in The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility, ed. Paul Anand, Prasanta Pattanaik, and Clemens Puppe, forthcoming 2007.

The Dutch Book argument, like Route 66, is about to turn 80. It is arguably the most celebrated argument for subjective Bayesianism. Start by rejecting the Cartesian idea that doxastic attitudes are ‘all-or-nothing’; rather, they are far more nuanced degrees of belief, for short credences, susceptible to fine-grained numerical measurement. Add a coherentist assumption that the rationality of a doxastic state consists in its internal consistency. The remaining problem is to determine what consistency of credences amounts to. The Dutch Book (...) argument, in a nutshell, says that if your credences do not obey the probability calculus, you are ‘incoherent’—susceptible to sure losses at the hands of a ‘Dutch Bookie’—and thus irrational. Conclusion: rationality requires your credences to obey the probability calculus. And like Route 66, the fortunes of the Dutch Book argument have been mixed. Opinions on the argument are sharply divided. The list of its proponents is quite a ‘who’s who’ of philosophers of probability; they include de Finetti (1937, 1980), Carnap (1950, 1962, and more fully, 1955), Kemeny (1955), Lehman (1955), Shimony (1955), Adams (1962), Mellor (1971), Rosenkrantz (1981), van Fraassen (1989), Jeffrey (1983, 1992). (shrink)

The psychoanalytical case history was in many ways the pivot point of John Forrester’s reflections on case-based reasoning. Yet the Freudian case is not without its own textual forebears. This article closely analyses texts from two earlier case-writing traditions in order to elucidate some of the negotiations by which the case history as a textual form came to articulate the mode of reasoning that we now call ‘thinking in cases’. It reads Eugène Azam’s 1876 observation of Félida X and her (...) ‘double personality’—the case that brought both Azam and Félida to prominence in late 19th-century French science—against a medico-surgical case penned by the Bordeaux physician in the same decade. While the stylistics of Azam’s medical case mirror its epistemic underpinnings in the ‘vertical’ logics of positivist science, the multiple narratives interwoven in Félida’s case grant both Azam and his patient the role of knowledge-making actors in the text. This narrative transformation chimes with the way Azam reasons ‘horizontally’ from particulars to Félida’s singular condition, but sits in tension with his choice to structure the observation along a ‘vertical’ axis. Between the two, we glimpse the emergence of the psychological observation as a mode of writing and thus of thinking in cases. (shrink)

“Pascal's Wager” is the name given to an argument due to Blaise Pascal for believing, or for at least taking steps to believe, in God. The name is somewhat misleading, for in a single paragraph of his Pensées, Pascal apparently presents at least three such arguments, each of which might be called a ‘wager’ — it is only the final of these that is traditionally referred to as “Pascal's Wager”. We find in it the extraordinary confluence of several important strands (...) of thought: the justification of theism; probability theory and decision theory, used here for almost the first time in history; pragmatism; voluntarism (the thesis that belief is a matter of the will); and the use of the concept of infinity. (shrink)

Some aspects of vagueness as presented in Shapiro’s book Vagueness in Context [23] are analyzed from the point of fuzzy logic. Presented are some generalizations of Shapiro’s formal apparatus.

I analyze David Hume’s "Of Miracles". I vindicate Hume’s argument against two charges: that it (1) defines miracles out of existence; (2) appeals to a suspect principle of balancing probabilities. He argues that miracles are, in a certain sense, maximally improbable. To understand this sense, we must turn to his notion of probability as ’strength of analogy’: miracles are incredible, according to him, because they bear no analogy to anything in our past experience. This reveals as anachronistic various recent Bayesian (...) reconstructions of his argument. But it exposes him to other charges, with which I conclude. (shrink)

This paper revisits the Pasadena game (Nover and Háyek 2004), a St Petersburg-like game whose expectation is undefined. We discuss serveral respects in which the Pasadena game is even more troublesome for decision theory than the St Petersburg game. Colyvan (2006) argues that the decision problem of whether or not to play the Pasadena game is ‘ill-posed’. He goes on to advocate a ‘pluralism’ regarding decision rules, which embraces dominance reasoning as well as maximizing expected utility. We rebut Colyvan’s argument, (...) offering several considerations in favour of the Pasadena decision problem being well posed. To be sure, current decision theory, which is underpinned by various preference axioms, leaves indeterminate how one should value the Pasadena game. But we suggest that determinacy might be achieved by adding further preference axioms. We conclude by opening the door to a far greater plurality of decision rules. We suggest how the goal of unifying these rules might guide future research. (shrink)

The so-called ‘Adams’ Thesis’ is often understood as the claim that the assertibility of an indicative conditional equals the corresponding conditional probability—schematically: $${({\rm AT})}\qquad\qquad\quad As(A\rightarrow B)=P({B|A}),{\rm provided}\quad P(A)\neq 0.$$ The Thesis is taken by many to be a touchstone of any theorizing about indicative conditionals. Yet it is unclear exactly what the Thesis is . I suggest some precise statements of it. I then rebut a number of arguments that have been given in its favor. Finally, I offer a new (...) argument against it. I appeal to an old triviality result of mine against ‘Stalnaker’s Thesis’ that the probability of a conditional equals the corresponding conditional probability. I showed that for all finite-ranged probability functions, there are strictly more distinct values of conditional probabilities than there are distinct values of probabilities of conditionals, so they cannot all be paired up as Stalnaker’s Thesis promises. Conditional probabilities are too fine-grained to coincide with probabilities of conditionals across the board. If the assertibilities of conditionals are to coincide with conditional probabilities across the board, then assertibilities must be finer-grained than probabilities. I contend that this is implausible—it is surely the other way round. I generalize this argument to other interpretations of ‘ As ’, including ‘acceptability’ and ‘assentability’. I find it hard to see how any such figure of merit for conditionals can systematically align with the corresponding conditional probabilities. (shrink)

Financial misconduct has come into the spotlight in recent years, causing market regulators to increase the reach and severity of interventions. We show that at times the economic benefits of illicit financial activity outweigh the costs of litigation. We illustrate our argument with data from the US Securities and Exchanges Commission and a case of investment misconduct. From the neoclassical economic paradigm, which follows utilitarian thinking, it is rational to engage in misconduct. Still, the majority of professionals refrain from misconduct, (...) foregoing economic rewards. We suggest financial activity could be reimagined taking into account intrinsic and prosocial motivations. A virtue ethics framework could also be applied, linking financial behavior to the quest for moral excellence and shared flourishing. By going beyond utilitarian thinking and considering alternative models, we offer a fuller account of financial behavior and a better perspective from which to design deterrence methods. (shrink)

Fuzzy logic is understood as a logic with a comparative and truth-functional notion of truth. Arithmetical complexity of sets of tautologies and satisfiable sentences as well of sets of provable formulas of the most important systems of fuzzy predicate logic is determined or at least estimated.

Four important arguments for probabilism—the Dutch Book, representation theorem, calibration, and gradational accuracy arguments—have a strikingly similar structure. Each begins with a mathematical theorem, a conditional with an existentially quantified consequent, of the general form: if your credences are not probabilities, then there is a way in which your rationality is impugned.Each argument concludes that rationality requires your credences to be probabilities.I contend that each argument is invalid as formulated. In each case there is a mirror-image theorem and a corresponding (...) argument of exactly equal strength that concludes that rationality requires your credences not to be probabilities. Some further consideration is needed to break this symmetry in favour of probabilism. I discuss the extent to which the original arguments can be buttressed.1. Introduction2. The Dutch Book Argument2.1. Saving the Dutch Book argument2.2. ‘The Dutch Book argument merely dramatizes an inconsistency in the attitudes of an agent whose credences violate probability theory’3. Representation Theorem-based Arguments4. The Calibration Argument5. The Gradational Accuracy Argument6. Conclusion. (shrink)

Dementia, a prevalent disorder of the brain, has negative effects on individuals and society. This paper concerns using Spontaneous Speech Challenge of Interspeech 2020 to classify Alzheimer's dementia. We used VGGish, a deep, pretrained, Tensorflow model as an audio feature extractor, and Scikit-learn classifiers to detect signs of dementia in speech. Three classifiers were 59.1% accurate, which was 3% above the best-performing baseline models trained on the acoustic features used in the challenge. We also proposed DemCNN, a new PyTorch raw (...) waveform-based convolutional neural network model that was 63.6% accurate, 7% more accurate then the best-performing baseline linear discriminant analysis model. We discovered that audio transfer learning with a pretrained VGGish feature extractor performs better than the baseline approach using automatically extracted acoustic features. Our DepCNN exhibits good generalization capabilities. Both methods presented in this paper offer progress toward new, innovative, and more effective computer-based screening of dementia through spontaneous speech. (shrink)

This article identifies the contemporary criteria of imperiality and then considers the normative aspects of the existence of certain great powers (empires) in international relations. It is argued that there is a body of norms valid among empires that may be referred to as interimperial law, in the sense of a normative order that is intended to lower the costs and dangers of competition between empires. The article outlines a basic theory of coexistence between the emerging interimperial law and the (...) existing international law, derived from theoretical and historical models of the coexistence of various legal orders within one territory. (shrink)

In the paper a thesis is stated that institutional economics presents considerable support for business ethics teaching. The assumptions of main-stream economics eliminated the problems of morality in economic life. The dominance of neo-classical economics in economic studies curricula contributes to the social opinion that business is deprived of moral dimensions. From this point of view, it is argued that business ethicists should be more interested in institutional economics. Some institutionalists see economics close to social moral philosophy and claim that (...) a normative approach in economics is natural and necessary. The questions of aims and economic morality are integral parts of many institutional research agendas. Especially the New Institutional Economics has developed tools that enable formalization and empirical verification of theories of morality in business. Institutional economics enriches the theoretical and empirical context of business ethics teaching. (shrink)

Artykuł jest próbą odpowiedzi na pytanie, jakie miejsce powinny zająć osoby gorzej sytuowanew społeczeństwie. Autor wykorzystuje etyczną teorię Hume’a oraz współczesną zasadępriorytaryzmu do stworzenia nowego projektu polityki współodczuwania. Celem projektujest całkowite odwrócenie ról z uwzględnieniem obopólnych korzyści: wszyscy ci, którzy dotej pory byli wykluczeni, stają się administratorami dóbr, a reszta społeczeństwa przekształcasię w osoby od nich zależne.

An arithmetical interpretation of dynamic propositional logic (DPL) is a mapping f satisfying the following: (1) f associates with each formula A of DPL a sentence f(A) of Peano arithmetic (PA) and with each program α a formula f(α) of PA with one free variable describing formally a supertheory of PA; (2) f commutes with logical connectives; (3) f([α] A) is the sentence saying that f(A) is provable in the theory f(α); (4) for each axiom A of DPL, f(A) is (...) provable in PA (and consequently, for each A provable in DPL, f(A) is provable in PA). The arithmetical completeness theorem is proved saying that a formula A of DPL is provable in DPL iff for each arithmetical interpretation f, f(A) is provable in PA. Various modifications of this result are considered. (shrink)

What does it tell us about the compatibility of freedom and determinism to recognize that, while acting freely, we typically have good reasons for whatever we are doing? More than it seems, I suppose. In this paper, it is argued that two well‐established accounts of human freedom—libertarianism and local miracle compatibilism—understate the connection between reasons and actions, leaving us only with the causal part of the explanation. This is so because on the basis of these views, a majority of alternate (...) actions relevant for the ascription of the ability to do otherwise turn out to be either unreasonable or irrational. Hence, by denying that free agents possess an ability to do otherwise rationally, these accounts fail to provide an adequate characterization of free action. Then, it is shown that the necessary requirement of reasons‐responsiveness may be satisfied by the altered‐reasons analysis of the ability to do otherwise. This particular kind of multiple‐past compatibilism, while providing a plausible response to the incompatibilist argument, also corresponds to a version of conditional analysis that is resistant to the classical objections to desire‐, choice‐, or try‐based conditionalism. (shrink)

In the last few decades many formal systems of fuzzy logics have been developed. Since the main differences between fuzzy and classical logics lie at the propositional level, the fuzzy predicate logics have developed more slowly (compared to the propositional ones). In this text we aim to promote interest in fuzzy predicate logics by contributing to the model theory of fuzzy predicate logics. First, we generalize the completeness theorem, then we use it to get results on conservative extensions of theories (...) and on witnessed models. (shrink)

A very simple many-valued predicate calculus is presented; a completeness theorem is proved and the arithmetical complexity of some notions concerning provability is determined.

The ArgumentCassirer's analyses of twentieth-century physics from the perspective of the philosophy of science focuses on the concept of the object of scientific experience. Within his concept of functional knowledge, he takes a structural stance and claims that it is specifically this concept of the object that has paved the way for modern science. This article aims, first, to show that Cassirer's interpretation of Felix Klein's “Erlanger Programm” provided the impetus for this view. Then, it analyzes Kant's conception of objectivity (...) in order to examine whether Cassirer can rightfully claim that his view is a further development of transcendental principles. Finally, it is argued that it is Cassirer's concept of the object that enables him to integrate one decisive feature of scientific progress, namely, the increasinggeneralizationof the basic concepts of a science, into his conception of knowledge. This is illustrated in more detail through the example of the progression from Newton's mechanics to relativity theory. (shrink)

David Lewis claims that a simple sort of anti-Humeanism-that the rational agent desires something to the extent he believes it to be good-can be given a decision-theoretic formulation, which Lewis calls 'Desire as Belief' (DAB). Given the (widely held) assumption that Jeffrey conditionalising is a rationally permissible way to change one's mind in the face of new evidence, Lewis proves that DAB leads to absurdity. Thus, according to Lewis, the simple form of anti-Humeanism stands refuted. In this paper we investigate (...) whether Lewis's case against DAB can be strengthened by examining how it fares under rival versions of decision theory, including other conceptions of rational ways to change one's mind. We argue that the anti-Humean may escape Lewis's argument either by adopting a version of causal decision theory, or by claiming that the refutation only applies to hyper-idealised rational agents, or by denying that the decision-theoretic framework has the expressive capacity to formulate anti-Humeanism. (shrink)

The article analyzes the process of modification of Japan’s foreign policy after Donald Trump’s election as US president. As short- and middle-range aims of Japan’s diplomatic strategy were outlined with expectation of victory of Hillary Clinton, Tokyo was forced to abruptly change its policy. Relying on the neoclassical realist theory, the article examines the complex interaction between the external factors, such as security threats from North Korea or China, and domestic factors both in Japan and the US, that is personal, (...) institutional, societal and economic determinants. It is argued that while it was strategic convergence between Tokyo and Washington that enabled relatively smooth cooperation between Prime Minister Abe and President Trump, internal factors, such as right-wing credentials of both decision makers, distorted and to some extent facilitated this process. (shrink)

The paper offers an attempt at an introduction to the political theory of Eric Voegelin, the political scientist, philosopher and social scientist, whose thought has been increasingly recognized in both the USA and Europe ever since shortly after his death in 1985. It explores the political dimension of Voegelin’s thought from a purely secular point of view, but could also be helpful to those looking to find a religious meaning in politics.

Number 1 of Fides et ratio contains a phrase crucial for the dialogue between science and philosophy. Its meaning is clear in the Latin, polish, English, German, French and Portuguese versions, but it loses its strength in the Italian and Spanish texts.

Fenomenologia w dwudziestym wieku wiąże się z filozofią Edmunda Husserla. Punktem wyjścia jego myślenia jest założenie korelacji świata i świadomości. Podstawowe pojęcie intencjonalności świadomości ukazuje, że świadomość jest zawsze świadomością czegoś. Tak więc wszelkie bycie tego, co bytuje, istnieje o tyle, o ile ma odniesienie do doświadczającej, postrzegającej i myślącej świadomości. Swiat jest zatem korelatem świadomości. Fenomenologia nie jest początkiem drogi myślowej Martina Heideggera. Jego myślenie filozoficzne ma swoje korzenie w teologii i wczesnej fascynacji ontologią. Droga myślowa Heideggera wiedzie przez (...) fenomenologię i ontologię fundamentalną ku myśleniu bycia. Husserl położył podwaliny pod fenomenologię w swoim dziele Logische Untersuchungen. Heidegger był tym dziełem zawsze zafascynowany. Nie mógł tylko zaakceptować fenomenologii jako filozofii transcendentalnej. Natomiast w pierwotnej fenomenologicznej zasadzie „ku rzeczom samym” widział doskonałą możliwość filozofowania i myślenia metafizycznego. Przez dziesięć lat był Heidegger postacią wiodącą wśród młodych fenomenologów we Fryburgu Bryzgowijskim, uznawaną również przez samego Husserla. Później ich drogi myślowe się rozeszły. Heidegger zajmował się fenomenologią przez całe życie. Od ukazania się jego Sein und Zeit przejął, zajmowaną dotąd przez Husserla, wiodącą pozycję w ruchu fenomenologicznym. Heidegger zarzucał Husserlowi, że ten nie wyciągnął konsekwencji ontologicznych z fenomenologii. Zawsze ubolewał nad tym, że ostatecznie ich drogi się rozeszły. (shrink)

W styczniu 1919 roku w odrodzonej Rzeczypospolitej odbyły się wybory do Sejmu Ustawodawczego. Efektem prac Sejmu było uchwalenie Konstytucji w marcu 1921 roku, a także wielu uchwał, m.in. w sprawie reformy rolnej. Największą prawicową siłą w Sejmie była Narodowa Demokracja, skupiona w Związku Ludowo-Narodowym, który z klubu parlamentarnego przekształcił się w 1919 roku w partię polityczną. Celem artykułu jest opis i analiza udziału posłów ZLN, wybranych z obszaru województwa kieleckiego, w pracach Sejmu Ustawodawczego. Podstawę źródłową analizy stanowiły przede wszystkim sprawozdania (...) stenograficzne z posiedzeń Sejmu. Omówiono sylwetki czterech parlamentarzystów, byli to: Konstanty Kowalewski, Franciszek Mazur, Witold Poklewski-Koziełł i Zygmunt Seyda. Reprezentowali oni różne klasy społeczne. Ich zaangażowanie w prace Konstytuanty było odmienne, ale wszyscy starali się solidarnie reprezentować klub parlamentarny ZLN. Największą aktywnością wykazywał się Seyda, prawnik pochodzący z Wielkopolski. (shrink)

_Beyond Reason_ relates Wagner’s works to the philosophical and cultural ideas of his time, centering on the four music dramas he created in the second half of his career:_ Der Ring des Nibelungen_, _Tristan und Isolde_, _Die Meistersinger von Nürnberg_, and _Parsifal_. Karol Berger seeks to penetrate the “secret” of large-scale form in Wagner’s music dramas and to answer those critics, most prominently Nietzsche, who condemned Wagner for his putative inability to weld small expressive gestures into larger wholes. Organized (...) by individual opera, this is essential reading for both musicologists and Wagner experts. (shrink)

THIS ESSAY will examine the connection between the subjectivity of man as a person and the structure of the human community. That relationship was tentatively explored in The Acting Person, especially in the chapter entitled "Participation." The present study is an attempt to develop insights initially introduced there.

Gonzales tells Mark Crimmins (1992) that Crimmins knows him under two guises, and that under his other guise Crimmins thinks him an idiot. Knowing his cleverness, but not knowing which guise he has in mind, Crimmins trusts Gonzales but does not know which of his beliefs to revise. He therefore asserts to Gonzales. (FBI) I falsely believe that you are an idiot.

Kolmogorov''s axiomatization of probability includes the familiarratio formula for conditional probability: 0).$$ " align="middle" border="0">.

The purpose of this volume is to help develop, through a variety of exploratory essays, the art and science of institutional design. The authors look at a variety of good societies as artifacts, as products—at least partly—of design, and consider how such societies can be crafted. They identify themselves with the New Constitutionalism movement, which aims to develop and promote the knowledge necessary for institutional reform and institutional creation through understanding the designer's, creator's, founder's, or reformer's perspective. The first part (...) of the volume considers some of the boundaries of what is humanly possible in politico-economic designs and the role in them of deliberation and the processes of adapting to limits. The second part considers different ways of exercising constitutionalist judgment analyzing a variety of cases, including general visions of the good society. Looking at whole societies, and at complexes of institutions, complements and informs the picture of the institutional microscale. Understanding the microscale, on the other hand, often makes the difference between empty slogans and realistic political proposals. Contributors are Karol Edward Soltan, Elinor Ostrorn, Viktor J. Vanberg, James lvi. Buchanan, John S. Dryzek, Charles 'X". Anderson, Stephen U. Elkin, Car Alperovirz, and Philip Green. (shrink)

This paper is partly a tribute to Richard Jeffrey, partly a reflection on some of his writings, The Logic of Decision in particular. I begin with a brief biography and some fond reminiscences of Dick. I turn to some of the key tenets of his version of Bayesianism. All of these tenets are deployed in my discussion of his response to the St. Petersburg paradox, a notorious problem for decision theory that involves a game of infinite expectation. Prompted by that (...) paradox, I conclude with some suggestions of avenues for future research. (shrink)

W listopadzie 1922 roku w odrodzonej Rzeczpospolitej odbyły się wybory do Sejmu i Senatu I kadencji. Główną prawicową opcją polityczną, która podjęła walkę o głosy wyborców, była Narodowa Demokracja. Do wyborów przystąpiła w szerszej koalicji, pod nazwą Chrześcijańskiego Związku Jedności Narodowej. Niniejszy artykuł jest próbą opisu i analizy udziału tej siły politycznej na terenie jednego z okręgów wyborczych w województwie kieleckim, który obejmował trzy powiaty: kielecki, jędrzejowski i włoszczowski. Opierając się na źródłach archiwalnych oraz publikacjach prasowych, przyjrzałem się bliżej dwóm (...) podstawowym formom prowadzenia przez endecję kampanii wyborczej. Pierwszą z nich było organizowanie otwartych spotkań z wyborcami, a drugą – oddziaływanie poprzez słowo drukowane. Na omawianym terenie silnymi wpływami cieszyła się lewicowa partia PSL „Wyzwolenie”, która odwoływała się do najliczniejszego elektoratu, jakim byli chłopi. Narodowa Demokracja w celu uzyskania satysfakcjonującego wyniku wyborczego musiała zatem podjąć walkę przede wszystkim o głosy tej warstwy społecznej. (shrink)