After describing Wittgenstein's notion of ‘certainty’, in this article I provide four arguments to demonstrate that no certainty can be acquired at will. Specifically, I argue that, in order to assimilate a certainty, it is irrelevant whether the individual concerned has found a ground that seemingly justifies that certainty; has a given mental state; is willing to accept the certainty on the proposal of a persuader; or tries to act according to the certainty involved. Lastly, I analyse how each of (...) these arguments is reflected in the way children acquire certainties. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Fredérique de Vignemont has argued that there is a positive quale of bodily ownership . She thinks that tactile and other forms of somatosensory phenomenology incorporate a distinctive feeling of myness and takes issue with my defense in Bermúdez of a deflationary approach to bodily ownership. That paper proposed an argument deriving from Elizabeth Anscombe’s various discussions of what she terms knowledge without observation . De Vignemont is not convinced and appeals to the Rubber Hand Illusion (...) to undercut my appeal to Anscombe. Section 1 of this article restates the case against the putative quale of ownership. Section 2 explains why de Vignemonts’ objections miss the mark. Section 3 discusses in more detail how to draw a principled distinction between bodily awareness and ordinary perceptual awareness. (shrink)

Resumen: El presente trabajo se centra en los presupuestos hermenéuticos de los que parte la teoría comunicacional del derecho de Gregorio Robles, como doctrina que muestra una vía de superación de la dicotomía entre filosofía analítica y hermenéutica con la finalidad de hacer más claro el lenguaje de los juristas. Para ello, se analizan cuatro de las obras del autor, desde un punto de vista descriptivo y crítico, que presentan una mayor impronta hermenéutica como son Introducción a la Teoría del (...) Derecho, El Derecho como texto, Teoría del Derecho y Comunicación, lenguaje y derecho, para abordar el contexto en el que se mueve, sus influencias, la plausibilidad de la propia teoría dentro del marco analítico-hermenéutico, y el análisis descriptivo y crítico del manejo de determinados conceptos del debate hermenéutico en la teoría comunicacional del derecho. Abstract: The present paper focuses on the hermeneutical assumptions of Gregorio Robles’s communicational theory of law, as doctrine that shows a way of overcoming the dichotomy between analytical philosophy and hermeneutics in order to clarify the language of jurists. For that purpose, it analyzes four of the author’s works from a descriptive and critical point of view that present a greater hermeneutical influence such as Introduction to Legal Theory, Law as Text, Legal Theory and Communication, Language and Law, to tackle the context of the author, his influences, the plausibility of the theory itself within the analytical and hermeneutical framework, and the descriptive and critical analysis of the use of certain concepts of the hermeneutical debate in the communicational theory of law. (shrink)

There is at present no publication specifically dedicated to analyzing the philosophical implications of augmented reality, especially regarding knowledge formation, which constitutes a fundamental trait of knowledge society. That is why this volume includes an analysis of the applications and implications of augmented reality. While applications cover diverse fields like psychopathology and education, implications concern issues as diverse as negative knowledge, group cognition, the internet of things, and ontological issues, among others. In this way, it is intended not only to (...) generate answers, but also, to draw attention to new problems that arise with the diffusion of augmented reality. In order to contemplate these problems from diverse perspectives, the auhors are from a variety of fields - philosophy, computer sciencess, education, psychology, and many more. Accordingly, the volume offers varied and interesting contributions which are of interest to professionals from multiple disciplines. (shrink)

Though Wittgenstein's On Certainty has been influential in analytic epistemology, its interpretation has been enormously controversial. It is true that exegesis has been mainly concerned with the proper characterization of Wittgenstein's very notion of ?certainty?; however, some important questions remain unanswered regarding this notion. On the one hand, I am above all referring to the study of the possibilities we have of retaining a certainty when it has seemingly been placed into question and, on the other hand, of regaining a (...) certainty once it has been lost. In this paper, I attempt to provide a detailed answer to both questions. In so doing, some important features of the picture of ourselves which emerges from Wittgenstein's On Certainty are also revealed. (shrink)

We argue that there is no general theory of explanation that spans the sciences, mathematics, and ethics, etc. More specifically, there is no good reason to believe that substantive and domain-invariant constraints on explanatory information exist. Using Nickel (Noûs 44(2):305–328, 2010 ) as an exemplar of the contrary, generalist position, we first show that Nickel’s arguments rest on several ambiguities, and then show that even when these ambiguities are charitably corrected, Nickel’s defense of general theories of explanation is inadequate along (...) several different dimensions. Specifically, we argue that Nickel’s argument has three fatal flaws. First, he has not provided any compelling illustrations of domain-invariant constraints on explanation. Second, in order to fend off the most vehement skeptics of domain-invariant theories of explanation, Nickel must beg all of the important questions. Third, Nickel’s examples of explanations from different domains with common explanatory structure rely on incorrect formulations of the explanations under consideration, circular justifications, and/or a mischaracterization of the position Nickel intends to critique. Given that the best and most elaborate defense of the generalist position fails in so many ways, we conclude that the standard practice in philosophy (and in philosophy of science in particular), which is to develop theories of explanation that are tailored to specific domains, still is justified. For those who want to buy into a more ambitious project: beware of the costs! (shrink)

This article evaluates the following four theses about bodily experience and self-consciousness: Descartes's thesis ; Kant's thesis ; Locke's thesis ; and Merleau-Ponty's thesis. I argue that they are all true.

Algunos autores han intentado considerar los delirios como certezas –entendidas en el sentido de Wittgenstein– debido a las similitudes que parecen existir entre sus respectivos estatus epistemológicos. Sin embargo, dicho intento ha sido criticado con agudeza, entre otras razones, porque el contenido de los delirios choca frontalmente con el contenido de las certezas, por lo que los delirios no pueden ser comprendidos debido a los cambios en las relaciones de significado. Pero es evidente que, aunque los delirios no se puedan (...) contemplar como certezas, muchos delirios afectan de un modo u otro al sistema de certezas del paciente. Partiendo de esta base, no es descabellado pensar que dicha influencia pudiera ser también recíproca: en otras palabras, parece sumamente recomendable analizar si algunos delirios se podrían contemplar como el resultado de variaciones en certezas. En este artículo llevo a cabo dicho análisis al intentar mostrar que el origen de algunos delirios pedestres y severos puede ser hallado en lo que llamaré “ceguera a posibilidades” e “incertidumbre”, términos que he desarrollado teniendo en cuenta la obra del filósofo Ludwig Wittgenstein. (shrink)

This paper presents the concept of ‘religious certainty’ I have developed by drawing inspiration from Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘certainty’. After describing the particular traits of religious certainty, this paper addresses two difficulties derived from this concept. On the one hand, it explains why religious certainty functions as such even though all its consequences are far from being absolutely clear; on the other hand, it clarifies why, unlike the rest of certainties, the loss of religious certainty does not result in the (...) collapse of the world-picture made up of all certainties. Subsequently, it analyzes to what extent the teacher can teach religious certainty by acting as a facilitator for its acquisition–if desired—particularly bearing in mind that religious certainty cannot be attained at will. These basic teaching guidelines have several advantages. First, they make it possible to know the nature of religious certainty even better. Second, and most importantly, the fact of having adopted the perspective of a teacher who tries inculcating a religious certainty contributes to detecting and preventing forms of indoctrination that, arguably, might go unnoticed even when attempting to properly present religious certainty—or rather, this way of being religious—in current schools to foster understanding thereof. (shrink)

En este artículo se expone una reflexión desde la propuesta teórica de Charles Taylor sobre la construcción de la identidad individual como una narración social frente a la crítica de Amartya Sen, quien propone la identidad como resultado solo de la elección personal. Se argumenta que las criticas que Amartya Sen hace a los argumentos de Taylor son infundadas, ya que la perspectiva de Charles Taylor se centra más en el carácter fundamentalmente constructivo, narrativo y dialógico de la identidad que (...) en la pérdida de la libertad y la mera aceptación acrítica de la identidad asumida. Se concluye que la identidad como narración social desde la perspectiva teoría de Taylor sí da cabida a la capacidad de elegir de los individuos y a la consideración de las identidades múltiples y múltiples lealtades identitarias, pero se hace notar la importacia del contexto social y del grupo por encima de la elección personal en el momento en que una persona contruye su identidad, ya que les da valor a los bienes externos como la comunidad cultural y lingüística a la que la pertenece y que hacen posible la inteligibilidad y la narracción de lo que somos y de quiénes somos. This paper presents Charles Taylor's theoretical proposal of construction of identity confronted to the criticism of Amartya Sen who conceives identity as a result of personal choice. It is argued that the critiques that Amartya Sen makes to the arguments of Taylor are groundless given that the perspective of Charles Taylor focuses more on the fundamentally constructive nature of identity than on the loss of freedom and the mere uncritical acceptance of the assumed identity. Taylor's theory does has space for the ability to choose and the consideration of multiple identities but it draws attention to the importance of social and group context when a person builds his identity and it assigns a higher value to the external goods that define the way people live in contemporary societies, such as the cultural and linguistic community, than to personal choice. (shrink)

In this paper, I try to facilitate the understanding of the concept of ‘omniscience’ by taking into account the terminology developed in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. Thus, I start by explaining why omniscience can be regarded neither as grounded knowledge nor as ungrounded or objective certainty. Instead, omniscience might be considered as subjective certainty, which has the advantage of leaving scope for a doubt that enables and strengthens religious faith. Lastly, I clarify how God’s omniscience would be enriched if He (...) were informed of—without needing to share—our objective certainties, in addition to which I highlight two paradoxes that would arise if we disagreed with God regarding some of our objective certainties. These paradoxes reveal that even though the believer could not understand literally God’s statement, it might strengthen her faith if she realized and accepted that a true and consistent commitment to such statement entails the suspension of her own capacity for judgment. (shrink)

Lurie, Yuval: Wittgenstein on the Human Spirit. Rodopi, Amsterdam & New York, 2012, 277 pp.

En el presente artículo se aborda la cuestión de si la fenomenología husserliana puede ser considerada un correlacionismo en el sentido en que Quentin Meillassoux lo caracteriza en Después de la finitud y textos relacionados. Se sostiene que la respuesta debe ser negativa strictu sensu, aunque se añade que la fenomenología de Husserl sí puede ser entendida como un correlacionismo, pero uno sui generis que cae fuera de la concepción de Meillassoux. Al contestar a esta interrogante se busca brindar una (...) vía de aclaración a posibles malentendidos sobre la fenomenología husserliana que pudieran suscitarse a propósito de los planteamientos de Meillassoux y, a su vez, se pretende contribuir al diálogo de dicha forma de fenomenología con otras corrientes filosóficas contemporáneas. (shrink)

Il est certes difficile de trouver, parmi les femmes musiciennes, interprètes ou compositrices capables de transmettre leur art, une figure qui puisse servir de référence indiscutable. Cette quête infructueuse peut donner lieu à deux interprétations différentes. L'opinion traditionnelle en déduira l'absence de femmes assez exercées dans l'art musical pour être reconnues et transmettre leurs connaissances, considérées comme inexistantes. La perspective féministe, que je partage, fera remarquer...

To the sceptic's contention that I don't know that I have hands because I don't know that there is an external world, the Moorean replies that I know that there is an external world because I know that I have hands. Crispin Wright has argued that the Moorean move is illegitimate, and has tried to block it by limiting the applicability of the principle of the transmission of knowledge by inference—the principle that recognising the validity of an inference from known (...) premises generates knowledge of the conclusion. I argue that, in the presence of some plausible assumptions, blocking the Moorean move does not require limiting the applicability of the transmission principle. Then I argue against Jim Pryor's contention that the Moorean argument transmits evidential support from its premises to its conclusion. (shrink)

The analysis of so-called ?strategic intentional fouls? (SIF) as well as the discussion of their validity in the normative systems of sports have a long track record. These fouls can be characterised as rule violations committed in order to be detected and which accept the corresponding sanction. However, there is an additional goal of obtaining an advantage or subsequent benefit in the competition. In fact, this practice is not infrequent and it is even occasionally accepted by the players themselves, referees, (...) judges, sports authorities and spectators. In this work I have analysed the internal structure of SIFs (the features of an axiological gap and a ?special intention?) with a view to providing a deeper understanding and stressing the differences with closely related concepts: cheating, and especially fraus legis or what in Anglo-Saxon culture is called ?spoiling the game?. Finally, I try to show some difficulties in distinguishing SIF from gamesmanship. (shrink)

I use some ideas of Keith DeRose's to develop an (invariantist!) account of why sceptical reasoning doesn't show that I don't know that I'm not a brain in a vat. I argue that knowledge is subject to the risk-of-error constraint: a true belief won’t have the status of knowledge if there is a substantial risk of the belief being in error that hasn’t been brought under control. When a substantial risk of error is present (i.e. beliefs in propositions that are (...) false in nearby worlds), satisfying the constraint requires bringing the risk under control. This is achieved either by sensitivity, i.e. you wouldn’t have the belief if it were false, or by identifying evidence for the proposition. However, when the risk of error is not substantial (i.e. beliefs in propositions that are not false in nearby worlds), the constraint is satisfied by default. My belief that I am not a brain in a vat is insensitive and I have no evidence for it, but since it is not false in nearby worlds, it satisfies the constraint by default. (shrink)

[1] Recent philosophy of mind and epistemology has seen an important and influential trend towards accounting for at least some features of experiences in content-involving terms. It is a contested point whether ascribing content to experiences can account for all the intrinsic properties of experiences, but on many theories of experiences there are close links between the ascription of content and the ways in which experiences are ascribed and typed. The issues here have both epistemological and psychological dimensions. On the (...) one hand, a theory of experiential content has a fundamental role in explaining how knowledge of the world can be acquired through experience. On the other hand, there are important psychological questions about the phenomenology of experiences and the conditions under which content ascriptions are made. (shrink)

Information theoretic semantics proposes to construe predicate reference in terms of nomological relations between distal properties and properties of representational mental events. Research on the model has largely concentrated on the problem of choosing the nomological relation in terms of which distal properties are to be singled out. I argue that, in addition to this, an information theoretic account has to provide a specification of which properties of representational mental events will play a role in determining reference, qua bearers of (...) nomological relations. I contend that this task poses a serious additional challenge to the viability of the model. (shrink)

Este artículo revisa la concepción de la Independencia de Antonio Caso, Alfonso Reyes, José Vasconcelos, Samuel Ramos, Juan Hernández Luna, Leopoldo Zea, Emilio Uranga y Luis Villoro. La pregunta por las “raíces ideológicas” de la Independencia guio en buena medida esta discusión intergeneracional. Miguel Hidalgo era considerado, de manera casi unánime, un héroe, ya fuese uno de la latinidad (para Caso o Reyes) o un héroe existencialista (para Villoro). El artículo adopta el presupuesto metodológico del historicismo: una idea no (...) es sino la forma de reacción de un ser humano concreto frente a sus circunstancias. (shrink)

El presente texto aborda la figura de José Gaos que Antonio Zirión nos transmite en su reciente libro El sentido de la filosofía desde dos aspectos: por un lado, Gaos como profesor de filosofía y, por otro, Gaos como filósofo interesado en la tensión no resuelta entre la fenomenología y la metafísica y en la metafísica como problema en sí. Se discute también el lugar que Gaos asignó a la “soberbia” como una faceta esencial del quehacer filosófico y la (...) idea de que las afirmaciones filosóficas son, en última instancia, expresiones de una perspectiva vital personalísima y única. (shrink)

El trabajo llama la atención sobre un problema poco atendido por los filósofos contractualistas el cual puede presentarse a manera de pregunta: ¿Cuál es la posición original de los individuos que pactan un acuerdo de fundación de la sociedad civilizada? Para efectos del presente trabajo recurriré a la propuesta de contrato social en De Cive (1642) y Leviathan de Thomas Hobbes (1651). El trabajo defenderá la tesis de que el camino sugerido por Hobbes apela a un recurso que, a pesar (...) de ser presentado como de vital importancia en su teoría contractual, resulta inútil. Tal recurso es el que se refiere al pacto de sociedad. A pesar de que este paso fundamenta la vida civilizada finalmente es abandonado por el autor teniendo que recurrir a la fuerza coactiva del soberano para hacer cumplir lo prometido en el pacto. La razón es que los seres humanos son egoístas y tienden ineludiblemente a ser bribones: la fuerza coactiva del soberano tiene que corregir tales comportamientos. La conclusión que alcanzo a vislumbrar es que la mesa de negociación en la posición inicial sólo podría estar conformada por algunos individuos cautos, y, muchos bribones y tontos. Este conjunto de individuos con diferente percepción del significado del interés social justificaría el gran peso del argumento de la coacción gubernamental posterior al pacto de sociedad hobbesiano. (shrink)

It is generally accepted that Popper‘s degree of corroboration, though “inductivist” in a very general and weak sense, is not inductivist in a strong sense, i.e. when by ‘inductivism’ we mean the thesis that the right measure of evidential support has a probabilistic character. The aim of this paper is to challenge this common view by arguing that Popper can be regarded as an inductivist, not only in the weak broad sense but also in a narrower, probabilistic sense. In section (...) 2, first, I begin by briefly characterizing the relevant notion of inductivism that is at stake here; second, I present and discuss the main Popperian argument against it and show that in the only reading in which the argument is formally it is restricted to cases of predicted evidence, and that even if restricted in this way the argument is formally valid it is nevertheless materially unsound. In section 3, I analyze the desiderata that, according to Popper, any acceptable measure for evidential support must satisfy, I clean away its ad-hoc components and show that all the remaining desiderata are satisfied by inductuvist-in-strict-sense measures. In section 4 I demonstrate that two of these desiderata, accepted by Popper, imply that in cases of predicted evidence any measure that satisfies them is qualitatively indistinguishable from conditional probability. Finally I defend that this amounts to a kind of strong inductivism that enters into conflict with Popper’s anti-inductivist argument and declarations, and that this conflict does not depend on the incremental versus non-incremental distinction for evidential-support measures, making Popper’s position inconsistent in any reading.Keywords: Popper; Inductivism; Confirmation; Corroboration. (shrink)

In the sport context, an essential aspect of an athlete’s development and performance happens during the interaction with the coach while receiving information on the aspects of performance that need to be modified. Grounded in the Self-Determination Theory and particularly on the basic psychological needs theory, a structural equation model was tested with the following sequence: perception of the amount of corrective feedback generated by the coach, perceived legitimacy of corrective feedback, satisfaction of basic psychological needs, and vitality in soccer (...) players. Additionally, simple mediation and serial mediation models were also tested. Participants were 377 Mexican soccer players, who completed the instruments that evaluated the study variables. SEM results reported positive and significant variables’ interrelations in the sequence. The analysis of serial mediation model showed that the perceived legitimacy of feedback and the satisfaction of basic psychological needs fully mediated the relationship between the perception of the amount of corrective feedback generated by the coach and the perception of the subjective vitality of Mexican soccer players. Results suggest that coaches have to ensure that athletes accept the corrective feedback provided and meet their basic psychological needs. Based on SDT tenets, this research highlights the importance for coaches to be aware of the athlete’s perceptions when they are providing corrective feedback and their implications for athlete’s technical development and well-being. It is suggested to incorporate those aspects to training programs for coaches. (shrink)

Interpretar un texto filosófico supone procurar descifrar su significado, identificar sus tesis y aislar sus argumentos. Desarrollar un texto filosófico, en cambio, consiste en seleccionar ciertas ideas fundamentales, valiosas aunque necesitadas de afinamiento, y lograr su mejor formulación. Lógica Viva, la obra filosófica más importante de Vaz Ferreira, ha merecido diversas interpretaciones y desarrollos. En particular, esto ha ocurrido con su capítulo dedicado a la falsa oposición. El objetivo principal de esta nota es reconocer cinco enigmas en tal capítulo, relevantes (...) para una interpretación y decisivos para ciertos desarrollos. Expresados sucintamente en forma de interrogantes los mismos podrían exponerse así: ¿cómo entender, en este contexto, oposición?, ¿cuál es el papel que, en la caracterización del paralogismo, juega la ejemplificación?, ¿cuán relevantes son, en tal labor, las dimensiones literal y no-literal?, ¿en qué consiste el “mal argumento” que se considera falsa oposición?, ¿cómo equivoca y cómo persuade el mismo? Se recurre además a un modelo de análisis argumental (denominado M), inspirado en las ideas de Vaz Ferreira, a los efectos de mostrar cómo su uso auspicia, por una parte, un tratamiento explícito de estos enigmas y, por otra, desafiado por estos, cómo su aplicación pueda quizá sugerir líneas prometedoras de interpretación y/o desarrollo. Estas páginas pretenden asimismo ilustrar ciertas relaciones entre ambas actividades. (shrink)

The article suggests an ethical-anthropological reading of Thoughts, magna opera of the French mathematician and philosopher Blaise Pascal, which was published after his death by his relatives and friends. Such a reading is presented in three moments: Firstly, an anthropological description aimed at answering the question ‘who is man?’; secondly, an analysis of Pascal’s erotic condition; and, finally, an ethical proposal as cura amoris. The main argument of the article is that every human being has a motivation in acting, that (...) of love and being loved. Thus, having a happy or unhappy life depends on the care for this erotic condition, and the latter is achieved through thought. (shrink)

The architecture of brain, consciousness, and behavioral processes is shown to be formally similar in that all three may be conceived and depicted as Petri net patterned processes structured by a series of elements occurring or becoming active in stochastic succession, in parallel, with different rhythms of temporal iteration, and with a distinct qualitative manifestation in the spatiotemporal domain. A patterned process theory is derived from the isomorphic features of the models and contrasted with connectionist, dynamic system notions. This empirically (...) derived formulation is considered to be optimally compatible with the dual aspect theory in that the foundation of the diverse aspects would be a highly structured and dynamic process, the psychophysical neutral “ground” of mind and matter posed (but not properly determined) by dual aspect and neutral monist theories. It is methodologically sound to approach each one of these processes with specific tools and to establish concurrences in real time between them at the organismic level of analysis. Such intra‐level and inter‐perspective correlations could eventually constitute psychophysical bridge‐laws. A mature psychology of consciousness is necessary to situate and verify the bridges required by a genuine mind‐body science. (shrink)

Andrés el Capellán: dialéctica y juego en el amor. Resumen de Tesis de doctorado en Filosofía de Nicolás José Martínez Sáez.

After two decades in the 21st Century, and despite all the advances in the area, some very important names from past centuries still do not have the recognition they deserve in the global history of library and information science and, specifically, of knowledge organization. Although acknowledged in British librarianship, the name of James Duff Brown still does not have a proper recognition on a global scale. His contributions to a free and more democratic library had a prominent place in the (...) works and projects he developed during his time at the libraries of Clerkenwell and Islington in London. Free access to the library shelves, an architecture centered on books and people, and classifications that are more dynamic were dreams fulfilled by Brown. With this biographical article, we hope to live up to his legacy and pay homage to a true librarian and an advocate of the public library and subject classification. (shrink)

O objetivo deste ensaio filosófico é analisar a noção de performatividade na leitura feita por Jacques Derrida em Força de Lei: o “fundamento místico da autoridade”. A pergunta de partida é: como o caráter performativo do discurso jurídico instaura o regime de violência no nível da linguagem? A categoria de “fundamento místico da autoridade” revela um problema quanto à dinâmica do discurso jurídico enquanto violência. Toda essa violência é guardada por um silêncio que sustenta a autoridade do direito. Por isso, (...) é preciso analisar o argumento de Derrida em relação às teses sobre performatividade de John Austin. A compreensão da leitura derridiana possibilitará uma margem de diferença em relação à proposta austiniana por meio da iteralibiliade, isto é, da condição de repetição do signo que institui seu significado diferencial. Essa possibilidade sustenta e condiciona a força do direito. (shrink)

Para Kant, a luta pelo aprimoramento do direito é travada com as armas da argumentação. Trata-se de emancipar a comunidade jurídica da tutela oriunda do senhorio violento das origens. rumo ao Estado republicano. O processo desemboca na constituição de um Estado estabelecido pela união de uma multidão de seres humanos submetida a leis de direito, no qual o povo exerce, na figura de seus representantes, a soberania e os poderes da República estão comprometidos com a eficácia do direito. O artigo (...) expõe tópicos do pensamento político do pensador alemão e destaca traços relevantes da filosofia da história no Kant tardio. O trabalho visa contribuir para o debate político, jurídico e filosó-fico atual sobre globalização e o futuro do Estado nacional de direito. (shrink)