An agent exercises instrumental rationality to the degree that she adopts appropriate means to achieving her ends. Adopting appropriate means to achieving one’s ends can, in turn, involve overcoming one’s strongest desires, that is, it can involve exercising synchronic self-control. However, contra prominent approaches, I deny that synchronic self-control is possible. Specifically, I draw on computational models and empirical evidence from cognitive neuroscience to describe a naturalistic, multi-system model of the mind. On this model, synchronic self-control is impossible. Must we, (...) then, give up on a meaningful conception of instrumental rationality? No. A multi-system view still permits something like synchronic self-control: an agent can control her very strong desires. Adopting a multi-system model of the mind thus places limitations on our conceptions of instrumental rationality, without requiring that we abandon the notion altogether. (shrink)

Iris Murdoch believes that unselfing is required for virtue, as it takes us out of our egoistic preoccupations, and connects us to the Good in the world. Love is a form of unselfing, illustrating how close attention to another, and the way they really are, again, takes us out of a narrow focus on the self. Though this view of love runs counter to a view that those in love often overlook flaws in their loved ones, or at least down-play (...) them, I argue that it is compatible with Murdoch's view that love can overlook some flaws, ones that do not speak to the loved one's true self. Unselfing requires that we don't engage in selfish delusion, but a softer view of our loved ones is permitted. (shrink)

Her analysis deals with the role of narcissism and idealization in the formation of a love object. She accounts for the role of the death drive by coining the term "love/hate.".

Leibniz’s claim that it is possible for us to gain metaphysical knowledge through reflection on the self has intrigued many commentators, but it has also often been criticized as flawed or unintelligible. A similar fate has beset Leibniz’s arguments against materialism. In this paper, I explore one of Leibniz’s lesser-known arguments against materialism from his reply to Bayle’s new note L, and argue that it provides us with an instance of a Leibnizian “argument from reflection”. This argument, I further show, (...) does not constitute a flawed appeal to mere introspection, but is in fact securely grounded in an important corollary of the Principle of Sufficient Reason: Leibniz’s Principle of Intelligibility. (shrink)

Current academic philosophy is being challenged from several angles. Subdisciplinary specialisations often make it challenging to articulate philosophy’s relevance for the societal questions of our day. Additionally, the success of the ‘scientific method’ puts pressure on philosophers to articulate their methods and specify how these can be successful. How does philosophical progress come about? What can philosophy contribute to our understanding of today’s world? Moreover, can it also contribute to resolving urgent societal challenges, such as anthropogenic climate change? This edited (...) volume evaluates the place of philosophy in the age of science. It addresses three related sub-themes: philosophical progress, philosophical method and philosophy’s societal relevance. Fourteen authors engage with these sub-themes, focusing on the topics of their philosophical expertise, such as the philosophy of religion, evolutionary ethics and the nature of free will. In doing so, they explore their methods of enquiry, and look at how progress in their research comes about. (shrink)

Kristeva points to Montesquieu's esprit général--his notion of the social body as a guaranteed hierarchy of private rights--in this humanistic plea for tolerance and commonality.

Examines prudential and moral reasoning in ancient and modern ethics. Ancient ethical theories' task of articulating the agent's overall goal; Structural differences between ancient eudaemonist theories and modern theories; Virtue as a complex intellectual kind of understanding.

Is Aristotle right when he says that Plato believed in a class ofentities which are "intermediate" between physical objects and Forms? It may seem unrewarding to ask this question again. Scholars divide into two groups over the answer, and it may well seem impossible by now for either side to make any point that will convince the other. If the issues are well understood, and the lines of the controversy drawn already, can it be worthwhile to reconsider the problem? In (...) this paper I shall try to reconsider this issue from a somewhat different angle. It may be that, while the traditional question cannot be conclusively answered as so stated, the problem can nevertheless be fruitfully investigated by first considering a related question,the answer to which has implications for the way in which the traditional question should be answered. (shrink)

Spoken language consists of a linear sequence of units, from which the existence of particular underlying hierarchical processing mechanisms is inferred. Uddén et al. use graph theory to provide a framework for describing the possible structural relationships that may underlie a linear output sequence. Being more explicit in defining different structures can help identifying and testing for such structures in AGL experiments, as well as help showing how behavioral and neuroimaging data reveals signatures of hierarchical processing in humans.

Consideramos de utilidad el análisis de la expresión "Historia de la Lógica" apelando a la teoría semántica de Frege, según la cual toda expresión lingüística dotada de sentido puede ser concebida como descompuesta en dos partes, una de las cuales está completa en sí misma (el argumento), mientras que la otra precisa de complemento; es no saturada (la función). A la Historia de la Lógica compete determinar la constitución-desaparación de categorías e ideas que en un proceso de desarrollo e influencia (...) mutua han configurado la lógica y la symploké entre esas categorías e ideas constituyen su cuerpo. Para recomponerlo, hemos procurado actuar, según aconseja Platón, como un dialéctico: cortar por las juntas naturales. El resultado ahí está. (shrink)

El escrito continúa una discusión mantenida por Macarena Marey, María Julia Bertomeu y Nuria Sánchez Madrid en torno a la capacidad de los principios del republicanismo kantiano para transformar el espacio social en un ámbito en el que la autosuficiencia material constituya una de las condiciones fundamentales para que la igualdad formal ante la ley y la libertad política puedan actualizarse. En estas coordenadas se manifiestan también algunas discrepancias en lo concerniente a la percepción kantiana de las injusticias sociales (...) y políticas propias de su tiempo, si bien se alcanza el acuerdo de que el diseño institucional del republicanismo kantiano constituye un dispositivo conceptual suficiente para eliminar la desigualdad económica que comporta pasividad civil y política. (shrink)

Inductive reasoning is fundamental to human cognition, yet it remains unclear how we develop this ability and what might influence our inductive choices. We created novel categories in which crucial factors such as domain and category structure were manipulated orthogonally. We trained 403 4–9-year-old children to categorise well-matched natural kind and artefact stimuli with either featural or relational category structure, followed by induction tasks. This wide age range allowed for the first full exploration of the developmental trajectory of inductive reasoning (...) in both domains. We found a gradual transition from perceptual to categorical induction with age. This pattern was stable across domains, but interestingly, children showed a category bias one year later for relational categories. We hypothesise that the ability to use category information in inductive reasoning develops gradually, but is delayed when children need to process and apply more complex category structures. (shrink)

Explores the benefits and consequences of archaeological theorizing on and interpretation of the social agency of nonhumans as relational beings capable of producing change in the world. Cross-examines traditional understanding of agency and personhood, presenting a globally diverse set of case studies that cover a range of cultural, geographical, and historical contexts"--Provided by publisher.

Galen is criticized for combining Plato’s tripartition-cum-trilocation of the soul, in which each part constitutes its own source of motivation, with the demand that the faculty of voluntary motion is limited to the rational part, being the only one located in the brain and having access to the relevant nerves. While scholars have concentrated on small nerves as connective organs, this paper focuses on thepneuma, blood and innate heat. When the latter is increased, the irrational parts can affect the brain’s (...) function to such an extent that the rational part’s volitions are reduced to their own desires. (shrink)

Staging and stratification are two diagnostic approaches that have introduced a more dynamic outlook on the development of diseases, thus participating in blurring the line between the normal and the pathological. First, diagnostic staging, aiming to capture how diseases evolve in time and/or space through identifiable and gradually more severe stages, may be said to lean on an underlying assumption of “temporal determinism”. Stratification, on the other hand, allows for the identification of various prognostic or predictive subgroups based on specific (...) markers, relying on a more “mechanistic” or “statistical” form of determinism. There are two medical fields in which these developments have played a significant role and have given rise to sometimes profound nosological transformations: oncology and psychiatry. Drawing on examples from these two fields, this paper aims to provide much needed conceptual clarifications on both staging and stratification in order to outline how several epistemological and ethical issues may, in turn, arise. We argue that diagnostic staging ought to be detached from the assumption of temporal determinism, though it should still play an essential role in adapting interventions to stage. In doing so, it would help counterbalance stratification’s own epistemological and ethical shortcomings. In this sense, the reflections and propositions developed in psychiatry can offer invaluable insights regarding how adopting a more transdiagnostic and cross-cutting perspective on temporality and disease dynamics may help combine both staging and stratification in clinical practice. (shrink)

El propósito de la “Dialéctica trascendental” es exponer cómo la razón es el origen de la ilusión trascendental, para prevenir los errores que puedan derivarse de ella. Sin embargo, en el “Apéndice”, Kant sostiene que la razón no sólo tiene este aspecto negativo o problemático, también es una facultad que le proporciona al entendimiento la meta de lograr una unidad sistemática de todo conocimiento. En el presente texto abordaré dos preocupaciones interpretativas en torno al “Apéndice”. La primera cuestiona si Kant (...) se contradice a sí mismo en esta sección al plantear que el principio de unidad sistemática es, simultáneamente, subjetivo y objetivo. La segunda reflexiona si se trata de una sección que contradice las tesis centrales de la “Analítica trascendental”, al presentar una nueva condición necesaria para el conocimiento, más allá de las establecidas por el entendimiento y la sensibilidad. (shrink)

I begin with some points from the Republic which are familiar, perhaps over-familiar, to everyone, and then raise an issue about the role of law in Kallipolis which points us to something not so familiar. I hope that this contribution to honoring Fred Miller will lead to the kind of discussion that his own work has stimulated over the years, across an incredibly wide range of topics. I am honored and delighted to contribute to honoring Fred, and hope that this (...) paper will be worthy of its inclusion in this collection. (shrink)

En el presente escrito indagamos en representaciones de docentes en torno a la experiencia de llevar adelante propuestas de filosofía con niños. Para ello, proponemos, primero, precisar las implicancias de lo que denominamos escenas filosóficas, definimos a la enseñanza de la filosofía como un problema filosófico y caracterizamos, luego, la práctica a partir de una polémica sobre su denominación de filosofía para niños o filosofía con niños. Para relevar estas representaciones, realizamos seis entrevistas en profundidad a docentes que tienen amplia (...) experiencia en esta práctica, y, a partir de un análisis de las entrevistas, ponemos el énfasis en la potencia de la reflexión sobre la experiencia. Recuperamos, en las narraciones, la revisión de la propia formación, de la idea de planificación y del modo en el que irrumpen las infancias. Por último, subrayamos el reconocimiento del carácter transformador del hacer filosofía con niños que relatan los docentes. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDer Text schlägt vor, die Entwicklung kollaborativer audiovisueller Wissenspraktiken in der Anthropologie als situiertes und diffraktives Wissen zu verstehen (Haraway, Barad, Smith). Im Durchgang durch einige historische Stationen der Geschichte kollaborativer und partizipativer Projekte wird vorgeschlagen, dass kollaboratives Filmemachen nicht nur eine Dezentrierung einseitiger Autor:innenschaft und einseitiger Repräsentationsmodi ist, sondern auch eine medienspezifische Wissensform, die an soziale Kontexte gebunden und in diese eingebettet ist. Vor dem Hintergrund des Kolonialfilms werden Stationen der Abgrenzung und Versuche der Dekolonisierung des Films beschrieben. Aktuelle (...) Filmexperimente mit marginalisierten Gruppen haben ihren Ursprung in den „shared anthropologies“ (Rouch) und haben diesen Ansatz durch konsequentere Formen des power sharing in Indigenen Kollaborationen und im Fourth Cinema weiterentwickelt. Film kann so auch Amateur:innenwissenspraktiken in kollaborativen Forschungsprojekten abbilden. (shrink)