Heidegger's 1950 claim to Jaspers (later repeated in his Spiegel interview), that his Nietzsche lectures represented a "resistance" to Nazism is premised on the understanding that he and Jaspers have of the place of science in the Western world. Thus Heidegger can emphasize Nietzsche's epistemology, parsing Nietzsche's will to power, contra Nazi readings, as the metaphysical culmination of the domination of the West by scientism and technologism. It is in this sense that Heidegger argues that German (...) Nazism is "in essence" the same as Soviet Bolshevism and American capitalism. Jaspers himself had likewise emphasized the Will to Power by contrast with the doctrine of eternal recurrence. Heidegger differs from Jaspers (as from their mutual student Hannah Arendt) inasmuch as Jaspers preserves an enthusiasm for the possibility of scientific certainty while yet recognizing (as Heidegger does) a strong sense of the limits of science. None of the three can correctly be labeled anti-scientific. The essay closes by recalling Arendt's reflections on the very possibility of resistance using the example of Jaspers' own resistance to contemporary political events.<br><br>------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------<br>. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Science and Philosophy in Being and Time BACHELARD The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking.

Martin Heidegger and Emanuele Severino reflected on the meaning of technology more than anyone else in the twentieth century. Their philosophies are irreconcilable. They converge on this simple recognition and its implications: techno‐science dominates our time. But they disagree even on the interpretation of this domination. Exploring this disagreement will help us understand the leading dynamics of our civilization. Therefore, the intention in this paper is to unveil, for English speakers, the value of Severino’s philosophy in relation to (...) Heidegger and the meaning technology. We will see that, ultimately, their disagreement concerns the originary truth of Being and has repercussions on how they conceptualize technology and the possibility of redemption from it. Heidegger indicated the letting‐be of beings in their freedom as the possible path beyond technology. Severino saw Heidegger’s indication as destined to remain trapped in technology itself. If we understand why this was so – from Severino’s point of view – this may open a new path for us: the path of day, the path that may truly lead beyond technology. The aim of this paper is, finally, to indicate one reason why delving into Severino’s works is truly worthwhile: if it is possible for the truth to unveil itself beyond willing – where Heidegger couldn’t see – then Severino’s works may the place where this possibility appears in coherent conceptual form. (shrink)

This text illuminates the relevance and importance of Heidegger’s thought today. The chapters address the modern living conditions of intense social transformation intertwined with the continuous and rapid development of technologies that redefine the borders between nations and cultures. Technology globalizes markets, customs, the exchange of information, and economic flows but also – as Heidegger reminds us – revolutionizes the way we relate to bodies, to life, and to earth, by way of introducing both unprecedented opportunities and great (...) dangers. (shrink)

Martin Heidegger’s writings on modern science as well as his stray remarks on communication are important theoretical resources to understand the character and contour of, and our response to the Anthropocene epoch. John Caputo distinguishes between the early hermeneutic account of science in Heidegger’s corpus and the later deconstructive account, claiming that the former would have sufficed to fulfil the critical task of the latter without its pejorative and dismissive reading of modern science. Accepting Caputo’s (...) distinction but rejecting his critique of the deconstructive account, this paper argues that Heidegger’s abandoning of the hermeneutic account was premised on the refusal of the Western metaphysical baggage that still pervades and is endorsed in that account, a baggage which is now leading to the Anthropocene epoch and the consequent ontological communication of distress. The deconstructive approach evokes the communication of scientific phenomena in plural ways such as fictional, poetical and metaphorical narratives, thus undercutting the reductionist and monolithic character of modern science. (shrink)

SummaryThe paper exposes the views of Ernst Cassirer and Martin Heidegger on the dynamics of the sciences of their day, as both developed them in the two decades after the encounter of the two philosophers in Davos in 1928. It emphasizes points of common concern, and it compares their positions to those of contemporary philosophers of science Gaston Bachelard and Edgar Wind.

This impressive volume of essays that includes contributions from Herbert Dreyfus, Sean Kelly, Mike Wheeler, Dan Zahavi, and Shaun Gallagher reflects an emerging trend in cognitive science, and explores this new approach to cognitive science informed by Heidegger's thoughts on human existence.

Discussion of recent analyses of Being and Time, concentrating on that of Hubert Dreyfus, in which Heidegger’s philosophy of science is claimed to be a form of realism. Surveying other views, those of William Blattner, Barry Allen, Charles Guignon, and Richard Rorty, I argue that Heidegger should not be anachronistically classified because, similar to Subject/Object, he considers the Realism/Idealism debate to belong to another era.

A letter from Martin Heidegger.--On the way to being; reflecting on conversations with Martin Heidegger, by Z. Adamczewski.--Heidegger's view and evaluation of nature and natural science, by E. G. Ballard.--Truth as art: an interpretation of Heidegger's Sein und Zeit (sec. 44) and Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, by C. D. Keyes.--The language of the event: the event of language, by T. Kisiel.--Heidegger: the problem of the thing, by T. Langan.--The late Heidegger's omission of the (...) ontic-ontological structure of Dasein, by R. Powell.--Towards the movement of reversal: science, technology, and the language of homecoming, by J. Sallis.--Prolegomena to "Time and being": truth and time, by A. Schuwer.--Cosmos, nature, and man and the foundations of psychiatry, by A.-T. Tymieniecka.--Heidegger and the existential a priori, by J. Wild. (shrink)

REVIEW (1): "Jeff Kochan’s book offers both an original reading of Martin Heidegger’s early writings on science and a powerful defense of the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) research program. Science as Social Existence weaves together a compelling argument for the thesis that SSK and Heidegger’s existential phenomenology should be thought of as mutually supporting research programs." (Julian Kiverstein, in Isis) ---- REVIEW (2): "I cannot in the space of this review do justice to the richness (...) and range of Kochan's discussion [...]. There is a great deal in this foundational portion of Kochan's discussion that I find tremendously interesting and engaging [...]." (David R. Cerbone, in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science) ---- REVIEW (3): "Science as Social Existence will be of interest not only to Heidegger scholars but to anyone engaged in science and technology studies. [...] This is an informative and original book. Kochan should be praised for his clear, pleasant-to-read prose." (Michael Butler, in CHOICE). (shrink)

In his book After Finitude, Quentin Meillassoux criticizes post-Kantian philosophy for its inability to explain how science is able to describe a world without human beings. This paper addresses that challenge through a consideration of Heidegger’s thought and his thinking about science. It is argued that the disagreement between Meillassoux and Heidegger comes down to a question of first philosophy and the priority of logic or ontology in philosophy. Ultimately, Heidegger’s emphasis on ontology in philosophy (...) is superior in its ability to give a more comprehensive account of science and thinking about things themselves. (shrink)

The question concerning technology.--The turning.--The word of Nietzsche: "God is dead."--The age of the world picture.--Science and reflection.

Este ensaio examina o relacionamento possível entre o pensamento de Martin Heidegger enquanto emerge no Zollikon Seminaire na sua troca de idéias com Medard Boss e a perspectiva da psicanálise como aparece através do prisma da releitura de Freud oferecido por Jacques Lacan. Heidegger entende Freud como vítima de uma compreensão positivista da ciência que procura explicar o comportamento humano patológico por um complexo de causas discerníveis conscientemente. Quando determinados fenômenos não podem ser explicados desta maneira, Freud postula (...) um jogo de causas psíquicas que não são conscientes, cuja soma ele chama o "inconsciente". Desde que todos os fenômenos humanos são, para Heidegger, discerníveis via uma profunda fenomenologia do ser humano como o ser-no-mundo, a construção hipotética de Freud é desnecessária e, a longo prazo, perniciosa. Mas Lacan propõe uma nova maneira de compreender o inconsciente descoberto por Freud, a saber, que não deve ser entendido como um sistema físico de forças hidráulicas, mas como um processo que seja estruturado como um idioma. A pergunta levantada neste ensaio é se Heidegger seria ou não igualmente hostil à hipótese de Freud, apresentada a ele dentro da forma de Lacan, como algo "estruturado como um idioma". O ensaio sugere que a resposta poderia ser "provavelmente não". Baseado num exemplo clínico altamente simplificado, este ensaio esforça-se para mostrar a compatibilidade entre determinados conceitos básicos de Heidegger e diversos, de Lacan, em especial as noções da verdade e da liberdade.This paper examines the possible relationship between the thought of Martin Heidegger as it emerges in the Zollikon Seminaire through his exchange with Medard Boss and the perspective of psychoanalysis as it appears through the prism of Jacques Lacan's rereading of Freud. Heidegger takes Freud to be victim of a positivist conception of science that seeks to explain pathological human behaviour by a complex of consciously discernible causes. When certain phenomena cannot be explained in this way, Freud postulates a set of psychic causes that are not conscious, the sum total of which he calls the "unconscious." Since all human phenomena are, for Heidegger, discernible through a thorough-going phenomenology of human being as being-in-the-world, Freud's hypothetical construct is unnecessary and, in the long run, pernicious. But Lacan proposes a new way to understand the unconscious that Freud discovered, namely, that it is not to be thought of as analogous to a physical system of hydraulic forces but rather to a process that is structured like a language. The question raised in the paper is whether or not Heidegger would have been equally hostile to Freud's hypothesis, if it had been presented to him in Lacanian fashion as something "structured like a language". The paper suggests that the answer could be "probably not". On the basis of a highly simplified clinical example, it endeavors to show the compatibility between certain basic Heideggerean concepts and several of those essential to Lacan, especially the notions of truth and freedom. (shrink)

This is the first English translation of the seminar Martin Heidegger gave during the Winter of 1934-35, which dealt with Hegel's Philosophy of Right. This remarkable text is the only one in which Heidegger interprets Hegel's masterpiece in the tradition of Continental political philosophy while offering a glimpse into Heidegger's own political thought following his engagement with Nazism. It also confronts the ideas of Carl Schmitt, allowing readers to reconstruct the relation between politics and ontology. The book (...) is enriched by a collection of interpretations of the seminar, written by select European and North American political thinkers and philosophers. Their essays aim to make the seminar accessible to students of political theory and philosophy, as well as to open new directions for debating the relation between the two disciplines. A unique contribution, this volume makes available key lectures by Heidegger that will interest a wide readership of students and scholars. (shrink)

The text of Martin Heidegger’s 1927–28 university lecture course on Emmanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason presents a close interpretive reading of the first two parts of this masterpiece of modern philosophy. In this course, Heidegger continues the task he enunciated in Being and Time as the problem of dismatling the history of ontology, using temporality as a clue. Within this context the relation between philosophy, ontology, and fundamental ontology is shown to be rooted in the genesis of (...) the modern mathematical sciences. Heidegger demonstrates that objectification of beings as beings is inseparable from knowledge a priori, the central problem of Kant’s Critique. He concludes that objectification rests on the productive power of imagination, a process that involves temporality, which is the basic constitution of humans as beings. (shrink)

(2005). Heidegger and Relativity Theory. Angelaki: Vol. 10, continental philosophy and the sciences the german traditionissue editor: damian veal, pp. 163-179.

Being and time : introduction -- What is metaphysics? -- On the essence of truth -- The origin of the work of art -- Letter on humanism -- Modern science, metaphysics, and mathematics -- The question concerning technology -- Building dwelling thinking -- What calls for thinking? -- The way to language -- The end of philosophy and the task of thinking.

Leading scholars address the ethical and practical dimensions of Heidegger's thought.

This paper describes Heidegger as a robust scientific realist, explains why his view has received such conflicting treatment, and concludes that the special significance of his position lies in his insistence upon linking the discussion of science to the question of its relation with technology. It shows that Heidegger, rather than accepting the usual forced option between realism and antirealism, advocates a realism in which he embeds the antirealist thesis that the idea of reality independent of human (...) understanding is unintelligible. This reading is defended against Rorty's antirealist interpretation, as well as Dreyfus' depiction of him as a deflationary realist, and his assessment of background realism is contrasted with Fine's. Further, the robustness of Heidegger's realism is laid out across several texts from 1912 to 1976, in order to show that he is neither an instrumental realist nor an internal realist. Finally, the point is made that the development of his view concerning realism gives rise to a critique of objectivity that is now being similarly advocated by numerous thinkers from a variety of disciplines, and that this critique is inevitably ethical and political. (shrink)

In April, 1976, The Monist published an article by Paul Edwards entitled “Heidegger and Death: A Deflationary Critique.” It demonstrates that even after fifty years of thoughtful consideration, important sections of Heidegger’s Being and Time still suffer serious misinterpretation. As discussion of topics relating to mortality have become an intellectual fad, a serious student of Being and Time would like to examine its analysis of death and to assess critically the contributions which this investigation could make to the (...) current interdisciplinary dialogues on the subject. Before one undertakes this task, however, one must clear the ground by showing that, contrary to Edwards’ position, Heidegger’s insights into human mortality amount to more than a “platitude” disguised by “pretentious and fantastically misleading language,” language which is grounded, in turn, in “a slurring of certain elementary distinctions and a set of perverse redefinitions.” This paper, therefore, critically examines Edwards’ account of Heidegger’s notion of being-towards-death and exhibits the grounds of Edwards’ serious misinterpretation. On the basis of a more accurate interpretation of this death analysis, it then sets forth the philosophically interesting theses about death which the work contains. This paper does not argue that a correct interpretation of the notion of being-towards-death automatically defuses all criticism directed against it; it argues only that one appreciates the genuine philosophical difficulties of the notion only after one grasps as precisely as possible the author’s meaning. The paper closes by enumerating these difficulties. (shrink)

The aim of the present study is to analyze the general outlook of Heidegger and Mullā Ṣadrā with regard to the meaning of metaphysics, occupying as it does a central position in their respective philosophies. It should first be made clear that “metaphysics” refers to First Philosophy or the scientia divina in the philosophical system of Ṣadrā.1 The English word “metaphysics” can be traced back to its etymological source in the Greek plural noun-phrase ta meta ta phusika, which became (...) metaphysica in Medieval Latin. The word was used both as a title for Aristotle’s seminal work Metaphysics and as the name of the “science” that was its subject matter. The term for... (shrink)

We characterize science in terms of nihilism: the nihilism of science is something faced not in what science i mplies, but as the very essence of science as such. The nihilism of science is the birth of the truth of Nietzsche's announcement "God is dead" from within science as it must now face its repressed subjective core. But in truth, as the Psychoanalytic tradition has determined, it is subjectivity itself that is a bottomless searching-the (...) subject is itself born from nothing. In this way it becomes clear that the nihilism of science is in fact the birth of a nothingness as the essence of science insofar as it embraces the nothingness of its own subjectivity. Therefore, we show that the proper determination of the crisis of science is not made via phenomenology, as Husserl attempted in the early 20th century, but can only be made properly in a philosophical-psychoanalytic register. This nihilism is encoded within science in its very modality of thought , as Heidegger well understood: science thinks by means of "representation", and it is this "representational thinking" which prevents the expression of the repressed core of subjectivity. Therefore, by overcoming representation, it is seen that science will no longer be in despair to determine itself as a self, but come to see that this self, grounded in nothingness, in fact becomes its greatest and final expression, that is, as a self rooted not in an unending yearning for the transcendent certainty of a ground, but in a productive desire -self as will-to-create, will-to-power . This transition from the self as rooted in Desire qua lack to a self as determined by an infinitely productive desire is shown to be, in fact, the transition from Lacan to Deleuze. Once this transition is accomplished, it becomes clear that the anti-representational mode of thinking, accompanied by the productive self as will-to-power, determines science not from a transcendent metaphysic , but as an aesthetically determined modality of pure creativity-i.e., as an art . We then conclude by speculating on the proper form of art that this new science should take. We see that anti-representational thinking, rooted in the self as infinite creativity , is determined not by concepts, but by play or performances . Perhaps, then, we should consider music as determining the proper artistic form of this new kind of science? In this way we finally come to see the possibility for the first time of music as a new kind of science. Normal 0 false false false EN-US X-NONE X-NONE /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Table Normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0in; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;}. (shrink)

Peter Eli Gordon - Heidegger and the Greeks: Interpretive Essays - Journal of the History of Philosophy 46:1 Journal of the History of Philosophy 46.1 178-179 Muse Search Journals This Journal Contents Reviewed by Peter E. Gordon Harvard University Drew A. Hyland and John Panteleimon Manoussakis, editors. Heidegger and the Greeks: Interpretive Essays. Bloomington-Indianapolis: University of Indiana Press, 2006. Pp. xiii + 194. Paper, $24.95. Heidegger's troubled and over-determined interest in Greek philosophy is well known. In the (...) 1933 rectoral address, he declared that genuine science would become possible only "if we again place ourselves under the power of the beginning of our spiritual-historical existence. This beginning is the departure, the setting out, of Greek philosophy." All of Western science, Heidegger concluded, "remains bound to that beginning of philosophy. From it science draws the strength of its essence, assuming that it still remains at all equal to this beginning." Such claims bear witness to his life-long interpretive confrontation with the dawning figures of Western philosophy: Aristotle, Plato, and the pre-Socratics. Heidegger's.. (shrink)

The question of knowledge - that is the question of truth - has moved Western philosophy from the very beginning, and this question must also show where Nietzsche stands in Western metaphysics: whether he is the perfector of it or whether he overthrows it This end opens up a new beginning. Heidegger's lecture thinks about this decision from the first sentence to the last. Seeing knowledge as a form of the will to power also means demarcating Nietzsche's philosophy from (...) misunderstandings and misinterpretations: Nietzsche's biologism and the relationship between science and philosophy are topics that are fundamentally discussed.The volume is based on the manuscript for the lecture from the summer semester of 1939. It also contains the "repetitions" that are missing from the individual volumes published by Neske in 1961. The version of the last lecture hour, revised in autumn 1940, was included in the appendix, as was a bundle of texts entitled "Notes on Nietzsche". [Publisher's synopsis]. (shrink)

In this fresh interpretation of Heidegger, Alexander S. Duff explains Heidegger's perplexing and highly varied political influence. Heidegger and Politics argues that Heidegger's political import is forecast by fundamental ambiguities about the status of politics in his thought. Duff explores how, in Being and Time as well as earlier and later works, Heidegger analyzes 'everyday' human existence as both irretrievably banal but also supplying our only tenuous path to the deepest questions about human life. (...) class='Hi'>Heidegger thus points to two irreconcilable attitudes toward politics: either a total and purifying revolution must usher in an authentic communal existence, or else we must await a future deliverance from the present dispensation of Being. Neither attitude is conducive to moderate politics, and so Heidegger's influence tends towards extremism of one form or another, modified only by explicit departures from his thought. (shrink)

This article offers a new reading of Heidegger's thesis of the animal in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. Framing Heidegger's text through a brief analysis of Protagoras' genetic story of nature and of man's nature in Plato's eponymous dialogue, our reading brings out three key elements common to both texts: living nature as a normative rather than a physical order, the poverty of man's world in relation to the animal, and the attempted redemption of the latter through the (...) acquisition of Weltbildung. Staying with the way Heidegger brings out man's poverty in world in the text allows us (i) to undo once for all the oft-repeated charge of Heidegger's anthropocentric interpretation of the animal, (ii) to stage the hypothesis that philosophy and the life sciences of his day draw upon a common basic experience of the autonomy of life in relation to everything human, all-too-human, and (iii) to demonstrate the normativity and poverty of life. (shrink)

Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy presents a lecture course given by Martin Heidegger in 1926 at the University of Marburg. First published in German as volume 22 of the collected works, the book provides Heidegger's most systematic history of Ancient philosophy beginning with Thales and ending with Aristotle. In this lecture, which coincides with the completion of his most important work, Being and Time, Heidegger is working out a way to sharply differentiate between beings and Being. Richard (...) Rojcewicz's clear and accurate translation offers English-speaking readers valuable insight into Heidegger's views on Ancient thought and concepts such as principle, cause, nature, unity, multiplicity, Logos, truth, science, soul, category, and motion. (shrink)

Since Schleiermacher and Hegel it has been part of the tradition of German philosophy to view the history of philosophy as an essential aspect of philosophy itself. The topic of “Heidegger and the History of Philosophy” should be considered with this in mind, which means that our question is as follows: Within this general attitude towards the history of philosophy, which has dominated German philosophy since Hegel, what distinctive attitudes are to be found in Heidegger? The context assumed (...) by the question is clear: it is that created by the rise of historical consciousness. It was part of the heritage of German Romanticism that not only historical research as a whole but also the position of philosophical theories would henceforth be affected by the problem of the nature of history. Before the Romantic period there was no such thing as the history of philosophy in the sense we are concerned with here. There was only the sort of scholarship which compiles lists. Hegel’s concept of a history of philosophy was itself in the fullest sense “philosophy;” it was a special subdivision of the philosophy of history, which was itself an attempt to demonstrate the presence of reason in history. Indeed, Hegel termed the history of philosophy the very heart of world history. However, the substantive portion of the Hegelian history of philosophy—its attempt to exhibit the necessity underlying the sequence of forms of philosophical thought, and thus the “rational” character of the history of thought—did not survive the criticism of the “historical school.”. (shrink)

Deleuze and Guattari’s manner of distinguishing science from philosophy in their last collaboration What is Philosophy? seems to imply a hierarchy, according to which philosophy is more adequate to the reality of virtual events than science is. This suggests, in turn, that philosophy has a better claim than science to truth. This paper clarifies Deleuze‘s views about truth throughout his career. Deleuze equivocates over the term, using it in an “originary” and a “derived” sense, probably under the (...) influence of Henri Bergson, who does similarly. Moreover, William James and pragmatism were to Bergson what the early analytic philosophers Frege and Russell are to Deleuze: excessively scientistic foils whose confusions about truth arise as a result of failing to distinguish science from philosophy. By situating Deleuze’s conception of truth in relation to the early Heidegger’s, which it to some extent resembles, the paper concludes by suggesting that, surprisingly, neither kind of truth Deleuze licenses applies to science, while both apply to philosophy. Science is indifferent to truth in the way that some of Deleuze‘s readers have incorrectly wanted to say that he thinks philosophy is. (shrink)

An alternative title for this discussion might have run: "Heidegger or The Concept of Mind." Its ambivalence provides a direction. Read in an inclusive or appositional way "or" has the sense of "Heidegger Revisited," while interpreted exclusively it confronts us with the necessity to choose between two incompatible versions. No one would seriously dispute that there are significant differences in technique, motive, and goal between Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit and Ryle’s Concept of Mind, and in their philosophizing (...) generally. Ryle’s technique is that of the linguistic portrayal or sentence-frame analysis; his goal is not a science or a clarification of the meaning of Being, but rather a "theory of mind" or philosophical psychology. His method lies within what may be termed a behaviorist perspective and, implicitly, adopts the verification principle of meaning. Unlike Skinnerian behaviorism, the source of the behavioral indicators of "mind" as well as its measure is provided for by ordinary, cultivated English. In Heidegger’s work the appeal to the evidence of ordinary language, the language of everyday being in the world, is frequent. He often cites linguistic usage for guidance in his analyses, as for example the passages on the hammer, on social inauthenticity, on temporal expressions, and on the grammar of listening and hearing. At this stage he is not as self-conscious of this method as is Ryle in a later period, although it is consonant with Heidegger’s emergent stress on the importance of language. For Heidegger of course these analyses of ordinary language are not ends in themselves, because this realm is meant to exhibit certain a priori structures of human existence, which he calls "existentials" in contradistinction to the "categories" applicable to things. Furthermore, his interest in these existential clarifications is governed by his contention that they afford a necessary basis for and prelude to ontology, for which reason he designates this endeavor "fundamental-ontology." The analysis of being human, consequently, can never, according to Heidegger, be autonomous and self-sufficient, because man’s constitution is meshed with that of others, things, and instruments, with works of art, thought, and politics, and above all with Being. His analysis also differs in an important way from Ryle’s in his view that our understanding of the world is ensnared in the conflicting claims of authentic and inauthentic possibilities for life. As a result, from the outset, ordinary language, a theme to which he later returns in his essays on Hölderlin, represents a threat as well as a rich fund of expression. Lastly, there is nothing in Ryle resembling Heidegger’s detailed examination of gossip, hearsay, and curiosity, boredom, fear, and dread, time, freedom, and death. (shrink)

Prince of Networks is the rst treatment of Bruno Latour speci cally as a philosopher. Part One covers four key works that display Latour’s underrated contributions to metaphysics: Irreductions, Science in Action, We Have Never Been Modern, and Pandora’s Hope. Harman contends that Latour is one of the central gures of contemporary philosophy, with a highly original ontology centred in four key concepts: actants, irreduction, translation, and alliance.

An overview of trends in present Continental philosophy and science. Husserl's writings are shown to prefigure the notion of a stratified structure as a model for scientific inquiry. Recent work in economics, sociology, and civil law is seen to presuppose something like Jasper's theory of the creative existential encounter. Heidegger's speculations on the nature of temporality and being-in-the-world are paralleled by several current versions of psychoanalysis. Though the influence of philosophy upon contemporary scientific movements is not claimed to (...) be direct in each instance, a convincing case is made out that those two fields are equally indicative of and contributive to a new humanistic Weltanschauung.--E. S. C. (shrink)

John Sallis of Duquesne University has edited this fine collection of essays on Heidegger as a tribute to the latter on the occasion of his eightieth birthday. Some of the contributions are papers that were read at a Heidegger Symposium at Duquesne in October, 1966. There is a brief letter by Heidegger addressed to Arthur Schrynemakers, chairman of the Symposium, in which Heidegger submits a set of questions for the consideration of the Symposium participants. Sallis contributes (...) an article which responds to these questions. Zygmunt Adamczewski's contribution is a commentary and elaboration of some issues, e.g., the translation of Wesen, which he discussed personally with Heidegger in 1968. Edward Ballard gives a very clear-headed account of Heidegger's critique of science. There is an excellent account of the "Ereignis" by Theodore Kisiel and of "Time and Being" by André Schuwer. Other contributors include C. D. Keyes, Thomas Langan, Ralph Powell, Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka and John Wild. The volume is lacking in two respects. Except for a brief piece by Langan and for certain implications of Powell's study, there is no really sustained and well-developed critique of Heidegger either internal or external, sympathetic or unsympathetic, a failure not uncommon among Heideggerians. Moreover, there is no index of any kind--of topics, of names, or of texts of Heidegger--which impairs the book's usefulness. --J. D. C. (shrink)

Volume 27 of Heidegger's Complete Works offers a translation of the lecture course Einleitung in die Philosophie, which Martin Heidegger delivered in the winter semester of 1928-29 at the University of Freiburg. This course represents an important bridge between the last course Heidegger offered at Marburg in summer semester 1928, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, and the seminal winter semester 1929-30 course The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. The two major themes treated in the course are the relation (...) between philosophy and science and that between philosophy and Weltanschauung. It will come as no surprise to those familiar with Heidegger's work and teaching that the course is anything but a schematic introduction to an academic discipline labeled Philosophy. It is designed instead as a veritable initiation into philosophical thinking, with the stated aim of "getting philosophizing underway.". (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A HEIDEGGERIAN CRITIQUE OF AQUINAS AND A GILSONIAN REPLY JOHN F. X. KNASAS Center for Thomistic Studies Houston, Texas I IN HIS BOOK, Heidegger and Aquinas: An Essay on Overcoming Metaphysics, John Caputo investigates among other points a claim of Etienne Gilson's followers. Their claim is that Heidegger's charge of an oblivion or forgetfulness of being cannot be pinned on Aquinas.1 Aquinas escapes the charge because he (...) alone in the history of Western philosophy deepens the understanding of being to the level of esse. How could someone who has seized upon the fundamental principle of being be guilty of a forgetfulness of being? Caputo begs to differ. A Heideggerian would find the Gilsonian thesis unimpressive. What Aquinas has done remains too ontical, for it still deals with things and the principles of things. Something else escapes Aquinas's eye, and Caputo variously expresses the Heideggerian dissatisfaction :... esse for Aquinas means that act by which a thing comes to be " real " rather than " present " in the original Greek sense of shining and appearing, revealing and concealing.... In St. Thomas the original Greek notion of presencing as the shining in which all appearances shine, as a rising up into appearance, into manifestness, has declined into an understanding of Being as "objective presence," the presence of what is mutely there, as a sound in an empty room is thought to be" there" in naive realism and common sense.2 1 John Caputo, Heidegger and Aquinas: An Essay on Overcoming Metaphysics (New York: Fordham University Press, 1982), pp. 100-1, 117-21. 2 Ibid., p. 199. 415 416 JOHN F. X. KNASAS Also: Hence, St. Thomas takes the being, not in its very Being-that is, in its quiet emergence into manifestness-but in its character as something created.3 Then: The metaphysics of actualitas is basically at odds with the meditative savoring of the original sense of Being as presencing.4 Finally: The early Greek experience of Anwesen, of the simple emergence of things into the light, differs fundamentally from St. Thomas's metaphysics of actuality and science of first causes.5 Caputo's conclusion is that one cannot accept Heidegger's criteria of S eindenken and think that Aquinas meets them.6 But a Gilsonian might humbly take Caputo's correction and still feel constrained to note that if the issue is being in the sense of presencing, then another portion of Aquinas's philosophical doctrine becomes relevant, viz., Aquinas's elaboration of the mechanics of cognition. In sum, things are present to us insofar as our form has been informed by their forms. Formal reception of form allows us to become the really other without loss to ourselves. We are then sufficiently actuated to cause the presence of the real as the term of our cognitional activity.7 a Ibid., p. 200. ' Ibid., p. 201. s Ibid., p. 209. 6 Ibid. 7 " ••• knowing beings are distinguished from non-knowing beings in that the latter possess only their own form ; whereas the knowing being is naturally adapted to have also the form of some other thing, for the species of the thing known is in the knower. Hence, it is manifest that the nature of a non-knowing being is more contracted and limited; whereas the nature of a knowing being has a greater amplitude and extension. That is why the Philosopher says that the soul is in a sense all things." Thomas Aquinas, ST I, 14, 2c, ed. Anton Pegis, The Basic Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas (New York: Random House, 1945), Vol. I, p. 136. On the Aristotelian background, see Joseph Owens, " Aristotelian Soul as Cognitive of Sensibles, Intelligibles and Self," Aristotle: The Collected Papers of Joseph Owens, ed. John R. Catan (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1981), pp. 81-98. A GILSONIAN REPLY TO HEIDEGGER 417 Once more, however, I believe that we have philosophers speaking past each other. For Heidegger believes that presencing requires an understanding of being as an a priori condition. Many texts to this effect exist. One of the most striking is from Heidegger's The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1927). I would like to quote it at length. In... (shrink)