorland 157 8 Laplace and Thereafter: The Status of Probability Calculus in the Nineteenth Century Ivo Schneider 191 9 Emile Borel as a Probabilist Eberhard Knobloch 215 III Uncertainty 10 The Domestication of Risk: Mathematical Probability and Insurance 1650-1830 237 11 The Objectification of Observation: Measurement and Statistical Methods in the Nineteenth Century Zeno G. Swijtink 261 12 The Measurement of Uncertainty in Nineteenth-Century Social Science Stephen M. Stigler 287 IV Society 13 Rational Individuals versus Laws of Society: From Probability to Statistics Lorraine J. Daston 295 14 Decrire, Compter, Calculer: The Debate over Statistics during the Napoleonic Period Marie-Noelle Bourguet 305 15 Probability in Vital and Social Statistics: Quetelet, Farr, and the Bertillons Bernard-Pierre Lécuyer 317 16 Paupers and Numbers: The Statistical Argument for Social Reform in Britain during the Period of Industrialization Karl H. Metz 337 17 Lawless Society: Social Science and the Reinterpretation of Statistics in Germany, 1850-1880 Theodore M. Porter 351 18 Prussian Numbers 1860-1882 Ian Hacking 377 19 How Do Sums Count? On the Cultural Origins of Statistical Causality M. Norton Wise 395. (shrink)

For an integer \, Ramsey Choice\ is the weak choice principle “every infinite setxhas an infinite subset y such that\ has a choice function”, and \ is the weak choice principle “every infinite family of n-element sets has an infinite subfamily with a choice function”. In 1995, Montenegro showed that for \, \. However, the question of whether or not \ for \ is still open. In general, for distinct \, not even the status of “\” or “\” is known. (...) In this paper, we provide partial answers to the above open problems and among other results, we establish the following:1.For every integer \, if \ is true for all integers i with \, then \ is true for all integers i with \.2.If \ are any integers such that for some prime p we have \ and \, then in \: \ and \.3.For \, \\\ implies \, and \ implies neither \ nor \ in \.4.For every integer \, \ implies “every infinite linearly orderable family of k-element sets has a partial Kinna–Wagner selection function” and the latter implication is not reversible in \ ). In particular, \ strictly implies “every infinite linearly orderable family of 3-element sets has a partial choice function”.5.The Chain-AntiChain Principle implies neither \ nor \ in \, for every integer \. (shrink)

Mit dem vorliegenden Werk schliesst Lorenz B. Puntel seine Seinstrilogie ab; die beiden vorherigen Bande sind unter dem Titel Struktur und Sein (2006) und Sein und Gott (2010) erschienen. Der neue Band fuhrt das in den anderen Banden nur inchoativ formulierte gesamtsystematische philosophische Programm aus. Lorenz B. Puntel betrachtet das Thema Sein und Nichts als das ursprungliche Thema der Philosophie und stellt daruber eine umfassende Theorie auf. Diese Theorie nennt er Seinstheorie; sie besteht aus den beiden Subtheorien: Ontologie (...) als Theorie (des Seins) der Seienden und Einailogie als Theorie des Seins selbst oder als solchen. Ausgangspunkt ist die von Heidegger eingefuhrte ontologische Differenz, die Unterscheidung von Sein und Seienden. In eingehenden, auf den einschlagigen Originaltexten der wichtigsten Philosophen basierenden Ausfuhrungen wird der Nachweis gefuhrt, dass der in der Philosophiegeschichte feststellbare Grundmangel in der haufigen totalen und in sehr wenigen Fallen partiellen Ignorierung der grossen Seinsfrage besteht; nirgends wird diese in adaquater Weise thematisiert. In Teil II arbeitet der Autor die Grundzuge sowohl der allgemeinen Ontologie als auch der Einailogie heraus. Zwei grundlegende Thesen werden bewiesen: die Moglichkeit des relativen Nichts, d. h. des Verschwindens aller Seienden auf der Basis ihrer Kontingenz, und die Unmoglichkeit des absoluten Nichts, d. h. des Verschwindens des Seins selbst auf der Basis seines notwendigen Status. Gezeigt wird schliesslich, dass dem Sein selbst eine geistige Verfasstheit innewohnt, die aus Intelligenz/Denken, Wille und Freiheit besteht, womit die Moglichkeit eroffnet wird, dass das notwendige geistig verfasste und damit freie Sein sich weiter offenbaren kann. Dem nachzugehen, setzt aber eine grundlegende methodische und thematische Zasur voraus. (shrink)

This paper intends to explore the prospects of a realistic view of scientific explanation, according to which the objects and structures occurring in the explanation must have real referents. Theories involving probability either lose their explanatory function or become counter-examples to this view, if real referents of probabilistic notions do not exist. It is argued that such referents can be found for statistical mechanics and quantum mechanics: the overall structure of mass phenomena that renders them capable of irreversible developments and (...) equilibrium states, and the inherent propensities of elementary systems. The present lack of a theoretical connection between these two referents impedes the recognition of the reality of probability in nature. (shrink)

The paper attempts to clarify some fundamental aspects of an explanationof the concept of truth which is neither “deflationary” nor “substantive”.The main aspect examined in detail concerns the ontological dimension of truth, the mind/language-world connection traditionally associated with the concept of truth. It is claimed that it does not make sense to defend or reject a relatedness of truth to the ontological dimension so long as the kind of presupposed or envisaged ontology is not made explicit and critically examined. In (...) particular, it is shown that generally an “objectual” ontology is – often only implicitly – presupposed, i.e., an ontology admitting “objects” (substances), properties, relations, sometimes also facts, events, and the like. The paper demonstrates that such an ontology derives from the Principle of Semantic Sentential Compositionality and that this principle should be rejected. It introduces instead the Principle of Semantic Sentential Contextuality (or Context Principle) as the semantic basis of a new ontology, an ontology of “primary states of affairs”. After sketching such an ontology, it is shown that the relatedness of truth to the ontological dimension becomes intelligible. (shrink)

In logic, Aristotelian diagrams are almost always assumed to be closed under negation, and are thus highly symmetric in nature. In linguistics, by contrast, these diagrams are used to study lexicalization, which is notoriously not closed under negation, thus yielding more asymmetric diagrams. This paper studies the interplay between logical symmetry and linguistic asymmetry in Aristotelian diagrams. I discuss two major symmetric Aristotelian diagrams, viz. the square and the hexagon of opposition, and show how linguistic considerations yield various asymmetric versions (...) of these diagrams. I then discuss a pentagon of opposition, which occupies an uneasy position between the square and the hexagon. Although this pentagon belongs neither to the symmetric realm of logic nor to the asymmetric realm of linguistics, it occurs several times in the literature. The oldest known occurrence can be found in the cosmological work of the 14th-century author Nicole Oresme. (shrink)

The Brute Within proceeds in three parts, the first two (amounting to half the book) on Plato and the third on Aristotle. Each part, as well as the book itself, has an Introduction in which Lorenz helpfully signals what he is up to; the author frequently (though sometimes repetitively) summarizes his argument as he goes along. There is no mistaking his central claims: that in both Plato and Aristotle there are three types of desires--reason, spirit and appetite--such that the (...) last two may motivate conduct without any participation in reason at all. In human beings, reason may itself motivate conduct and also may share information with appetite and spirit to modify behavior. (shrink)

In the recent debate on future contingents and the nature of the future, authors such as G. A. Boyd, W. L. Craig, and E. Hess have made use of various logical notions, such as the Aristotelian relations of contradiction and contrariety, and the ‘open future square of opposition.’ My aim in this paper is not to enter into this philosophical debate itself, but rather to highlight, at a more abstract methodological level, the important role that Aristotelian diagrams can play in (...) organizing and clarifying the debate. After providing a brief survey of the specific ways in which Boyd and Hess make use of Aristotelian relations and diagrams in the debate on the nature of the future, I argue that the position of open theism is best represented by means of a hexagon of opposition. Next, I show that on the classical theist account, this hexagon of opposition ‘collapses’ into a single pair of contradictory statements. This collapse from a hexagon into a pair has several aspects, which can all be seen as different manifestations of a single underlying change. (shrink)