본 논문의 목적은 흄의 믿음 이론에 있어 ‘힘과 활력’이라는 성질의 본성을 밝히는 것이다. 흄이 사용한 힘과 활력이라는 개념에 대해 다양한 해석들이 존재한다. 첫 번째 입장에 따르면, 흄이 힘과 활력 개념을 어떤 기술적(technical) 의미로 사용한 것이 아니므로 우리는 이 개념들을 글자그대로 이해해야 한다는 것이다. 필자는 이와 같은 입장을 ‘표준적 해석’ 또는 ‘전통적 해석’이라고 부르겠다. 두 번째 해석에 따르면 힘과 활력 개념은 흄이 허용한 것 보다 더 복잡하며 기술적인 의미를 지닌다. 필자는 두 번째 해석을 힘과 활력에 관한 흄주의(Humean) 이론이라고 부르겠다. 비록 (...) 흄이 힘과 활력 개념에 의존하여 인간 마음의 작용을 설명하는데 있어 어려움에 직면하긴 했지만, 우리가 흄주의 해석을 취하면 흄은 이 개념을 오직 믿음을 설명하기 위한 것이었음을 알게 될 것이다. 나는 이와 같은 점에서 흄주의 해석에 동조하게 될 것이다. 그러나 흄이 몇 가지 점에서 힘과 활력에 관한 글자그대로의 개념에 의존했음은 분명하다. 힘과 활력이라는 말은 다양한 의미로 이해될 수 있다. 1) ‘강도 또는 강렬함’, 2) ‘실재감(verisimilitude)’, 3) ‘반성적인 의식 활동 속에서 접할 수 있는 성질, 4) ‘마음의 다른 상태와 기능적으로 연관된 느낌’등의 의미가 있다. 이 글에서 필자는 1)과 2)는 인상과 관념간의 구분에만 적용될 수 있으며, 3)과 4)는 믿음과 동일시됨을 보이게 될 것이다. 또한 2), 3), 4)는 일상적 의미가 아니라는 점에서 공통점을 가지며, 기술적인 의미로 사용되고 있음을 밝힐 것이다. 우리가 『인성론』에서 흄이 사용하고 있는 ‘힘과 활력’이란 용어에 관해 일의적인 의미로 해석하기를 시도했을 때 그 핵심적 특징을 이해할 수 없지만 두 종류의 해석으로부터 어느 정도의 타당성을 발견할 수 있다고 필자는 제안할 것이다. 즉 3) ‘생각의 방식으로서 의식적으로 떠올려진 명제 또는 관념’과 4) ‘마음의 다른 상태 예컨대, 욕망과 기능적으로 연관된 느낌’이 ‘힘과 활력’에 관한 가장 정당한 해석이라고 제안하게 될 것이다. 그러나 문제는 이 두 해석, 즉 (3)과 (4)가 서로 조화될 수 있는지 하는 것이다. 현대 기능주의자들은 믿는 명제를 그것에 따라 적절하게 행위하려는 경향성과 동일시함으로써 네 번째 해석을 지지한다. 필자는 이와 같은 기능주의 해석에 동의한다. 그러나 믿음이 갖는 ‘힘’과 ‘활력’ 개념에 관한 세 번째 해석 즉 부사구주의 해석이 더 강력한 지지를 얻기 위해서는 흄의 관념 이론도 부사구주의로 읽을 수 있는지가 증명되어야할 문제로 남는다. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume XXV, Numbers 1 and 2, April/November 1999, pp. 83-99 Force and Vivacity in the Treatise and the Enquiry FRANCIS W. DAUER Hume's appeal to "force and vivacity" presents a challenge to those of us who try to render his views as plausible as possible. Of course, if we reject "folk psychology " or an appeal to our consciousness, the challenge becomes insurmountable. Fortunately, in (...) today's philosophical climate such appeals are no longer universally rejected, and at least in some quarters there may be interest in discerning what such appeals may reveal. But even granting such an appeal, is there anything given to our consciousness that will do the kind of work Hume intends for force and vivacity? I shall attempt to make an affirmative answer as plausible as I can. Recall that Hume appeals to force and vivacity to distinguish (1) impressions from ideas, (2) memory from other ideas, and (3) beliefs from fictions of the fancy. In my defense of Hume, I shall urge that, taken separately, each of these appeals has some plausibility and to this extent provides some tentative suggestions on what it is like to perceive, remember, and believe. Before proceeding to this defense, several preliminaries are called for. Hume's view on force and vivacity underwent changes in his writings, and no one view can be said to be his account of force and vivacity. His initial view occurs in Book I of the Treatise (which was published along with Book II). By the time the Appendix of the Treatise was published with Book III, we see Hume shifting away from his initial view. Further changes, as well as a full appreciation of the shift, can be found in the Enquiry. For most of this paper I shall primarily be concerned with his later views, though earlier views will Francis W. Dauer is a professor at the Department of Philosophy, South Hall, University of California at Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA 93105, USA. e-mail: dauer@humanitas.ucsb.edu 84 Francis W. Dauer occasionally be mentioned for contrast. In the final section, I shall address the more exegetical issues concerning Hume's change of mind over the years. While space constraints prevent a discussion that will do justice to the views of other commentators, a few words may be in order to indicate what I think is needed to render Hume's views plausible. Leaving aside commentators finding fatal defects with his account, those trying to salvage a tolerable reading of Hume more or less identify force and vivacity with belief (which Hume on one occasion says is the true and proper name for the feeling). One group focuses on Hume's use of 'force' and proposes a functionalist account of force and vivacity whereby it is a causal property of "perceptions" (in the wide sense) to produce such states as passions and actions which are functionally related to beliefs.1 At least on the face of it, this is at odds with force and vivacity being available to consciousness, and I shall take it that Hume took force and vivacity to be so available. Beyond this, while I shall take it that Hume appealed to force and vivacity to distinguish impressions from ideas, a functionalist account has difficulties in preventing impressions from degenerating into mere beliefs (unless something quite foreign to the Humean framework is appealed to).2 A second line of thought is due to Wayne Waxman, who identifies force and vivacity with something like a felt sense of reality or truth, with impressions having this quality in the highest degree.3 While this avoids the first defect of the functionalist account, I believe it fails to avoid a variant of the second problem: without appealing to something quite un-Humean, some impressions can become mere beliefs, and vice versa.41 shall assume that force and vivacity must be consciously available, and that appealing to them, at least in one guise, must allow impressions and ideas to be distinguished. Impressions Hume introduces the distinction between impressions and ideas in the Treatise by saying: The difference betwixt these consists in the degrees of force and liveliness with which... (shrink)

Hume seems to have discarded with final causes and teleology. However, his invocation of a pre-established harmony between the course of nature and the succession of our ideas suggests otherwise. This paper takes Hume’s general strategy of shifting to the external perspective into account, and argues that the seemingly internal property of force and vivacity are, in fact, functional-teleological properties. Force and vivacity bears many explanatory burdens: It explains the difference between imagination and memory, between conception and belief, (...) and it establishes causal necessity. What kind of property is this supposed to be? We can answer this question by taking into account Hume’s explanation of the way in which this very property is communicated in the cases of ideas of memory and belief, and of the function it performs in these cases. It will be argued that force and vivacity is not an intrinsic, phenomenal property of ideas. It is a relational and historical property. A major objective of the paper is the application of this interpretation from the case of ideas to the case of impression. What kind of history could transfer force and vivacity to impressions? Answer: natural history. By a careful examination of passages concerning innate capacities, passions, and animal instincts, we can make sense of the tenet that impressions have force and vivacity because of our natural history. It will be suggested that Hume’s philosophy of mind is fit to integrate Darwinian Design as an explanatory corner-stone. Hume, so scheint, ist ein scharfer Kritiker von Finalursachen und Teleologie. Seine häufig als ironisch missverstandene Berufung auf eine Art „prästabilierter Harmonie“ zwischen Naturverläufen und Ideenabfolgen verweist jedoch auf eine andere Lesart. Der folgende Essay behauptet, indem er Humes explanatorische Strategie betont, etwa im Falle seiner berühmten Lösung der skeptischen Zweifele zur Kausalität zu einer externen Perspektive zu wechseln, dass es sich bei der scheinbar geistinternen Eigenschaft „Kraft und Lebendigkeit“ tatsächlich um eine teleologisch- historische Eigenschaft handelt. Kraft und Lebendigkeit leisten in Humes Philosophie des Geistes eine große Erklärungsarbeit: Sie erklären den Unterscheid zwischen Vorstellung und Erinnerung, zwischen Vorstellung und Überzeugung, und sie stellen die wesentliche Zutat der kausalen Notwendigkeit dar. Doch um welche Art Eigenschaft handelt es sich? Diese Frage kannmit Blick auf Humes Ausführung darüber beantwortet werden, wie diese Eigenschaft auf Ideen der Erinnerung und auf Überzeugungsideen übertragen wird, und v.a. mit Blick auf die Funktion, die diese Eigenschaft übernimmt. Es soll gezeigt werden, dass es sich bei Kraft und Lebendigkeit um keine intrinsische, phänomenale Eigenschaft von Ideen handelt, sondern um eine relationale, historische Eigenschaft. Ein wichtiges Ziel des Essays besteht darin, diese Deutung von Ideen auf Eindrücke zu übertragen. Inwiefern kann es sich bei der Kraft und Lebendigkeit von Eindrücken umeine relationale und historische Eigenschaft handeln? Die Antwort findet sich in der Naturgeschichte, wie mit Verweis auf Humes Ausführungen zu angeborenen Fähigkeiten, Leidenschaften und tierlichen Instinkten gezeigt werden kann. Die Stoßrichtung des Essays besagt, dass Humes Philosophie des Geistes durchaus mit einer Darwinschen Auffassung des Geistes zusammengeführt werden kann. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:277 HUME'S IMPRESSIONS OF BELIEF Introduction Hume's theory of belief is often taken to be fully stated in his opening remarks on the subject in A Treatise of Human Nature, Book I, Part III, Section VII: "An opinion, therefore, or belief may be most accurately defin'd, A LIVELY IDEA RELATED TO OR ASSOCIATED WITH A PRESENT IMPRESSION."1 Taking this definition as Hume's final account leaves the reader with many (...) problems. What is it for an idea to be lively? How is an idea related to or associated with an impression? Is belief really so simple a phenomenon? I argue that Hume's theory of belief is much more complex than this, and that the Treatise contains only a rough, preliminary account of belief. By the time he wrote An Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding, Hume had developed his theory in full detail. As I show, in this latter account a belief is an intentional state involving a combination of Humean ideas and impressions. The nature of these ideas and impressions allows the mind to take note of a belief as something quite different from its other perceptions. In the Treatise, however, Hume did not have a clear understanding of how the mind could distinguish beliefs from other perceptions. He could only go so far as to say that an idea believed is livelier than other ideas. He argued that a present impression is capable of calling to mind an idea of something that has been associated with that impression in the past, and of transferring some of its own vivacity to that idea. As we look at the account of belief in the Treatise, we will see how the preliminary concepts of force and liveliness and a transference of vivacity lay the foundation for his 278 final account, yet point to a need for a fuller explication of the difference the mind notes between beliefs and other perceptions. We will see that in the Appendix to the Treatise Hume tried to work out this difference in terms of 'feeling' but this was unsuccessful without the notion of an intentional act. Finally, we will see that Hume concluded in the Enquiry that a belief is an intentional state in which a new impression of reflection arises about the idea believed. This new impression is the feeling of belief by which beliefs are distinguished from other 2 perceptions of the mind. The Account in the Treatise We begin our explication of Hume's theory of belief by looking at the account in A Treatise of Human Nature. Here Hume maintains that it is ideas which are believed, and that these beliefs differ from other ideas only in their "force and vivacity" (T 96). This force and vivacity is a result of the believed idea's relation to an impression. These theses lead us to the familiar Treatise definition of belief as "A LIVELY IDEA RELATED TO OR ASSOCIATED WITH A PRESENT IMPRESSION" (T 96). Hume begins his analysis of belief in Section VII of the Treatise by stating that "the idea of an object is an essential part of the belief of it, but not the whole" (T 94). The suggestion is that there is more to being in a state of belief than merely entertaining the idea believed. The simple phrase "belief o_f_ an object" leads us to presume that it is ideas that are believed, or that we have beliefs o_f ideas. We will need to examine Hume's meaning of 'idea' in enough depth to understand the role it plays in the theory of belief. 279 Hume gives some examples of the way we may conceive ideas without believing them: Suppose a person present with me, who advances propositions, to which I do not assent, that Caesar dy'd in his bed, that silver is more fusible than lead, or mercury heavier than gold; 'tis evident, that notwithstanding my incredulity, I clearly understand his meaning, and form all the same ideas, which he forms (T 95). Note that Hume says one may form all the same ideas as another. Yet the ideas one forms are just what Hume had earlier called the propositions one... (shrink)

Hume’s remark that “the conviction of religionists, in all ages, is more affected than real” is considered in relation to various monotheistic beliefs against the background of his account of belief more generally. The issue arises as to what Hume means by characterizing the assent associated with religious belief as an operation between disbelief and conviction. According to Hume, the obscurity of the ideas involved in the religious convictions of the “vulgar” prevents them from achieving the force and vivacity (...) characteristic of belief. As for philosophers, their idea of God encounters the problem of evil and the question of whether it is possible for the deity to possess moral virtues. Even the ascription to God of natural attributes takes us beyond what may meaningfully be imagined. Finally, the philosophical idea of God as a principle of order provides a form of theistic belief that is only verbally different from atheism. (shrink)

Hume introduced important innovations concerning the theory of ideas. The two most important are the distinction between impressions and ideas, and the use he made of the principles of association in explaining mental phenomena. Hume divided the perceptions of the mind into two classes. The members of one class, impressions, he held to have a greater degree of force and vivacity than the members of the other class, ideas. He also supposed that ideas are causally dependent copies of impressions. (...) And, unlike Locke and others, Hume makes positive use of the principle of association, both of the association of ideas, and, in a more limited way, of the association of impressions. Such associations are central to his explanations of causal reasoning, belief, the indirect passions (pride and humility, love and hatred), and sympathy. These views about impressions and ideas and the principles of association form the core of Hume’s science of human nature. Relying on them, he attempts a rigorously empirical investigation of human nature. The resulting system is a remarkable but complex achievement. (shrink)

David Hume fancied himself the Newton of the mind, aiming to reinvent the study of human mental life in the same way that Newton had revolutionized physics. And it was his view that the novel account of belief he proposed in his Treatise of Human Nature was one of that work’s central philosophical contributions. From the earliest responses to the Treatise forward, however, there was deep pessimism about the prospects for his account. It is easy to understand the source of (...) this pessimism: The constraints he employed in theorizing stem from his Newtonian ambitions. Constraints such as his copy principle and his decision to rely only on variations in “force and vivacity” for differentiating types of mental states severely limit his available explanatory resources. However, it is one thing to regard an account as untenable, and quite another to understand where it fails. In this paper, I focus on one long-standing objection to Hume’s account — the objection that Hume cannot offer an account of negative belief or denial — as presented by Hume’s contemporary Thomas Reid, as well as more recently by Barry Stroud, and defend Hume from this objection. I argue that Hume both should and does endorse an account of negative belief based in relations of contrariety between contents, rather than between mental activities, and survey the different options available to Hume for spelling out an account of contrary contents. (shrink)

Although Hume insists that belief does not involve a separate impression, select scholars have argued that, as Hume’s thoughts on belief developed, he either was moving toward, or adopted, the impression of reflection view of belief. In my paper, I attempt to show that neither of these views is correct. As well, I argue that there is a role for distinctions of reason in belief, which is similar to the role played by distinctions of reason in Hume’s moral theory, at (...) the point where Hume shows how we form a disinterested standpoint when making moral judgements. In the last part of my paper, I show that Hume develops “Of Scepticism with Regard to Reason” to confirm the force and vivacity view of belief, and to show that force and vivacity has application even with regard to intuitive and demonstrative reasoning. (shrink)

What is the source of normativity in Hume’s account of causal reasoning? In virtue of what are causal beliefs justified for Hume? To answer these questions, the literature appeals, almost invariably, to custom or some feature thereof. I argue, in contrast, that causal beliefs are justified for Hume because they issue from experience. Although he denies experience the title of justifying reason, for Hume experience has normative authority. I offer an interpretation of the source and nature of the normativity of (...) experience in causal reasoning. I argue that the senses and memory have a special, positive status within the mind in virtue of their force and vivacity, which, on my reading, Hume identifies with a sense of presentness and a strong effect on the mind. Hume dignifies the system of memory and the senses with the title of reality because of these features. Causal beliefs are dignified as “realities” because they issue from reality. However, because the imagination can sometimes enhance the force and vivacity of ideas without the help of experience, Hume appeals to coherence and general rules as well. (shrink)

Hume's treatment of scepticism with regard to reason is analogous to his account of probable reasoning. In neither case is Hume concerned with the justification of beliefs or the warrant of reason as much as with the explanation of the presence of beliefs. In his account of probable reasoning, the issue was the origin of beliefs; in his account of scepticism with regard to reason, the issue is the retention of beliefs in the face of sceptical arguments. The sceptical arguments (...) threaten to lessen the degree of force and vivacity characteristic of our beliefs to the extent that they are in danger of becoming mere ideas and not beliefs at all. We know, as a matter of fact, that this result does not obtain, and Hume attempts to explain this by an appeal to a feature of his account of reasoning: lengthy chains of abstruse reasoning have little effect on us. Hume considers his ability to respond to these sceptical arguments to be a vindication of his theory of belief. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume's Theory of Belief Michael M. Gorman Belief is a key concept in Hume's philosophy, and yet Hume's statements aboutbeliefappear to be hopelesslyinconsistent.1 Various solutions have been offered, from saying that Hume is incorrigibly confused to saying that his theory ofbeliefchanged over the course of his career. This article will focus on the question ofthe nature ofbelief and show that Hume's theory is in fact consistent. In sections 1 (...) and 2, I will separate those passages where Hume discusses the nature of beUeffrom those where he discusses other questions. In sections 3-6, 1 will examine his theory ofthe nature ofbelief. Finally, in section 7, 1 will briefly look at his theories on other questions concerning belief. 1.Hume's statements about belief can be divided into at least nine different categories. Hume says that a beliefis: 1.an idea conceived in a certain manner (e.g., E 49, T 96); 2.that certain manner ofconception itself(e.g., E 49, T 97); 3.an idea that feels a certain way (e.g., E 48, T 103); 4.that certain feeling itself(e.g., E 49, T 624, 629); 5.an idea that has a great influence on the mind (e.g, T 118-20); 6.an act ofmind rendering realities influential on the mind (e.g., E 49, T 629); 7.a lively idea related to an impression (e.g., T 96); 8.a lively manner of conceiving an idea, which manner arises from an impression (e.g., E 50); 9.something that makes ideas forceful and vivacious (e.g., T 101, 627). If one were in a really bad mood, one could probably split Hume's formulations into even more categories.2 2.One solution wouldbe to saythat Hume ishopelessly confused.3 This is not accurate, however. The first thingtobe done is to notice thatonly the statements belonging to the first four categories are actually answers to the question, What is the nature of beUef? Hume tells us that abeUefis: an ideaconceived in acertainmanner, theverymanner ofconception ofsuch an idea, an idea thatfeels a certain way, thevery feeling of such an idea. To explicate Hume's theory of the nature of Volume XLX Number 1 89 MICHAEL M. GORMAN beUef, I will show that the second formulation is a poor version ofthe first and that the fourth formulation is a poor version ofthe third—in other words, that there are reallyonlytwo theorieshere, notfour. Then I will reconcile these two theories. As for Hume's discussion ofother questions concerning belief, the statementsin the fifth and sixth categories address the question, What does à belief do? Those in the seventh and eighth categories take for granted the statements in the first and second categories respectively and address the further question, What causes beliefs? Those in the ninth category are probably cases of bad writing. All these will be examined in section 7. 3. Let us look at the texts that fit into the first and second categories listed in section 1. These express what can be called Hume's "manner-of-conception theory" (MCT). First, Hume says that a belief is a certain kind ofidea, namely an idea conceived in a certain manner. He describes this manner ofconception by saying that such an idea is conceived with a high degree of force and vivacity, liveliness, and so forth. This analysis rests on Hume's distinction between the content of an idea and the manner in which the idea is conceived. [A]s 'tis certain there is a great difference betwixt the simple conception ofthe existence ofan object, and the beliefofit, and as this difference lies not in the parts or composition of the idea, which we conceive; it follows, that it must lie in the manner, in which we conceive it. (T 94-95) One can believe that something is the case, or one can simply conceive ofits being the case without assenting to it. In both cases, Hume says, the content ofthe idea must be the same. Otherwise, both making up one's mind and disagreeingwith someone wouldbe impossible: making up one's mind would be a transition from thinking about one thing to thinking about... (shrink)

After rejecting traditional accounts in terms of reason, Hume presents his own explanation of how we are led from a present impression directly to an idea of something unobserved by the association of ideas set up by past experience. It is this that explains our most basic probable inferences. Hume also has to explain why and how the results of such inferences are believed. What distinguishes belief from mere conception is the very same thing as that which distinguishes impressions from (...) ideas, and ideas of memory from ideas of the imagination: force and vivacity. Once he has an account of these basic inferences and beliefs, he is able to explain how we manage to engage in more complex, reflective reasonings. Such reasonings make use of the uniformity principle and the causal maxim, and Hume is even able to explain how we get the idea of necessary connection. At the end of the story, we have an account of how we manage to perform really difficult and complex feats of reasoning. But this account requires his explanation of the simplest cases of probable reasoning as merely associative, and his account of belief as belonging more to the sensitive than the cogitative part of our natures. (shrink)

Reid’s dilemma concludes that, whether the idea associated with a denied proposition is lively or faint, Hume is committed to saying that it is either believed or merely conceived. In neither case would there be denial. If so, then Hume cannot give an adequate account of denial. I consider and reject Powell’s suggestion that Hume could have advanced a “Content Contrary” account of denial that avoids Reid’s dilemma. However, not only would a Humean Content Contrary account be viciously circular, (...) textual evidence suggests that Hume did not hold such an account. I then argue that Govier’s distinction between force and vivacity cannot help Hume. Not only did Hume fail to recognize this distinction, we can advance a variant of Reid’s dilemma even if we distinguish force from vivacity. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:168 HUME ON MEMORY AND CAUSATION In the first part of this paper I shall argue that an examination of Hume's second criterion for distinguishing between ideas of the memory and ideas of the imagination shows that Hume's ideas of the memory are relative ideas corresponding to definite descriptions of the general form, "the complex impression that is the (original) cause of a particular positive idea m and which (...) exactly (or closely) resembles m," where 'm' is a variable ranging over positive ideas (mental images). I shall show that if this is correct, there is a clear basis for distinguishing ideas of the memory both from ideas of the imagination and from beliefs regarding spatially and temporally located objects that are not based upon the memory. But since there is often a significant temporal distance between the impression remembered and the positive component of one's relative idea of the memory, it is incumbent upon me to explain how the remembered impression and the positive idea can be causally related even though they are not temporally contiguous. In the second part of the paper I shall argue that, contrary to his "definitions" of causation in the Treatise,2 Hume took neither spatial nor temporal contiguity to be essential to causation. In Book I, Part I, Section 3 and again in Book I, Part III, Section 5 of his Treatise of Human Nature, Hume provides two criteria for distinguishing between ideas of the memory and ideas of the imagination. I shall refer to these two criteria as "the phenomenal criterion" and "the formal criterion". In this section I shall show that while the phenomenal criterion 169 expresses the means one actually employs in distinguishing an idea of the memory from an idea of the imagination, the formal criterion provides one with insight into the complex structure of an idea of the memory, and therefore allows one to distinguish ideas of the memory from both ideas of the imagination and from other ideas of and beliefs regarding spatially and temporally located objects. In Book I, Part I,- Section 3 of the Treatise, Hume introduces the phenomenal criterion as follows: We find by experience, that when any impression has been present with the mind, it again makes its appearance there as an idea; and this it may do after two different ways: either when in its new appearance it retains a considerable degree of its first vivacity, and is somewhat intermediate betwixt an impression and an idea; or when it entirely loses that vivacity, and is a perfect idea. The faculty, by which we repeat our impressions in the first manner, is called the MEMORY, and the other the IMAGINATION. 'Tis evident at first sight, that the ideas of the memory are much more lively and strong than those of the imagination, and that the former faculty paints its objects in more distinct colours, than any which are employ'd by the latter. When we remember any past event, the idea of it flows in upon the mind in a forcible manner; whereas in the imagination the perception is faint and languid, and cannot without difficulty be preserv'd by the mind steddy and uniform for any considerable time. Here then is a sensible difference betwixt one species of ideas and another. (T 8-9; cf. T 85) It is clear that Hume took this to be a phenomenal criterion, i.e., to specify a sensible characteristic by which one can distinguish an idea of the memory from an idea of the imagination. Not only does he state that he has found "a sensible difference betwixt one species of ideas and another" (T 9), in the parallel 170 passage in Part III, Section 5 he claims to "search for the characteristic [of the idea], which distinguishes the memory from the imagination" (T 85, Hume's emphasis). The characteristic that allows one to "distinguish them in their operation" (T 85) is the difference in the force and vivacity of the ideas involved. Ideas of the memory are "much more lively and strong than those of the imagination," "the former faculty paints its objects in more distinct colours", and ideas of the memory... (shrink)

According to Husserl, Hume’s empirical method was deeply flawed—like all empiricists, Hume did not, and could not adequately justify his method, much less his findings. Instead, Hume gives us a “circular” and “irrational” “psychological explanation” of “mediate judgments of fact,” i.e. of inductive inferences. Yet Husserl was certain that he could justify both his own method and his own findings with an appeal to the phenomenological, pre-theoretical, pre-naturalistic “epoché”. However, whether or not Husserl’s notion of an epoché is justified, or (...) even viable, is not our focus here. Rather, our issue is with Hume, particularly: How could Hume have responded? In this paper, I show that in Book I of the Treatise, Hume did—however implicitly—appeal to a “pre-theoretical” notion of belief, which meets Husserl’s demands for a pre-theoretical grounding, i.e. a justificatory grounding. And so, his method is, at least in this respect, justified. But this belief is by no means “prenaturalistic.” Rather, it is a function of empirical data. In particular, it is a product of the “constant and coherent” impressions that seem to naturally obtain of experience. As a result, Hume’s method, which, in agreement with Husserl, we may characterize as psychology, does admit of a certain degree of regularity, but an empirical regularity. And according to Hume, contra Husserl’s complaints, this is the best that we can hope for; regularity will have to suffice, not certainty. However, it must be noted up front that this justification is implicit—Hume is not nearly as forthright as he could have been. Thus, making his position more explicit is the task of this paper. I am not presenting my own position, where I offer my own arguments. Instead, I present textual evidence, contextualized with ample explication. It is my hope that by doing so, Hume may more effectively make his case. (shrink)

In ordinary life we think that we know many things about the world. I know that I am sitting here. I know that it is not raining. I know that Reagan is President--and many more interesting things. We also think that we know things of a more general sort, e.g., that there are tables, chairs, physical objects, other people. Most of the time, we believe that we have good reasons for our beliefs. Descartes, Hume and Russell, however, as a result (...) of philosophical reflection, discover that we cannot know, nor do we have any good reason for our beliefs. ;Thomas Reid and G. E. Moore reject the sceptic's negative conclusions. They think scepticism is absurd, ridiculous and contrary to common sense. It is contrary to what we believe in ordinary life. These commonsense philosophers do not find the sceptical arguments compelling. They argue that scepticism is not as well supported as the ordinary view that we do know. ;A large part of my dissertation is a defense of scepticism against these commonsense philosophers' objections. I argue that Reid and Moore fail to appreciate the power and significance of scepticism. They fail to understand the relation between philosophical scepticism and ordinary life. A proper understanding of Humean scepticism thwarts any attempt to argue from ordinary life against scepticism. ;Still, I argue that Hume was concerned, indeed distressed, by the conflict between scepticism and ordinary life. But he does not think that conflict casts doubt on the truth of scepticism. I argue that Hume feels "philosophical melancholy" over his discoveries about human nature and the human condition. But his distress is totally at the philosophical level. That is because the recognition of the conflict between ordinary life and philosophical reflection is distressing at the philosophical level. I argue that Hume is right to feel the distress that he does, but I also maintain that he should be dissatisfied with his negative appraisal of our epistemic position, just as we are. ;Reid and Moore are right to be dissatisfied with scepticism, even though their attempts to legitimize that dissatisfaction fail. Their failure to appreciate the nature and importance of scepticism, however, is instructive because it forces us to explain why there is thought to be a problem about knowledge. They force us to express what is indeed difficult to express, namely, what it is that we want to understand when we undertake a philosophical investigation of knowledge. . . . UMI. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 42.1 (2004) 109-110 [Access article in PDF] Paul Stanistreet. Hume's Scepticism and the Science of Human Nature. Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2002. Pp.xi + 226. Cloth, $69.95. Any new book on David Hume enters an already overcrowded field. There is no shortage of commentary on Hume's philosophy to be found in a broad range of journals such as Hume Studies, and in recent years (...) a steady stream of monographs and collections have appeared. In addition to this rapidly expanding body of literature, rigorous textual scholarship is being brought to bear on Hume's philosophical writings in the Clarendon edition of Hume's works; significant eighteenth-century editions of Hume are more widely available thanks to facsimile reprints; and a new edition of Hume's correspondence is in preparation. Moreover, this activity has not taken place in a vacuum, insofar as the study of the Scottish Enlightenment and of key figures like Francis Hutcheson, Adam Smith, and Thomas Reid has itself been something of an academic growth industry. Consequently, the interpretation of Hume now requires considerable intellectual expertise, a familiarity with an increasingly technical secondary literature, and a firm grasp on the divergent approaches to Hume that have emerged over the past quarter century.In Hume's Scepticism and the Science of Human Nature, Paul Stanistreet aims both to "provide the reader with an accessible guide to the most significant recent developments in Hume scholarship" and "[defend] a general interpretation of Hume's philosophy" (viii) that is largely based on a close reading of Book I of Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature. Although Stanistreet's introductory statement of his intentions may seem innocuous to the student readership his book is least partly intended for, the apparent innocence of his opening remarks masks a serious issue, namely the validity of grounding a reading of Hume primarily on the first book of the Treatise. A number of leading Hume scholars would argue, pace Stanistreet, that one cannot offer such an interpretation without reference to the two Enquiries and other texts by Hume. Furthermore, Hume himself can be read as opposing Stanistreet's approach. In the face of hostile critics like James Beattie and Thomas Reid, who focussed their attacks on the Treatise, Hume chose to exclude his first publication from the Humean canon and thereby deflect some of the ill-tempered criticism he had been forced to endure in his later years. Thus, in the "Advertisement" prefacing the 1777 edition of the Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects, he explicitly disavowed the Treatise and announced that his philosophical principles were to be found exclusively in the works included in the Essays and Treatises. For the long line of commentators fixated on the Treatise, the "Advertisement" poses questions of interpretation that cannot be ignored, and, for the benefit of his readers, Stanistreet therefore should have not only acknowledged that such questions exist, but also provided some justification for the approach to Hume he adopts.According to Stanistreet, the key to understanding Hume's philosophy is to see how he reconciles his positive programme of constructing a "science of man" with the apparently sceptical thrust of the major arguments advanced in Book I of the Treatise. To show how this reconciliation is achieved, Stanistreet first elucidates Hume's conception of the science of human nature and then proceeds to a detailed consideration of Hume's version of the theory of ideas, his treatment of causation and probable reasoning, and his analysis of our belief in objects external to and independent of ourselves. What emerges from Stanistreet's patient exposition of Hume's position is that Hume was no Pyrrhonian, but rather an advocate for a form of mitigated scepticism that was of a piece with his science of man. For anyone with even a passing familiarity with the Hume literature, this will hardly be a startling conclusion. Nor is it news that Hume was supposedly engaged in establishing a genuinely Newtonian science of the mind, as Stanistreet argues at length in Chapter 1... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:On Friedman's Look Daniel E. Flage In a pair of articles and a book (Flage 1985a, 1985b, 1990), I argued that Hume's ideas of memory are relative ideas. In "Another Look at Flage's Hume" (this volume), Lesley Friedman challenges my account on four points. She argues (1) that it is possible to remember simple ideas in their simplicity; (2) that I have misrepresented Humean impressions ofreflection; (3) that (...) I have overlooked the importance of force and vivacity in Hume's account ofmemory; and (4) that there is no textual evidence for claiming that Humean ideas of memory are relative ideas. In addition, she contends that my interpretation cannot account for mis-remembering. In this paper I show that some of the problems Friedman finds with myinterpretation arise from myreading of Lockean distinctions into the Treatise while others stem from my conflation of distinctions drawn in the first Enquiry with comparable distinctions in the Treatise. 1. Remembering simple ideas My argument that Humean ideas ofmemory are relative ideas is based primarily on Hume's remarks in three passages. In Treatise 1.1.3, one finds this: "the imagination is not restrain'd to the same order and form with the original impressions; while the memory is in a manner tytt down in that respect, without any power of variation."1 Later in the same passage one finds this: Tis evident, that the memory preserves the original form, in which its objects were presented, and that where-ever we depart from it in recollecting any thing, it proceeds from some defect or imperfection in that faculty.... The chiefexercise of memory is not to preserve the simple ideas, but their order and position. (T 9) And in Treatise 1.3.5, one finds this: These faculties [memory and imagination] are as little distinguish'd from each other by the arrangement of their complexideas. For tho'itbe apeculiar propertyofthe memory to preserve the original order and position of its ideas, while the imagination transposes and changes them, as it pleases; yet this difference is not sufficient to distinguish them in their Volume XLX Number 1 187 DANIEL E. FLAGE operation, or make us know the one from the other; it being impossible to recai the past impressions, in order to compare them with our present ideas, and see whether their arrangement be exactly similar. (T 85) This is only one characteristic ofideas ofmemory, the other being the greater degree of"force andvivacity" in an idea ofthe memory vis-à-vis an idea ofthe imagination (T 9, 85). I call this characteristic the formal criterion (Flage 1985a, 171); Friedman calls it the external difference (p. 178). These passages show that ideas of the memory represent earlier impressions, or ideas, or "events," or things known.2 How do they do so? Given the remarks on the preservation of"order and form" and "order and position," and given that resemblance alone is not sufficient to distinguish nonmnemonic ideas from mnemonic ideas (see T 9), I argued that there is an implicit causal thesis: an idea ofmemory singles out the impression that was its original cause. It is a relative idea corresponding to a definite description ofthe form, "the impression that is the (original) cause of and exactly (or closely) resembles m," where 'm' denotes a particular positive idea. (Flage 1985a, 172)3 If my account of memory is correct, there is a positive idea ("mental image") that provides the basis for every relative idea of memory. Further, this positive idea must be complex. Friedman objects (pp. 180-81) that insofar as my account requires that there be a complex positive idea that provides the basis for one's relative idea of memory, this conflicts with several passages in the Treatise. She cites the ink spot experiment (T 42) as showing that one can have a simple impression of colour. She remarks, "Since we can have such a simple impression, we can also remember it" (p. 180), adding, "It seems clear that Hume thinks that in the [ink spot] experiment, all that is present in one's visual field is the spot of ink" (ibid.). Since I had argued that "Hume's example ofseeing a minimum... (shrink)

This paper is the product of an interdisciplinary, interreligious dialogue aiming to outline some of the possibilities and rational limits of supernatural religious belief, in the light of a critique of David Hume’s familiar sceptical arguments -- including a rejection of his famous Maxim on miracles -- combined with a range of striking recent empirical research. The Humean nexus leads us to the formulation of a new ”Common-Core/Diversity Dilemma’, which suggests that the contradictions between different religious belief systems, in (...) conjunction with new understandings of the cognitive forces that shape their common features, persuasively challenge the rationality of most kinds of supernatural belief. In support of this conclusion, we survey empirical research concerning intercessory prayer, religious experience, near-death experience, and various cognitive biases. But we then go on to consider evidence that supernaturalism -- even when rationally unwarranted -- has significant beneficial individual and social effects, despite others that are far less desirable. This prompts the formulation of a ”Normal/Objective Dilemma’, identifying important trade-offs to be found in the choice between our humanly evolved ”normal’ outlook on the world, and one that is more rational and ”objective’. Can we retain the pragmatic benefits of supernatural belief while avoiding irrationality and intergroup conflict? It may well seem that rationality is incompatible with any wilful sacrifice of objectivity. But in a situation of uncertainty, an attractive compromise may be available by moving from the competing factions and mutual contradictions of ”first-order’ supernaturalism to a more abstract and tolerant ”second-order’ view, which itself can be given some distinctive intellectual support through the increasingly popular Fine Tuning Argument. We end by proposing a ”Maxim of the Moon’ to express the undogmatic spirit of this second-order religiosity, providing a cautionary metaphor to counter the pervasive bias endemic to the human condition, and offering a more cooperation- and humility-enhancing understanding of religious diversity in a tense and precarious globalised age. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:478 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY David Hume. By Nicholas Capaldi. (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1975. Pp. 241. $7.50) Professor Capaldi has taken Hume's profession in the Treatise to establish a new "science of man" very seriously indeed, and he intends to show us in this book how the "almost entirely new'" foundation of this science is thoroughly Newtonian. Hume, he tells us, was "the first philosopher to understand fully, to appreciate (...) and to articulate the philosophical implications of Newtonian physics" (p. 50). Newtonian science is therefore the basis of Humean philosophy, and we should at once set aside the idea that this philosophy is in any way dependent on a preconceived theory of psychology. Even worse would be for us to accept the vulgar error that Hume failed to distinguish between psychology and logic. These are not the only myths Capaldi is intent on exploding, nor the only windmills at which he tilts. He tells us, among other things, that Hume should not be thought of as belonging to the Locke-Berkeley tradition; that Hume's theory of causation must not be regarded as having any connection with his theory of perception; that there is no problem of induction in Hume; that critics as distinguished as Popper and Passmore have been mistaken about Hume's explanation of "constant conjunction" (p. 124); that Hume was not a hedonist; that Hume was not concerned with the is-ought problem; that Hume does not deny the argument from design; and, finally, that we ought ourselves to be skeptical of Hume's alleged skepticism. Lest I give the impression that the book is a long series of refutations, let me give examples of the positive assertions: Hume should be seen as developing, albeit rather elaborately, a common sense theory of reality; Hume advances a naturalistic theory of ethics as well as of religion; Hume provides a scientific basis for the social sciences; and Hume provides a convincing psychology in his theory of the passions. The scope of this relatively short work is therefore rather extensive, and to achieve a tour de force of Hume's thought, Capaldi has organized his book tightly. After a brief glimpse at Hume's life, we are led, in successive chapters, to consider his view of philosophy, the Newtonian program of his work, the structure of the Treatise, the analysis of causation, his moral theory, the theory of the passions, and finally questions about his philosophy of religion and his alleged skepticism. Hume's first contact with Newtonian ideas was probably at Edinburgh University as an undergraduate; at any rate, by the time he comes to write the Treatise he is, according to Capaldi, self-consciously out to apply Newton's method to the "moral" subjects--ethics, psychology, and what we now call the social sciences. Hume begins by rejecting any kind of speculative metaphysics in the traditional, Aristotelian manner; he insists that philosophers, like physicists, must limit themselves to actual experience and concern themselves with experimentation along the lines laid down by Newton. The "Newtonian method" consists of six stages. The first is the identification and isolation of the objects of analysis. Hume's division of perception into ideas and impressions is his first move in applying the method. The second stage is experimentation; in Hume's case introspection and observation of human behavior provide this obligatory experimentation. The next stage consists of the working out of generalizations: Hume's theory of association corresponds to Newton's theory of the attraction of physical bodies. The fourth stage of the Newtonian program is to extend the theory to explain further phenomena: in Hume's case the theory of association is used as an explanatory principle throughout the Treatise. Finally, Newton's concern with momentum is reflected in Hume's theory of the transfer of vivacity, and both share a recognition of the inherent limitations of the reasoning faculty of man. Hume thus combines these procedures and principles of Newtonian science and applies them to philosophical investigation, placing this study on a new footing and dispelling the Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge(Oxford, 1888), p. xx. BOOK REVIEWS 479 them to philosophical investigation, placing... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:137. PROBABILITY IN HUME'S SCIENCE OF MAN This paper is an attempt to make sense of a fragment of Hume's positive philosophy, namely his theory of how we apportion belief on the basis of ambiguous evidence. The topic is one that has received little critical attention from philosophers. One reason for this neglect is the belief that Hume's discussion of probable reasoning is not addressed to philosophical questions, but (...) rather is concerned merely to give a psychological theory of why we tend to make the inferences we do. Another is the view that Hume's psychology of probability is too obscure to merit serious study. I hope to show, however, that Hume's discussion of probable reasoning contains more philosophy, and more interesting psychology, than the prevalence of these attitudes would suggest. The main philosophical content that I see in Hume's account of probable reasoning is that it embodies a certain theory of belief, worked out in some detail. Here the central notion is the "belief-feeling", vivacity. After an initial discussion of Hume's use of this notion, I hazard the opinion that vivacities are related to probabilities by a simple subtraction formula (§1). The investigation of Hume's account of probable inference (§2) gives strong grounds for thinking that this conjecture is indeed correct. Finally, an examination of what Hume says about the influence of probability on the passions unearths a bold theory of the specific psychological mechanism by which the subtraction of probabilities is effected (§3).§1 Degrees of belief Hume's philosophy makes heavy use of the quality of perceptions which he referred to variously as "force", "liveliness", "violence", "vivacity", "strength", "firmness" and so on. As the variety of these terms indicates, Hume was not entirely happy with any of them. He says it is 138. impossible by words to describe this feeling, which every 2 one must be conscious of in his own breast (A19). But we need to use some word, and rather than emulate Hume's diverse usage it will be convenient to adhere uniformly to the single term 'vivacity'. The first use to which Hume puts vivacity is in distinguishing impressions from ideas. Intuitively, impressions are either sensations, passions or emotions, whereas ideas are the perceptions involved in thinking or reasoning. And Hume maintains that we can distinguish these two kinds of perceptions by their differing degrees of vivacity: all impressions have greater vivacity than any idea. Apparently Hume thinks that the difference in vivacity between impressions and ideas is normally quite considerable, although in a few instances there is only a small differential (T2). Vivacity is again used by Hume to distinguish between belief and conception. Although to have an idea of God, say, is not the same thing as to believe in God, Hume argues that what distinguishes the latter is only the manner of conception. In belief, the idea feels different to an idea that is entertained incredulously. And this difference in feeling is identified by Hume with a difference in vivacity (T96).3 In general, Hume thinks of beliefs as being ideas, not impressions (T86 being an exception). This is the natural view, if one thinks of the distinction between impressions and ideas as a distinction between feeling and thinking (T2, A9 ). What distinguishes beliefs then is a somewhat intermediate vivacity, inferior to the vivacity of an impression but superior to the vivacity of a mere conception. A third use to which Hume puts vivacity is in making the distinction between memory and other beliefs. Just as beliefs are distinguished from other conceptions by their greater vivacity, so likewise memories are distinguished from other beliefs by their greater vivacity (T153). 139. Each of these three applications of vivacity seems to be implausib^e. Introspection inevitably suggests that impressions are not always more vivacious or forceful, or whatever, than ideas. Similarly it seems that our beliefs, and even our memories, are often less vivid than our fancies, contrary to what Hume claims. A considerable part of Hume's appendix to the Treatise is concerned with such objections. Hume appears to allow that what we would naturally call the vivacity of ideas is not a quality... (shrink)

The article argues that Meillassoux's 'After Finitude' underestimates the nature and profundity of Hume's sceptical challenge; it neglects the fact that Hume's scepticism concerns final causes (and agrees fundamentally with Bacon and Descartes in this respect), and that in Hume even the operations of reason do not furnish entirely a priori knowledge. We contend that Hume himself institutes a form of correlationism (which in part showed Kant the way to counter the sceptical challenge via transcendental idealism), and sought not merely (...) to abolish the 'principle of sufficient reason' but to salvage it in a weak form, in turning his attention to the grounds for our beliefs in necessity. We argue further that the 'mathematizability' of properties is not a sufficient criterion to yield realist, non-correlational knowledge, or to demonstrate the 'irremediable realism' of the 'ancestral' statement. Finally, we contend that Meillassoux himself relies on a certain 'Kantian moment' which exempts the reasoning subject from otherwise 'omnipotent' chaos, and that ultimately the 'speculative materialist' position remains exposed to the original Humean sceptical challenge. (shrink)

In the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Philo and Cleanthes make use of irregular arguments—arguments whose veracity is founded on the force and vivacity with which they strike the mind. This paper provides an analysis of the irregular arguments by the two characters in the Dialogues and by Hume in the Treatise of Human Nature. Since both characters accept the veracity of irregular arguments, it seems that they are in agreement at the end of the Dialogues. The similarity between their (...) arguments and those Hume presents in the Treatise seem suggests that both characters represent Hume’s actual position. (shrink)

In the modern metaethical debate, the term 'non-cognitivism' is often used to describe a claim in moral psychology: the claim that moral judgments are constituted by desire-like mental states rather than beliefs. An argument tradi- tionally employed in defences of non-cognitivism is the 'motivation argument' which can be traced back to David Hume. The motivation argument combines the idea that moral judgments are motivationally efficacious states of mind with the idea that beliefs are incapable of exerting motivational force. The (...) aim of this paper is to take a closer look at the second premise of the argument, often re- ferred to as the orthodox Humean theory of motivation. I want to demonstrate that the orthodox Humean theory asks for a specific kind of contextualization and is most plausible if embedded into a variant of psychological hedonism. However, once the second premise is understood in this manner, the motivation argument can no longer give non-cognitivists what they are after. (shrink)

This guide accompanies the following article: Nikolaj Nottelmann, ‘Belief‐Desire Explanation’. Philosophy Compass Vol/Iss : 1–10. doi: 10.1111/j.1747‐9991.2011.00446.xAuthor’s Introduction“Belief‐desire explanation” is short‐hand for a type of action explanation that appeals to a set of the agent’s mental states consisting of 1. Her desire to ψ and 2. Her belief that, were she to φ, she would promote her ψ‐ing. Here, to ψ could be to eat an ice cream, and to φ could be to walk to the ice cream vendor. Adherents (...) of belief‐desire explanation, often labelled “Humeans”, standardly assume that appeals to such belief‐desire pairs sufficiently explain many human and animal actions, and also that all actions are explainable thus, at least in so far as they are guided by the agent’s intentions. Humeans take their lead from David Hume’s famous dictum that “Reason...is only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.” In its original context, this passage from the Treatise is naturally taken to convey the thesis that mental states subservient to epistemic rationality – such as beliefs – are never in themselves sufficient to motivate action. Thus, an appeal to an agent’s beliefs is never in itself sufficient to lay bare her motivations and explain her actions, but must be supplemented by an appeal to “passions” such as desires. Many philosophers, so‐called Anti‐Humeans, have sharply disagreed. Some have pointed to certain beliefs with alleged motivational force in isolation from desires, most commonly evaluative beliefs. Others have argued that belief‐desire psychology fails to cut up mental space in a way fruitful to action explanation. Instead, only appeals to other types of mental state will adequately explain many types of intentional action. The debate for and against Humeanism is a highly complex one, which is likely to persist along with any general interest in the theory of action explanation.Author RecommendsHume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature. 2nd ed. Edited and with an Analytical Index, by L. A. Selby‐Bigge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978.Part III. Sect. III. of the Treatise is the classical source of the Humean view. Any in‐depth understanding of contemporary Humeanism must take it as its starting point.Stroud, Barry. Hume. London: Routledge, 1977.This is an excellent introductory text. Chap. VII treats on Humeanism and the key part of the Treatise listed above.Smith, Michael. ‘The Humean Theory of Motivation.’Mind 96.381 : 36–61.This is an authoritative modern account of Humeanism. Even if a bit imprecise in some regards, the text is lucidly written and nicely captures the structure of the debate over Humeanism.Schaefer‐Landau, Russ. Moral Realism. A Defence. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003.Chapt. 5 contains another fine, more recent, introduction to Humeanism and the typical arguments for and against it. This introduction is particularly recommendable in virtue of its clarity and comprehensiveness.Ratcliffe, Matthew. Rethinking Commonsense Psychology. A Critique of Folk Psychology, Theory of Mind and Simulation. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.This monograph treats on a very wide number of subjects pertaining to action explanation and harbours many highly controversial theses. Still, it is a refreshing eye‐opener re the immense complexity of the topic of action explanation and the great variety of such explanations in our folk practices. On my view Ratcliffe makes plausible the view that neither our folk practices nor our scientific practices single out a unique model of action explanation as the only appropriate one. Rather our practices of action explanation constitute a rather motley family. The consequence of this to the debates over Humeanism is obvious: The combatants must get clear on the exact models of action explanation within which they discuss the place of belief‐desire references instead of pretending to fight over action explanation in general.Gendler, Tamar Szabó. ‘Alief and Belief.’Journal of Philosophy 105 : 634–63.This paper, together with Gendler’s contemporary sister paper ‘Alief in Action ’, is an engaging proponent of the view that belief‐desire psychology and its associated practice of Human action explanations gets psychological reality radically wrong. Gendler presents a number of cases where, allegedly, relevant human actions are only explicable by appeal to a type of mental state, which Gendler dubs “alief”. Aliefs are neither beliefs nor desires; but share certain characteristics with both.Online MaterialsSample SyllabusWeek I: David Hume’s viewHume, Treatise, Part III. Sect III.Stroud: Hume, Chapt. VII.Week II: Modern HumeanismSmith, ‘The Humean Theory of Motivation’.Nottelmann, ‘Belief‐Desire Explanation’.Week III: Modern Humeanism continued: The Dialectics of the DebateSchaefer‐Landau, ‘Motivational Humeanism’.Week IV: Intention, Agency and CausationDavidson, Donald. ‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’ & ‘Freedom to Act’, both in: Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980.Week V: Modern Anti‐Humeanism, The Neo‐Kantian VersionScanlon, T. M. What we Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 1998, Chapt. 1. ‘Reasons’.Week VI: Modern Anti‐Humeanism, The Cognitive Science VersionGendler, Tamar Szabó. ‘Alief and Belief’, supplemented with excerpts of her ‘Alief in Action ’. Mind and Language 23.5 : 552–85.Focus Questions1 Which kinds of explanation do belief‐desire explanations belong to?2 In so far as belief‐desire explanations provide causal explanation of action, how are we to understand the causal nexus between belief‐desire pairs and successful agency?3 How are we to understand the notions of belief and desire as appealed to in belief‐desire explanations? Are they even conceptually distinct from the concept of a belief‐desire explanation of human action?4 May evaluative judgments such as moral judgments motivate and/or rationalize action in isolation from accompanying distinct co‐native states of the agent?5 Are certain types of intentional action better explained with sole reference to mental states different from belief as well as desire? (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:343 'LIVELY' MEMORY ANP 'PAST' MEMORY At the very beginning of the Treatise Hume distinguishes memory from imagination by noting two different features of ideas of memory not shared by ideas of imagination. The distinguishing marks of memory can be described as (1) memory conceived in terms of the liveliness or vivacity of its ideas and (2) memory conceived in terms of the constraints imposed on the order and (...) form of its ideas by the original impressions from which these ideas have been derived. Both of these conceptions of memory, according to Hume in this initial description, serve to distinguish ideas of memory from ideas of imagination. For purposes of brevity I shall call them, respectively, 'lively' memory and 'past' memory. In this paper I shall be concerned with four main issues arising from Hume's dual characterization of memory. First, I shall call attention to a point whose importance Hume scholars have not, I think, fully appreciated; namely, that later in Book I of the Treatise (Part III, Section V) Hume recognizes that his original dual characterization is not viable because it cannot be fit into his general theory of ideas and that, therefore, one of his two distinguishing features of memory must be abandoned. Second, I shall consider some problems generated by his abandonment of this conception of memory. Third, I shall construct a Humean solution to these problems, based on Hume's revised conception of memory -- a solution that he suggests but never develops. Finally, I shall apply Hume's revised characterization of memory to a central issue in his philosophy, his conception of the self, and show that, although he does not himself use it in his own 344 analysis, this characterization can provide a Humean explanation of our belief in our selves. My line of argument, which will depart not only from that of Hume but also of most of his commentators, is by no means free of difficulties; nevertheless, it has, I think, the virtue of being more consistent with Hume's general theory of ideas, hence is more Humean, than his own. To set the stage for our discussion I shall begin with Hume's initial description of memory and its difference from imagination, as it appears at the beginning of the Treatise. He writes as follows: We find by experience, that when any impression has been present with the mind, it again makes its appearance there as an idea; and this it may do after two different ways: either when in its new appearance it retains a considerable degree of its first vivacity, and is somewhat intermediate betwixt an impression and an idea; or when it entirely loses that vivacity, and is a perfect idea. The faculty, by which we repeat our impressions in the first manner, is called the MEMORY, and the other the IMAGINATION ___ There is another difference betwixt these two kinds of ideas, which is no less evident, namely that tho' neither the ideas of the memory nor imagination, neither the lively nor faint ideas can make their appearance in the mind, unless their correspondent impressions have gone before to prepare the way for them, yet the imagination is not restrain'd to the same order and form with the original impressions; while the memory is in a manner ty'd down in that respect, without any power of variation (T 89 ) A few comments on this passage are in order. Hume distinguishes memory from imagination on two grounds: (1) the experienced quality of the ideas 345 themselves and (2) the power or the faculty of the mind that produces them. Memory-ideas, as they actually occupy our consciousness, are lively and strong; imagination ideas are faint and languid. Also, memory and imagination, as separate faculties of the mind, differ in their power. Imagination is free to play with its ideas as it pleases; it can arrange and rearrange them at will, to allow us to contemplate "winged horses, fiery dragons, and monstrous giants." (T 10) Memory, however, has no such power but must reproduce impressions as memoryideas in the same order and form as they originally appeared in the mind. It requires little explanation to understand why... (shrink)

Many philosophers have found in Hume’s skeptical doubts concerning the operations of the understanding the materials for an argument that generalizes from induction to other domains, like our beliefs in the external world, other minds, and the past. This chapter offers a novel reconstruction of that argument and identifies the principles that are responsible for its capacity to generalize beyond induction. Next, it presents a classical reading of Hume’s skeptical solution and shows that Crispin Wright’s entitlement theory is close in (...) spirit to it. After that, it develops two objections to entitlement theory: it relies on the truth of deeply contingent propositions that are not a priori rational, and it does not manage to redefine the concept of epistemic rationality while offering an effective anti-skeptical response. The chapter concludes with a constructive suggestion: some passages that support a non-classical reading of Hume’s positive views on induction offer the materials to reject the steps of the skeptical argument that cause trouble for entitlement theory. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume XXII, Number 2, November 1996, pp. 325-337 Hume's Aesthetic Theism JOHN IMMERWAHR When it comes to religion, Hume's motto is corruptio optimi pessima, "the corruption of the best things gives rise to the worst" (NHR 338,339, SScE 73).1 He warmly endorses what he calls "true religion" and strongly attacks false religion, superstition and priestcraft. Hume's distaste for false religion is obviously sincere, but scholars have sometimes (...) wondered how seriously to take Hume's "veneration for true religion" (DNR 219). Are his favorable comments about true religion honest or is this just one more smokescreen?2 In fact, Hume tells us very little about what he calls "true religion," "true theism" or "genuine piety." At one point Hume even drafted an apology to readers of his History of England for the fact that "the Mischiefs which arise from the Abuses of Religion, are so often mentioned, while so little in comparison is said of the salutary Consequences which result from true & genuine piety."3 In what follows I look at a number of the passages where Hume does discuss true religion, in an attempt to ask what makes true religion true.4 In brief, his answer is that the superiority of genuine theism results from its moral qualities rather than its epistemological warrant.5 Unlike other forms of religion, true religion is based on the calm passions rather than the violent ones and as such it alone is able to perform "the proper Office of religion" which is to reinforce and support morality.6 While Hume never wavers from his position that morality does not require any religious or theological commitment, he does feel that at least this one approach to religion has a positive moral contribution to make. John Immerwahr is at the Department of Philosophy, Villanova University, Villanova PA 19085-1699 USA. Email: Immerwa@Email.Vill.Edu 326 John Immerwahr True religion in Hume's writings Scattered through Hume's writings are a number of references to a minimalistic religion that is immune from the usual Humean critiques. The exempted form of religion is what Gaskin describes as an "attenuated Deism," which includes a conviction of the existence of God as the cause of order in the universe, together with a commitment to a secular human morality.7 Here are a few passages where this form of religion is mentioned: The Natural History of Religion: The whole frame of nature bespeaks an intelligent author; and no rational enquirer can, after serious reflection, suspend his belief a moment with regard to the primary principles of genuine Theism and Religion. (NHR 309) History of England: In every religion, except the true, [the diligence of the clergy] is highly pernicious, and it has even a natural tendency to pervert the true, by infusing into it a strong mixture of superstition, folly, and delusion. (HE III 135) Dialogues concerning Natural Religion: Philo: All the new discoveries in astronomy, which prove the immense grandeur and magnificence of the works of Nature, are so many additional arguments for a Deity, according to the true system of Theism. (DNR 165) It is, of course, dangerous to take anything Hume says about religion at face value. On the one hand, Hume's religious works, such as his essay on miracles, were a major force in attracting the kind of literary reputation which he so much desired. On the other hand, he lived with the constant possibility of persecution by the ultra-conservative wing of the Scottish church.8 One of his self-protective techniques is to criticize one religious position only from the framework of another. This allows him a certain "deniability" in that he can always say that he was only criticizing a specific form of religion, not religion generally.9 At least some of what he says about true religion can probably be written off as protective coloration. Nonetheless, if we take seriously what Hume says about the "suitable notions of [God's] divine perfections" (DNR 88) we come up with a model of true religion that is compatible with Hume's overall perspective. The justifiability of true theism What makes true religion true? Hume tells... (shrink)

Grant that Hume is a contractarian. Justice then arises from more basic features of humans and their circumstances. Among these more basic features from which justice arises Hume includes (in addition to self-interest narrowly construed) the widely held passions of benevolence and sympathy. But it is mysterious why he included them in his contractarian theory for the derivation of justice does not need them, and may even be weaker with them included. This paper suggests that Hume’s philosophy of mind, in (...) particular his account of the imagination, forced him to include benevolence and sympathy along with self-interest as the passions on which justice is based. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume XXVI, Number 2, November 2000, pp. 279-289 Explaining General Ideas JANET BROUGHTON Hume declared himself a scientist of man; his aim was to identify the principles according to which our impressions give rise to our thoughts, beliefs, passions and actions. He took it that there are things about these products of experience that need to be explained, and as a scientist of man he aimed to (...) provide the needed explanation by finding principles that govern the operations of the mind. In what follows I want to consider Hume's account of general ideas, and I want especially to raise the question what it is about them that he wants to explain. In order to see what Hume thinks he should explain about our general ideas, we need first to see what sort of explanatory resources he thinks are available. In the introduction to the Treatise, he proposes to undertake a study of human nature, a study of the particular kind that he calls science of man. He is going to study the human mind using "careful and exact experiments"1 gleaned up from a "cautious observation of human life" as it appears in the "common course of the world" (T xix). The outcome will be the discovery of "principles," and Hume aims to render them "as universal as possible," "explaining all effects from the simplest and fewest causes" (T xvii). By itself this sounds awfully bland. How does it differ from the generalizations any of us might make about human mental life? On one common understanding of Hume, the answer is that he is studying objects we don't ordinarily talk about, using a method of observation we don't ordinarily use. He is studying what Locke called "ideas": the items of which a person is immeJanet Broughton is Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720-2390, USA. e-mail: broughtn@socrates.berkeley.edu 280 Janet Broughton diately aware, and which depend on that awareness for their existence. He is studying them by using his power of introspection, the power by which a person may become immediately aware of his own ideas. I have argued elsewhere2 that Hume's term, 'perception,' isn't meant to refer to Lockean ideas but to people's states of mind as we ordinarily understand them: dateable episodes of consciousness of a great many types, including episodes of seeing, touching, smelling, tasting and hearing objects in the world around us. Nor, I have argued, does Hume's "cautious observation of human life" (T xix) invariably or even usually take the form of introspection. Rather, the scientist of man attends to a range of the features of perceptions that we notice from time to time in ordinary life. What distinguishes the activities of the scientist of man from those of the ordinary observer of human mental life is that the scientist of man attends mainly just to this range of features, and reflects upon them in a sustained and systematic way. The features to which he gives his attention are, I believe, these: force and vivacity; content compounded from simple elements; and the kinds of sequences or patterns in which perceptions with such-and-such content having such-and-such force and vivacity occur. Of these three features, the most puzzling by far, I think, is content; I will be exploring aspects of content as I attempt to identify what it is about general ideas that the scientist of man wants to understand. To put it crudely, we must see what Hume thinks impressions already contain if we want to see what it is about general ideas he wants to explain. In the first part of Book I of the Treatise, Hume sets out the basic distinctions and principles upon which he will draw: the distinctions between impressions and ideas, between simple and complex perceptions, between impressions of sensation and those of reflection, and between ideas of memory and of imagination; and the principles that our simple ideas are derived from resembling simple impressions, and that our ideas are associated via relations of resemblance, contiguity and causation. After clarifying the notion of relations, Hume concludes part i by... (shrink)

Hume's scepticism about the ability of demonstrative reasoning to justify many of our most common and important beliefs, such those concerning the connection between causes and effects, does not sit well with his tendency to make normative claims about which beliefs we ought to accept. I argue that Hume's naturalist account of the causes of belief is nonetheless rich enough to provide for normative assessments of belief and even for the modification of beliefs in light of these assessments. I argue, (...) moreover, that far from interfering with his normative claims, Hume's appeals to the force of sceptical arguments are essential premises for this result. (shrink)

David Hume’s theory of action is well known for several provocative theses, including that passion and reason cannot be opposed over the direction of action. In Hume, Passion, and Action, the author defends an original interpretation of Hume’s views on passion, reason and motivation that is consistent with other theses in Hume’s philosophy, loyal to his texts, and historically situated. This book challenges the now orthodox interpretation of Hume on motivation, presenting an alternative that situates Hume closer to “Humeans” than (...) many recent interpreters have. Part of the strategy is to examine the thinking of the early modern intellectuals to whom Hume responds. Most of these thinkers insisted that passions lead us to pursue harmful objects unless regulated by reason; and most regarded passions as representations of good and evil, which can be false. Understanding Hume’s response to these claims requires appreciating his respective characterizations of reason and passion. The author argues that Hume’s thesis that reason is practically impotent apart from passion is about beliefs generated by reason, rather than about the capacity of reason. Furthermore, the argument makes sense of Hume’s sometimes-ridiculed description of passions as “original existences” having no reference to objects. The author also shows how Hume understood morality as intrinsically motivating, while holding that moral beliefs are not themselves motives, and why he thought of passions as self-regulating, contrary to the admonitions of the rationalists. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Reflection and the Stability of Belief: Essays on Descartes, Hume, and Reid by Louis E. LoebKevin MeekerLouis E. Loeb. Reflection and the Stability of Belief: Essays on Descartes, Hume, and Reid. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. Pp. xvii + 369. ISBN: 978-0-19-536876-5, Cloth, $99.00. ISBN 978-0-19-536875-8, Paper, $45.00.This book is (almost entirely) a collection of previously published essays by Louis Loeb. The first three essays focus primarily (...) on advancing the general interpretive claim that Descartes’s main epistemological goal is achieving unshakable beliefs. While essays 5–10 address many topics in Humean interpretation, they all contribute in various ways to supporting Loeb’s claim that Hume’s primary epistemological goal is achieving stable beliefs. Essay 12 compares the naturalisms of Hume and Reid. All of the collected essays are excellent.Such excellence is not surprising, for Loeb is an influential interpreter of early modern philosophy, justly renowned for the ingenuity of his readings. Spanning the last three decades, these essays display many fine qualities that have helped make Loeb such a prominent historian. Here I will briefly mention three of these qualities. First, Loeb has remarkable command of the primary historical texts and the secondary literature. This mastery is perhaps best seen in his “What is Worth Preserving in the Kemp Smith Interpretation of Hume?” (essay 9). In addition to providing a detailed exposition of a wide range of texts from Hume and Norman Kemp Smith, Loeb also makes adroit comments about the literature discussing the secondary literature when he addresses the “Canonical Understanding” of Kemp Smith (246–47). Second, Loeb effortlessly integrates historical and contemporary concerns. His “Hume’s Agent-Centered Sentimentalism” (essay 8), for instance, has [End Page 257] an interesting discussion of how Hume’s moral theory might aid contemporary utilitarians (238–44). Moreover, essays 5 (“Integrating Hume’s Accounts of Belief and Justification”) and 10 (“Psychology, Epistemology, and Skepticism in Hume’s Argument about Induction”) fruitfully discuss Hume’s epistemology in light of issues important to the contemporary distinction between internalism and externalism. Third, Loeb’s intuitive knack for isolating important connections amongst various texts and figures allows him to tell a concise story about the evolution of certain philosophical ideas that panoramically covers large portions of the history of philosophy. His “Locke and British Empiricism” (essay 11), which connects epistemological themes in Locke with Descartes, Hume, Berkeley, Malebranche, and Reid, among others, is one example. (Because this essay is, as of this writing, still forthcoming, it is the only essay that is not previously published.) Finally, all three of these qualities are prominently on display in “Sextus, Descartes, Hume, and Peirce” (essay 4), which interestingly uses contemporary views about belief (especially as developed by David Velleman) to understand Descartes and Hume “against the backdrop of Sextus and Peirce” (107). To my mind this essay is the best in the book.There are at least two main advantages of collecting these excellent essays into a book. First, the collection allows Loeb to systematically emphasize the similarities between different early modern thinkers in a way that typically strengthens the cumulative case he makes for his readings of these philosophers. Second, the volume permits us to catch a rare glimpse of how an interpreter’s views can change over time. Considering the cumulative effect of the arguments as well as the changes in Loeb’s views also provides us with a great opportunity to reflect critically on many important issues in a fruitful way. The rest of this review will focus on such critical reflections.Let us start with Descartes, as Loeb does. In his introduction to the essays, Loeb helpfully contextualizes his discussions of Descartes. He points out that his paper “Was Descartes Sincere in His Appeal to the Light of Nature?” (not included here) maintains that the arguments Descartes presents are so poor that they “suggest” that “Descartes was insincere in offering his proofs of the existence of God and in appealing to Divine veracity to validate clear and distinct perception” (9; cf. 35). Of course others have likewise contended that Descartes was a dissimulator. But in the first four chapters... (shrink)

Hume’s thesis that reason alone does not motivate is taken as the ground for this theory: Reason produces beliefs only, and beliefs are mere representations of fact, which, without passions for the objects the beliefs concern, cannot move anyone at all. Discussions of the Humean theory of motivation usually begin with the motivating passions in place without asking about their genesis. This emphasis, I think, overlooks a good deal of what Hume’s thesis concerning the motivational impotence of reason is (...) about: It concerns the incapacity of reason to generate the motivating passions in the first place, and not just the ineffectiveness of beliefs, without passions, to produce action. [...] In this paper, I will offer an interpretation of Hume's theory of motive formation and show how it provides crucial support for a famous claim in his argument against the moral rationalists[...]. As it turns out, reason does play a necessary role in motive formation even for Hume, but the answer why it is not sufficient is a telling difference between a rationalist moral psychology and Hume's. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:236 REMEMBERING THE PAST In his recent article "'Lively' Memory and 'Past' Memory," Oliver Johnson argues that the remarks in Treatise I. iii. 5 entail that Hume rejects all mnemonic knowledge of the past and that "we must drop the concept of the past, as it is ordinarily understood as something that once existed, from our account of memory." While I shall grant that Hume could claim no knowledge (...) of the past, I do not believe Johnson has shown that Hume rejects the past from his account of memory. In this paper I argue that Johnson misconstrues the relationship between Hume's two 'criteria' for distinguishing between ideas of memory and ideas of the imagination. I also show that if Johnson's account were correct, much of Hume's philosophy would be incoherent. Johnson begins by claiming that in Treatise I.i.3, Hume introduces two criteria for distinguishing between ideas of the memory and ideas of the imagination, namely, a criterion based on the greater force and liveliness of the idea of memory vis-a-vis the idea of imagination ('lively' memory) and a criterion based on the correspondence of the idea of memory to the impression from which it was derived ('past' memory). After commenting that these criteria follow one's common sense beliefs regarding memory (LMPM 345-346), Johnson suggests that Hume came to realize that there is a problem with his initial characterization of the distinction. He sets the problem in the form of a question: How do we go about distinguishing a memory-idea from an imagination idea in practice? Or, to sharpen the problem. How are we able to tell when we are really remembering some past 237 event instead of only imagining that we remember it? The answer to this question would seem to be simple. Since we have at our disposal two marks by which to distinguish memoryideas from imagination-ideas, all that we need to do is to determine whether the idea in question satisfies one of them. If it satisfies either, it is a memory-idea; if it satisfies neither, it must be an imaginationidea. Furthermore, since every memory-idea satisfies both criteria, it should be immaterial to which we appeal in making our test. (LMPM 346) Johnson goes on to show that in Treatise I. iii. 5 Hume claims that the criterion for past memory "is not sufficient to distinguish them [ideas of the memory from ideas of the imagination] in their operation, or make us show the one from the other; it being impossible to recai the past impressions, in order to compare them with our present ideas, and see whether their arrangement be exactly similar," which he takes to mark Hume's rejection of the criterion of past memory (LMPM 347). If a criterion is a principle that can be used to divide a class of objects into two subclasses without remainder, then, as Johnson presents them, both of Hume's 'criteria' are inadequate because each is too broad. The 'criterion' for past memory is concerned with the truth of an idea (cf. T 448 and 458), and, as such, it is equally applicable to ideas of memory and the imagination. For example, a historian 's reconstruction of a past event might be true, but the reconstruction is certainly an idea of the imagination, not an idea of the memory. Similarly, the 'criterion' for lively memory ('force and vivacity') is used to distinguish impressions from ideas (T 1) and beliefs regarding events of any temp- 238 oral location from ideas that are not believed (T 96) as well as ideas of the memory from ideas of the imagination. Thus, neither 'criterion' can singularly mark the distinction between ideas of the memory and ideas of the imagination. But if there is a problem with inadequate criteria, it is not clear that the problem is Hume's, for Hume did not claim that the 'criteria' can operate independently of one another. In Treatise I.i.3, Hume first discusses the 'criterion' for lively memory (T 8-9), and then he indicates that "There is another difference betwixt these two kinds of ideas, which is no less evident," viz.. that... (shrink)

The thesis defended is that, for Hume, all vivacity, including that of impressions, is belief, and all belief, including the "infallibility" of the immediate given, is vivacity. This allows one to treat as different axes of description Hume's categories of perception (sensation, reflexion, and thought) and his categories of the consciousness of perception (belief, felt ease of transition), thus making it possible to defend his distinction between impressions and ideas against the criticisms of Ryle, Russell, and others. The article is (...) an excerpt from my forthcoming book, "Hume's Theory of Consciousness" (Cambridge). (shrink)

RESUMEN Aún no se ha explorado si el potencial comunicativo del principio humeano de simpatía se limita al intercambio de sentimientos y emociones o si permite también compartir creencias. Mostraremos que Hume considera esta última posibilidad tanto a partir de la universalidad de la naturaleza humana y del carácter inherentemente social del hombre, como de la existencia de una interconexión entre pensamientos y sentimientos. Contrariamente a la opinión de diversos autores, afirmamos además que la experiencia propia no es condición de (...) posibilidad para poner en acto el principio de simpatía, sino que podemos recibir los sentimientos y creencias de los demás aunque no contemos con experiencia similar. ABSTRACT It has not yet been explored whether the communicational power of the Humean principle of sympathy is limited to conveying feelings and emotions or it also allows sharing beliefs. I will show that Hume considers the latter possibility both by means of the universality of human nature and the inherently social character of man, and the interconnection between thoughts and feelings. Contrary to the opinion of several authors, I will also argue that our personal experience is not a necessary condition to start up the principle of sympathy, but we can receive feelings and beliefs from other people even though we do not have previous similar experience. (shrink)

When we see the way that the parts of the Appendix concerning belief hang together, we can understand how and why Hume moved from saying that belief is a vivid idea to saying that belief is a sui generis feeling. In the Appendix to the Treatise, Hume retracts his claim that perceptions with the same object only vary with respect to vivacity. In material in the appendix that he tells his reader to insert in Book 1, he explains his reasons: (...) the vivacity connected to belief is different in kind from that from the vivacity connected to poetry. Poetry can be more vivid, in its way, than belief. Since Hume’s main arguments for the thesis that beliefs are vivid ideas in the main body of the Treatise depend on the assumption that ideas with the same object only vary in vivacity, he owes us new arguments from his claim. He provides various arguments for a slightly revised thesis that belief is a particular sort of vivid idea at the beginning of the Appendix. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume 29, Number 2, November 2003, pp. 305-325 Hume, Sympathy, and the Theater BRIAN KIRBY Every movement of the theater, by a skillful poet, is communicated, as it were by magic, to the spectators; who weep, tremble, resent, rejoice, and are inflamed with all the variety of passions, which actuate the several personages of the drama. (EPM 5.2.26; SBN 221-2) Much has been written recently about the (...) role of sympathy in Hume's moral theory. That may indeed be its most important use. But it seems from a number of illustrations he uses that it has broader applications, in particular, application to a spectator's appreciation of drama. The problem some see with this broader application is that it conflicts with the basic definition of sympathy as a process by means of which impressions are shared. The actors on the stage would not seem to have the same passions which "inflame" the spectators. Worse, the spectators do not believe in their hearts that the passions which inflame them have real correlates. At first blush, "sympathy" might mean any one of several things. In "The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn," for example, Jonathan Bennett says, "As for 'sympathy': I use this term to cover every sort of fellow-feeling, as when one feels pity over someone's loneliness, or horrified compassion over his pain, and when one feels a shrinking reluctance to act in a way which will bring misfortune to someone else."1 However, fellow-feeling is not a sharing of feelings in Hume's sense. Alvin I. Goldman comes closer to Hume's meaning in a narrow description of empathy: "To empathize with someone, in its Brian Kirby, Associate Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at St. Lawrence University, is at 172 Miner Street Road, Canton, NY 13617, USA. e-mail: bkirby2@twcny.rr.com 306 Brian Kirby most frequent sense, is to sympathize or commiserate, which involves shared attitudes, sentiments, or emotions."2 Still, Hume's sympathy is not the commiseration but rather what is involved in the commiseration, the shared attitudes, sentiments, and emotions. "No quality of human nature," says Hume, "is more remarkable, both in itself and in its consequences, than that propensity we have to sympathize with others, and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments, however different from, or even contrary to our own" (T 2.1.11.2; SBN 316). The principle of sympathy as he describes it in his technical sense is as follows: When any affection is infus'd by sympathy, it is at first known only by its effects, and by those external signs in the countenance and conversation, which convey an idea of it. This idea is presently converted into an impression, and acquires such a degree of force and vivacity, as to become the very passion itself, and produce an equal emotion, as any original affection. However instantaneous this change of the idea into an impression may be, it proceeds from certain views and reflections, which will not escape the strict scrutiny of a philosopher, tho' they may the person himself, who makes them. (T 2.1.11.3; SBN 317) If sympathy has to do with the sharing of impressions, what can one say about possible broader applications in which the correlate impression is absent? One tack to take is to dismiss the illustrative examples as aberrations or at least minor inconsistencies on Hume's part. A second is to argue that the broader applications follow reasonably, given Hume's description of the mechanism of sympathy. I propose, in this paper, to take the second tack. The above description characterizes what one might call sympathy in its normal social context in which the feelings of another are identifiable from his verbal and bodily behavior. Of course, the identification is not infallible. The other person may intend to deceive by lying or mimicking the behavior associated with a feeling. But such occasions are parasitic on normal contexts. But beyond the normal social context, there are other occasions which elicit sympathy, situations in which passions are aroused in the sympathizers for good cause, but which have no correspondent in the objects of sympathy. The case... (shrink)

In his Treatise of Human Nature, Hume defines a belief as "a lively idea related to or associated with a present impression".1 He offers variations on this definition throughout the work, writing, for instance, that "belief is a more vivid and intense conception of an idea, proceeding from its relation to a present impression" and that his "general position" is "that an opinion or belief is nothing but a strong and lively idea deriv'd from a present impression related to it". (...) Lest his readers misunderstand, Hume endeavours to clarify these notions of "vivacity" and "liveliness" by appealing to a cluster of other notions, such... (shrink)

Hume argues against the seventeenth-century rationalists that reason is impotent to motivate action and to originate morality. Hume's arguments have standardly been considered the foundation for the Humean theory of motivation in contemporary philosophy. The Humean theory alleges that beliefs require independent desires to motivate action. Recently, however, new commentaries allege that Hume's argument concerning the inertness of reason has no bearing on whether beliefs can motivate. These commentaries maintain that for Hume, beliefs about future pleasurable and painful (...) objects on their own can produce the desires that move us to action. First, I show that this reading puts Hume at odds with Humeans, since the latter are committed, not only to the view that beliefs and desires are both necessary to action, but also to the view that beliefs do not produce desires. Second, I review textual, philosophical and historical grounds for my interpretation of Hume's argument for the inertness of reason. I argue that the new line on Hume, while consistent with a certain reading of the Treatise, is not supported by the Dissertation on the Passions and the second Enquiry, where Hume argues that all motivation has an origin in “taste”, which I take to be different from belief. Thus, Hume's arguments do support the contemporary Humean theory of motivation. (shrink)

Understanding the distinction between impressions and ideas that Hume draws in the opening paragraphs of his A Treatise on Human Nature is essential for understanding much of Hume's philosophy. This, however, is a task that has been the cause of a good deal of controversy in the literature on Hume. I here argue that the significant philosophical and exegetical issues previous treatments of this distinction (such as the force and vivacity reading and the external-world reading) encounter are extremely problematic. (...) I propose an alternative reading of this distinction as being between original mental entities and copied mental entities. I argue that Hume takes himself to discover this distinction as that which underlies our pre-theoretical sorting of mental entities. Thus, while the Copy Principle is initially treated by Hume as a mere empirical fact, it later comes to play a more substantial explanatory role in his account of human nature. This reading makes Hume's distinction a more philosophically robust one, and avoids many of the exegetical difficulties of previous interpretations. (shrink)

This paper defends a rigorous reading of Hume’s critiques of arguments for the existence of God and of the belief in God against interpretations that endorse Humean theism, deism, and fideism. The latter include Donald Livingston’s theist reading, J. C. A. Gaskin’s “attenuated deism” reading, and Edward Kanterian’s “humble fideism” reading. I also examine whether Hume’s rejections of a positive theology commit him to agnosticism or atheism. My innovative challenge to such conclusions maintains that, while elements of both agnosticism (...) and atheism are found in Hume, these denote, respectively, a methodology and an incidental implication of his philosophy. But neither sufficiently captures his constructive vision for a society, individual psychology, and system of knowledge guided by naturalist principles and aims. For this, an alternate conception is needed that describes Hume’s philosophy of religion beyond mere atheism. (shrink)

1.1 The Concept of Evil The problem of evil, in the sense relevant here, concerns the question of the reasonableness of believing in the existence of a deity with certain characteristics. In most discussions, the deity is God, understood as an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect person. But the problem of evil also arises, as Hume saw very clearly, for deities that are less than all-powerful, less than all-knowing, and less than morally perfect. What is the relevant concept of evil, (...) in this context? Here it is useful to distinguish between axiological concepts and deontological ones. First, there are judgments about whether certain states of affairs make the world better or worse, whether those states are good or bad, desirable or undesirable. Such normative concepts – of good and bad, or desirable and undesirable, states of affairs – are axiological concepts. Secondly, there are judgments about the rightness and wrongness of actions, about what one morally ought or ought not do, of what one’s duty is, of whether a certain action violates someone rights, and these concepts – of the rightness and wrongness of actions, of duties, of the rights of individuals, of what one should or should not do – are deontological concepts. Given this distinction, should the problem of evil be understood axiologically or deontologically? Often, and I think most commonly in this context, evils are equated with states of affairs that, all things considered, are bad or undesirable: they are states of affairs that make the world a worse place. But one can also interpret the problem of evil in a deontological fashion, equating evils with states of affairs that a person should have prevented, if he could have done so. Elsewhere (2008, 105-6), I have argued that the deontological interpretation is preferable. But for present purposes, either interpretation will be fine. 1.2 Evil and the Reasonableness of Belief in the Existence of God That many things in the world – tsunamis, earthquakes, the suffering of non-human animals and innocent children, human actions such as the carrying out of the Holocaust – certainly appear to be evil is not a controversial matter. But whether such things are really evils, all things considered, is disputed. Assume, however, that the world does continue genuine evils, and not merely apparent ones. How, then does the existence of such evils bear upon the reasonableness of belief in the existence of God? First, the existence of evils can be used to show that certain arguments for the existence of God cannot establish that conclusion, or even render it probable. For some arguments, of course, one need not appeal to evil to make that point. If someone argues for the existence of a first cause, or an unmoved mover, or a necessary being having its necessity of itself, and then claims that this is what everyone understands by the term “God”, one can point out that no reason has been offered for thinking that the entity in question is even a person, let alone omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good. By contrast, with the type of argument that Hume was concerned with when he discussed the problem of evil – namely, arguments from the existence of order in the world to the existence of a designer, or intelligent cause of that order – one does have a type of argument that, if sound, shows that there is a person who, even if not omnipotent and omniscient, is at least extremely powerful and very knowledgeable. But such arguments do not support for conclusions about the moral character of such a person, and so it is at this point that the existence of evils becomes crucial. For in providing a reason for holding that the one is not justified in attributing even moral goodness to such a being, let alone moral perfection, it supports the conclusion that that argument in question cannot be a successful argument for the existence of God. The existence of evils, then, can serve to block arguments for the existence of God. But a second, and very familiar possibility, is that the existence of evils can also provide the basis of arguments against the existence of God. A very important distinction here is between deductive, or logical incompatibility, versions of the argument from evil, and inductive, or evidential, or probabilistic versions of the argument. According to the former, there are facts about the existence of evils in the world that are logically incompatible with the existence of God. Thus, some have held that the mere existence of any evil whatsoever is incompatible with the existence of God; others, that that certain types of evil – such as natural evils – are incompatible with the existence of God; and others, that it is the amount of evil in the world, or the fact that some people suffer horrendous evils, that logically precludes the existence of God. Inductive (or evidential, or probabilistic) versions of the argument from evil, by contrast, do not claim that there are facts about the evils in the world that are logically incompatible with the existence of God. The claim is rather that there are facts about the evils found in the world that render the existence of God at the very least unlikely, and perhaps extremely so. 1.3 Hume’s Use of the Existence of Evils The preceding discussion suggests two very different ways in which Hume might be employing the existence of evils. First, he might be appealing to the existence of evils simply to undercut certain arguments for the existence of God. In particular, he might be appealing to evils to show that, whatever the merits of the argument from order to design may be, it can nether establish, nor render probable, the existence of a morally good deity. Secondly, Hume might be advancing a version of the argument from evil, and that in turn could take the form either of an argument that claims that facts about evil are logically incompatible with the existence of God, or of an argument that claims, more modestly, that the apparent evils found in the world render the existence of God unlikely. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:HUME, MOTIVATION AND MORALITY Hume remarks, in the Abstract, that his account of the passions in Book II of the Treatise has 'laid the foundation' (A 7 Ì1 for his theory of morals. Pall Ardal has shown how Hume's theory of certain indirect passions (pride, humility, love, hatred) underpins his theory of the evaluation of character. I propose to explore the links between Hume's account of motivation and his (...) treatment of an agent 'ß moral assessment of prospective action. Where Ardal stresses the moral spectator, my focus is on the agent. Hume himself attends primarily to the moral spectator, but the agent's perspective is central in two of his chief arguments concerning morals, that for the thesis that moral distinctions are derived from a moral sense, and that for the artificiality of justice. I shall take it that the argument of Treatise II, iii, 3 ("Of the influencing motives of the will") provides the framework for analysis: acting for moral reasons is like acting for any other reason; citing his moral principles to explain a man's actions is like citing his desire to preserve his health as an explanation of his taking exercise; deliberating about moral matters is like pondering the purchase of a pair of shoes. Of course there are differences; I shall look to them shortly. It is essential, however, to begin with the similarities. To a first approximation, the central doctrine is that the reasons that explain actions are rational causes of those actions. Reasons for actions are constituted by suitably related desires and beliefs; volitions are somehow implicated in intentional actions. Reasons are causes: the desires and beliefs that constitute reasons cause volitions, and thus actions. They are rational causes: there are links of special kinds between the contents of the desires and beliefs that constitute an agent's reasons for what he does, and the content of the volitions implicated in the actions done. Hume is at pains to deny that "reason [here: belief] alone can... be a motive to any action of the will" (T 413). But he insists there are "two principal parts [of human nature], which are requisite in all its actions, the affections and understanding' (T 493). I suggest that by "affections" he here means specifically (if broadly) desires, and so both the "direct passions" of desire and aversion and such "indirect passions" as benevolence, anger, pity, compassion and malice. Hume's official doctrines both of desires and of volitions are unsatisfactory as they stand; he treats each as simple impressions. To be sure, these simple impressions are said always to be accompanied by thoughts of (in Hume's phrase) their objects. Even such complex states, however, can play no satisfactory role in psychological theory. The insights that Hume's official doctrines mishandle can, I suggest, be incorporated into more defensible, and more-or-less Humean, analyses of the internal structure of desire and volition. Having made efforts along these lines elsewhere, however, I shall here concentrate on other features of desire and volition that are germane to Hume's moral psychology. Desires and volitions are alike in two linked respects, among others: neither takes a truth value (and so each differs from belief); each is a conative, not a cognitive, psychological state (and so, again, each differs from belief). Because desires and volitions are not capable of "an agreement or disagreement either to the real relations of ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact" it is "impossible... they can be pronounced either true or false" (T 458). Their general functional role is that of "propense and averse motions of the mind" (T 574). To be sure, there are differences. The principal difference is that of specific functional location: desires are constituents in reasons for acting: volitions are constituents of (or otherwise implicated in) actions done for such reasons. This functional difference is tied to differences of content. To grasp the many relations among belief, desire and volition, when the first two serve as 4 reason for (and so cause of) the third, it is useful to plot their causal relations onto the elements in an Aristotelian practical syllogism. Desires function as causally salient major premises... (shrink)

This is an age of naturalization projects. Much epistemological work has been done toward naturalizing theoretical reason. One might view Hume as seeking to naturalize reason in both the theoretical (roughly, epistemological) and the practical realms. I suggest that whatever else underlies the vitality of Hume's instrumentalism - encapsulated in his view that 'reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions' - one incentive is the hope of naturalizing practical reason. This paper explores some broadly (...) class='Hi'>Humean versions of instrumentalism that are among the most plausible contenders to represent instrumentalism as a contemporary naturalistic position. It first offers a taxonomy of reasons for action and, in that light, formulates a plausible version of instrumentalism. It then raises difficulties for the view, some of them concerning the nature of desire. It also develops an epistemologically significant comparison of desires with beliefs. Given the magnitude of the difficulties, it outlines an alternative account of practical reason. (shrink)