What grounds facts of ground? Some metaphysicians invoke fundamental grounding laws to answer this question. These are general principles that link grounded facts to their grounds. The main business of this paper is to advance the debate about the metaphysics of grounding laws by exploring the prospects of a plausible yet underexplored minimalist account, one which is structurally analogous to a familiar Humean conception of natural laws. In the positive part of this paper, I articulate such a novel view and (...) argue for its merits. The minimalist account shuns essences and takes laws to be unmysterious elite regularities. Therefore, it is a promising alternative for theorists of ground who spurn the acceptance of essentialism about the grounding laws but think that these are needed in our theorizing. In the negative part, I argue that widely accepted principles of ground, coupled with the tenets of minimalism, jeopardize the fundamentality of the grounding laws. I discuss two immediately available and prima facie appealing strategies to evade this threat. However, I show that both have undesirable theoretical costs. I conclude by casting doubts on whether the benefits of a minimalist account of fundamental grounding laws outweigh such costs. (shrink)

Dispositionality and qualitativity are key notions to describe the world that we inhabit. Dispositionality is a matter of what a thing is disposed to do in certain circumstances. Qualitativity is a matter of how a thing is like. According to the Identity Theory of powers, every fundamental property is at once dispositional and qualitative, or a powerful quality. Canonically, the Identity Theory holds a contentious identity claim between a property’s dispositionality and its qualitativity. In the literature, this view faces a (...) contradiction objection that undermines its merits. We should therefore consider an alternative version that does not embrace the identity claim. My aim is to show that we can enjoy the benefits of the Identity Theory without embracing the identity between the dispositional and the qualitative. I shall argue that a distinction between two senses of dispositionality and qualitativity serves the purpose. I will then discuss three readings of the identity claim that can be formulated in light of such a distinction. I will conclude that even if the identity were to fail in any of the suggested readings, it would be possible to hold an account of fundamental powerful qualities. (shrink)

In contemporary metaphysics, the doctrine that the fundamental facts are those which are wholly ungrounded is the received view or something near enough. Against this radical brutalism, several metaphysicians argued in favour of the existence of fundamental facts that are moderately brute or merely partially grounded. However, the arguments for moderately brute facts rely on controversial metaphysical scenarios. This paper aims to counteract the tendency in favour of radical brutalism on scientific grounds. It does so by showing that naturalistic metaphysicians (...) can appeal to plausible considerations from physical theory to establish the existence of moderately brute facts. But should the naturalistic metaphysician embrace moderate brutalism, namely the view that the fundamental facts are those which are merely partially ungrounded? Here I argue for a negative answer, recommending a more inclusive pluralism about the kinds of brute facts we can expect to find in nature. (shrink)

Dispositionalism holds that at least some fundamental physical properties are ungrounded dispositional ones. Unfortunately, the very scientific practice that dispositionalists invoke to support their view undermines the dispositional thesis: putative fundamental properties such as mass, charge, and spin appear to be grounded in symmetry structures. Can the dispositionalist hold that fundamental symmetry structures are dispositional? Livanios (2019) defends a negative answer: symmetry structures do not satisfy the truthmaking principle of dispositionality. By contrast, I offer a positive answer. Here I argue (...) that if dispositionalists adopt an identity-based criterion of dispositionality, they can endorse what I shall call moderate dispositional structuralism: the view that the identity of fundamental symmetry structures is partially but not exhaustively fixed by their dispositional character. The purpose of this paper is to articulate moderate dispositional structuralism and its merits. To defend the plausibility of this view, I compare it with its radical counterpart: the view that the identity of symmetry structures is fully or wholly fixed by their dispositionality. -/- . (shrink)

The central thesis of this paper is that in digital media the operations and representations of the human body reveal close somatic and aesthetic links with each other, the latter often working as forms of mitigation of the effects of the former. I will argue, therefore, that, in the digital domain, the modes and contents of representation should not be understood without the embodied relations inherent to the use of devices. For this to be feasible, it is essential to formulate (...) a new conception of the materiality of digital interfaces. Instead of being conceived according to traditional epistemological models—entirely detached from the agent’s performance—such materiality will be thought of in close connection with the nature of embodied relations and the interfaces’ technological structures and functions. (shrink)

Grounding is claimed to offer a promising characterization of the fundamental as thatwhich is ungrounded. Detractors of this view argue that there can be fundamental and yet mutuallygrounded entities. Such a possibility undermines the denition of the fundamental as theungrounded. I aim to show, however, that the possibility of fundamental mutually grounded entitiesdoes not force us to renounce the prospects of characterizing fundamentality in terms of ground-ing. To accomplish this aim, I defend a grounding-based view that accommodates fundamentalmutually grounded entities (...) straightforwardly. My denition of fundamentality is similar to, butimportantly different from, one that Karen Bennett discusses. I conclude by resisting two objec-tions raised by Jessica Wilson against the Bennettian framework that also target theproposed view. (shrink)

A respectable assessment of priority-based ontic structuralism demands an elucidation of its metaphysical backbone. Here we focus on two theses that stand in need of clarification: the Fundamentality Thesis states that structures are fundamental, and the Priority Thesis states that these structures are prior to putative fundamental objects, if these exist. Candidate notions to illuminate and such as supervenience and ontological dependence failed at this task. Our purpose is to show that grounding is the best competitor to articulate and, and (...) regiment such theses in a desirable unified way. Our strategy is two-fold. First, we make the case that grounding does better than ontological dependence and supervenience. Second, we show that the distinction between partial and full grounds permits us to respond to an objection raised by Kerry McKenzie against the proposal of interpreting priority-based Ontic Structuralism in the idiom of metaphysical determination. Our conclusion is that priority ontic structuralists have compelling reasons for adopting a grounding-based approach. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Jc Beall and A. J. Cotnoir proposed a bi-modal solution to the fundamental problem of Christology - the problem of reconciling the apparent contradiction implied by Christ’s divine and human natures. According to their solution, the contradiction could be resolved if one takes Christ’s dual nature as implying two different theological modal notions: one ranging over divine possibilities and the other over human possibilities. As a riposte, I argue that as novel and ingenious as Beall and (...) Cotnoir’s solution may be, it still fails to account for the very crux of the fundamental problem, viz., the true proposition about Christ being God-incarnate. (shrink)

Com este artigo são trazidas à reflexão duas temáticas que, desde longa data, animam o pensamento filosófico ocidental, a saber: a representação imagética do corpo e as suas potencialidades simbólicas discursivas. Tendo em vista a articulação conceptual de ambas, no quadro geral de uma teoria estética da sensibilidade afecta aos novos meios tecnológicos, será aqui introduzido e desenvolvido o conceito de ‘convergência figurativa’, do qual se partirá para repensar as dinâmicas emergentes da representação do corpo e as diferenças que o (...) médium digital impõe à própria ideia de representação. Mais do que ver na relação entre médium e corpo um liame puramente contingente e ancorado, única e exclusivamente, na representação do segundo pelo primeiro, trata-se, inversamente, de mostrar como é que ambos despoletam dinâmicas estruturais de complementaridade, quer estas sejam relativas aos domínios da figuração ou aos domínios da constituição material dos processos de mediação. Porém, para que, teórica e conceptualmente, possam ser escrutinadas, tais dinâmicas exigem uma reformulação do modo como se tem habitualmente compreendido a figuração do corpo pelos media, como, por exemplo, no caso das obras pictóricas artísticas. Por outro lado, tal como acontece no universo estético da arte, a ideia de ‘convergência figurativa’ deve, também, tornar evidente as formas da sua supressão, nomeadamente aquelas que atribuem ao corpo um estatuto pós-figurativo. (shrink)

In this book, authors from a wide interdisciplinary spectrum discuss the issue of care. The book covers both philosophical and therapeutic studies and contains a three-pronged approach to discussing the concepts of care: vulnerability, otherness, and therapy. Above all, it is a matter of combining, in a plural form, a path with multiple theoretical and conceptual bifurcations, but which always point to an observation of society from the perspective of human vulnerability.

DIREITO À INFORMAÇÃO NAS RELAÇÕES DE CONSUMO DE PRODUTOS ALIMENTÍCIOS NO ATACADO E NO VAREJO: PARTICULARIDADES SOBRE COMPOSIÇÃO, CARACTERÍSTICAS, PREÇO E QUANTIDADE DO PRODUTO.

Metaphysical orthodoxy holds that a privileged minority of properties carve reality at its joints. These are the so-called fundamental properties. This thesis concerns the contemporary philosophical debate about the nature of fundamental properties. In particular, it aims to answer two questions: What is the most adequate conception of fundamental properties? What is the “big picture” world-view that emerges by adopting such a conception? I argue that a satisfactory answer to both questions requires us to embrace a novel conception of powerful (...) qualities, according to which properties are at once dispositional and qualitative. By adopting the proposed conception of powerful qualities, an original theory of fundamental properties comes to light. I call it Dual-Aspect Account. In this thesis, I defend the Dual-Aspect Account and its superiority with respect to rival views of fundamental properties. I illustrate this claim by examining Dispositionalism, the view defended among others by Alexander Bird and Stephen Mumford, Categoricalism, which has been advocated notably by David Lewis and David Armstrong, and the Identity Theory of powerful qualities, primarily championed by C. B. Martin and John Heil. The latter is the standard conception of powerful qualities. However, in the literature, the Identity Theory faces the charge of contradiction. A preliminary task is therefore to show that a conception of powerful qualities is coherent. To accomplish this aim, I introduce the notion of an aspect of a property. On this interpretation, powerful qualities can be thought of as having dispositional and qualitative aspects. I show that such a conception allows us to disambiguate the claim that a property’s dispositionality is identical with its qualitativity, and evade the charge of contradiction. Aspects bring us other theoretical benefits. I illustrate this claim by showing how the Dual-Aspect Account offers us a promising theory of resemblance. I then compare its merits with David Armstrong’s theory of partial identity. The conclusion of this thesis is that the Dual-Aspect Account is better suited to capturing the world as we find it in everyday life and scientific investigation as compared to the theoretical positions examined. (shrink)

Nesta publicação se reúnem contribuições que abarcam algumas das principais questões que a Sociedade Moderna continua a colocar ao trabalho filosófico, rejeitando respostas pré-formatadas e exigindo novos modos de observar, reflectir e ler a realidade. É esse o desafio a que correspondem individual e colectivamente estes ensaios em torno de media, política e sentido.

Os problemas clássicos da possibilidade, origem e natureza do conhecimento não deixaram rasto na obra de Vilém Flusser; e mesmo os relativos à ciência e à técnica foram abordados, não numa perspectiva teórica, mas prática.O autor de A Dúvida, depois de uma intervalar sedução pelas virtualidades integradoras da cultura lusíada, na versão brasileira, recaiu na atitude analítica, crítica e separativa em que nascera para a vida do espírito. A crescente preocupação operativa de que deu mostras a partir daí constitui uma (...) pedra de escândalo na modernidade, conforme se apura até da recepção que tem tido. (shrink)

Dispositional essentialism is the view that all or many fundamental properties are essentially dispositional, orpowers. The literature on the dispositional essence of powers is abundant. In contrast, the question of how to understand the fundamentality of fundamental powers has received scarce interest. Therefore, the fundamentality of powers stands in need of clarification. There are four main conceptions of the fundamental, namely as that which is (i)metaphysically independent; or (ii)belonging to a minimally complete basis; or (iii)perfectly natural; or (iv)metaphysically primitive. Here, (...) I present and discuss each of these approaches from the viewpoint of dispositional essentialism. I show that (i) is incompatible with the metaphysics of powers and (ii)–(iv) have more drawbacks than merits. Therefore, my conclusion is that the dispositional essentialist should seek an alternative. Although I offer no positive account, I pave the way to more fruitful views by identifying the shortcoming of these unpromising options. (shrink)

In the fields of linguistics and psychology the didactic implementation of new knowledge relative to argumentative discourse and its acquisition has led us to develop a didactic sequence focused on the teaching of argumentation in 11–12 year old pupils. This sequence was experimented in six schools in order to assess the effect of these new educational methods on the capacities of pupils to treat the dialogic dimensions of argumentation in the writing of monologues. An analysis of the productions of the (...) puils who had been submitted to the didactic sequence, compared with those of a control group, showed a significant improvement in the capacities of the first group. These improvements concerned aspects such as backing up arguments, acknowledging the addressee, negotiating with an eventual contradictor and using of a certain number of units and linguistic expressions t specific to argumentative texts (expressions of responsability taking, textual organisers of cause and conclusion, modalisations of probability and of certitude, concessions and polite expressions). (shrink)

Strong emergentists about mental properties of conscious experience typically hold that these are ontologically “over and above” and distinct in kind as compared to physical properties. Powers-based account of strong emergence offer a promising framework for elucidating the ontological “over and above”-ness of strongly emergent properties. However, they do not automatically ensure the desired non-physicality. In this paper, I argue that a conception of properties as powerful qualities has in-built resources for capturing both the ontological “over and above”-ness and the (...) kind distinctness in a unified way. I begin by illustrating powers-based accounts of strong emergence. Then I defend the superiority of a powerful qualities-based account of strong emergence over two standard approaches recovering the distinctness in kind of strongly emergent mental properties: the via negativa strategy, and the anti-materialist strategy. I conclude that a conception of powerful qualities is a surprising yet natural ally for the proponent of strongly emergent mental properties. (shrink)

[...] Eu não sou "educador". Basta-me ser um dentre os demais seres do universo. Ou a ventura de ter procurado ser na vida um pedagogo. Nos últimos tempos tenho pensado muito nisto. Acho mesmo que a partir do final da década de 60 nós permitimos a despedagogização do ensino neste país de nome Brasil. Que é verde. amarelo, azul e branco! É mesmo. E pronto. Nestas duas décadas mataram ou permitimos que matassem a disciplina e a seriedade e o prazer (...) na Escola. E, aí, vale a questão: "escola para quê?" [...] Palavras-chave: Educador; Pedagogo; Escola; Brasil; Competência pedagógica. (shrink)

There is no consensus on the most adequate conception of the fundamental properties of our world. The pure powers view and the identity theory of powerful qualities claim to be promising alternatives to categoricalism, the view that all fundamental properties essentially contribute to the qualitative make-up of things that have them. The pure powers view holds that fundamental properties essentially empower things that have them with a distinctive causal profile. On the identity theory, fundamental properties are dispositional as well as (...) qualitative, or powerful qualities. Despite the manifest difference, Taylor (2018) argues that pure powers and powerful qualities collapse into the same ontology. If this collapse objection were sound, the debate between the pure powers view and the identity theory of powerful qualities would be illusory: these views could claim the same advantages and would suffer the same problems. Here I defend an ontologically robust distinction between pure powers and powerful qualities. To accomplish this aim, I show that the collapse between pure powers and powerful qualities can be resisted. I conclude by drawing some positive implications of this result. (shrink)

Some facts ground by generating: they ground by bringing about other facts or grounding connections among them. Intuitively, other facts play a similar role to background conditions in the causal case: they ground by enabling the obtaining of grounded facts or generative connections among them. As we may ask whether causal background conditions are irreducible to causes, we may wonder whether enablers are irreducible to generators. Some metaphysicians defend a genuine metaphysical distinction between generators and enablers. Yet considerations from ideological (...) parsimony and unity should prompt us to defend a unified account of ground. Here, I identify and discuss some characteristics extracted from the literature that are said to be possessed by enablers only. Contrary to this claim, I argue that generators can possess the same features. I conclude that such features should not be regarded as a guide to the irreducibility of enabling to generation. (shrink)

Centrada na reflexão sobre as diversas formas culturais que geram o liame simbólico entre homem e mundo, a filosofia cassireriana está, simultaneamente, comprometida com uma “antropologia da individuação”, através da qual é possível vislumbrar as possibilidades de formação da consciência humana face ao universo mediado pelo símbolo. Tal como Cassirer inúmeras vezes reitera, é no interior desse universo que devem ser procurados os principais nexos individuantes subjacentes à energia criadora do espírito. Daí que, no próprio conceito de cultura cassireriano, as (...) formas simbólicas – mito, religião, ciência, arte, linguagem, técnica – assumam, ab initio, o estatuto de realizações progressivas da auto-libertação do ser humano. Ao contrário da tese da Tragödie der Kultur, de Georg Simmel, as formas simbólicas e os seus artefactos materiais não encerram o sujeito num cosmo auto-suficiente, absoluto e definitivo, cuja natureza objectiva tende a pôr em causa a formação da sua vida subjectiva. Para Cassirer, inversamente, os processos de simbolização são inscrições do sentido em devir, isto é, tanto estruturam a apreensão da realidade como pressupõem a sua contínua transformação. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: SATS Jahrgang: 17 Heft: 2 Seiten: 185-196.

Any criticism that can be made of philosophy necessarily implies knowledge of the nature of its symbolic structures. Accordingly, in this paper, I argue that the reflective value of philosophy in the understanding of reality must start by taking into account the peculiar features of the symbolic elements, which compose and support its epistemic structures. The representative core of these elements is, to that extent, the philosophical concept. Through it, as I will try to bring to light, the human mind (...) acquires an ideal coupling between thought objects and the act of thinking itself, which in turn differs from that of other forms of knowledge. The question remains, however, whether such unity always carries a sense of reality and what its nature is. (shrink)

More than a matter confined to Mandevillean thought, the discourse on the relationship between imagination and sensibility is a significant theoretical framework of eighteenth-century philosophical thought. Sensibility and imagination appear in Bernard Mandeville's The Fable of the Bees as antithetical concepts, because they are fully articulated according to a natural and deterministic criterion of the expression of passions. Such a materialist understanding of the passions places a premium upon the proximity of stimulus and accordingly problematizes the responsive role of imagination. (...) I intend to show in this paper that the primacy of expression takes place, at first instance, regarding the imagination, which, as we can detect in all Mandeville's oeuvre, is well exemplified by the mimetic function that art itself earns. (shrink)

O fenómeno da corrupção não pode ser pensado sem a inclusão das suas potencialidades simbólicas. A informação que, pela acção dos mass media, aparece construída sob a forma de escândalo, acaba por determinar a própria construção da sua natureza factual. Logo, aqui impera a questão de saber por que é que as práticas corruptas favorecem o discurso do escândalo, bem como a legitimação dos mass media como instrumentos de objectivação dos comportamentos ilícitos. Procurar-se-á ponderar essas questões, mediante a formulação de (...) uma estética da "invisibilidade" inerente aos meios de comunicação, que é, por sua vez, reforçada pelas potencialidades discursivas das práticas corruptas. (shrink)

In a first approach, “caring” can be understood as a way of articulating time in full agreement with the need of others. Therefore, and thanks to care, we profit with the access to a peculiar consciousness of time which transcends the practical time of caring and simultaneously fosters and frames our own perception of time itself. Nevertheless, we know that in several care institutions there is a kind of “economic time” which is necessary both to the meeting with the most (...) urgent needs as to fill the scarcity of the available resources. The time of institutionalized care is, above all, measured by the spatial conditions and possibilities as well as by the individuals who daily dwell and struggle in between such factors. The institutionalization of care practices tends to arouse an apparent primacy of space over time. Hospitals, nursing homes, day-care centers for children, recovery centers, among others, are now more likely than ever to fill the lack of time of individuals. Therefore, space is also a material reaction both to the lack of time and to the consciousness of time, especially boosted by those who abandon their loved ones. Based on these multiple articulations of time and space, I will try to show how the relational nature of care is transformed and gives rise to new ways of conceiving the idea of caring. (shrink)

The present work is completely grounded in the methodology of textual analysis as present in buddhist studies and has three essential pretentions. The first one is to discuss the relationship between the conceptual and non-conceptual dimensions of buddhist practice from the standpoint of the concept of the three wisdoms. The second one is to define a central standpoint able to judge the difference between buddhist practice proper and the therapeutic and scientific approaches to meditation. The third one tries to think (...) the complete autonomy of the conceptual dimension from an analysis of the relationship between the three wisdoms and the three worlds in the Satya-siddhi-Sãstra. (shrink)

RESUMO Este artigo pretende analisar o tópico das "Duas Verdades" na história do pensamento budista. Seu objetivo consiste em elucidar esse tópico a partir do ponto de vista do "Satya-siddhi-śāstra". Parte-se aqui de uma consideração metodológica referente ao problema das múltiplas tradições intelectuais do universo budista, desenvolvendo-se uma análise do conceito das "Duas Verdades" presente no "Satya-siddhi-śāstra". ABSTRACT This article hopes to analyze the topic of the "Two truths" in the history of Buddhist thought. The subject is to elucidate this (...) topic from the point of view of the "Satya-siddhi-śāstra". The starting point is the methodological considerations concerning the multiple intellectual traditions present in the Buddhist universe developing an analysis of the "Two truths" as present in the "Satya-siddhi-śāstra". (shrink)

L’on montre dans quelles circonstances et pourquoi le problème des valeurs s’est posé dans la philosophie moderne. Jusqu’à la Renaissance et à Descartes, être et valeur sont identiques parce que l’être est défini par sa fonction et cette fonction par son rapport au tout. Dès que l’on admet, au contraire, l’univocité de l’être, il en résulte cette indifférence de l’être aux valeurs, qui se marque dans le principe d’inertie ou dans la relativité. Dans une pareille conception de l’être, les valeurs (...) ne peuvent être qu’autonomes par rapport à l’être, et c’est la recherche de cette autonomie qui caractérise la théorie moderne des valeurs. (shrink)

This book provides new theoretical approaches to the subject of virtuality. All chapters reflect the importance of extending the analysis of the concept of “the virtual” to areas of knowledge that, until today, have not been fully included in its philosophical foundations. The respective chapters share new insights on art, media, psychic systems and technology, while also presenting new ways of articulating the concept of the virtual with regard to the main premises of Western thought. Given its thematic scope, this (...) book is intended not only for a philosophical audience, but also for all scientists who have turned to the humanities in search of answers to their questions. (shrink)

Este trabajo titulado " El Deber de Adoptar y los Derechos de la niñez en Chile" será incluido en el Volumen 24. Número 86(2024) de Revista Iberoamericana en la sección Foro de Debate denominada “Infancias Latinoamericanas: desafíos para la garantía de derechos en la región".

Theorists of grounding believe that this notion has an intimate connection with metaphysical explanation. However, they struggle to harmonize the objective mind-independent features of grounding and the context-sensitive aspects of metaphysical explanation. As a reconciliatory approach, I offer a framework of metaphysical explanation that draws from perspectival realist views in the philosophy of science. According to the proposed view, our understanding of grounding claims is inescapably situated in agent-dependent perspectives that aim to aptly latch onto a grounding structure out there. (...) To defend its merits, I discuss how this grounding perspectivalism offers an insightful analysis of disagreements concerning the priority and asymmetry of what grounds what. Exploring some of the deeper implications of the proposed framework, I conclude by stirring controversy: contrary to a popular view, grounding perspectivalism implies that metaphysical explanation should not be regarded as a guide to grounding. -/- . (shrink)

Summary We intended to contribute with an innovation for the study of the applied phenomenology to the field of the imaginary. It is a group of ideas that will allow to elaborate a phenomenological reading of Gaston Bachelard’s aesthetic work. In first place we will approach the husserlian notion of neutrality modification as form of opening road to the interpretation of the bachelardian imagination of the matters. Continuously we will present some theories that demonstrate the possibility of a new phenomenology, (...) the dynamic phenomenology. We will end with a type of introduction to another phenomenological attitude based on the topoanalysis and in the awake ego of the active imagination. (shrink)