The work is significant not only for its illuminating assessment of Kant's thought but also for its elaboration of themes first broached in Being and Time, ...

Der erste Teilband des umfangreichen Seminarbandes 84 der Gesamtausgabe gehort in den grossen Kontext von Martin Heideggers Auseinandersetzung mit Immanuel Kant und Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Leibniz ist fur Heidegger von herausragender Bedeutung fur die Geschichte der neuzeitlichen Metaphysik zwischen Descartes und Kant. Im Band 84.1 kommen drei Seminare zu Kant und ein Seminar zu Leibniz erstmals zur Veroffentlichung. Die drei Kant-Seminare befassen sich mit Kants Preisschrift uber die aFortschritte der Metaphysik (Sommer 1931), mit Kants aTranszendentaler Dialektik aus der Kritik der (...) reinen Vernunft im Hinblick und Vorgriff auf Kants praktische Philosophie (Winter 1931/32) und nochmals mit aHauptstucken aus der Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Sommer 1934). Das Leibniz-Seminar (Winter 1935/36) gibt erstmals eine grundlegende und wegweisende Gesamtinterpretation der aMonadologie. (shrink)

By tracing the discourse employed by Critical philosophy back to a pre-predicative level of language, this paper adds a dimension to Heidegger’s retrieval of Kant. By making explicit the role that language plays in the first Critique—both in the development of the transcendental schema of knowledge in the Transendental Analytic and the determination of the boundaries of pure reason in the Transcendental Dialectic—a bridge is formed between Heidegger’s hermeneutics and Kant’s critical enterprise. Heidegger’s destructive-retrieval of Kant’s thought is then seen (...) to hinge as much on exploring the issue of language, as it is on the issue of temporality. (shrink)

A complete English translation of an important work from a crucial period in Heidegger’s overall intellectual trajectory.

The text of Martin Heidegger’s 1927–28 university lecture course on Emmanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason presents a close interpretive reading of the first two parts of this masterpiece of modern philosophy. In this course, Heidegger continues the task he enunciated in Being and Time as the problem of dismatling the history of ontology, using temporality as a clue. Within this context the relation between philosophy, ontology, and fundamental ontology is shown to be rooted in the genesis of the modern (...) mathematical sciences. Heidegger demonstrates that objectification of beings as beings is inseparable from knowledge a priori, the central problem of Kant’s Critique. He concludes that objectification rests on the productive power of imagination, a process that involves temporality, which is the basic constitution of humans as beings. (shrink)

Die Vorlesung knupft an das Ende der Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie an. Sie gibt ausfuhrlicher als dort eine Bestimmung des Verhaltnisses von positiver Wissenschaft, wissenschaftlicher Philosophie oder Ontologie und Fundamentalontologie. Die phanomenologische Interpretation der transzendentalen Asthetik und des ersten Buches der transzendentalen Analytik ist gegenuber der spateren Arbeit Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik weniger die abgeloste Darstellung als die Herausarbeitung der Kantdeutung in einer genauen und detaillierten Textanalyse, in der Abschnitt fur Abschnitt durchgegangen wird. Die Vorlesung bietet einen breiteren Zugang (...) zur lntention der Kantdeutung Heideggers. (shrink)

Temel ontoloji, sonlu insan özünün ontolojik açıdan çözümlenmesi anlamına gelir. Bu ontolojik çözümleme, “insanın doğasına ait” metafizik için temel hazırlamalıdır. Temel ontoloji, metafiziğin olanaklılaşması için gerekli olan insan Dasein’ın metafiziğidir ve tüm antropoloji türlerinden, felsefi antropolojiden de temelden ayrışır. Bir Temel ontoloji idesini açıklamak demek, Dasein’a ilişkin tanımlı ontolojik çözümlemeyi kaçınılmaz bir gereksinim olarak görmek ve bu yolla temel ontolojinin “insan nedir?” biçimindeki somut soruyu hangi amaçla ve hangi tarzda, hangi sınırlama içerisinde ve hangi koşullar altında sorduğunu açıklığa kavuşturmak demektir. (...) Ancak bir fikir öncelikle bir olguyu ya da olayı aydınlatma gücüne dayanarak beliriyorsa, temel ontoloji idesi de bir metafiziğin temellendirilmesi olarak “Saf Aklın Eleştirisi”nin bir yorumunda kendini savunmalı ve göstermelidir. (shrink)

The way in which a schema represents something is precisely by abstracting from some of its features; in a schema, representation and abstraction are thus not opposed to each other but rather internally related. The first part of this paper investigates this internal relation by delineating Kant’s concept of schema as the term mediating concept and intuition. Due to its pivotal position, however, the schema tends to collapse either into the conceptual or into the intuitive. The second part of the (...) paper turns to Heidegger who tries to overcome this difficulty: he does not conceive the schema as a supplementary representation that connects already determinate concepts and intuitions, but rather locates schematization immanently in the very articulation of concept and intuition themselves. The third part of the paper proposes that the schematicity of our representations can be reflected in three pictorial strategies that are important for contemporary art: reduction, serialization, and reconstruction. These strategies are exemplified in certain images which put us in a position to see through our own representational form, as it were, and observe the procedures of figuration involved in that very form. (shrink)

Since its original publication in 1929, Martin Heidegger’s provocative book on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason has attracted much attention both as an important contribution to twentieth-century Kant scholarship and as a pivotal work in Heidegger’s own development after Being and Time. This fifth, enlarged edition includes marginal notations made by Heidegger in his personal copy of the book and four new appendices—Heidegger's postpublication notes on the book, his review of Ernst Cassirer's Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Heidegger's response to reviews (...) by rudolf Odebrecht and Cassirer, and an essay "On the History of the Philosophical Chair since 1866." The work is significant not only for its illuminating assessment of Kant’s thought but also for its elaboration of themes first broached in Being and Time, especially the problem of how Heidegger proposed to enact his destruction of the metaphysical tradition and the role that his reading of Kant would play therein. (shrink)

Continues and extends explorations begun in Being and Time.

Die Schrift bringt den Text einer Vorlesung, die im Wintersemester 1935/36 unter dem Titel »Grundfragen der Metaphysik« an der Universität Freiburg/Br. gehalten wurde. Sie ist zu einem wesentlichen Teil Auslegung der Lehre Kants vom 'System aller Grundsätze des reinen Verstandes' in der »Kritik der reinen Vernunft« und führt fort, was in der Abhandlung »Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik« (1929) begonnen wurde.

While in Being and Time Heidegger criticizes Kant for presupposing the very objects that he then goes on to examine, in his 1935–1936 lecture course What Is a Thing? he argues that the differentiation of subject and object with which Kant begins enables him to point to the temporal nature of thought. In following Kant’s own description of his project, Heidegger deems the presupposition of the objects of experience not detrimental to the inquiry, but determinative of its circular method. In (...) this paper I investigate whether such circularity offers an entrance to Heidegger’s own hermeneutic circle. (shrink)

[Heidegger’s “always still an interpretation” of Kant].

Wandlung und Bestand, von H. Jonas.--Die Bedeutung von Martin Heideggers Denken für die Methode der Theologie, von H. Ott.--Das befreite Nichts, von K. Harries.--Bevestigter Gesang; Bemerkungen zu Heideggers Hölderlin-Auslegung, von R.E. Schulz-Seitz.--Heidegger und das Problem einer "philosophischen" Anthropologie, von H. Fahrenbach.--"Das Sein und das Nichts," von E. Tugendhat.--Der Logos-Gedanke des Heraklit, von K. Held.--Platon und das Problem der Wahrheit, von W. Hirsch.--Sein und Cogitationes, von Fr.-W. von Herrmann.--Die Zeitlichkeit der Repräsentation, von W. Janke.--Wandlungen in der Kant-Auffassung Heideggers, von H. Hoppe.--Dialectique (...) et difference. par J. Taminiaux.--Nietzsche im Denken Heideggers, von E. Heftrich.--Remarques sur le rapport de Sein und Zeit et de la phénoménologie husserlienne, par G. Granel.--chiasma (romanized); Merleau-Ponty und Heidegger, von R. Boehm.--Heidegger vom anderen Ufer, von H. Patočka.--Der Spruch des Heidegger, von G. Petrović. (shrink)

The way in which a schema represents something is precisely by abstracting from some of its features; in a schema, representation and abstraction are thus not opposed to each other but rather internally related. The first part of this paper investigates this internal relation by delineating Kant’s concept of schema as the term mediating concept and intuition. Due to its pivotal position, however, the schema tends to collapse either into the conceptual or into the intuitive. The second part of the (...) paper turns to Heidegger who tries to overcome this difficulty: he does not conceive the schema as a supplementary representation that connects already determinate concepts and intuitions, but rather locates schematization immanently in the very articulation of concept and intuition themselves. The third part of the paper proposes that the schematicity of our representations can be reflected in three pictorial strategies that are important for contemporary art: reduction, serialization, and reconstruction. These strategies are exemplified in certain images which put us in a position to see through our own representational form, as it were, and observe the procedures of figuration involved in that very form. (shrink)

This paper provides a new, comprehensive overview of Martin Heidegger’s interpretations of Immanuel Kant. Its aim is to identify Heidegger’s motive in interpreting Kant and to distinguish, for the first time, the four phases of Heidegger’s reading of Kant. The promise of the “phenomenological Kant” gave Heidegger entrance to a rich domain of investigation. In four phases and with reference to Husserl, Heidegger interpreted Kant as first falling short of phenomenology (1919-1925), then approaching phenomenology (1925-1927), then advancing phenomenology (1927-1929), and (...) finally recovering phenomenology (1930 and after). By identifying this motive and these four phases, the paper sets aside a number of common misinterpretations concerning the significance of the 1925 turn to Kant, the relation of the Kant-interpretation to Husserl, the relation of the 1929 'Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics' to 'Being and Time,' and Heidegger’s regard for Kant in his later writings. The paper thereby clarifies Heidegger’s path of thinking and its indebtedness to transcendental philosophy. (shrink)

Im ersten Hauptstück dieser Vorlesung interpretiert Heidegger die Wahrheitsfrage bei Aristoteles, insbesondere das Kapitel 10 des IX. Buches der Metaphysik. Das zweite Hauptstück entfaltet ein radikalisiertes Fragen nach der Wahrheit im Sinne der Zeitproblematik, wie sie die Daseinsanalytik ermöglicht; hier steht die Interpretation von Kants 'Kritik der reinen Vernunft' im Zentrum. Zum Verständnis der Genese von Heideggers Denken ist die Kenntnis dieser Vorlesung unentbehrlich.

The editors of the French edition of Michel Foucault's Introduction to Kant's Anthropology claim that Foucault started rereading Kant through Nietzsche in 1952 and then began rereading Kant and Nietzsche through Heidegger in 1953. This claim has not received much attention in the scholarly literature, but its significance should not be underestimated. In this article, I assess the likelihood that the editor’s claim is true and show how Foucault’s introduction to Kant’s Anthropology and his comments about Kant in The Order (...) of Things echo the concerns about finitude and subjectivity in Heidegger’s Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. I then argue that Foucault's later preoccupation with Kant's essay An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment? should be regarded as an attempt to develop an alternative to the Heideggerian interpretation of Kant, and the preoccupation with finitude, that had played such an important role in Foucault’s earlier works. (shrink)

_Heidegger’s Shadow_ is an important contribution to the understanding of Heidegger’s ambivalent relation to transcendental philosophy. Its contention is that Heidegger recognizes the importance of transcendental philosophy as the necessary point of entry to his thought, but he nonetheless comes to regard it as something that he must strive to overcome even though he knows such an attempt can never succeed. Engelland thoroughly engages with major texts such as _Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics_, _Being and Time_, and _Contributions _and (...) traces the progression of Heidegger’s readings of Kant and Husserl to show that Heidegger cannot abandon his own earlier breakthrough work in transcendental philosophy. This book will be of interest to those working on phenomenology, continental philosophy, and transcendental philosophy. (shrink)

Craft Objects, Aesthetic Contexts examines the place of contemporary craft in traditional aesthetics.

This book examines the ways that Heidegger, Lacoue-Labarthe, and Nancy adopt and reconfigure the Kantian understanding of "aesthetic presentation." In Kant, "aesthetic presentation" is understood in a technical sense as a specific mode of experience within a typology of different spheres of experience. This study argues that Heidegger, Lacoue-Labarthe, and Nancy generalize the elements of this specific mode of experience so that the aesthetic attitude and the vocabulary used by Kant to describe it are brought to bear on things in (...) general. The book goes beyond documenting the well-known influence of Kant's Critique of Judgment , however, to open up a new way of approaching some of the central issues in post-Kantian thought—including why it is that art, the art work, and the aesthetic are still available as a vehicle of critique even, or especially, after Auschwitz. It shows that a genealogy of contemporary theory needs to look at the question of presentation, which has arguably been a question that has worried philosophy from its very beginning. (shrink)

Heidegger has a reputation for reading himself into the philosophers he interprets, and his interpretation of Kant has therefore had little uptake in anglophone Kant scholarship. In this book, Morganna Lambeth provides a new account of Heidegger's method of interpreting Kant, arguing that it is more promising than is typically recognized. On her account, Heidegger thinks that Kant's greatest insights are located in moments of tension, where Kant struggles to articulate something new about his subject-matter. The role of the interpreter, (...) then, is to disentangle competing strands of argument, and to determine which strand is most compelling. Lambeth traces Heidegger's interpretive method across his reading of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and situates Heidegger's reconstruction of Kant's best line of argument against other post-Kantian readings. She finally shows how Heidegger's deep engagement with Kant sheds light on Heidegger's own philosophical views. (shrink)

The purpose of our contribution in this paper is to provide an overview of development of Heidegger’s account of imagination with a special focus to the affinity between phenomenology and psychology. (I.) Firstly, we reconstruct how – by his reading Husserl and Aristotle – the early Heidegger got to know the function of imagination as it can open the realm of the things themselves. (II.) Secondly, we investigate that in his Kant-book, Heidegger gave up his plan to further think the (...) viewpoints envisioned by Husserl and the Neo-Kantians, and he entirely transformed his previous concept of imagination by the chapter on Schematism. Ourcore thesis is that Heidegger’s account of imagination is concerned with the emergence of schemes of our thinking, that is to say, Heidegger went beyond the psychological Kant-interpretation, and at the same time he turned to discover the field of phenomenological unconscious. (shrink)

Segundo o autor do presente artigo, Martin Heidegger oferecenos uma nova interpretação de Kant. Usando o método fenomenológico, Heidegger busca os pressupostos implícitos no conhecimento finito na Crítica da razão pura de Kant. O pressuposto fundamental seria a temporalidade do sujeito. Desta forma, Heidegger encontra em Kant um apoio para a sua hermenêutica do Dasein, cujo ser é a temporalidade. O artigo defende que, segundo Heidegger, Kant deu passos importantes para uma reflexão radical sobre o tempo, mas não chegou propriamente (...) a fazêla, pois permaneceu ligado à metafísica tradicional. Mas o artigo mostra também que tampouco Heidegger logrou articular suficientemente a temporalidade do Dasein, facto este que lhe terá fechado o passo para uma verdadeira compreensão do sentido do ser. (shrink)

Between 1927 and 1936, Martin Heidegger devoted almost one thousand pages of close textual commentary to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. This article aims to shed new light on the relationship between Kant and Heidegger by providing a fresh analysis of two central texts: Heidegger’s 1927/8 lecture course Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and his 1929 monograph Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. I argue that to make sense of Heidegger’s reading of Kant, one must resolve two (...) questions. First, how does Heidegger’s Kant understand the concept of the transcendental? Second, what role does the concept of a horizon play in Heidegger’s reconstruction of the Critique? I answer the first question by drawing on Cassam’s model of a self-directed transcendental argument, and the second by examining the relationship between Kant’s doctrine that ‘pure, general logic’ abstracts from all semantic content and Hume’s attack on metaphysics. I close by sketching the implications of my results for Heidegger’s own thought. Ultimately, I conclude that Heidegger’s commentary on the Critical system is defined, above all, by a single issue: the nature of the ‘form’ of intentionality. (shrink)

The article defends Heidegger’s view that the main question of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is the question of being. It is also argued that Heidegger special understanding of the level and method of KrV deserves serious attention. Finally it is argued that Heidegger’s phenomenological reading of the KrV is best seen as representative of an hermeneutical conception of phenomenology.

Heidegger’s 1927 lecture course, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, includes an examination of the Kantian conception of being as it appears within the first Critique’s refutation of the ontological proof of God’s existence. There, Heidegger maintains that the Kantian definition of being as position is beset with an ambiguity that Kant could not resolve, as such a resolution would require the repudiation of the traditional ontology of the subject that Kant presupposes. Heidegger then claims that his own ontology of Dasein, (...) articulated in Being and Time, addresses the ambiguity in the Kantian position, and thus in Kantian being, through a phenomenology of the intentio/intentum relation—an analysis in which Heidegger attempts to move beyond the traditional ontology. Heidegger’s assessment of Kant, here, is characteristic of Heideggerian Kant-interpretation. That is, Heidegger typically views Kant as having pushed the traditional ontology to its limits, and then as having retreated from the radical implications of his own thought, due to his allegiance to that ontology. And in the context of his Kant-interpretations, Heidegger characterizes his own philosophical position as resulting from the pursuit of these radical implications of Kantian thought. (shrink)