J. L. Schellenberg's Philosophy of Religion argues for a specific brand of sceptical religion that takes ‘Ultimism’ – the proposition that there is a metaphysically, axiologically, and soteriologically ultimate reality – to be the object to which the sceptical religionist should assent. In this article I shall argue that Ietsism – the proposition that there is merely something transcendental worth committing ourselves to religiously – is a preferable object of assent. This is for two primary reasons. First, Ietsism (...) is far more modest than Ultimism; Ietsism, in fact, is open to the truth of Ultimism, while the converse does not hold. Second, Ietsism can fulfil the same criteria that compel Schellenberg to argue for Ultimism. (shrink)

Although ietsism, which comes from a Dutch term referring to “somethingism,” came on the religious scene a couple of decades ago, Anglophone publications springing from serious reflections on this term have only just recently appeared. This paper constitutes an attempt at addressing a couple of questions pertaining to this rather novel term. Two of these main questions concern the characteristics of ietsism that set it apart from other faith orientations, and the means by which ietsism is able (...) to stand up to the test of its practical worth in terms of promising to fulfil a profound need in human life. (shrink)