Results for 'Hume, force, vivacity, belief, Humean force and vivacity, 흄, 믿음, 힘, 활력, 흄주의 힘과 활력'

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  1.  19
    Hume’s theory of belief in the Treatise - ‘Force’ and ‘Vivacity’.양선이 ) - 2018 - Modern Philosophy 12:59-82.
  2.  24
    On the Nature of ‘Force and Vivacity’ in Hume’s theory of Belief. 양선이 - 2008 - CHUL HAK SA SANG - Journal of Philosophical Ideas 28 (28):315-346.
    본 논문의 목적은 흄의 믿음 이론에 있어 ‘힘과 활력’이라는 성질의 본성을 밝히는 것이다. 흄이 사용한 힘과 활력이라는 개념에 대해 다양한 해석들이 존재한다. 첫 번째 입장에 따르면, 흄이 힘과 활력 개념을 어떤 기술적(technical) 의미로 사용한 것이 아니므로 우리는 이 개념들을 글자그대로 이해해야 한다는 것이다. 필자는 이와 같은 입장을 ‘표준적 해석’ 또는 ‘전통적 해석’이라고 부르겠다. 두 번째 해석에 따르면 힘과 활력 개념은 흄이 허용한 것 보다 더 복잡하며 기술적인 의미를 지닌다. 필자는 두 번째 해석을 힘과 활력에 관한 흄주의(Humean) 이론이라고 부르겠다. 비록 (...)
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  3.  74
    Force and Vivacity in the Treatise and the Enquiry.Francis W. Dauer - 1999 - Hume Studies 25 (1):83-99.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume XXV, Numbers 1 and 2, April/November 1999, pp. 83-99 Force and Vivacity in the Treatise and the Enquiry FRANCIS W. DAUER Hume's appeal to "force and vivacity" presents a challenge to those of us who try to render his views as plausible as possible. Of course, if we reject "folk psychology " or an appeal to our consciousness, the challenge becomes insurmountable. Fortunately, in (...)
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  4.  58
    (1 other version)Hume on Force and Vivacity.Markus Wild - 2011 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 14 (1):71-88.
    Hume seems to have discarded with final causes and teleology. However, his invocation of a pre-established harmony between the course of nature and the succession of our ideas suggests otherwise. This paper takes Hume’s general strategy of shifting to the external perspective into account, and argues that the seemingly internal property of force and vivacity are, in fact, functional-teleological properties. Force and vivacity bears many explanatory burdens: It explains the difference between imagination and memory, between conception and belief, (...)
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  5.  31
    Hume’s theory of belief in the Treatise - ‘Force’ and ‘Vivacity’.Sunny Yang - 2018 - Modern Philosophy 12:59-82.
  6.  77
    Hume's Impressions of Belief.Stacy J. Hansen - 1988 - Hume Studies 14 (2):277-304.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:277 HUME'S IMPRESSIONS OF BELIEF Introduction Hume's theory of belief is often taken to be fully stated in his opening remarks on the subject in A Treatise of Human Nature, Book I, Part III, Section VII: "An opinion, therefore, or belief may be most accurately defin'd, A LIVELY IDEA RELATED TO OR ASSOCIATED WITH A PRESENT IMPRESSION."1 Taking this definition as Hume's final account leaves the reader with many (...)
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  7. Hume and the mechanics of mind : impressions, ideas, and association.David Owen - 1993 - In David Fate Norton & Jacqueline Taylor, The Cambridge Companion to Hume. New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Hume introduced important innovations concerning the theory of ideas. The two most important are the distinction between impressions and ideas, and the use he made of the principles of association in explaining mental phenomena. Hume divided the perceptions of the mind into two classes. The members of one class, impressions, he held to have a greater degree of force and vivacity than the members of the other class, ideas. He also supposed that ideas are causally dependent copies of impressions. (...)
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  8.  42
    "More Affected than Real": Hume and Religious Belief.A. E. Pitson - 2015 - Res Philosophica 92 (3):691-721.
    Hume’s remark that “the conviction of religionists, in all ages, is more affected than real” is considered in relation to various monotheistic beliefs against the background of his account of belief more generally. The issue arises as to what Hume means by characterizing the assent associated with religious belief as an operation between disbelief and conviction. According to Hume, the obscurity of the ideas involved in the religious convictions of the “vulgar” prevents them from achieving the force and vivacity (...)
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  9.  34
    Belief, Morality, and Reasoning in Hume's Philosophy.Stanley Tweyman - 2015 - Res Philosophica 92 (3):723-741.
    Although Hume insists that belief does not involve a separate impression, select scholars have argued that, as Hume’s thoughts on belief developed, he either was moving toward, or adopted, the impression of reflection view of belief. In my paper, I attempt to show that neither of these views is correct. As well, I argue that there is a role for distinctions of reason in belief, which is similar to the role played by distinctions of reason in Hume’s moral theory, at (...)
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  10.  12
    Reason, Belief, and Scepticism.David Owen - 1999 - In Hume's reason. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Hume's treatment of scepticism with regard to reason is analogous to his account of probable reasoning. In neither case is Hume concerned with the justification of beliefs or the warrant of reason as much as with the explanation of the presence of beliefs. In his account of probable reasoning, the issue was the origin of beliefs; in his account of scepticism with regard to reason, the issue is the retention of beliefs in the face of sceptical arguments. The sceptical arguments (...)
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  11. The Normativity of Experience and Causal Belief in Hume’s Treatise.Miren Boehm - 2014 - Hume Studies 39 (2):203-231.
    What is the source of normativity in Hume’s account of causal reasoning? In virtue of what are causal beliefs justified for Hume? To answer these questions, the literature appeals, almost invariably, to custom or some feature thereof. I argue, in contrast, that causal beliefs are justified for Hume because they issue from experience. Although he denies experience the title of justifying reason, for Hume experience has normative authority. I offer an interpretation of the source and nature of the normativity of (...)
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  12. Hume's Treatment of Denial in the Treatise.Lewis Powell - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14.
    David Hume fancied himself the Newton of the mind, aiming to reinvent the study of human mental life in the same way that Newton had revolutionized physics. And it was his view that the novel account of belief he proposed in his Treatise of Human Nature was one of that work’s central philosophical contributions. From the earliest responses to the Treatise forward, however, there was deep pessimism about the prospects for his account. It is easy to understand the source of (...)
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  13. Variations on force and vivacity in Hume.Trudy Govier - 1972 - Philosophical Quarterly 22 (86):44-52.
  14. Hume's Theory of Belief.Michael M. Gorman - 1993 - Hume Studies 19 (1):89-101.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume's Theory of Belief Michael M. Gorman Belief is a key concept in Hume's philosophy, and yet Hume's statements aboutbeliefappear to be hopelesslyinconsistent.1 Various solutions have been offered, from saying that Hume is incorrigibly confused to saying that his theory ofbeliefchanged over the course of his career. This article will focus on the question ofthe nature ofbelief and show that Hume's theory is in fact consistent. In sections 1 (...)
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  15. Can Hume Deny Reid's Dilemma?Anthony Nguyen - 2017 - Hume Studies 43 (2):57-78.
    Reid’s dilemma concludes that, whether the idea associated with a denied proposition is lively or faint, Hume is committed to saying that it is either believed or merely conceived. In neither case would there be denial. If so, then Hume cannot give an adequate account of denial. I consider and reject Powell’s suggestion that Hume could have advanced a “Content Contrary” account of denial that avoids Reid’s dilemma. However, not only would a Humean Content Contrary account be viciously circular, (...)
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  16.  4
    Belief and the Development of Hume's Account of Probable Reasoning.David Owen - 1999 - In Hume's reason. New York: Oxford University Press.
    After rejecting traditional accounts in terms of reason, Hume presents his own explanation of how we are led from a present impression directly to an idea of something unobserved by the association of ideas set up by past experience. It is this that explains our most basic probable inferences. Hume also has to explain why and how the results of such inferences are believed. What distinguishes belief from mere conception is the very same thing as that which distinguishes impressions from (...)
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  17. Philosophical Scepticism and Ordinary Beliefs.Gloria H. Eres - 1984 - Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley
    In ordinary life we think that we know many things about the world. I know that I am sitting here. I know that it is not raining. I know that Reagan is President--and many more interesting things. We also think that we know things of a more general sort, e.g., that there are tables, chairs, physical objects, other people. Most of the time, we believe that we have good reasons for our beliefs. Descartes, Hume and Russell, however, as a result (...)
     
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  18.  40
    Hume's Scepticism and the Science of Human Nature (review).Paul Wood - 2004 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 42 (1):109-110.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 42.1 (2004) 109-110 [Access article in PDF] Paul Stanistreet. Hume's Scepticism and the Science of Human Nature. Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2002. Pp.xi + 226. Cloth, $69.95. Any new book on David Hume enters an already overcrowded field. There is no shortage of commentary on Hume's philosophy to be found in a broad range of journals such as Hume Studies, and in recent years (...)
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  19. Humbling Hume: A Concise Way to Force Humeans and Neo-Humeans to Wrestle With the Evidence for Miracles.Jim A. Stewart - 2001 - Religious Studies 37 (1).
     
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  20. Hume on Memory and Causation. [REVIEW]Daniel E. Flage - 1985 - Hume Studies 1985 (1):168-188.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:168 HUME ON MEMORY AND CAUSATION In the first part of this paper I shall argue that an examination of Hume's second criterion for distinguishing between ideas of the memory and ideas of the imagination shows that Hume's ideas of the memory are relative ideas corresponding to definite descriptions of the general form, "the complex impression that is the (original) cause of a particular positive idea m and which (...)
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  21.  59
    On Friedman's Look.Daniel E. Flage - 1993 - Hume Studies 19 (1):187-197.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:On Friedman's Look Daniel E. Flage In a pair of articles and a book (Flage 1985a, 1985b, 1990), I argued that Hume's ideas of memory are relative ideas. In "Another Look at Flage's Hume" (this volume), Lesley Friedman challenges my account on four points. She argues (1) that it is possible to remember simple ideas in their simplicity; (2) that I have misrepresented Humean impressions ofreflection; (3) that (...)
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  22.  15
    David Hume (review). [REVIEW]Malcolm Jack - 1977 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 15 (4):478-480.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:478 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY David Hume. By Nicholas Capaldi. (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1975. Pp. 241. $7.50) Professor Capaldi has taken Hume's profession in the Treatise to establish a new "science of man" very seriously indeed, and he intends to show us in this book how the "almost entirely new'" foundation of this science is thoroughly Newtonian. Hume, he tells us, was "the first philosopher to understand fully, to appreciate (...)
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  23. The Common-Core/Diversity Dilemma: Revisions of Humean thought, New Empirical Research, and the Limits of Rational Religious Belief.Branden Thornhill-Miller & Peter Millican - 2015 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7 (1):1--49.
    This paper is the product of an interdisciplinary, interreligious dialogue aiming to outline some of the possibilities and rational limits of supernatural religious belief, in the light of a critique of David Hume’s familiar sceptical arguments -- including a rejection of his famous Maxim on miracles -- combined with a range of striking recent empirical research. The Humean nexus leads us to the formulation of a new ”Common-Core/Diversity Dilemma’, which suggests that the contradictions between different religious belief systems, in (...)
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  24.  89
    Regularity and certainty in Hume’s treatise: a Humean response to Husserl.Stefanie Rocknak - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):579-600.
    According to Husserl, Hume’s empirical method was deeply flawed—like all empiricists, Hume did not, and could not adequately justify his method, much less his findings. Instead, Hume gives us a “circular” and “irrational” “psychological explanation” of “mediate judgments of fact,” i.e. of inductive inferences. Yet Husserl was certain that he could justify both his own method and his own findings with an appeal to the phenomenological, pre-theoretical, pre-naturalistic “epoché”. However, whether or not Husserl’s notion of an epoché is justified, or (...)
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  25. Hume's Correlationism: On Meillassoux, Necessity and Belief.Paul O'Mahoney - 2013 - Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy 21 (1):132-160.
    The article argues that Meillassoux's 'After Finitude' underestimates the nature and profundity of Hume's sceptical challenge; it neglects the fact that Hume's scepticism concerns final causes (and agrees fundamentally with Bacon and Descartes in this respect), and that in Hume even the operations of reason do not furnish entirely a priori knowledge. We contend that Hume himself institutes a form of correlationism (which in part showed Kant the way to counter the sceptical challenge via transcendental idealism), and sought not merely (...)
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  26.  58
    Probability in Hume's Science of Man.Patrick Maher - 1981 - Hume Studies 7 (2):137-153.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:137. PROBABILITY IN HUME'S SCIENCE OF MAN This paper is an attempt to make sense of a fragment of Hume's positive philosophy, namely his theory of how we apportion belief on the basis of ambiguous evidence. The topic is one that has received little critical attention from philosophers. One reason for this neglect is the belief that Hume's discussion of probable reasoning is not addressed to philosophical questions, but (...)
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  27.  87
    Teaching & Learning Guide for: Belief‐Desire Explanation.Nikolaj Nottelmann - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (1):71-73.
    This guide accompanies the following article: Nikolaj Nottelmann, ‘Belief‐Desire Explanation’. Philosophy Compass Vol/Iss : 1–10. doi: 10.1111/j.1747‐9991.2011.00446.xAuthor’s Introduction“Belief‐desire explanation” is short‐hand for a type of action explanation that appeals to a set of the agent’s mental states consisting of 1. Her desire to ψ and 2. Her belief that, were she to φ, she would promote her ψ‐ing. Here, to ψ could be to eat an ice cream, and to φ could be to walk to the ice cream vendor. Adherents (...)
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  28. Hume's Aesthetic Theism.John Immerwahr - 1996 - Hume Studies 22 (2):325-337.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume XXII, Number 2, November 1996, pp. 325-337 Hume's Aesthetic Theism JOHN IMMERWAHR When it comes to religion, Hume's motto is corruptio optimi pessima, "the corruption of the best things gives rise to the worst" (NHR 338,339, SScE 73).1 He warmly endorses what he calls "true religion" and strongly attacks false religion, superstition and priestcraft. Hume's distaste for false religion is obviously sincere, but scholars have sometimes (...)
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  29.  81
    Vivacity and Force as the Source of Hume’s Irregular Arguments.Paul Neiman - 2006 - Philo 9 (2):131-143.
    In the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Philo and Cleanthes make use of irregular arguments—arguments whose veracity is founded on the force and vivacity with which they strike the mind. This paper provides an analysis of the irregular arguments by the two characters in the Dialogues and by Hume in the Treatise of Human Nature. Since both characters accept the veracity of irregular arguments, it seems that they are in agreement at the end of the Dialogues. The similarity between their (...)
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  30.  54
    'Lively' Memory and 'Past' Memory.Oliver Johnson - 1987 - Hume Studies 13 (2):343-359.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:343 'LIVELY' MEMORY ANP 'PAST' MEMORY At the very beginning of the Treatise Hume distinguishes memory from imagination by noting two different features of ideas of memory not shared by ideas of imagination. The distinguishing marks of memory can be described as (1) memory conceived in terms of the liveliness or vivacity of its ideas and (2) memory conceived in terms of the constraints imposed on the order and (...)
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  31.  92
    Explaining General Ideas.Janet Broughton - 2000 - Hume Studies 26 (2):279-289.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume XXVI, Number 2, November 2000, pp. 279-289 Explaining General Ideas JANET BROUGHTON Hume declared himself a scientist of man; his aim was to identify the principles according to which our impressions give rise to our thoughts, beliefs, passions and actions. He took it that there are things about these products of experience that need to be explained, and as a scientist of man he aimed to (...)
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  32.  8
    Warum Humes Motivationsargument dem Non-Kognitivismus nicht helfen kann.Daniel Eggers - 2024 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 78 (3):361-384.
    In the modern metaethical debate, the term 'non-cognitivism' is often used to describe a claim in moral psychology: the claim that moral judgments are constituted by desire-like mental states rather than beliefs. An argument tradi- tionally employed in defences of non-cognitivism is the 'motivation argument' which can be traced back to David Hume. The motivation argument combines the idea that moral judgments are motivationally efficacious states of mind with the idea that beliefs are incapable of exerting motivational force. The (...)
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  33. Humean Skepticism and Entitlement.Santiago Echeverri - 2024 - In Scott Stapleford & Verena Wagner, Hume and contemporary epistemology. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 183-205.
    Many philosophers have found in Hume’s skeptical doubts concerning the operations of the understanding the materials for an argument that generalizes from induction to other domains, like our beliefs in the external world, other minds, and the past. This chapter offers a novel reconstruction of that argument and identifies the principles that are responsible for its capacity to generalize beyond induction. Next, it presents a classical reading of Hume’s skeptical solution and shows that Crispin Wright’s entitlement theory is close in (...)
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  34. Hume, Passion, and Action.Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe - 2018 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    David Hume’s theory of action is well known for several provocative theses, including that passion and reason cannot be opposed over the direction of action. In Hume, Passion, and Action, the author defends an original interpretation of Hume’s views on passion, reason and motivation that is consistent with other theses in Hume’s philosophy, loyal to his texts, and historically situated. This book challenges the now orthodox interpretation of Hume on motivation, presenting an alternative that situates Hume closer to “Humeans” than (...)
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  35.  99
    Humean Minds and Moral Theory.Sheldon Wein - 1988 - Philosophy Research Archives 14:229-236.
    Grant that Hume is a contractarian. Justice then arises from more basic features of humans and their circumstances. Among these more basic features from which justice arises Hume includes (in addition to self-interest narrowly construed) the widely held passions of benevolence and sympathy. But it is mysterious why he included them in his contractarian theory for the derivation of justice does not need them, and may even be weaker with them included. This paper suggests that Hume’s philosophy of mind, in (...)
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  36.  54
    Remembering the Past.Daniel E. Flage - 1989 - Hume Studies 15 (1):236-246.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:236 REMEMBERING THE PAST In his recent article "'Lively' Memory and 'Past' Memory," Oliver Johnson argues that the remarks in Treatise I. iii. 5 entail that Hume rejects all mnemonic knowledge of the past and that "we must drop the concept of the past, as it is ordinarily understood as something that once existed, from our account of memory." While I shall grant that Hume could claim no knowledge (...)
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  37. Naturalism, Normativity, and Scepticism in Hume's Account of Belief.Lorne Falkenstein - 1997 - Hume Studies 23 (1):29-72.
    Hume's scepticism about the ability of demonstrative reasoning to justify many of our most common and important beliefs, such those concerning the connection between causes and effects, does not sit well with his tendency to make normative claims about which beliefs we ought to accept. I argue that Hume's naturalist account of the causes of belief is nonetheless rich enough to provide for normative assessments of belief and even for the modification of beliefs in light of these assessments. I argue, (...)
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  38. Hume on the Generation of Motives: Why Beliefs Alone Never Motivate.Elizabeth S. Radcliffe - 1999 - Hume Studies 25 (1-2):101-122.
    Hume’s thesis that reason alone does not motivate is taken as the ground for this theory: Reason produces beliefs only, and beliefs are mere representations of fact, which, without passions for the objects the beliefs concern, cannot move anyone at all. Discussions of the Humean theory of motivation usually begin with the motivating passions in place without asking about their genesis. This emphasis, I think, overlooks a good deal of what Hume’s thesis concerning the motivational impotence of reason is (...)
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  39. The inertness of reason and Hume’s legacy.Elizabeth S. Radcliffe - 2012 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (S1):117-133.
    Hume argues against the seventeenth-century rationalists that reason is impotent to motivate action and to originate morality. Hume's arguments have standardly been considered the foundation for the Humean theory of motivation in contemporary philosophy. The Humean theory alleges that beliefs require independent desires to motivate action. Recently, however, new commentaries allege that Hume's argument concerning the inertness of reason has no bearing on whether beliefs can motivate. These commentaries maintain that for Hume, beliefs about future pleasurable and painful (...)
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  40.  95
    Hume, Sympathy, and the Theater.Brian Kirby - 2003 - Hume Studies 29 (2):305-325.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume 29, Number 2, November 2003, pp. 305-325 Hume, Sympathy, and the Theater BRIAN KIRBY Every movement of the theater, by a skillful poet, is communicated, as it were by magic, to the spectators; who weep, tremble, resent, rejoice, and are inflamed with all the variety of passions, which actuate the several personages of the drama. (EPM 5.2.26; SBN 221-2) Much has been written recently about the (...)
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  41.  18
    (1 other version)Reflection and the Stability of Belief: Essays on Descartes, Hume, and Reid by Louis E. Loeb (review). [REVIEW]Kevin Meeker - 2014 - Hume Studies 39 (2):257-260.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Reflection and the Stability of Belief: Essays on Descartes, Hume, and Reid by Louis E. LoebKevin MeekerLouis E. Loeb. Reflection and the Stability of Belief: Essays on Descartes, Hume, and Reid. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. Pp. xvii + 369. ISBN: 978-0-19-536876-5, Cloth, $99.00. ISBN 978-0-19-536875-8, Paper, $45.00.This book is (almost entirely) a collection of previously published essays by Louis Loeb. The first three essays focus primarily (...)
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  42. (1 other version)Prospects for a naturalization of practical reason: Humean instrumentalism and the normative authority of desire.Robert Audi - 2002 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10 (3):235 – 263.
    This is an age of naturalization projects. Much epistemological work has been done toward naturalizing theoretical reason. One might view Hume as seeking to naturalize reason in both the theoretical (roughly, epistemological) and the practical realms. I suggest that whatever else underlies the vitality of Hume's instrumentalism - encapsulated in his view that 'reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions' - one incentive is the hope of naturalizing practical reason. This paper explores some broadly (...) versions of instrumentalism that are among the most plausible contenders to represent instrumentalism as a contemporary naturalistic position. It first offers a taxonomy of reasons for action and, in that light, formulates a plausible version of instrumentalism. It then raises difficulties for the view, some of them concerning the nature of desire. It also develops an epistemologically significant comparison of desires with beliefs. Given the magnitude of the difficulties, it outlines an alternative account of practical reason. (shrink)
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  43. Impressions and Ideas: Vivacity as Verisimilitude.Wayne Waxman - 1993 - Hume Studies 19 (1):75-88.
    The thesis defended is that, for Hume, all vivacity, including that of impressions, is belief, and all belief, including the "infallibility" of the immediate given, is vivacity. This allows one to treat as different axes of description Hume's categories of perception (sensation, reflexion, and thought) and his categories of the consciousness of perception (belief, felt ease of transition), thus making it possible to defend his distinction between impressions and ideas against the criticisms of Ryle, Russell, and others. The article is (...)
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  44.  22
    Naturalism and Skepticism in the Philosophy of Hume.Barry Stroud - 2016 - In Paul Russell, The Oxford Handbook of David Hume. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Hume takes his “naturalistic” study of human nature to show that certain general “principles of the imagination” can explain how human beings come to think, feel, believe, and act in all the ways they do independently of the truth or reasonableness of those responses. This appears to leave the reflective philosopher with no reason for assenting to what he has discovered he cannot help believing anyway. Relief from this unacceptably extreme skepticism is found in acknowledging and acquiescing in those forces (...)
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  45.  58
    Occurrent States and the Problem of Counterfeit Belief in Hume's Treatise.Emily Nancy Kress - 2017 - Hume Studies 43 (1):61-90.
    In his Treatise of Human Nature, Hume defines a belief as "a lively idea related to or associated with a present impression".1 He offers variations on this definition throughout the work, writing, for instance, that "belief is a more vivid and intense conception of an idea, proceeding from its relation to a present impression" and that his "general position" is "that an opinion or belief is nothing but a strong and lively idea deriv'd from a present impression related to it". (...)
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  46. Hume’s Empiricist Inner Epistemology: A Reassessment of The Copy Principle.Angela Coventry & Tom Seppalainen - 2012 - In Alan Bailey & Dan O'Brien, The Continuum Companion to Hume. Continuum. pp. 38--56.
    Vivacity, the “liveliness” of perceptions, is central to Hume’s epistemology. Hume equated belief with vivid ideas. Vivacity is a conscious quality so believable ideas are felt to be lively. Hume’s empiricism revolves around a phenomenological, inner epistemology. Through copying, Hume bases vivacity in impressions. Sensory vivacity also concerns liveliness or patterns of change. Through learnt skillful use, it tracks change specific to intentional sense-perceptual experience, Hume’s “coherent and constant” complex impressions. Copying, in turn, communicates the conscious skill of vivacity to (...)
     
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  47. Hume's Second Thoughts on Belief.Michael Jacovides - 2024 - Journal of Modern Philosophy 6.
    When we see the way that the parts of the Appendix concerning belief hang together, we can understand how and why Hume moved from saying that belief is a vivid idea to saying that belief is a sui generis feeling. In the Appendix to the Treatise, Hume retracts his claim that perceptions with the same object only vary with respect to vivacity. In material in the appendix that he tells his reader to insert in Book 1, he explains his reasons: (...)
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  48. Hume’s Impression/Idea Distinction.David Landy - 2006 - Hume Studies 32 (1):119-139.
    Understanding the distinction between impressions and ideas that Hume draws in the opening paragraphs of his A Treatise on Human Nature is essential for understanding much of Hume's philosophy. This, however, is a task that has been the cause of a good deal of controversy in the literature on Hume. I here argue that the significant philosophical and exegetical issues previous treatments of this distinction (such as the force and vivacity reading and the external-world reading) encounter are extremely problematic. (...)
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  49.  63
    Thomas More and the Christian ‘Superstition’: A Puzzle for Hume’s Psychology of Religious Belief.Rico Vitz - 2011 - Modern Schoolman 88 (3-4):223-244.
    In this paper, I examine one particular element of Hume’s psychology of religious belief. More specifically, I attempt to elucidate his account of what I call the sustaining causes of religious belief—that is, those causes that keep religious beliefs alive in modern human societies. In attempting to make some progress at clarifying this element of Hume’s psychology, I examine one particular ‘experiment’—namely, the case of Thomas More, a man who is, by Hume’s own admission, a person of remarkable virtue. I (...)
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  50. Moral internalism and moral cognitivism in Hume’s metaethics.Elizabeth S. Radcliffe - 2006 - Synthese 152 (3):353 - 370.
    Most naturalists think that the belief/desire model from Hume is the best framework for making sense of motivation. As Smith has argued, given that the cognitive state (belief) and the conative state (desire) are separate on this model, if a moral judgment is cognitive, it could not also be motivating by itself. So, it looks as though Hume and Humeans cannot hold that moral judgments are states of belief (moral cognitivism) and internally motivating (moral internalism). My chief claim is that (...)
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