Ein gutes Verfahren, reine Mathematik kennenzulernen, ist - ein mathematisches Buch in die Hand zu nehmen und zu lesen. Es ist moglich, auf diese Weise in mathematisches Denken zu kommen ohne Reflexion iiber dies Denken. Aber da die Mathematik auch anwendbar ist, fiihren viele Wege von vorweisbaren Sachverhalten her zur Mathe­ matik, und auf solchen Wegen sich der Mathematik anzunahern, mag um so wertvoller sein, als man dabei nach Mathematischem zu fragen lernt und fertige Theorien dann vielleicht besser wiirdigen (...) kann. Bei einer solchen Annaherung stellen sich aber immer Gedanken iiber das Denken seiber ein und diese Gedanken haben ihre eigenen Gefahren. Sofern sie nur eine Annaherung vorbereiten, die dann in medias res fiihrt und die Mathematik so wie sie ist und sein solI zu W orte kommen laBt, ist alles gut. Aber Anleitungen machen um der Verstandlichkeit willen gern in einem Vorstadium halt, das sich womoglich noch als lebendig und dem reinen mathematischen Denken als iiberlegen anempfiehlt. Aus diesem Vorbezirk nahrt die Legende, das mathematische Denken der Neuzeit sei wesentlich von dem der Antike verschieden, ihre Lebenskraft. Fiir Nichtmathematiker, insbesondere solche mit philosophischen Neigungen, scheint diese Legende eine unwiderstehliche Glaubwiirdigkeit zu be­ sitzen. Sie hii. ngt mit der Meinung zusammen, daB die neuere Mathematik die Anschauung als Quelle mathematischer Erkenntnis vernachlassige. (shrink)

Beim Wort 'Aufklarung' denken wir zunachst und zumeist an Immanuel Kant und sein beruhmtes Diktum vom 'Ausgang des Menschen aus seiner selbstverschuldeten Unmundigkeit'. Doch die europaische Aufklarungsbewegung war vieldimensional und bewegte sich nicht nur in einer Richtung. Der bohmische Philosoph Bernard Bolzano (1781-1848) steht fur einen ganz anderen Pfad in der Geschichte der Aufklarung. Er war ein Philosoph der mitteleuropaischen Denkstromung, der eine Welt jenseits des Kapitalismus und der Ausbeutung des Planeten dachte. Er sah in der Aufklarung einen konkreten Auftrag (...) an jeden einzelnen Menschen, 'stets kluger, (moralisch) besser und damit glucklicher zu werden': Nicht die Welt zu beherrschen, sondern sie zu verstehen, das sei der Auftrag auf diesem Weg zum allgemeinen Gluck. Die Monographie stellt Leben und Werk dieses zu Unrecht vergessenen katholischen Denkers umfassend und quellengesattigt vor. (shrink)

Heraklits Denken und seine philosophischen Positionen haben einen ungeheuren Einfluss im Altertum, in der Neuzeit und bis in die Moderne hinein ausgeübt. Die Beiträge dieses Bandes machen die kulturellen Bedingungen sichtbar, unter denen dieses Denken entstanden ist, und helfen, sowohl den,Dunklen' selbst, wie er seit der Antike genannt wurde, als auch seine Wirkung systematisch besser zu verstehen. Alle Beiträge gehen auf eine internationale Konferenz zurück, die im Oktober 2013 ausgewiesene Spezialisten zu einem umfassenden Dialog in Ephesos zusammenführte. Im Zusammenwirken (...) verschiedener Disziplinen ließ sich Heraklits Ort in der Philosophie- und Geistesgeschichte genauer bestimmen, als das in den bisher vorwiegend auf philosophiehistorisch-philologische Aspekte fokussierten Darstellungen geschehen ist. Das Alleinstellungsmerkmal der Konferenz in ihrer Orientierung am genius loci und auch die damit einhergehende Einbeziehung historischer und archäologischer Fragestellungen bedeutet etwas Neues für die Heraklit-Forschung: Das Aufzeigen der Verbindungen zwischen der naturräumlichen Situation in Ephesos zur Zeit Heraklits, dem Verhältnis des Denkers zu seiner Stadt sowie der Rolle seiner Reflexion auf die Bedingungen menschlicher Erkenntnis und ihrer Vermittlung. (shrink)

There is an emerging consensus within Natural Law that explains transgender identity as an “embodied misunderstanding.” The basic line of argument is that our sexual identity as male or female refers to our possible reproductive roles of begetting or conceiving. Since these two possibilities are determined early on by the presence or absence of a Y chromosome, our sexual identity cannot be changed or reassigned. I develop an argument from analogy, comparing gender and language, to show that this consensus is (...) premature. Language and gender imbue our body with further social meaning and so, I conclude, that just as we can learn multiple languages, so too can we learn multiple genders. Since language and gender each constitutively contribute to our wellbeing as a “second nature,” I argue against this consensus to show that the reason people who are transgender struggle to flourish is not because of a “troubled trans psyche,” but because there are conceptual, interpersonal, and institutional obstacles stacked against them. (shrink)

Annie Besant has rarely been identified as a philosopher. Her work as an ethicist has been obscured by the reaction of critics to her abandonment of Anglican Christianity for serial eng...

When is it morally permissible for performers to portray characters from marginalized groups of which they are not a member? Although this question is philosophically underexplored, it has been commanding increasing attention in the public sphere, especially with respect to straight performers portraying queer characters. While the demand for increasing self-representation from marginalized communities is laudable, we argue that demanding performers to disclose their social identity is, in general, morally counterproductive. We make our case by focusing on recent instances where (...) fans demanded that a performer disclose their sexual orientation, putting vulnerable performers in a harmful trilemma. In short, it will force many to either out themselves against their will, subject themselves to intense public backlash by taking the role without outing themselves, or forgo taking a role they want and at which they would excel. Instead, we propose that performers have a general (epistemic) obligation to learn about what their characters’ corresponding real-world experiences would plausibly be like, representing what they learned in their performances. We will argue that meeting this obligation typically entails learning about the values, broadly construed, of the community in question. If we are right, there is not even a general obligation that performers only take roles that correspond to their own social identity. Just as importantly, there is a strong moral reason not to demand that performers disclose aspects of their social identity in order to take on a role. (shrink)

Categorization and memory for specific items are fundamental processes that allow us to apply knowledge to novel stimuli. This study directly compares categorization and memory using delay match to category (DMC) and delay match to sample (DMS) tasks. In DMC participants view and categorize a stimulus, maintain the category across a delay, and at the probe phase view another stimulus and indicate whether it is in the same category or not. In DMS, a standard item working memory task, participants encode (...) and maintain a specific individual item, and at probe decide if the stimulus is an exact match or not. Constrained Principal Components Analysis was used to identify and compare activity within neural networks associated with these tasks, and we relate these networks to those that have been identified with resting state-fMRI. We found that two frontoparietal networks of particular interest. The first network included regions associated with the dorsal attention network and frontoparietal salience network; this network showed patterns of activity consistent with a role in rapid orienting to and processing of complex stimuli. The second uniquely involved regions of the frontoparietal central executive network; this network responded more slowly following each stimulus and showed a pattern of activity consistent with a general role in role in decision-making across tasks. Additional components were identified that were associated with visual, somatomotor and default mode networks. (shrink)

Abstract: In 1990, Congress established the Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program (RWHP). The program has since expanded to cover numerous treatments and support services. It’s hard to overstate how transformative RWHP has been, but hundreds of thousands of other people had died from the same condition White had, so why did politicians wait to enact serious AIDS healthcare? Bluntly, White’s AIDS education activism was sympathetic because he embodied a “moral innocence,” a quality the public did not usually extend to gay men, (...) intravenous drug users, or others who suffered from HIV/AIDS. I ask two questions about this delayed political support. First, are there any moral problems with appealing to moral innocence, even if it secures public support and medical care, by hierarchically ranking lives as more or less sympathetic? Second, can we reduce or eliminate these problems, or are they a necessary cost to getting the public to care about marginalized communities? (shrink)

The Copernican revolution with which Kant transformed the question of whether knowledge is possible into the query as to how knowledge is possible, constitutes one stage in the development of epistemology from a speculative to an observational science — i.e., one that proceeds from the investigation of concrete, existent objects rather than from a small number of presupposed concepts. This path, leading from speculation to examination of the concrete objects of research — for epistemology, to the investigation of the various (...) individual sciences — is long and arduous, and even now it has been traversed only a small part of the way. Although epistemological research has for a long time had some relation to mathematics and physics, and a more concrete exploration of biology and the humanities has recently been launched as well, we undoubtedly still stand at the very beginning of this enterprise. One major task for the epistemological inquiry into a specific discipline is bound up with tracing the course of development of that science — in particular, the radical shifts and readjustments in a science that promise to furnish the epistemologist with valuable information. Seen from this angle, psychology also currently deserves the special attention of epistemology. (shrink)

In its first part, this paper seeks to make plausible (a) that molecular genetic diagnostics differs in ethically relevant ways from traditional types of medical diagnostics and (b) that the consequences of introducing this technology in broad screening-programs to detect widespread genetic diseases in a population which is not at high risk may change our understanding of health and disease in a problematic way. In its second part, the paper discusses some aspects of public control of scientific and technological innovations (...) in the field of molecular genetic diagnostics. (shrink)

Many prominent proponents of Old and New Natural Law morally condemn sexual acts between people of the same sex because those acts are incapable of reproduction; they each offer a distinct set of supporting reasons. While some New Natural Law philosophers have begun to distance themselves from this moral condemnation, there are not many similarly ameliorative efforts within Old Natural Law. I argue for the bold conclusion that Old Natural Law philosophers can accept the basic premises of Old Natural Law (...) without also being committed to morally condemning sexual activity between people of the same sex. I develop an argument from analogy that shows how we can draw metaphysically distinct sub‐categories based on someone's capacity to experience the unitive goods of sex. This unitive capacity constitutes the sub‐category and provides a distinct principle for evaluating how members of that sub‐category (X) act as members of that sub‐category, rather than as acting as defective members of another category (Y). Even though my argument is ‘internal’ to Old Natural Law, I conclude by showing how these conclusions can also address some of the objections to same‐sex sex in New Natural Law. (shrink)

A systematic critique of the notion that natural science is the sovereign domain of truth, Critique of Scientific Reason uses an extensive and detailed investigation of physics—and in particular of Einstein's theory of relativity—to argue that the positivistic notion of rationality is not only wrongheaded but false. Kurt Hübner contends that positivism ignores both the historical dimension of science and the basic structures common to scientific theory, myth, and so-called subjective symbolic systems. Moreover, Hübner argues, positivism has led in (...) our time to a widespread disillusionment with science and technology. (shrink)

In “Understanding Demonstratives”, Gareth Evans bites the bullet regarding Rip van Winkle cases in cognitive dynamics: the fact that Rip sleeps for twenty years and completely loses track of time means he is unable to retain his original belief that “Today is a fine day”. In this paper, the author argues that Evans need not bite this bullet because there are resources in his account of the cognitive dynamics involved in belief retention developed in The Varieties of Reference to successfully (...) confront the challenge posed by the Rip van Winkle case. In particular, when we combine the two central elements of Evans’s cognitive dynamics – the skill of keeping track of one’s spatio-temporal location in addition to memory – it is possible to arrive at the conclusion that it is indeed possible for Rip to retain and re-express his original belief. (shrink)

Sometimes, people who are otherwise eligible to donate blood are unduly deferred from donating. “Unduly” indicates a gap where a deferral policy misstates what exposes potential donors to risk and so defers more donors than is justified. Since the error is at the policy-level, it’s natural and understandable to focus criticism on reformulating or eliminating the offending policies. Policy change is undoubtedly the right goal because the policy is what prevents otherwise safe eligible donors from donating needed blood. But focusing (...) exclusively at the policy-level passes over a largely undiscussed question: if policy change takes time and there is an urgent need for blood now, then what should unduly deferred donors do in the meanwhile? Blood banks and federal agencies recommend that deferred donors donate their time or money until they become eligible, but blood is a non-fungible good: donated cash or volunteered time cannot replace a transfusion. Further, this request ignores that otherwise eligible donors could safely donate their blood in addition to their time and money. Here is the central question I will focus on in this paper: is a donor morally justified in lying on a questionnaire to donate blood if they justifiably believe that their blood poses no risk to a recipient and knows that honestly answering a donor questionnaire would unduly defer them from donating? (shrink)

Review Essay on: Simeon Wade, Foucault in California [A True Story – Wherein the Great French Philosopher Drops Acid in the Valley of Death], foreword by Heather Dundas. (Berkeley, California: Heyday, 2019). 144 pp, ISBN 9781597144636 (hardback).

On April 20, 1999, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold shot and killed fifteen people at their high school in Columbine, Colorado. National media dubbed the event a “school shooting.” The term grimly expanded over the next several years to include similar events at army bases, movie theaters, churches, and nightclubs. Today, we commonly use the categories “mass shooter” and “mass shooting” to organize and classify information about gun violence. I will argue that neither category is an effective tool for reducing (...) gun violence and use empirical data to show how these categories perpetuate a moral panic that harms already vulnerable demographics. I conclude that we should instead favor a narrower description of individuals and events, (e.g., “X shot Y people at Z”) because we can talk about all of the relevant cases without contributing the undue harms. (shrink)

This article is concerned with the question of the relative priority between political and social ontology within left-Heideggerianism, a tradition recently reconstructed by Oliver Marchart. Although the title seems to imply that this question is an open and live one within left-Heideggerianism – that the two paths at the crossroads have been clearly delineated when, in fact, the current predicament of left-Heideggerianism resembles more a one-way street – this is somewhat misleading: the identification of left-Heideggerianism with a post-foundationalist political ontology (...) that enjoys systematic priority over the social has contributed to the suppression of the question of the Being of the social and, therefore, prevented a critical re-examination of its relationship to the political. The aim of this article is both modest and ambitious: modest, in that it merely seeks to pose and motivate the question of the social within left-Heideggerianism both at an exegetical and at a systematic level; ambiti... (shrink)

This article takes as its point of departure Hannah Arendt’s discussion of public happiness, contextualising it within her thoughts on politics, democracy and revolution. It draws on Arendt’s discussion of how the expression “pursuit of happiness” has historically shifted from a public understanding of happiness into an increasingly privatised one. The article engages with Arendt’s account of public happiness in order to reanimate her radical democratic critique of how representative politics reduces the scope of political action and participation; and how (...) the notion of happiness in a neoliberal era can only be interpreted in economistic and subjectivist terms. Furthermore, the article turns to examine how recent works in contemporary political thought, namely, those by Adriana Cavarero and Judith Butler, extend and transform the stakes of Arendt’s account of public happiness. On one hand, Cavarero’s notion of surging democracy is considered as an account of radical politics that keeps alive the Arendtian concern with public happiness by contextualising it within contemporary political struggles and social movements. On the other hand, Butler problematises Arendt’s discussion of politics for its neglect of precarity; however, this article argues that Butler’s work on assembly extends Arendt’s by highlighting possibilities of resistance, radical democracy and even public happiness amid experiences of loss and grief. Although prima facie it might appear that happiness and precarity are opposed to each other, this article points towards contemporary political practices, such as those of Ni Una Menos, that are critically reanimating public happiness through the intertwining of affective registers that range from joy to grief. (shrink)