This paper provides a computational characterization of coherence that applies to a wide range of philosophical problems and psychological phenomena. Maximizing coherence is a matter of maximizing satisfaction of a set of positive and negative constraints. After comparing five algorithms for maximizing coherence, we show how our characterization of coherence overcomes traditional philosophical objections about circularity and truth.

It is known that various complexity-theoretical problems can be translated into some special spectra problems. Thus, questions about complexity classes are translated into questions about the expressive power of some languages. In this paper we investigate the spectra of some logics with Henkin quantifiers in the empty vocabulary.

This discussion paper describes the attempt of an imagined group of non-ecologists to determine the population growth rate from field data. The Modellers wrestle with the multiple definitions of the growth rate available in the literature and the fact that, in their modelling, it appears to be drastically model-dependent, which seems to throw into question the very concept itself. Specifically, they observe that six representative models used to capture the data produce growth-rate values, which differ significantly. Almost ready to concede (...) that the problem they set for themselves is ill-posed, they arrive at an alternative point of view that not only preserves the identity of the concept of the growth rate, but also helps discriminate between competing models for capturing the data. This is accomplished by assessing how robustly a given model is able to generate growth-rate values from randomized time-series data. This leads to the proposal of an iterative approach to ecological modelling in which the definition of theoretical concepts and model selection complement each other. The paper is based on high-quality field data of mites on apple trees and may be called a “data-driven opinion piece”. (shrink)

Die Würde des Menschen ist unantastbar. Die Menschenrechte gelten universell. Doch was bedeutet das? Die Autorinnen und Autoren dieses Bandes gehen dieser Frage interdisziplinär und aus ganz unterschiedlichen Perspektiven auf den Grund. Zu Wort kommen u. a. Philosophie, Ethik, Technik, Medizin, Archäologie, Psychologie, Theologie und Pädagogik. Von Hannah Arendt, Martin Heidegger und Immanuel Kant geht es über ethische Fragen, wie der nach Selbstverantwortung und jener nach dem Recht auf Migration, zu den Herausforderungen von Fortschritt, Nachhaltigkeit und Künstlicher Intelligenz. Daneben stehen (...) historische und grundsätzliche Einordnungen des Themas sowie alltagspraktische Überlegungen zum Umgang mit Menschenwürde und Menschenrechten in professionellen Kontexten, z. B. bei archäologischen Grabungen, in Psychologie, Medizin und in der Schule. (shrink)

Proceedings of a conference held Dec. 4-5, 1998 at the Universit'at G'ottingen.

Wissenschaftsfreiheit wird vorherrschend als Freiheit der Wissenschaft von politischer Einmischung verstanden. Der Artikel kritisiert dieses negative Verständnis von Wissenschaftsfreiheit anhand einer Analyse seines prominentesten Vertreters, dem Netzwerk Wissenschaftsfreiheit, das damit eine Politisierung einseitig den Vertreter*innen gesellschaftskritischer Ansätze zuschreibt, während es die eigene Position als ‚rein wissenschaftlich‘ und politisch neutral dargestellt. Demgegenüber schlägt der Artikel ein kritisches Verständnis von Wissenschaftsfreiheit vor, das seine Politizität reflektiert. Ausgehend von der Analyse, dass starre Macht- und Privilegienstrukturen das zentrale Hindernis für die gemeinsame Arbeit an (...) wissenschaftlicher Objektivität sind, geht es beim kritischen Begriff der Wissenschaftsfreiheit um die Reflexion und Transformation des Verhältnisses von Wissenschaft und Politik. Dabei steht die Diversifizierung von Zugangschancen und Standpunkten innerhalb der Wissenschaft im Mittelpunkt – also die Neuverteilung von Macht und Privilegien. Der Artikel entwickelt dieses Verständnis aus einer Diskussion des Verhältnisses von Wissenschaft und Politik in zwei philosophischen Begründungsmöglichkeiten der Wissenschaftsfreiheit und aus einer Rekonstruktion der kritischen politischen Theorie, insbesondere der foucaultschen Machttheorie und der feministischen Standpunkttheorie. Er zeigt auf dieser Grundlage, dass drei verschiedene Arten der Diversifizierung der Wissenschaft – intern, extern-institutionell und extern-aktivistisch –, die vom vor dem Hintergrund des negativen Begriffs als Einschränkung der Wissenschaftsfreiheit verstanden werden, tatsächlich zu ihrer Verbesserung beitragen. (shrink)

The Values in Action (VIA) classification of character strengths and virtues has been recently proposed by two leading positive psychologists, Christopher Peterson and Martin Seligman as “the social science equivalent of virtue ethics.” The very possibility of developing this kind of an “equivalent,” however, is very doubtful in the light of the cogent criticism that has been leveled at modern moral theory by Alasdair MacIntyre as well as the well argued accusations that positive psychology, despite its official normative neutrality, is (...) pervaded by specifically Western individualism and instrumentalism. In order to evaluate whether the VIA project can be considered as substantially rooted in virtue ethical tradition, the classification was assessed against two fundamental features of the classical version of the latter: (1) the substantial interconnectedness of individual virtues, as expressed by the thesis of the unity of virtue, and (2) the constitutive character of the relationship between virtue and happiness. It turned out, in result, that the two above features are not only absent from but also contradicted by the VIA framework with the latter's: (1′) construal of individual virtues and character strengths as independent variables and (2′) official endorsement of the fact/value distinction. As soon as the arguments for the superiority of the classical virtue ethical perspective are provided, the potential responses available to the VIA's proponents are discussed. (shrink)

Originally published in 1968, Karsten Harries's classic work provides a philosophical understanding of how modern art differs fundamentally from the art of earlier periods.

Psychological questions within philosophical ethics, although very often deeply distrusted, are justified if we presume the ultimate unity of the ethical and psychosocial subject. Such questions are especially well-grounded when we deal with a philosophy that is as practical as Stoicism. Because of both their contents and origins, the theories of values and emotions proposed by this ancient school may attract the suspicious attention of psychologists. For there are good reasons to suggest that the ideas in question were neurotic – (...) that they arose from and caused neurosis. This hypothesis can be verified within the framework of Paul Tillich’s multidisciplinary conception of neurosis. After a somewhat more detailed analysis, it turns out that the Stoic conception is in principle neither the result nor the cause of neurotic disturbances. Furthermore, it seems that it is quite the contrary – it causes people to flourish psychologically and existentially. It must nevertheless be emphasized that Stoic philosophy, if misunderstood or led astray, still might become neurotic in character. (shrink)

Der Tagungsband beinhaltet fünfzehn Beiträge einer interdisziplinären Tagung des wissenschaftlichen, bildungsorientierten und gemeinnützigen Arbeitskreises philosophierender Ingenieure und Naturwissenschaftler (APHIN) e.V. Der Band umfasst Aufsätze aus dem Spannungsfeld von Philosophie, Ingenieur- und Naturwissenschaften und Aufsätze, die diesen Bereich transzendieren. Alle Beiträge spiegeln die Neugierde und Freude wider, über den eigenen fachlichen Tellerrand hinauszuschauen. Und sie zeigen, dass der Philosophie hierbei eine Schlüsselrolle zukommt. Das Selbstverständnis von APHIN – die Offenheit für die Fragen und Probleme der jeweils anderen – ist damit in (...) allen Beiträgen gegenwärtig. (shrink)

Der demographische Wandel, die Veränderung von Akteurskonstellationen und Besitzverhältnissen, Suburbanisierungsprozesse, die Energiewende sowie neue private und öffentliche Nutzungsansprüche an Raum und Landschaft schaffen neue kulturelle, soziale, ökonomische, ökologische und politische Herausforderungen. Architektonische und planerische Disziplinen sind daher zur Zusammenarbeit aufgerufen, um die Herausforderungen der Zukunft bei der nachhaltigen Gestaltung, Nutzung und Schonung einer weiterhin bewohnbaren Welt annehmen, begleiten und mitsteuern zu können. Die Beiträge dieses Bandes gehen daher der Frage nach, ob und wie das wissenschaftstheoretische Konzept der Transdisziplinarität so genutzt (...) werden kann, dass die aspekthaften Ergebnisse der vielen Landschaftsforschungen und die ausserwissenschaftlichen Ansprüche lebensweltlicher Akteure wieder zusammengeführt und auf gemeinsame Forschungsperspektiven und Anwendungskontexte hin organisiert werden können. (shrink)

Die 'Musica' ist in Weltvorstellungen des Mittelalters und der Frühen Neuzeit oft nicht nur ein Bestandteil des Wissens neben vielen anderen, sondern stellt ein übergeordnetes Ordnungsprinzip dar. Erstmals untersucht dieses Buch die genaue Stellung von Musik innerhalb der universalen Ordnung der Dinge, wie sie sich in enzyklopädischen Texten auch jenseits des fachdisziplinären Diskurses darstellt. Anhand zentraler Leitthemen wie Produktivität, Kombinatorik und Kosmologie führt die Untersuchung von der mittelalterlichen Logik Ramon Llulls über zahlreiche Stationen bis hin zur Weltkonzeption Athanasius Kirchers. Noch (...) im 17. Jahrhundert, so wird deutlich, kann die Rolle der Musik nur vor dem Hintergrund der anhaltenden Wirksamkeit mystischer, magischer und kosmologischer Denkweisen verstanden werden. (shrink)

The content of a work of literature, Walter Benjamin reminds us in “The Author as Producer,” is inextricably bound up with its form. Hence, it is hardly astounding that much critical attention has been focused on the proper generic classification of Harriet E. Wilson’s Our Nig . This task, though, has not been easy. Henry Louis Gates, rediscoverer and earliest critic of Our Nig, for example, goes to great length discussing parallels between Wilson’s work and Nina Baym’s ‘overplot’ of the (...) ‘women’s novel,’ before settling on reading it as a new form of distinctly African-American lit- erature that combines “conventions of the sentimental novel with certain key conventions of the slave narratives” . Elizabeth Ammons, by contrast, places Our Nig squarely in the feminist tradition of the sentimental novel and argues that “the ideal of mother love explicit in Uncle Tom’s Cabin operates implicitly in Our Nig.” 4 2 3 Contesting Ammons’ claim, Eric Gardner asserts that Our Nig is not a ‘novel of abolition’ but “a novel about Northern racial issues, a young black woman’s bildungsroman, and, as such, is far from Uncle Tom’s Cabin.” 5 Echoing some of Gardner’s points, Elizabeth Breau contends that Our Nig “is actually satiric” and therefore gives an overly “bleak picture of northern antebellum society.” Foregrounding neither Bildung nor “ironic inversions” but the “politics of rage at work in Wilson’s tale,” Julia Stern argues that Our Nig “used the sentimental form to mask a gothic message.” 7 Rejecting Gates’ attempt to posit Our Nig as “a significant beginning of an African-American literary mode, a distinctive first in a century of firsts,” John Ernest wants to read Wilson’s work as a traditional “blend of autobiography and fiction,” hoping to ‘re-place’ it “within the racial, gender, and economic matrix of secular history.” R.J. Ellis, while accepting Gates’ assessment that Our Nig “draw[s] on the genres of sentimental fiction and abolitionist slave narrative,” stresses the ways in which the ‘hybrid’ work “fractures generic boundaries” in order to provide a “full retrieval of Frado’s pain, her experience of body politics.” Lastly, offering a reading that links Our Nig to the Puritan tradition, Elizabeth West argues that Our Nig “manipulates well-known trappings of the conversion narrative” by telling “the story of the heroine’s failed initiation into the community of earthly saints.”. (shrink)

ASKED WHETHER, in the light of recent attempts to use philosophy to change our goals and to help transform society, he saw a social mission for his philosophy, Heidegger gave a negative reply: "If one wants to answer this question, one has to ask first: what is society? and consider that society today is only the absolutization of modern subjectivity and that from this perspective a philosophy which has overcome the stand-point of subjectivity is not even permitted to participate in (...) the discussion." What rules out such participation is the fact that Heidegger’s thinking, as he himself interprets it for us, has pushed beyond his own time in such a way that given all that the age considers important it must seem beside the point. The work of the later Heidegger is an extended untimely meditation. This untimeliness helps to explain the apolitical character of this work. (shrink)

Wie können Freiheit und Widerstand innerhalb von Foucaults Theorie der Macht und Subjektivierung konzipiert werden? Karsten Schubert liefert die erste systematische Rekonstruktion der sozialphilosophischen Debatte um Freiheit bei Foucault und eine neue Lösung für das Freiheitsproblem: Freiheit als die Fähigkeit zur reflexiven Kritik der eigenen Subjektivierung – kurz: Freiheit als Kritik – ist das Resultat von freiheitlicher Subjektivierung in politischen Institutionen. Der Band zeigt so die Konsequenzen von Foucaults Freiheitsdenken für die Demokratietheorie und die allgemeine sozialphilosophische Freiheitsdiskussion auf.

Foucault’s theory of power and subjectification challenges common concepts of freedom in social philosophy and expands them through the concept of ‘freedom as critique’: Freedom can be defined as the capability to critically reflect upon one’s own subjectification, and the conditions of possibility for this critical capacity lie in political and social institutions. The article develops this concept through a critical discussion of the standard response by Foucault interpreters to the standard objection that Foucault’s thinking obscures freedom. The standard response (...) interprets Foucault’s later works, especially The Subject and Power, as a solution to the problem of freedom. It is mistaken, because it conflates different concepts of freedom that are present in Foucault’s work. By differentiating these concepts, this article proposes a new institutionalist approach to solve the problem of freedom that breaks with the partly anarchist underpinnings of Foucault scholarship: As freedom as critique is not given, but itself a result of subjectification, it entails a demand for ‘modal robustness’ and must therefore be institutionalized. This approach helps to draw out the consequences of Foucault’s thinking on freedom for postfoundationalist democratic theory and the general social-philosophical discussion about freedom. (shrink)

Can architecture help us find our place and way in today's complex world? Can it return individuals to a whole, to a world, to a community? Developing Giedion's claim that contemporary architecture's main task is to interpret a way of life valid for our time, philosopher Karsten Harries answers that architecture should serve a common ethos. But if architecture is to meet that task, it first has to free itself from the dominant formalist approach, and get beyond the notion (...) that its purpose is to produce endless variations of the decorated shed. In a series of cogent and balanced arguments, Harries questions the premises on which architects and theorists have long relied—premises which have contributed to architecture's current identity crisis and marginalization. He first criticizes the aesthetic approach, focusing on the problems of decoration and ornament. He then turns to the language of architecture. If the main task of architecture is indeed interpretation, in just what sense can it be said to speak, and what should it be speaking about? Expanding upon suggestions made by Martin Heidegger, Harries also considers the relationship of building to the idea and meaning of dwelling. Architecture, Harries observes, has a responsibility to community; but its ethical function is inevitably also political. He concludes by examining these seemingly paradoxical functions. (shrink)

In deze beschouwing ordent Karsten Harries zijn gedachten over het fenomeen ‘kitsch’. Hij gaat daarbij uit van de vraag of kitsch eigenlijk wel zo afkeurenswaardig is. Of hoort ze bij de menselijke natuur en haar hang naar romantiek en nostalgie? We kwalificeren iets als kitsch als we denken dat het voortkomt uit onoprechtheid en getuigt van slechte smaak. Maar is de nostalgie, het dromerige of stichtelijke van kitsch niet beter dan postmoderne ironie of moedeloosheid? Daar staat tegenover dat kitsch (...) onder het mom van authenticiteit de werkelijkheid afbeeldt, maar deze feitelijk met zijn leugens aan het zicht onttrekt. Iets dergelijks geldt ook voor kitsch en religie: niet langer tracht het kunstwerk een werkelijkheid uit te beelden die ons voorstellingsvermogen te boven gaat, maar het wordt in de plaats van die werkelijkheid gesteld. In de politiek kan eenzelfde esthetisering de werkelijkheid een schijn van betekenis geven die mensen blind maakt voor de menselijkheid van hun medemensen. Niet kitsch, maar alleen het ‘aura’ van kunst kan en moet ons ontvankelijk maken voor deze werkelijkheid, die uitstijgt boven wat de rede kan bevatten. (shrink)

Ethical evaluation of deep brain stimulation as a treatment for Parkinson’s disease is complicated by results that can be described as involving changes in the patient’s identity. The risk of becoming another person following surgery is alarming for patients, caregivers and clinicians alike. It is one of the most urgent conceptual and ethical problems facing deep brain stimulation in Parkinson’s disease at this time. In our paper we take issue with this problem on two accounts. First, we elucidate what is (...) meant by “becoming another person” from a conceptual point of view. After critically discussing two broad approaches we concentrate on the notion of “individual identity” which centers on the idea of “core attitudes”. Subsequently we discuss several approaches to determine what distinguishes core attitudes from those that are more peripheral. We argue for a “foundational-function model” highlighting the importance of specific dependency relations between these attitudes. Our second aim is to comment on the possibility to empirically measure changes in individual identity and argue that many of the instruments now commonly used in selecting and monitoring DBS-patients are inappropriate for this purpose. Future research in this area is advised combining a conceptual and an empirical approach as a basis of sound ethical appraisal. (shrink)

In this timely and wide-ranging study, Karsten Stueber argues that empathy is epistemically central for our folk-psychological understanding of other agents--that it is something we cannot do without in order to gain understanding of other minds. Setting his argument in the context of contemporary philosophy of mind and the interdisciplinary debate about the nature of our mindreading abilities, Stueber counters objections raised by some in the philosophy of social science and argues that it is time to rehabilitate the empathy (...) thesis.Empathy, regarded at the beginning of the twentieth century as the fundamental method of gaining knowledge of other minds, has suffered a century of philosophical neglect. Stueber addresses the plausible philosophical misgivings about empathy that have been responsible for its failure to gain widespread philosophical acceptance.Crucial in this context is his defense of the assumption, very much contested in contemporary philosophy of mind, that the notion of rational agency is at the core of folk psychology. Stueber then discusses the contemporary debate between simulation theorists--who defend various forms of the empathy thesis--and theory theorists. In distinguishing between basic and reenactive empathy, he provides a new interpretive framework for the investigation into our mindreading capacities. Finally, he considers epistemic objections to empathy raised by the philosophy of social science that have been insufficiently discussed in contemporary debates. Empathy theorists, Stueber writes, should be prepared to admit that, although empathy can be regarded as the central default mode for understanding other agents, there are certain limitations in its ability to make sense of other agents; and there are supplemental theoretical strategies available to overcome these limitations. (shrink)

Marc-Wogau, K. Mina filosofiska fördomar.--Gustafsson, L. Om klassifikation.--Kanger, S. Några synpunkter på begreppet inflytande.--Torstendahl, R. Minikrav, optimumnormer och paradigm i historisk vetenskap.--Lagerberg, D. Punktkommentarer till dialektiken.--Nordenfeldt, L. Om olika former av interaktion.--Puterman, Z. An indeterminist interpretation of Marx's historical determinism.--Carls, R. Kunskap och frihet.--Andersson, J. S. Some notions of pragmatic implication.--Tönisson, I. A preliminary study of interpreting K[subscript x]ø¹.--Bergström, L. Vilken handlingsutilitarism är den riktiga?--Alfredsson, T. Kärlekskoefficienter.--Segerberg, K. The assignment problem as a problem of social choice.--Åqvist, L. En tidslogisk variant (...) av Morgenstjärneparadoxen. (shrink)

Context: Von Foerster’s concept of eigenbehavior can be recognized against the broader context of enactivism as it has been advocated by Varela, Thompson and Rosch, by Noë and recently by Hutto and Myin, among others. This flourishing constellation of ideas is on its way to becoming the new paradigm of cognitive science. However, in my reading, enactivism, putting stress on the constitutive role of action when it comes to mind and perception, faces a serious philosophical challenge when attempting to account (...) for the way we actually perceive our environments, most importantly for the fact that we perceive things or objects. Von Foester’s eigenbehavior is understood here as a concept supposed to take on this challenge. Problem: In this article I tackle the following issues: Enactivism must be able to account for the apparent stability of the perceived world: this is not a realm of a never-ending flux of stimuli; it is a realm of stable things. Enactivism is committed to the anti-Cartesian endeavor seeking to bridge the gap between the inner and the outer; between the subjective and the objective. Now, these two points constrain each other so that one cannot address simply by regarding the apparent stability of things as a projection that springs out of the internal machinery binding inputs with outputs. This is because the very idea of such an internal machinery opposes, i.e., it employs the Cartesian dichotomy. So, enactivism is in need of an account of that would not oppose its anti-Cartesian commitment. Method: I introduce the ontology of location and niche theory, as it has been brought forth by Varzi, Casati, and Smith, and develop it so that it can be used in the philosophy of mind. This is a conceptual, semi-formal philosophical analysis. Results: I shall come up with the idea of object conceived of a product of action, and - drawing on von Foerster’s central idea - as a product of coordination of perceptions. Yet, it is not coordination of stimuli but coordination of cognitive connections. The notion of connection is thus articulated in the article and cast as the central concept in my proposal. Implications: We are able to account for both and (2. The apparent stability of the perceived world is due to the setting up and maintaining of connections between the perceiver and the things perceived, resulting in the establishment of what I call a cognitive niche. Constructivist content: Constructivism, broadly construed, takes, in my reading, a negative stance in the first place. Namely, it opposes what I call the metaphysics of the ready-made world. So, it holds that there is no ready-made reality; however it remains open when it comes to positive claims: a mind-independent reality does not exist at all or it does exist but it is not ready-made and as such it must be brought to completion, so to speak, or enacted, as Varela et al. would say, by a cognitive subject. In this article, I follow the latter and address one specific issue: how the enacted world gains its relatively stable architecture. (shrink)