This is an entry into a collective journal of the twenty-first century years of plague. It introduces the notion of ‘lawfare’ by way of the contemporary case concerning Lula da Silva and Brazil’s fall from grace. The latter is presented as an instance of violence in the international context, the managerial attitude to global disasters and, indeed, a plague. It chronicles the social struggles around the case and on that basis builds a somewhat playful manifesto for a new relationship between (...) legal scholarship, the law school and the imaginary of permanent catastrophe and plague. (shrink)

Los ciudadanos necesitan seguridad y certeza en sus relaciones sociales, y los poderes del Estado deben proporcionárselas. Sin embargo, hoy en día no es así. El principio de separación de poderes amenaza con quiebra. El poder del Estado se debilita y los ciudadanos ya no confían ni en la independencia, ni en la transparencia de sus actuaciones. En esta situación, el poder judicial se muestra como el último reducto de confianza para los ciudadanos. Sin embargo, su actuación también plantea problemas. (...) Los ciudadanos se preguntan. ¿Existe o no una única respuesta judicial para cada caso concreto? El presente trabajo se ocupa de abordar este asunto defendiendo la discrecionalidad judicial y condenando, por el contrario, la arbitrariedad que supondría la utilización del lawfare. (shrink)

War is bad for the environment, yet the environmental ramifications of warfare have not been widely addressed by just war theorists and revisionist philosophers of war. The law and legal scholars have paid more attention to protecting nature during armed conflict. But because the law focuses invariably on rules mitigating the conduct of hostilities rather than on objective justice of cause, environmental jus ad bellum has been explored even less extensively than environmental ethics in war. Setting out with the presumption (...) against the use of force and its exceptions, this article considers whether environmental harm can trigger a new justification for war, at whose behest, and what might be a proportionate response to aggressive or negligent harm to nature. Force is clearly justified against military attacks. Where environmental harm is not caused by military aggression, proportionality points towards a response short of war. Full‐scale warfare will likely be counterproductive in protecting nature. This is less true if war is fought by drones destroying specific targets, or by cyber‐war, or by alternatives (or supplements) to war such as boycotts, ‘lawfare’, and ‘information/media warfare’. Responding in ways that minimize harm to nature also helps demonstrate ‘right intention’. (shrink)

Just war theory focuses primarily on bodily harm, such as killing, maiming, and torture, while other harms are often largely overlooked. At the same time, contemporary international conflicts increasingly involve the use of unarmed tactics, employing 'softer' alternatives or supplements to kinetic power that have not been sufficiently addressed by the ethics of war or international law. Soft war tactics include cyber-warfare and economic sanctions, media warfare, and propaganda, as well as non-violent resistance as it plays out in civil disobedience, (...) boycotts, and 'lawfare.' While the just war tradition has much to say about 'hard' war - bullets, bombs, and bayonets - it is virtually silent on the subject of 'soft' war. Soft War: The Ethics of Unarmed Conflict illuminates this neglected aspect of international conflict. (shrink)

Contemporary international law. Methodology -- The origin of sovereignty in Roman and medieval law -- The transformation of sovereignty and international law in late modernity -- The transformation of international law by human rights -- The UN convention system and US foreign policy -- IR realism and the positivity of international law -- Containment and disengagement -- Assassination and international law -- Humanitarian intervention and international law -- Lawfare, Wikileaks, and the rule of law.

Legality, interdisciplinarity and the study of practice -- Re-thinkinking interdisciplinarity by re-reading hume -- Tainted love : the struggle over legality in international relations and international law -- The power of legality, legitimacy and the (im)possibility of interdisciplinary research -- Moving while standing still : law, politics and hard cases -- International law, Kelsen and the aberrant revolution : excavating the politics and practices of revolutionary legality in Rhodesia and beyond -- Juris dicere : custom as a matrix, custom as (...) a norm, and the role of judges and (their) ideology in custom making -- Multiple legalities and international criminal tribunals : juridical versus political legality -- Palestine's quest for statehood and the practice of the United Nations -- Regulatory legality : extraterritorial rule across domestic and international arenas -- Legality and lawfare in regime implementation -- Whose legality? Rule of law missions and the case of Kosovo -- Perspectives on the perils, promise, politics - and practice of interdisciplinarity. (shrink)

Ya sea que uno favorezca o se oponga al expresidente Trump, es evidente que, contrario a lo que él ha argumentado, este juicio demostró que ningún ciudadano de los EE. UU. está por encima de la ley. Según el expresidente y sus simpatizantes, el sistema legal estadounidense está «amañado». Alegan que el presidente Biden y el liderazgo del partido demócrata han librado “una guerra legal” (lawfare) es decir, convertir la ley en un arma para obtener una ventaja política sobre el (...) expresidente en las próximas elecciones presidenciales del 5 de noviembre. Sin embargo, para las personas razonables e imparciales, este juicio representa el éxito del Estado de derecho en los Estados Unidos. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine the ethics of nonviolent protest when a violent response is either foreseen or intended. One central concern is whether protesters, who foresee a violent response but persist, are provoking the violence and whether they are culpable for any eventual harms. A second concern is whether it is permissible to publicize the violent response for political advantage. I begin by distinguishing between two senses of the term provoke: a normative sense where a provocateur knowingly imposes an (...) unjustified risk of a violent response, and a descriptive sense where the respondent feels provoked. I argue that, when the risk of a violent response is justified, the protesters are not provocateurs but akin to nonculpable, entrapping agents who create an opportunity for the regime to respond with disproportionate violence. The regime’s response can disclose its brutality or criminality and this can be fairly publicized for political advantage. When nonviolent protesters create an unjustified risk of violence either because the injustice they oppose is insufficient to justify the risk of a violent response or because the risked harms are disproportionate with the likely political advantages derived from the protest, they are partially culpable provocateurs. However, I argue these partially culpable provocateurs can still permissibly publicize the disproportionate violence of the regime so as to shape public opinion. (shrink)