Description: Ancient Indian logic by itself is a very vast subject. The ancient Sanskrit term nyaya which was first used in a different or in a much more general sense, was later specifically applied to the Nyaya school. The physics and physiology and psychology of the Nyaya doctrine are not specifically its own, being from the first indistinguishable from those of its sister Sastra, the Vaisesika. What characterizes it specifically is the development of the nyaya or five-membered method of demonstration (...) and its insistence on the four sources of knowledge, corresponding to the first four members of its demonstrative formula, or 'Syllogism.' The importance of Nyaya is in its doctrine of the pramanas, or sources of proof, and in its formulation of the nyaya, or method of demonstration. Indian Logic in its Early Schools by H.N. Randle is an interpretation of Indian logical theory in its historical development based on the study of original texts wherever reference to Nyaya as a method of logic has been made, and thus, covers a very wide field of Indian philosophy. An indispensable work for students of Indian philosophy, it is especially important for those who are interested in Nyayadarsana in its relation to the early logic of other schools. (shrink)

H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr.; Roman Catholic Social Teaching and Religious Hospital Identity in a Post-Christian Age, Christian bioethics: Non-Ecumenical Studies.

We all think that science is special. Its products—its technological spin-off—dominate our lives which are thereby sometimes enriched and sometimes impoverished but always affected. Even the most outlandish critics of science such as Feyerabend implicitly recognize its success. Feyerabend told us that science was a congame. Scientists had so successfully hood-winked us into adopting its ideology that other equally legitimate forms of activity—alchemy, witchcraft and magic—lost out. He conjured up a vision of much enriched lives if only we could free (...) ourselves from the domination of the ‘one true ideology’ of science just as our ancestors freed us from the domination of the Church. But he told us these things in Switzerland and in California happily commuting between them in that most ubiquitous product of science—the aeroplane. (shrink)

We start this issue of Journal of Military Ethics with a recent address on military ethics given by one of the US ARMY's leading officers.Brigadier General H. R. McMaster graduated from the United...

Philosopher Peter Sjöstedt-H’s Noumenautics traverses the mindscape of metaphysics, nihilism and psychedelic phenomenology. It navigates through subjects such as the sentience of cells, the constrictions of consciousness, the metaphysics of might, the magic of mushrooms, the narcotics of Nietzsche, and the neologism of neo-nihilism – the last of which may itself cause flashbacks. -/- Tracing the fall of western morality through Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, the book descends deeper still into a metaphysics further upheld by Henri Bergson and Alfred North (...) Whitehead. This collection of essays and notes provides a most idea-provoking, educational, and original piece of literature for the thoughtful lay-reader and specialist alike. -/- Contents: I. Philosophy and Psychedelic Phenomenology II. Myco-Metaphysics: a Philosopher on Magic Mushrooms III. Psychedelics and Empiricism IV. Bergson and Psychedelic Consciousness V. Vertexes of Sentience: Whitehead and Psychedelic Phenomenology VI. Antichrist Psychonaut: Nietzsche and Psychedelics VII. Neo-Nihilism: the Philosophy of Power VIII. The Teutonic Shift from Christian Morality: Kant – Schopenhauer – Nietzsche IX. Schopenhauer and the Mind X. The Will to Power. (shrink)

This new edition emphasizes Emerson's philosophy and thoughts on such issues as freedom and fate; creativity and established culture; faith, experience, and evidence; the individual, God, and the world; unity and dualism; moral law, grace, and compensation; and wealth and success. Emerson's text has been fully annotated to explain difficult words and to clarify his references. The Introduction, Notes, Bibliography, Index, and Chronology of Emerson's life help the reader understand his distinctive outlook, his contributions to philosophy, and his place in (...) American culture and society. (shrink)

The significance of the dating of Enmann's Kaisergeschichte in the controversy which has long surrounded the Historia Augusta is common knowledge to all scholars who have more than a nodding acquaintance with the period. Enmann himself concluded that the KG ended with or shortly after Diocletian's accession. This was a necessary hypothesis for Enmann in 1884 because the H.A. had clearly used the KG and the self-proclaimed authorship and dating of the former were generally accepted. None the less in Enmann's (...) opinion the resemblances between Victor and Eutropius continued into the sole reign of Constantius II down to the Battle of Strasbourg in 357 and Enmann was compelled to ascribe this to a ‘continuation’ of the KG. (shrink)

Mr. P. H. Ling's suggestion that the famous line θερουσιν θη χρσθ' μιλαι κακα stood at the beginning of a play of Euripides seems to me to lack anything like cogent proof. A gnomic verse of this sort—to take the characteristics of the line in the order given by Mr. Ling—may indeed begin a play, as in the fragment of the Stheneboia which he quotes; but it may also begin a speech, as Hec. 864; or come early in a speech, (...) cf. Heracl. 2; or alone in stichomythia, as Alc. 540; or late in a speech, as Med. 561; or at the end of one, as Supp. 510. In other words, there is no position which it may not have. As to its lack of ‘any particle or conjunction to connect it with what preceded or followed,’ how does Mr. Ling prove that it was not preceded by γιγνσκων τι, cf. Med. 560; or that the previous line did not end in γάρ, like Hec. 551, Supp. 361; or that this line is not the end of a longer sentence, like Alc. (shrink)

Originally published in 1950, the name of the late Dr H.G. Baynes was already well-known as a leading exponent of and translator of the writings of Professor C.G. Jung, as author and as psychotherapist. The essay which gives it title to this varied and interesting collection of writings, shows clearly Dr Baynes’s gift for illuminating a familiar subject with fresh insight drawn from his wide knowledge of the unconscious mind. He can make the unconscious real to us, and can convince (...) us that myth and dream are expressions of vital problems of the human soul. The collection includes material to interest many types of reader, from _The British Journal of Medical Psychology_, from _Folk-Lore_, from The Society for Psychical Research. But perhaps most full of interest for the majority of readers are the first three chapters of an unfinished book – _What It Is All About_; here we find an admirable introduction, given with a wealth of illustration, to the main concepts of Professor Jung’s analytical psychology. Dr Baynes made Professor Jung’s thought his own, without loss of his own originality. He can touch with significance any subject on which he writes, whether it be the problem of the individual or the kindred problems of humanity. (shrink)

We are dealing with the Dirac Hamiltonian H = H0 + V with no magnetic field and radially symmetric electrostatic potential V = V(r), preferably the Coulomb potential. While the observable H is precisely predictable, its components H0 (relativistic mass) and V (potential energy) are not. However they both possess precisely predictable approximations H0 ∼ and V∼ which approximate accurately if the particle is not near its nucleus. On the other hand, near 0, H0 and V are practically unpredictable, perhaps (...) in agreement with the fact, that a neutrino also should be in the game. [We have not yet studied the corresponding observables for the (≥ 12-dimensional) problem of electro-weak interaction.] Mathematically we are focusing on the spectral theory of the unbounded self-adjoint operators H0 ∼ and V ∼. We can prove that V ∼ is unitarily equivalent to V(r) again, by a unitary map given as Wiener-Hopf-type singular integral operator in the standard separation of variables for radially symmetric Dirac Hamiltonians. [This is, as far as the continuous spectrum is concerned.] Very similar unitary equivalence holds for H 0 ∼ and H 0. We are tempted to regard this as a form of “renormalization”. (shrink)

How can we explain that our dreams are often not a chaotic, incoherent pile of images, but a definite, perfectly organized sequence of images? How do the sensations and images fit in dreams, what kind of logic do they obey, what is the role of emotions and ideas? Henri Delacroix formulates these questions in his article and offers his answers, delineating and examining different types of dreams. Taking into account and critically evaluating the concepts of contemporary researchers who studied the (...) problem of dreams, Delacroix puts forward his own hypothesis. From his point of view, at the basis of many dreams lies an extremely changeable and mobile basic idea which is able to direct the movement of images that are its representation. Images represent the development of a mental theme or a combination of many topics. Between a dream and a daydream, according to Delacroix, there is only a difference in complexity and systematization. Translation of the publication: Delacroix H. Sur la structure logique du rêve // Revue de métaphysique et de morale. 1904. T. 12. № 6. P. 921–934. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume XXIII, Number 2, November 1997, pp. 227-244 Hume on Geometry and Infinite Divisibility in the Treatise H. MARK PRESSMAN Scholars have recognized that in the Treatise "Hume seeks to find a foundation for geometry in sense-experience."1 In this essay, I examine to what extent Hume succeeds in his attempt to ground geometry visually. I argue that the geometry Hume describes in the Treatise faces a serious (...) set of problems. Geometric Lines Hume maintains that ideas "are images" (T 6) which may be called up "when I shut my eyes" (T 3). "That we may fix the meaning of a word, figure," according to Hume, "we may revolve in our mind the ideas of circles, squares, parallelograms, triangles of different sizes and proportions, and may not rest on one image or idea" (T 22). As Arthur Pap notes, "'Idea' is in Hume's usage synonymous with 'mental image'." D.C.G. MacNabb also notes that "Hume thought of ideas as images, and primarily as visual images."2 When Hume argues, then, that "we have the idea of indivisible points, lines and surfaces conformable to the [geometer's] definition" (T 44), he is arguing that we have mental images of geometry's points, lines and planes. Consider geometric lines first. Geometers define a line "to be length without breadth or depth" (T 42). It is not apparent to everyone that we have mental images of such lines. According to "L'Art de penser" (T 43), published in 1662, it is impossible "to conceive a length without any breadth" (T 43). H. Mark Pressman is at the Department of Philosophy, University of California, Davis, 1238 Social Sciences and Humanities Building, Davis CA 95616-8673 USA. email: imn78@cvin.fresno.com 228 H. Mark Pressman We can only by an abstraction "consider the one without regarding the other" (T 43). Hume, however, offers "clear proof" (T 44), in the form of two arguments, that we actually possess ideas or mental images of geometry's lines. First, we have ideas or mental images of lengths with breadth, though these are supposed never to be without breadth and thus not geometric lines. (A mental image oflength is also a mental image with length, just as "to say the idea of extension agrees to any thing, is to say it is extended" [T 240].) Hume reduces to absurdity the view that our mental images of length are always with breadth and thus not images of geometric lines. If our length-images were always with breadth, then our mental images would be endlessly divisible in breadth, since they would always have some positive breadth (T 43). But no mental image is endlessly divisible, for the mind arrives "at an end in the division of its ideas, nor are there any possible means of evading the evidence of this conclusion" (T 27). We thus have an idea or image of length without (divisible) breadth conforming to the geometer's definition (T 44). Second, we can imagine or picture the termination of a geometric plane. But a geometric plane must terminate in a geometric line (T 44). (Proof: Assume L is a line with breadth which terminates plane P. Since L has breadth, L must contain at least two parts, w and y, exactly one of which actually terminates P. But whether it is w or y, L doesn't terminate P, which was the assumption.) Since we can picture the termination of a geometric plane, we can picture a geometric line, length without divisible breadth. It is one thing to have ideas or mental images of geometric lines which may be called up "when I shut my eyes" (T 3). It is another for such objects actually to exist "in nature." The conceptualist holds that though (a) geometry 's points, lines and planes are ideas, nevertheless (b) there are no such things in nature and that (c) there can't be such things in nature: [T]he objects of geometry... are mere ideas in the mind, and not only never did, but never can exist in nature. They never did exist; for no one will pretend to draw a line or make a... (shrink)

Now, we can draw a conclusion on the matter of the necessity of angādhikāra in Pā $$ \underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{n}$$ ini's grammar. We have seen that angādhikāra constitutes a very important section of the grammar where the relation of the suffixes and their bases is crucial. We also have observed that the concept of anga cannot be separated from Pā $$ \underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{n}$$ ini's system due to its being a part of many sūtras as well as many paribhā $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{s}$$ ās. We have also (...) seen that at least three exclusive prayojanas exist for the justification of angādhikāra. Another justification can be given in the form of preventing the double samprasāra $$ \underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{n}$$ a in forms like vavraś which we discussed while determining the limit of angādhikāra. We saw that three important paribhā $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{s}$$ ās, which are accepted by Patañjali, depend on angādhikāra. Finally we saw that an alternative suggested by Patañjali for angādhikāra is in no way better, but actually defective.Kātyāyana's use of angādhikāra in other sections to counter some objections has been shown too. Patañjali's apparent rejection of angādhikāra on the basis of Kātyāyana's vārtika on ‘angasya’ (6-4-1) is not supported by his own treatment of the subject in other places. So, we conclude that Patañjali did not really intend to refute the angādhikāra and the view which appears in his commentary on 6-4-1 should not be taken as his siddhānta on this matter. Tasmād angādhikāra iti bhagavato gūdho 'bhisandhir iti bhāvah. Naitāni ity ādi grantha $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{h}$$ ekadeśyuktir iti tātparyam. Nāgeśa, ‘Uddyota’, MB, Vol. 5, p. 273.Thus the necessity of angādhikāra in Pā $$ \underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{n}$$ ini's A $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{s}$$ $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{t}$$ ādhyāyī is established. (shrink)

Muḥammad Mahdī ibn Abī Z̲arr Narāqī, -1794 or 1795. Jāmiʻ al-saʻādāt - Criticism and interpretation; Islamic ethics.

A collection of essays written in affectionate tribute to Gombrich.

Philosophy; philosophical theology; philosophical anthropology; history.

International cooperation is an integral part of furthering medical and scientific progress. Many specilist societies exist for that purpose and have written into their constitutions that such cooperation and coordination is their aim. They hope to achieve their aims by exchange, in all languages, of information and by so doing strengthen the relations between individual physicians and scentists as well as between corporate professional bodies from different countries. However, at the same time emphasis is laid on the political neutrality of (...) such organsations. Increasingly, this 'neutrality' is being questioned as doctors and scientists become aware of abuse and distortion of their profession taking place in other countries. H Merskey highlights the problems and offers his opinion on the ethics of maintaining these professional relationships with colleagues abroad who are involved in such abuse and distortion. (shrink)

In the modern world of total technologization, scientific knowledge devoid of worldview correction (humanitarian expertise) carries a threatening tendency of self-denial: without a constant, philosophically correct transformation of objective knowledge about certain fragments (branches) of the surrounding reality into human knowledge (questions) about itself, the practical effectiveness of such knowledge inevitably accumulates in itself the threat of practical helplessness. Aim and the tasks of the research. Based on an in-depth analysis of the category of existence, as well as on modern (...) philosophical reflections on the methodological and cognitive insolvency of the idea of the world, to find out the real meaning of those changes that this idea meaningfully undergoes in the conditions of the modern total technologization of human life. The research methodology. From a methodological point of view, the author prefers a dialectical approach, considering the analyzed phenomena, regardless of the mode of their reality, in their development and internally contradictory essence. H. Plesner’s theory of eccentric positionality serves as a certain base point for the analysis of human nature and, accordingly, the world of human existence. Research results: The problematic existence of the world and the epistemological «failure» of the corresponding category, declared in some modern philosophical reflections, are connected exclusively with its anthropological and worldview function, which is based on the fundamental uncertainty of a man’s place in the world. The «worthlessness» («futility») of worldview thematization is derived from the allencompassing inability of the human figure in the world, from that «emptiness» and «invisibility» (specific own transparency) of the spiritual dimension of human existence, on which, however, this existence is based. Discussion. The human «option» of fulfilling the unity of living being can be characterized as extremely intense. In this variant, the phylogenetic line of development turns into an ontogenetic point of worldliness devoid of predetermined content, a fundamentally new type of integration. The horizons of such integration far exceed primarily because of its understanding. And the subject of such a meaningful life is forced to integrate everything that happens to him every time into a certain system (synthesis) of the world. That subjectivity the world has distinguishes the subject from the thing. Subjectivity and the world mutually belong to each other - they are correlative. A thing exists because it is what it is. The subject (and with it his world) does not exist like that. A subject is how and to what it relates. But the relation «how» and «to what» is not carried out completely anew and isolated every time, but exists in its multiplicity in a certain relationship. Each individual case, each individual action (method of action) acquires its meaning from a wider, structured context – in whole or in part. This context is the «world», the «life world» of the real subject, or the «world» as an anthropological idea. Conclusions. The task of modern humanitarianism is not only to find opportunities for rational use of the fact of the fundamental openness of the human being, but also to cultivate the ability to reconcile a man with himself, to accept himself. This gives us certain reasons to hope for the enduring significance of worldview thematization. Criticism regarding the seemingly paradoxical conclusion that to become a man, one must already be one, could be considered fair, but only if one does not take into account the principled nature of such an aphoristic position, because this is exactly how the human world exists - as the art of tolerance uncertainty. (shrink)