Reductive intellectualists (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a; 2011b; Brogaard 2008; 2009; 2011) hold that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. If this thesis is correct, then we should expect the defeasibility conditions for knowledge-how and knowledge-that to be uniform—viz., that the mechanisms of epistemic defeat which undermine propositional knowledge will be equally capable of imperilling knowledge-how. The goal of this paper is twofold: first, against intellectualism, we will show that knowledge-how is in fact resilient to being undermined by (...) the very kinds of traditional (propositional) epistemic defeaters which clearly defeat the items of propositional knowledge which intellectualists identify with knowledge-how. Second, we aim to fill an important lacuna in the contemporary debate, which is to develop an alternative way in which epistemic defeat for knowledge-how could be modelled within an anti-intellectualist framework. (shrink)

This paper advances new theses about the relationship between luck and risk, using recent work by Duncan Pritchard (2014, 2015, 2016) as its foil. Once Pritchard’s views are introduced in section 1, the rest of the paper completes two different tasks, one critical and one constructive. By focussing on some epistemological cases that Pritchard’s model would fail to identify, section 2 shows that it relies on a difference that is in fact inessential: the one between the occurrence and the non‐occurrence (...) of an event. Section 3 sketches and defends an alternative account of the luck/risk distinction, based on the consideration of situations (instead of events) from different temporal perspectives: luck assessments track a situation’s past, considering it the actual outcome of some previous event, whereas risk assessments look at the situation’s future, regarding it as the initial condition of some unsettled event. (shrink)

According to robust versions of virtue epistemology, the reason why knowledge is incompatible with certain kinds of luck is that justified true beliefs must be achieved by the agent . In a recent set of papers, Pritchard has challenged these sorts of views, advancing different arguments against them. I confront one of them here, which is constructed upon scenarios affected by environmental luck, such as the fake barn cases. My objection to Pritchard differs from those offered until now by Carter (...) , Jarvis or Littlejohn in that it is based on the claim that cognitive performances may not be properly considered as achievements beyond the scope of the agent’s intentional action—an idea that confers more explanatory power on my argument, and contributes to stregthening links between knowledge and agency. (shrink)

We are witnessing a certain tendency in epistemology to account for the anti-luck intuition in terms of risk. I.e., instead of the traditional anti-luck diagnosis of Gettier cases and fake barn cases, a new anti-risk diagnosis seems to be preferable by many. My goal in this paper is twofold: first, I contribute to motivate that drift; and second, I defend that we ought to partially resist it. An anti-risk diagnosis is valid and preferable for fake barn cases, but we still (...) need an anti-luck diagnosis for classic Gettier cases. The paper thus defends the Solomon-like result that we need both concepts—epistemic luck and epistemic risk—to deal with all the cases where knowledge is undermined. (shrink)

Knowledge, like other things of value, can be faked. According to Hawley (2011), know-how is harder to fake than knowledge-that, given that merely apparent propositional knowledge is in general more resilient to our attempts at successful detection than are corresponding attempts to fake know-how. While Hawley’s reasoning for a kind of detection resilience asymmetry between know-how and know-that looks initially plausible, it should ultimately be resisted. In showing why, we outline different ways in which know-how can be faked even when (...) a given performance is successful; and in doing so, we distinguish how know-how can be faked (no less than know-that) via upstream and downstream indicators of its presence, and within each of these categories, we’ll distinguish (in connection with detection resilience) both faking symptoms and (various kinds of) criteria. The unappreciated resilience of faked knowledge-how to successful detection highlights a largely overlooked dimension of social-epistemic risk – risk we face not just in our capacity as recipients of testimony, but in our capacity as both (would-be) apprentices and clients of knowledge-how. (shrink)

We may succed in the fulfilment of our desires but still fail to properly own our practical life, perhaps because we acted as addicts, driven by desires that are alien to our will, or as “wantons,” satisfying the desires that we simply happen to have (Frankfurt, 1988 ). May we equally fail to own the outcomes of our epistemic life? If so, how may we attain epistemic ownership over it? This paper explores the structural parallellism between practical and epistemic rationality, (...) building on Williamson’s ( 2002 ) suggestion that we should commence with successful performances as the foundation for both domains, be it action or knowledge. By highlighting the limitations of higher-order regulative approaches in epistemology, exemplified by Sosa ( 2007, 2011, 2015, 2021 ), the paper introduces a form of teleological epistemic constitutivism inspired by Velleman ( 2000, 2009 ). The proposal is that epistemic ownership is not attained in the mere pursuit of truth or knowledge, but requires furthermore a struggle to understand what we know. (shrink)

According to Sosa (2015, 2021), the domain of epistemic normativity divides into gnoseology and intellectual ethics, a boundary that results from the key notion that gnoseological assessments are telic. We share this view here and highlight the implications that the telic claim has for different debates in contemporary epistemology. However, we also raise the complaint that Sosa’s analogy of the archer has suggested that this boundary aligns with those of the instant of cognitive performance and its attributability to an individual, (...) as featured in the Cartesian fundamental epistemic question: _What should I believe now?_ Against this Cartesian imprint, we claim that temporality and sociality may be constitutive features of gnoseology. In order to show this, we introduce alternative analogies of belief formation processes that illustrate how cognitive achievements may be collectively attained across time, features that may manifest as an epistemology of conversation. (shrink)

The questions ‘Do I know p?’ and ‘shall I take p as a reason to act?’ seem to belong to different domains — or so claims Ernest Sosa in his Judgment and Agency, the latest version of his virtue epistemology. According to Sosa, we may formulate the first question in a purely epistemological way — a matter of knowledge “full stop” —, while the second one is necessarily intruded by pragmatic factors — a matter of “actionable knowledge”. Both should be (...) answered, in his view, considering the reliability of my belief, but the former could be faced in total abstraction from my personal practical concerns. In this paper I dispute Sosa’s view, and claim that no purely epistemic level of knowledge “full stop” is conceivable, at least within a reliabilist framework. A case is put forward in order to show that some given belief may not be considered as reliable by itself, as a token, but always as a member of a type, belonging to some class of reference of other beliefs. And the relevant class of reference may only be chosen considering personal practical interests. (shrink)

This study tested a structural model of cognitive-emotional explanatory variables to explain performance in mathematics. The predictor variables assessed were related to students’ level of development of early mathematical competencies (EMCs), specifically, relational and numerical competencies, predisposition toward mathematics, and the level of logical intelligence in a population of primary school Chilean students (n = 634). This longitudinal study also included the academic performance of the students during a period of four years as a variable. The sampled students were initially (...) assessed by means of an Early Numeracy Test (ENT), and, subsequently, they were administered a Likert-type scale to measure their predisposition toward mathematics (EPMAT) and a basic test of logical intelligence (TILE). The results of these tests were used to analyse the interaction of all the aforementioned variables by means of a structural equations model. This combined interaction model was able to predict 64.3% of the variability of observed performance. Preschool students' performance in EMCs was a strong predictor for achievement in mathematics for students between 8 to 11 years of age. Therefore, this paper highlights the importance of EMCs and the modulating role of predisposition toward mathematics. Also, this paper discusses the educational role of these findings, as well as possible ways to improve negative predispositions toward mathematical tasks in the school domain. (shrink)

Humans can follow different social learning strategies, sometimes oriented toward the models’ characteristics. The goal of the present study was to explore which who-strategy is preferentially followed in the technological context based on the models’ psychological characteristics. We identified three potential who-strategies: Copy the pedagogue, copy the engineer, and copy the friend. We developed a closed-group micro-society paradigm in which participants had to build the highest possible towers. Participants began with an individual building phase. Then, they were gathered to discuss (...) the best solutions to increase tower height. After this discussion phase, they had to make a new building attempt, followed by another discussion phase, and so forth for a total of six building phases and five discussion rounds. This methodology allowed us to create an attraction score for each participant. We also assessed participants’ theory-of-mind skills, technical-reasoning skills, and prosocialness to predict participants’ attraction scores based on these measures. Results show that we learn from engineers because they are the most successful. Their attraction power is not immediate, but after they have been identified as attractors, their technique is copied irrespective of their pedagogy or friendliness. These findings open avenues for the study of the cognitive bases of human technological culture. (shrink)

Historical accounts of the work of J. J. Thomson find a contradiction in his work. On the one hand, he is presented as a Maxwellian theoretical physicist dealing with a typically Victorian entity, the ether. On the other hand, the analysis of his experimental work at the Cavendish seems to have little connection with his mathematical work. In this paper, I discuss the metaphysical views of J. J. Thomson, and argue that his deep belief in the ultimate continuity of matter (...) can be seen to give a framework to both his theoretical and his experimental work. His metaphysical beliefs were not in the least shaken by the discovery of discrete phenomena and entities, not even by his suggestion of the existence of corpuscles later known as electrons. His formation in Cambridge, together with some ideas that he acquired in his youth at Owens College, Manchester, are the key to understanding his metaphysics and the role it plays in his scientific work. (shrink)

According to the standard view, Montaigne’s Pyrrhonian doubts would be in the origin of Descartes’ radical Sceptical challenges and his cogito argument. Although this paper does not deny this influence, its aim is to reconsider it from a different perspective, by acknowledging that it was not Montaigne’s Scepticism, but his Stoicism, which played the decisive role in the birth of the modern internalist conception of subjectivity. Cartesian need for certitude is to be better understood as an effect of the Stoic (...) model of wisdom, which urges the sage to build an inner space for self-sufficiency and absolute freedom. (shrink)

Faced with the impossibility of reaching any reductive analysis of the concept of lying, Tobies Grimaltos and Sergi Rosell have proposed a conception thereof that is based on its paradigmatic conditions. Among those conditions, the one of deceiving the listener is prominent. The relationship between lying and deceiving would be crucial in order to understand the paradigmatic cases of the concept, even if merely contingent — a thesis with important implications for its moral assessment. I present their proposal here and (...) advance three objections to it. First: that any theory of lying should be built on a theory of assertion, which already delimits what is properly said in parasitic uses of language (such as metaphor or irony). Second: that we should distinguish the uses of lying from its constituent aspects, among which the intention to lie, not the one to deceive, stands out. And third: that a paradigmatic model of lying should assume an epistemic condition, and not merely a doxastic one, according to which lying is, paradigmatically, saying something that one knows to be false. (shrink)

Gilbert Ryle famously denied that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that, a thesis that has been contested by so-called “intellectualists.” I begin by proposing a rearrangement of some of the concepts of this debate, and then I focus on Jason Stanley’s reading of Ryle’s position. I show that Ryle has been seriously misconstrued in this discussion, and then revise Ryle’s original arguments in order to show that the confrontation between intellectualists and anti-intellectualists may not be as insurmountable as it seems, (...) at least in the case of Stanley, given that both contenders are motivated by their discontent with a conception of intelligent performances as the effect of intellectual hidden powers detached from practice. (shrink)

This article delves into the reception of John W. Draper's History of the Conflict between Religion and Science in Spain. With two translations into Spanish appearing almost simultaneously in 1876, the conflict became a weapon in a long political dispute. The tensions between conservatives and liberals, between monarchists and republicans had the university and pedagogical reforms as one of the main battlefields. One of the chief reformist movements was informed by “Krausism,” an ideology that had academic freedom as one if (...) its central tenets. The similarities between the educational agenda of Draper and that of Krausists explain why the former's book resonated among members of the latter group. The article argues that in order to understand the reception of Draper in Spain, one should pay attention to the disputes about national identity and educational reforms, so as to place the so‐called conflict thesis in the context of opposing Spanish patriotisms. (shrink)

Nowadays philosophy is characterized by such heterogeneous intellectual practices that its very unity and coherence seem endangered. What is especially disconcerting is that most authors manage to largely ignore the very existence of methodological positions radically different from their own. Fortunately, there have been exceptions, and the present volume focuses on one of them: the failed debate that took place between John Searle and Jacques Derrida. -/- This book thoroughly analyses that exchange, contextualizing it within the respective philosophical traditions of (...) the two thinkers, with the general aim of turning their dispute into what it was not: a respectful, sensible and fruitful controversy. This episode is thus taken as an opportunity to reflect on the peculiar nature of philosophy as an intellectual practice, and to discuss some of its main themes: language as an instrument for communication, the intentionality of consciousness, and difference as a constitutive element of every text. (shrink)

La nuestra parece ser una época aquejada por el escepticismo. ¿Pero qué forma de escepticismo es propiamente la que nos afecta, y cómo recibimos esta herencia del pensamiento antiguo? En este trabajo exploro la cuestión atendiendo al origen histórico del escepticismo filosófico, su actualización durante el Renacimiento y su influencia en el presente. En la primera parte presento las dos variantes del escepticismo clásico, pirronismo y academicismo. En la segunda señalo cómo el primero dejó su impronta en el Renacimiento fomentando (...) la crítica intelectual y la tolerancia social. En la tercera parte presento cómo, con Descartes, la discusión sobre el escepticismo partió de asunciones infalibilistas, confinándose en los límites de lo que Williams llamó «la investigación pura». En la cuarta parte esbozo el marco de la normatividad epistémica, señalando diversas patologías contemporáneas propias de lo que se ha denominado “la posverdad” (auge de las fake news, producción sistemática de incertidumbre, conspiracionismo…). Cuestiono ahí ese apelativo y presento estas patologías como efecto de lo que llamo “desnutrición epistémica”. En la quinta apunto en qué sentido estos males parecen ser resultado de aquella herencia escéptica. En la sexta parte descarto algunos diagnósticos fallidos de esta relación, y en la séptima afino finalmente el tiro, subrayando que es a la interpretación infalibilista del escepticismo, así como a su desvinculación de toda motivación práctica, y no al escepticismo per se, a lo que cabría, si acaso, atribuir estos perniciosos efectos. (shrink)

Dynamic Assessment (DA) has been shown to have more predictive value than conventional tests for academic performance. However, in relation to reading difficulties, further research is needed to determine the predictive validity of DA for specific aspects of the different processes involved in reading and the differential validity of DA for different subgroups of students with an academic disadvantage. This paper analyzes the implementation of a DA device that evaluates processes involved in reading (EDPL) among 60 students with reading comprehension (...) difficulties between 9 and 16 years of age, of whom 20 have intellectual disabilities, 24 have reading-related learning disabilities, and 16 have socio-cultural disadvantages. We specifically analyze the predictive validity of the EDPL device over attitude towards reading, and the use of dialogue/participation strategies in reading activities in the classroom during the implementation stage. We also analyze if the EDPL device provides additional information to that obtained with a conventionally applied personal-social adjustment scale (APSL). Results showed that dynamic scores, obtained from the implementation of the EDPL device, significantly predict the studied variables. Moreover, dynamic scores showed a significant incremental validity in relation to predictions based on an APSL scale. In relation to differential validity, the results indicated the superior predictive validity for DA for students with intellectual disabilities and reading disabilities than for students with socio-cultural disadvantages. Furthermore, the role of metacognition and its relation to the processes of personal-social adjustment in explaining the results is discussed. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to discuss a basic assumption tacitly shared by many philosophers of mind and language: that whatever can be meant, can be said. It specifically targets John Searle's account of this idea, focusing on his Principle of Expressibility . In the first part of the paper, PE is exposed underlining its analyticity and its relevance for the philosophy of language , mind , society and action . In the critical part, the notion of Background is (...) taken into account in order to re-evaluate two basic distinctions: the one between sentence and utterance meanings , and the one between native and type speakers . PE is reconsidered in the light of the previous arguments as a methodological strategy that does not prevent uses of language from eventual semantic excesses and deficits , and a complementary Principle of Expression Fallibility is finally proposed. (shrink)

Aún a falta de la imprescindible perspectiva temporal, se presentan aquí (1) una tesis sobre el movimiento 15M en su fase inicial de las acampadas: su discurso político en su fase de emergencia es un republicanismo cívico democrático de marca blanca sin referencias teóricas o filosóficas; y (2) varias hipótesis: se trata de un fenómeno político en sentido fuerte, producto del civismo bienestarista, sin conexión con movimientos sociales alternativos y sus ideologías, con una concepción novedosa de sí mismo como sujeto, (...) y que desafía el papel de los cuerpos intermedios en el ámbito de la sociedad civil, desde partidos hasta movimientos sociales. (shrink)

Claims of epistemic credit in social context Resumen: En este ensayo explico la propuesta fundamental de Conocimiento expropiado (Broncano 2020) en el marco agencial y fiabilista que asume el autor. A continuación, me centro en su análisis de las situaciones de injusticia testimonial, contraponiendo los caminos seguidos por Miranda Fricker (enfocado en el prejuicio del intercambio testimonial) y Broncano (enfocado en el desajuste estructural). Tras señalar las deficiencias de cada modelo, apunto una propuesta alternativa: la injusticia testimonial se produce cuando (...) la atribución de credibilidad es efecto de un juicio identitario, ya sea este ajustado o no, con respecto al colectivo al que pertenece la testigo. Abstract: In this essay, I explain the main claim of Conocimiento expropiado (Broncano 2020) against the background of the agential and reliabilist framework that its author assumes. I then focus on his analysis of situations of testimonial injustice, opposing Miranda Fricker’s approach (focused on prejudice in testimonial exchanges) and Broncano’s one (focused on structural imbalances). By pointing out the shortcommings of both models, I skech an alternative proposal: testimonial injustice is produced when the credibility assessment results from an identity judgment, whether it is effectively appropriate regarding the collective or not. Palabras clave: Epistemología política, fiabilismo agencial, injusticia testimonial, credibilidad. Keywords: Political Epistemology, agent reliabilism, testimonial injustice, credibility. (shrink)

Educational interventions are necessary to develop mathematical competence at early ages and prevent widespread mathematics learning failure in the education system as indicated by the results of European reports. Numerous studies agree that domain-specific predictors related to mathematics are symbolic and non-symbolic magnitude comparison, as well as, number line estimation. The goal of this study was to design 4 digital learning app games to train specific cognitive bases of mathematical learning in order to create resources and promote the use of (...) these technologies in the educational community and to promote effective scientific transfer and increase the research visibility. This study involved 193 preschoolers aged 57–79 months. A quasi-experimental design was carried out with 3 groups created after scores were obtained in a standardised mathematical competence assessment test, i.e., low-performance group, high-performance group, and control group. The results show that training with the 4 digital learning app games focusing on magnitude, subitizing, number facts, and estimation tasks improved the numerical skills of the experimental groups, compared to the control group. The implications of the study were, on the one hand, provided verified technological tools for teaching early mathematical competence. On the other hand, this study supports other studies on the importance of cognitive precursors in mathematics performance. (shrink)

Nel 1929 avviene a Davos il famoso incontro tra Ernst Cassirer e Martin Heidegger che rappresenta il dibattito tra le correnti filosofiche dominanti nel mondo di lingua tedesca in quel momento, mentre ci si focalizza, nella sua risoluzione, sull’immediato futuro politico che avrebbe dovuto riguardare l'Europa, con i soliti mitmachen dell'università e della stragrande maggioranza dei suoi intellettuali, tra cuianche buoni sacerdoti e i barbieri di Cervantes, che bruciavano libri. Esattamente quattro secoli fa, tra gli altri, Lutero e Zwingli hanno (...) discusso nel cosiddetto Colloquio di Marburg, sul sacramento dell’Eucaristia, prendendo posizioni inconciliabili riguardo alla questione della presenza reale di Cristo in essa. Il presente documento intende dimostrare l'identità strutturale tra la discussione di Davos e quella del colloquio di Marburg, rivelando le sue dimensioni teologiche, che avranno, conosciute o meno, un enorme impatto sull'ulteriore sviluppo di discipline come la linguistica. (shrink)

Ernesto Sosa tiene el mérito de haber sido pionero en lo que podría describirse, quizás sin demasiada exageración, como un cambio de paradigma en la epistemología contemporánea: el que supuso el tránsito desde una epistemología centrada en el problema de la estructura de la justificación hasta una nueva concepción del conocimiento enfocada en la naturaleza del agente epistémico. Un aspecto de este cambio que conviene no tratar con negligencia es el cambio de las analogías fundamentales, que pasaron de ser arquitectónicas (...) a ser deportivas o prácticas, entre las que destaca la analogía del arquero. Nuestro objetivo en este capítulo es describir someramente dicho cambio para apuntar dos sentidos en los que creemos que la propuesta de Sosa podría «deslimitarse», es decir, desprenderse de límites que él mismo ha impuesto a su planteamiento. Un primer límite está relacionado con la dimensión temporal de la gnoseología (que, a diferencia de la ética de la creencia, habría de adoptar, según Sosa, un planteamiento esencialmente instantáneo o sincrónico). Un segundo límite es relativo a la identidad del agente epistémico, en la medida en que el planteamiento de Sosa parece asumir un enfoque individualista de difícil aplicación en casos de agentes colectivos. Sostendremos que ambos límites aparecen si mantenemos la analogía del arquero con el agente de conocimiento, al ser la suya una actividad instantánea y radicalmente individual. Si en su lugar adoptamos otras analogías para la acción epistémica, como las que aquí proponemos, salta a la vista que la sincronía y la individualidad son limitaciones contingentes para una epistemología de virtudes télica. En nuestra opinión, el abandono de esos dos límites podría abrir nuevos y prometedores horizontes para la epistemología social. (shrink)

En palabras de la Dra. Ivana Costa, la argumentación que aquí se propone lleva a los lectores a descubrir en la teoría epicureísta de las pasiones el fundamento de la filosofía política epicúrea [...]. Pero el eje de esta teoría está, indudablemente, en la caracterización que hace Epicuro del placer; esto es, la determinación precisa de qué lugar le cabe [...] entre los bienes para la buena vida [y] qué credenciales tiene para ser considerado el bien supremo. Este fue uno (...) de los temas centrales del debate ético-político que plantearon las diferentes líneas filosóficas en Grecia entre fines del siglo V a.C. y comienzos del siglo IV a.C. [...] Epicuro intentaba demostrar [...] que la justicia, entendida como virtud individual, se identifica con el placer, a contracorriente de la communis opinio, que la concibe destinada al beneficio de los demás. Al identificar a la virtud de la justicia con la ataraxia, al concebirla como virtud que es también capaz de "tranquilizar" con eficacia a quien la posee y la practica (porque es precisamente su contrario, la injusticia, la que provoca la turbación del alma), la noción epicúrea de justicia queda unida también a su singular teoría del placer. Que no es mero disfrute personal sino actividad que extirpa las opiniones equivocadas y las sustituye por estados mentales verdaderos y adecuados. La investigación que da origen a este libro había mostrado, con sólidas herramientas de análisis de las fuentes y exhaustiva discusión de la literatura sobre el tema, que el concepto epicúreo de justicia no puede escindirse del entramado de la lógica, la física y la ética del maestro de Samos. [...] Se parte entonces de esa trama compleja y, con delicadeza y generosidad, la argumentación va deshilvanando los motivos que han llevado tradicionalmente a una interpretación convencionalista o naturalista de la filosofía epicúrea. Finalmente, señala que el profesor Navarro nos propone considerar el concepto de justicia subrayando la posición excéntrica que insinúa Epicuro respecto de la contraposición nómos-phýsis en la que se venía dirimiendo la cuestión desde finales del siglo V a.C. El análisis [...] abre a la posibilidad de una reconstrucción global de la filosofía política epicúrea [y] permite reformular, a partir del eje naturaleza-convención, tanto su teoría física, como su gnoseología [...]. En cuanto a los aspectos específicamente políticos de la filosofía de Epicuro, la argumentación va, de los comienzos de la asociación humana, al estatuto de las leyes, el progreso de la historia y el papel de la prólepsis como criterio de lo justo. (shrink)

Emancipación contra natura. La crítica ecológica a la teoría marxiana de la alienación.

AbstractAccording to the standard view, Montaigne’s Pyrrhonian doubts would be in the origin of Descartes’ radical Sceptical challenges and his cogito argument. Although this paper does not deny this influence, its aim is to reconsider it from a different perspective, by acknowledging that it was not Montaigne’s Scepticism, but his Stoicism, which played the decisive role in the birth of the modern internalist conception of subjectivity. Cartesian need for certitude is to be better understood as an effect of the Stoic (...) model of wisdom, which urges the sage to build an inner space for self-sufficiency and absolute freedom.KeywordsScepticism, Stoicism, subjectivity, Michel de Montaigne, René DescartesResumenSegún el punto de vista general, las dudas pirronianas de Montaigne se situarían en el origen de los desafíos escépticos radicales del argumento cogito de Descartes. Si bien este artículo no niega tal influencia, nuestro objetivo es reconsiderarla desde una perspectiva diferente mediante el reconocimiento de que no fue el escepticismo de Montaigne sino su estoicismo el que jugó un papel decisivo en el nacimiento del concepto moderno internalista de la subjetividad. La necesidad cartesiana de certeza se entiende mejor como un efecto del modelo estoico de sabiduría, el cual impulsa al sabio a construir un espacio interior para la autosuficiencia y la libertad absoluta.Palabras claveEscepticismo, estoicismo, subjetividad, Michel de Montaigne, René Descartes. (shrink)

ArgumentThe discovery of electron diffraction by George Paget Thomson in Aberdeen and Clinton J. Davisson and Lester H. Germer at the Bell Labs has often been portrayed as an example of independent discovery. Neither team was particularly interested in the developments of the nascent quantum theory but they both ended up demonstrating one of the most striking experimental consequences of the new physics. This paper traces the aftermath of this discovery and the way electron diffraction immediately turned from empirical evidence (...) of a highly novel theory into a technique for applied and technological research. Thomson was the first to design an “electron diffraction camera,” an instrument that soon found its place in laboratories around the world. I discuss the role played by Davisson and Germer, and by Thomson in the development of electron diffraction as a “research technology,” taking into account their specific institutional settings and research cultures. While Davisson and Germer remained in the industry-oriented Bell Labs, Thomson moved to Imperial College in 1930 where collaboration first, and competition later with George I. Finch was also relevant for the consolidation of an instrument that eventually became widely known as the “Finch Camera.”. (shrink)