In this paper I present an interpretation of Deleuze's concept of the virtual. I argue that this concept is best understood in relation to the problematic of individuation or differentiation, which Deleuze inherits from Duns Scotus. After analysing Scotus' critique of Aristotelian or hylomorphic approaches to the problem of individuation, I turn to Deleuze's account of differentiation and his interpretation of the calculus in chapter 4 of Difference and Repetition. The paper seeks thereby to explicate Deleuze's dialectics or theory of (...) Ideas, his approach to the principle of sufficient reason, and the concept of the virtual itself. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Vatter’s proposed solution to the problem of thanatopolitics in the development of a concept of eternal life is inadequate. In the first section I situate Vatter’s project, sketching out Foucault’s concept of biopolitics and marking Vatter’s specific difference from others working to articulate an affirmative biopolitics in contemporary discussions. In the second section I argue, following Foucault and Mbembe, that the possibility of a thanatopolitics or necropolitics that institutes regimes of mass death by racist (...) fragmentations of the population is a possibility intrinsic to biopolitics as such. In the third section I reconstruct Vatter’s proposal, according to which the thanatopolitical inversion can be blocked by developing an atheistic and philosophical concept of eternal life. I argue that this is inadequate for three reasons: first, the specifically contemplative character of the life Vatter proposes as eternal seems to valorize only a particular form of life; second, the transfinite character of living as such which is valorized in this conception seems to repeat, rather than repudiate, the logic of thanatopolitics; third, this concept of life as eternal seems not to be able to account for the reality of extinction. (shrink)

In this article I critically assess Deleuze’s interpretation of Spinoza’s metaphysics of modes. I argue that the conception of modal essence that Deleuze attributes to Spinoza is untenable in terms of Spinoza’s metaphysics. I further show that the idea that modal essences are eternally static degrees of power is incompatible with Spinoza’s ethics, wherein modes strive to increase their power by means of positive interactions with others. I suggest that Deleuze’s interpretation of this crucial aspect of Spinozism runs the risk (...) of reinstating Platonic idealist and moralistic themes, of the kind that both Spinoza and Deleuze are committed to overcoming. (shrink)

"Alexandre Matheron is considered one of the most important interpreters of Spinoza's philosophy in the 20th century. These 20 essays, translated into English for the first time, focus on ontology, knowledge, politics and ethics in Spinoza, his predecessors and his contemporaries."--Publisher description.

ABSTRACT In this article I challenge a common reading of Benedict de Spinoza’s political philosophy, which holds that since his metaphysics is entirely positive or affirmative, his politics must be affirmative as well. In the first part, I show how this interpretation is found in the works of Gilles Deleuze and Antonio Negri. In the second part, I show that the negative has no ontological reality in Spinoza’s metaphysics. In the third, building on the work of Alexandre Matheron, I show (...) that there is nevertheless real and unavoidable negativity in Spinozist politics, and that according to Spinoza, sad passions and repression must lie at the heart of any political society. (shrink)

In a discussion of Victor Delbos, the doyen of early twentieth-century French Spinozism, Alexandre Matheron recalls with fondness a remark once made by his former doctoral sponsor, and fellow Spino...

Physicians frequently encounter situations in which their professional practice is intermingled with moral affordances stemming from other domains of the physician’s lifeworld, such as family and friends, or from general morality pertaining to all humans. This article offers a typology of moral conflicts ‘at the margins of professionalism’ as well as a new theoretical framework for dealing with them. We start out by arguing that established theories of professional ethics do not offer sufficient guidance in situations where professional ethics overlaps (...) with moral duties of other origins. Therefore, we introduce the moral theory developed by Christine M. Korsgaard, that centres around the concept of practical identity. We show how Korsgaard’s account offers a framework for interpreting different types of moral conflicts ‘at the margins of professionalism’ to provide either orientation for solving the conflict or an explanation for the emotional and moral burden involved in moral dilemmas. (shrink)

Spoofing is the act of placing orders to buy or sell a financial contract without the intention to have those orders fulfilled in order to create the impression that there is a large demand for that contract at that price. In this article, I deny the view that spoofing in financial markets should be viewed as morally permissible analogously to the way bluffing is permissible in poker. I argue for the pro tanto moral impermissibility of spoofing and make the case (...) that spoofing is disanalogous from bluffing in at least one important regard—speculative trading serves an important economic role, whereas poker does not. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss a prevailing view by which logical terms determine forms of sentences and arguments and therefore the logical validity of arguments. This view is common to those who hold that there is a principled distinction between logical and nonlogical terms and those holding relativistic accounts. I adopt the Tarskian tradition by which logical validity is determined by form, but reject the centrality of logical terms. I propose an alternative framework for logic where logical terms no longer (...) play a distinctive role. This account employs a new notion of semantic. (shrink)

Policy-makers sometimes aim to improve well-being as a policy goal, but to do this they need some way to measure well-being. Instead of relying on potentially problematic theories of well-being to justify their choice of well-being measure, Daniel Hausman proposes that policy-makers can sometimes rely on preference-based measures as evidence for well-being. I claim that Hausman’s evidential account does not justify the use of any one measure more than it justifies the use of any other measure. This leaves us at (...) a loss as to which policy should be chosen in the non-trivial cases for which there is substantial disagreement between the different measures in their assessment of policy. (shrink)

The medical profession is observing a rising number of calls to action considering the threat that climate change poses to global human health. Theory-led bioethical analyses of the scope and weight of physicians’ normative duty towards climate protection and its conflict with individual patient care are currently scarce. This article offers an analysis of the normative issues at stake by using Korsgaard’s neo-Kantian moral account of practical identities. We begin by showing the case of physicians’ duty to climate protection, before (...) we succinctly introduce Korsgaard’s account. We subsequently show how the duty to climate protection can follow from physicians’ identity of being a healthcare professional. We structure conflicts between individual patient care and climate protection, and show how a transformation in physicians’ professional ethos is possible and what mechanisms could be used for doing so. An important limit of our analysis is that we mainly address the level of individual physicians and their practical identities, leaving out important measures to respond to climate change at the mesolevels and macrolevels of healthcare institutions and systems, respectively. (shrink)

Analitik psikoloji 20. yüzyılda İsviçreli psikoterapist Carl Gustav Jung tarafından oluşturulmuş kuramdır. Kuram sadece psikoterapi alanını değil psikolojiden teoloji, etnografi, edebiyat ve güzel sanatlara kadar pek çok bilim dalını da etkilemiştir. Jung’un kuramındaki en önemli başarısı; bilinçdışı ile bireysel bilinçdışı ve kolektif bilinçdışının keşfidir. Bu keşifle sadece çeşitli bilim dalları edebî metinlerde geçen kolektif imgeler ve onların kolektif simgelerinin neler olduğunu değil insanlar da ruhun ihtiyacının ne olduğunu öğrenmiştir. Jung’un kuramının birincil maddesi ontolojik açıdan insanın kendisinden daha güçlü bir varlığa (...) bağlanma ihtiyacıyla doğmasıdır. İnsan bu temel ihtiyacını göz ardı ederek yaşamını sürdürdüğünde enerjisini yapısına ters yönde isteklere harcayarak giderir. Nitekim insan doğası gereği hayatın çeşitli yönlerine ilgi duyan, onları gerçekleştirmede istekli olan varlıktır. Bu istekler bazen toplumun refahını engelleyici dolayısıyla dinî emirlere aykırı olabilir. Böylece gerek toplumun kurallarına gerek dinin buyruklarına ters düşülür. Bu durumda dinen istenilen insan olunamadığı gibi psikolojik açıdan da bireyselleşme gerçekleştirilememiş olur. Bireyselliğini gerçekleştirememiş insanlar Jung’un kuramında isimlendirdiği gibi gölgelerinin farkına varamamış kişilerdir. Analitik psikolojide insanlık adına çok önemli olan gölgelerin farkına varılması oldukça zordur. Klinik gözlemlerinden hareketle kuramını oluşturan Jung’a göre hayatı boyunca gölgelerinin farkına varamayan insanlar olduğu gibi hayatlarının bazı evrelerinde yaşadıkları tecrübe neticesinde kendilerini bitkin, yorgun hatta hasta hisseden insanların olması da mümkündür. Jung kuramında gölgelerinin farkına varamayan insanların; bireyselleşmelerinin gerçekleşmediğini belirtir. Ona göre insanlığın en büyük yıkımı bireyselleşmenin gerçekleşmediği toplumlardan kaynaklanacaktır. Makale; analitik psikolojide gölge arketipinin tasavvufî görüşte arzu, istek, hayatın ilkeleri manalarına da gelen nefs teriminin benzeşik oluşu üzerine kaleme alınmıştır. Bu sebeple makalede on bir tane mutasavvıf şairin dîvânında zikredilen nefs kelimesi kuram doğrultusunda titizlikle incelenmiştir. Makale Jung’un kuramı ışığında bir arketip olan gölge ibaresinin mutasavvıf şairlerin dîvânlarında incelenen nefs ibaresine karşılık geldiği elli bir manzumenin açıklanmasından oluşmaktadır. Elde edilen veriler neticesinde makale gölgenin tanımı, bilinçlenmeye başlama, gölgeleri tanıma, bireyselleşme ve gölge çeşitleri olmak üzere beş bölümdür. Makalede yer alan gölge çeşitleri; acelecilik, hırs, kibir ve kin alt bölümlerini ihtiva etmektedir. Bu alt bölümlerde insanın olumsuz özelliklerini anlatan gölge çeşitlerini bildiren manzumelerin aynı zamanda insanın bu kötü hasletleriyle nasıl mücadele edeceğine dair öğütleri, çözüm önerilerini içerdiği tespit edilmiştir. Mutasavvıf şairler tarafından okuyucusuna verilen bu öğütler Jung’un da kuramında özellikle üzerinde durduğu hasletlerdir. Çalışmayla gerek klasik Türk edebiyatı gerek Türk İslâm edebiyatı alanına metinlerde zikredilen kelimelerin sembolik anlamlarının kazandırılması, farklı bir derinlik getirilmesinin yanında teoloji bilim dallarına da katkı sağlaması ümit edilmektedir. (shrink)

This essay offers a conception of logic by which logic may be considered to be exceptional among the sciences on the backdrop of a naturalistic outlook. The conception of logic focused on emphasises the traditional role of logic as a methodology for the sciences, which distinguishes it from other sciences that are not methodological. On the proposed conception, the methodological aims of logic drive its definitions and principles, rather than the description of scientific phenomena. The notion of a methodological discipline (...) is explained as a relation between disciplines or practices. Logic serves as a methodological discipline with respect to any theoretical practice, and this generality, as well as logic’s reflexive nature, distinguish it from other methodological disciplines. Finally, the evolution of model theory is taken as a case study, with a focus on its methodological role. Following recent work by John Baldwin and Juliette Kennedy, we look at model theory from its inception in the mid-twentieth century as a foundational endeavour until developments at the end of the century, where the classification of theories has taken centre-stage. (shrink)

Las últimas décadas atestiguan un avance acelerado de la tecnología. El futuro que se augura es asombroso en múltiples sentidos. Camina a pasos agigantados y veloces. Estos hechos abren una serie de acuciantes preguntas que exigen un serio discernimiento y que, alzándose como un desafío para los hombres del tercer milenio que comienza, no dejan indiferente al filósofo, uno de los más indicados para contribuir a su respuesta: ¿cómo se debe valorar este fenómeno?, ¿qué implicancias tiene en la vida humana?, (...) ¿hacia dónde camina el acelerado progreso tecnológico? Preguntarse por lo que es la tecnología y darle el lugar adecuado es urgente para comprender mucho de lo que está sucediendo y afrontar debidamente los retos del mañana. El presente artículo tiene como objetivo contribuir a estas reflexiones desde el pensamiento del filósofo de la ciencia italiano Evandro Agazzi. Luego de una introducción, se presentarán algunas ideas sobre operacionalismo, realismo, ciencia y técnica en Evandro Agazzi; posteriormente, se desarrollarán los conceptos de ciencia y técnica en su propuesta, lo que permitirá desembocar en algunas reflexiones acerca del poder que la tecnología ha otorgado a la humanidad. (shrink)

Many philosophers reject the view that well-being over a lifetime is simply an aggregation of well-being at every moment of one's life, and thus they reject theories of well-being like hedonism and concurrentist desire satisfactionism. They raise concerns that such a view misses the importance of the relationships between moments in a person's life or the role narratives play in a person's well-being. In this article, we develop an atomist meta-theory of well-being, according to which the prudential value of a (...) life depends solely on the prudential value of each moment of that life. This is a general account of momentary well-being that can capture different features of well-being that standard atomistic accounts fail to capture, thus allowing for the possibility of an atomism that is compatible with a variety of well-being theories. Contrary to many criticisms leveled against momentary well-being, this well-being atomism captures all of the important features of well-being. (shrink)

Downward causation exercised by emergent properties of wholes upon their lower-level constituents’ properties has been accused of conceptual and metaphysical incoherence. Only upward causation is usually peacefully accepted. The aim of this paper is to criticize and refuse the traditional hierarchical-vertical way of conceiving both types of causation, although preserving their deepest ontological significance, as well as the widespread acceptance of the traditional atomistic-combinatorial view of the entities and the relations that constitute the so-called ‘emergence base’. Assuming those two perspectives (...) with no reserves, we are condemned to confine our debate to the question of whether reified wholes can have the power to downwardly change or influence their lower-level parts, a question which seems profoundly misleading to me. I therefore propose an alternative relational ontological view, assuming a straightforward horizontal and intra-level way of representing those putative cases of cross-level causation. I finally confront two recent replies to Kim’s well-known objections to DC—Craver and Bechtel and Kistler :595–609, 2009)—, emphasizing their global positive approaches, as well as the reasons why their accounts still seem insufficient to me. I conclude arguing that both Kim’s principle of the causal closure of the physical domain and its allegation of an overdetermination in cases of DC can be surpassed by the new relational ontological perspective presented here. (shrink)

In standard model-theoretic semantics, the meaning of logical terms is said to be fixed in the system while that of nonlogical terms remains variable. Much effort has been devoted to characterizing logical terms, those terms that should be fixed, but little has been said on their role in logical systems: on what fixing their meaning precisely amounts to. My proposal is that when a term is considered logical in model theory, what gets fixed is its intension rather than its extension. (...) I provide a rigorous way of spelling out this idea, and show that it leads to a graded account of logicality: the less structure a term requires in order for its intension to be fixed, the more logical it is. Finally, I focus on the class of terms that are invariant under isomorphisms, as they render themselves more easily to mathematical treatment. I propose a mathematical measure for the logicality of such terms based on their associated Löwenheim numbers. (shrink)

In this article I address the issue of the ontological conditions of possibility for a naturalistic notion of emergence, trying to determine its fundamental differences from the atomist, vitalist, preformationist and potentialist alternatives. I will argue that a naturalistic notion of ontological emergence can only succeed if we explicitly refuse the atomistic fundamental ontological postulate that asserts that every entity is endowed with a set of absolutely intrinsic properties, being qualitatively immutable through its extrinsic relations. Furthermore, it will be shown (...) that, ironically enough, this metaphysical assumption is implicitly shared by all the above mentioned alternatives to Emergentism. The current article concludes that the notion of organization by itself is not enough, and that ontological emergence can only be justified by assuming a relational ontological perspective that, in opposition both to atomism and holism, defends that the existence-conditions, the identity and the causal behavior of any emergent systemic property can only be conceived, and explained, as constructed by and through specific networks of qualitatively transformative relational processes that occur between the system’s components and between the system and its environment. Additionally, I try to explain how one can make sense of the idea that an emergent phenomenon is both dependent on, and autonomous from, its emergence base. (shrink)

Philosophers of well-being have tended to adopt a foundationalist approach to the question of theory and measurement, according to which theories are conceptually before measures. By contrast, social scientists have tended to adopt operationalist commitments, according to which they develop and refine well-being measures independently of any philosophical foundation. Unfortunately, neither approach helps us overcome the problem of coordinating between how we characterize well-being and how we measure it. Instead, we should adopt a coherentist approach to well-being science.

Many believe that an upward-sloping life is better than a downward-sloping life because of its shape. This is a common way of formulating the shape of a life hypothesis. We argue that the hypothesis is mistaken. We need not assume that there is something intrinsically valuable in the shape of one’s life to justify the tendency to judge an upward-sloping life as better than a downward sloping one. Instead, we can appeal to more fundamental and less controversial claims to justify (...) such a judgment. What one might justifiably judge to be better are features of lives which are often (though not necessarily) correlated with, rather than constituted by, an upward slope. (shrink)

Often institutions or individuals are faced with decisions where not all claims can be satisfied. Sometimes, these claims will be of differing strength. In such cases, it must be decided whether or not weaker claims can be aggregated in order to collectively defeat stronger claims. Many are attracted to a view, which this chapter calls Limited Aggregation, where this is sometimes acceptable and sometimes not. A new version of this view, Local Relevance, has recently emerged. This chapter seeks to explore (...) and evaluate this view. In order to do so, the chapter offers a more precise interpretation of this basic approach, calling it ‘Sequential Claims-Matching’. The chapter shows how Sequential Claims-Matching avoids problems that dog other Limited Aggregation views but suffers from difficulties and ambiguities of its own. In particular, the chapter shows that it is hard to accommodate some core Limited Aggregation intuitions around tie-break cases within the Local Relevance view. (shrink)

Feelings are conscious mental events that represent body states as they undergo homeostatic regulation. Feelings depend on the interoceptive nervous system (INS), a collection of peripheral and central pathways, nuclei and cortical regions which continuously sense chemical and anatomical changes in the organism. How such humoral and neural signals come to generate conscious mental states has been a major scientific question. The answer proposed here invokes (1) several distinctive and poorly known physiological features of the INS; and (2) a unique (...) interaction between the body (the ‘object’ of interoception) and the central nervous system (which generates the 'subject' of interoception). The atypical traits of the INS and the direct interactions between neural and non‐neural physiological compartments of the organism, neither of which is present in exteroceptive systems, plausibly explain the qualitative and subjective aspects of feelings, thus accounting for their conscious nature. (shrink)

According to what I call the ‘argument from public bads’, if a researcher deceived subjects in the past, there is a chance that subjects will discount the information that a subsequent researcher provides, thus compromising the validity of the subsequent researcher’s experiment. While this argument is taken to justify an existing informal ban on explicit deception in experimental economics, it can also apply to implicit deception, yet implicit deception is not banned and is sometimes used in experimental economics. Thus, experimental (...) economists are being inconsistent when they appeal to the argument from public bads to justify banning explicit deception but not implicit deception. (shrink)

To advance current knowledge on ethical decision-making in organizations, we integrate two perspectives that have thus far developed independently: the organizational identification perspective and the ethical climate perspective. We illustrate the interaction between these perspectives in two studies, in which we presented participants with moral business dilemmas. Specifically, we found that organizational identification increased moral decision-making only when the organization’s climate was perceived to be ethical. In addition, we disentangle this effect in Study 2 from participants’ moral identity. We argue (...) that the interactive influence of organizational identification and ethical climate, rather than the independent influence of either of these perspectives, is crucial for understanding moral decision-making in organizations. (shrink)

This easy-to-understand translation of one of the earliest surviving Buddhist texts offers a pathway to awakening that is simple, straightforward, and free of religious doctrine One of the earliest of all Buddhist texts, the Atthakavagga, or “Book of Eights,” is a remarkable document, not only because it comes from the earliest strain of the literature—before the Buddha, as the title suggests, came to be thought of as a “Buddhist”—but also because its approach to awakening is so simple and free of (...) adherence to any kind of ideology. Instead the Atthakavagga points to a direct and simple approach for attaining peace without requiring the adherence to doctrine. The value of the teachings it contains is not in the profundity of their philosophy or in their authority as scripture; rather, the value is found in the results they bring to those who live by them. Instead of doctrines to be believed, the “Book of Eights” describes means or practices for realizing peace. Gil Fronsdal’s rigorous translation with commentary reveals the text to be of interest not only to Buddhists, but also to the ever-growing demographic of spiritual-but-not-religious, who seek a spiritual life outside the structures of religion. (shrink)

This article brings a historical perspective to explain the recent dissemination of randomized controlled trials (RCTs) as the new “gold standard” method to assess international development projects. Although the buzz around RCT evaluations dates from the 2000s, we show that what we are witnessing now is a second wave of RCTs, while a first wave began in the 1960s and ended by the early 1980s. Drawing on content analysis of 123 RCTs, participant observation, and secondary sources, we compare the two (...) waves in terms of the participants in the network of expertise required to carry out field experiments and the characteristics of the projects evaluated. The comparison demonstrates that researchers in the second wave were better positioned to navigate the political difficulties caused by randomization. We explain the differences in the expertise network and in the type of projects as the result of concurrent transformations in the fields of development aid and the economics profession. We draw on Andrew Abbott’s concept of “hinges,” as well as on Bourdieu’s concept of “homology” between fields, to argue that the similar positions and parallel struggles conducted by two groups of actors in the two fields served as the basis for a cross-field alliance, in which RCTs could function as a “hinge” linking together the two fields. (shrink)

Microsystems are described as contexts formed by a subject, their roles, their interactions, and a specific physical space and time, such as housing and the school environment. Although several studies suggest the importance of studying this type of environment and its repercussion on children’s development, in a Latin American context, few studies integrate the interaction of two primary settings in the development of executive functioning. The present study explores the effects of the quality of housing and school environments on the (...) perception of stress, decision making, and planning among children. A total of 114 children (43% girls and 57% boys, M age = 10.57) from a primary school located in a community classified as poor participated in the study. The following was measured: the environmental quality of classrooms, housing, stress, and executive functioning of children. The results reveal a model linking environmental quality levels in children’s homes and schools and executive functioning. We also obtain a mediating role of stress between microsystems and performance, finding a deficit in executive performance when children experienced higher levels of stress as a result of poor environmental quality both in their homes and in their schools. (shrink)

A qualitative difference between Rules and Similarity in categorization can be described in terms of “commitment”: Rules entail it, Similarity does not. Commitment derives from people's knowledge of a domain, and it is what justifies people's inferences, selective attention, and dismissal of irrelevant information. Studies show that when children have knowledge, they manifest these aspects of commitment, thus overcoming Similarity.

Generating an account that can sidestep the disagreement among substantive theories of well-being, while at the same time still providing useful guidance for well-being public policy, would be a significant achievement. Unfortunately, the various attempts to remain agnostic regarding what constitutes well-being fail to either be an account of well-being, provide useful guidance for well-being policy, or avoid relying on a substantive well-being theory. There are no theory-free lunches in well-being policy. Instead, I propose an intermediate account, according to which (...) well-being is constituted by endorsed veridical experiences. This account refers back to theories of well-being but does so as agnostically as possible. An intermediate account of well-being is meant as a policy guiding compromise between the different theories of well-being that make claims regarding what constitutes well-being. An intermediate account does as well as can be hoped for in providing a basis for well-being policy. (shrink)

The essay discusses a recurrent criticism of the isomorphism-invariance criterion for logical terms, according to which the criterion pertains only to the extension of logical terms, and neglects the meaning, or the way the extension is fixed. A term, so claim the critics, can be invariant under isomorphisms and yet involve a contingent or a posteriori component in its meaning, thus compromising the necessity or apriority of logical truth and logical consequence. This essay shows that the arguments underlying the criticism (...) are flawed since they rely on an invalid inference from the modal or epistemic status of statements in the metalanguage to that of statements in the object-language. The essay focuses on McCarthy’s version of the argument, but refers to Hanson and McGee’s versions as well. (shrink)

Physicians frequently encounter situations in which their professional practice is intermingled with moral affordances stemming from other domains of the physician’s lifeworld, such as family and friends, or from general morality pertaining to all humans. This article offers a typology of moral conflicts ‘at the margins of professionalism’ as well as a new theoretical framework for dealing with them. We start out by arguing that established theories of professional ethics do not offer sufficient guidance in situations where professional ethics overlaps (...) with moral duties of other origins. Therefore, we introduce the moral theory developed by Christine M. Korsgaard, that centres around the concept of practical identity. We show how Korsgaard’s account offers a framework for interpreting different types of moral conflicts ‘at the margins of professionalism’ to provide either orientation for solving the conflict or an explanation for the emotional and moral burden involved in moral dilemmas. (shrink)

We examine whether a taxpayer’s decision to choose a taxpayer-favorable characterization of income is associated with contextual and individual dimensions of that decision. Using a 2 × 2 factorial experimental design, we manipulate the prevailing social norm on whether there is a general belief that a specific form of income should be characterized as a capital gain or as ordinary income, and the group affiliation on whether the individual is making a tax characterization decision as a sole proprietor or as (...) a member of a group practice. Moreover, we measure participants’ fairness perception of characterizing the income as capital gains versus ordinary. We study the decisions of 180 graduate business and accounting students from two US business schools to explore these dimensions using a tax-ambiguous income situation. Results indicate that both contextual and individual dimensions impact taxpayer decisions. Specifically, the social norm and fairness perception of characterizing income as capital gains affects the likelihood of choosing such a characterization. Being a sole proprietor or a member of a group practice does not have any significant main effect. However, relative to all other conditions, taxpayers are most likely to characterize income as capital gains when both the social norms are for capital gains characterization and when the taxpayer is a member of a group practice. Results remain largely robust to a variety of alternative explanations. We conclude the paper with a discussion of our findings and their implications for tax policy, enforcement, and research. (shrink)

Paraconsistent Weak Kleene logic is the 3-valued logic with two designated values defined through the weak Kleene tables. This paper is a first attempt to investigate PWK within the perspective and methods of abstract algebraic logic. We give a Hilbert-style system for PWK and prove a normal form theorem. We examine some algebraic structures for PWK, called involutive bisemilattices, showing that they are distributive as bisemilattices and that they form a variety, \, generated by the 3-element algebra WK; we also (...) prove that every involutive bisemilattice is representable as the Płonka sum over a direct system of Boolean algebras. We then study PWK from the viewpoint of AAL. We show that \ is not the equivalent algebraic semantics of any algebraisable logic and that PWK is neither protoalgebraic nor selfextensional, not assertional, but it is truth-equational. We fully characterise the deductive filters of PWK on members of \ and the reduced matrix models of PWK. Finally, we investigate PWK with the methods of second-order AAL—we describe the class \ of PWK-algebras, algebra reducts of basic full generalised matrix models of PWK, showing that they coincide with the quasivariety generated by WK—which differs from \—and explicitly providing a quasiequational basis for it. (shrink)

The global Covid-19 pandemic has resulted in social and economic disruption unprecedented in the modern era. Many countries have introduced severe measures to contain the virus, including travel restrictions, public event bans, non-essential business closures and remote work policies. While digital technologies help governments and organizations to enforce protection measures, such as contact tracing, their rushed deployment and adoption also raises profound concerns about surveillance, privacy and data protection. This article presents two critical cases on digital surveillance technologies implemented during (...) the Covid-19 pandemic and delineates the privacy implications thereof. We explain the contextual nature of privacy trade-offs during a pandemic and explore how regulatory and technical responses are needed to protect privacy in such circumstances. By providing a multi-disciplinary conversation on the value of privacy and data protection during a global pandemic, this article reflects on the implications digital solutions have for the future and raises the question of whether there is a way to have expedited privacy assessments that could anticipate and help mitigate adverse privacy implications these may have on society. (shrink)

This paper deals with the adequacy of the model-theoretic definition of logical consequence. Logical consequence is commonly described as a necessary relation that can be determined by the form of the sentences involved. In this paper, necessity is assumed to be a metaphysical notion, and formality is viewed as a means to avoid dealing with complex metaphysical questions in logical investigations. Logical terms are an essential part of the form of sentences and thus have a crucial role in determining logical (...) consequence. Gila Sher and Stewart Shapiro each propose a formal criterion for logical terms within a model-theoretic framework, based on the idea of invariance under isomorphism. The two criteria are formally equivalent, and thus we have a common ground for evaluating and comparing Sher and Shapiro philosophical justification of their criteria. It is argued that Shapiro's blended approach, by which models represent possible worlds under interpretations of the language, is preferable to Sher’s formal-structural view, according to which models represent formal structures. The advantages and disadvantages of both views’ reliance on isomorphism are discussed. (shrink)

Many believe that an upward-sloping life is better than a downward-sloping life because of its shape. This is a common way of formulating the shape of a life hypothesis. We argue that the hypothesis is mistaken. We need not assume that there is something intrinsically valuable in the shape of one’s life to justify the tendency to judge an upward-sloping life as better than a downward sloping one. Instead, we can appeal to more fundamental and less controversial claims to justify (...) such a judgment. What one might justifiably judge to be better are features of lives which are often (though not necessarily) correlated with, rather than constituted by, an upward slope. (shrink)

It is an open question whether well-being ought to primarily be understood as a temporal concept or whether it only makes sense to talk about a person’s well-being over their whole lifetime. In this article, I argue that how this principled philosophical disagreement is settled does not have substantive practical implications for well-being science and well-being policy. Trying to measure lifetime well-being directly is extremely challenging as well as unhelpful for guiding well-being public policy, while temporal well-being is both an (...) adequate indirect measure of lifetime well-being, and an adequate focus for the purposes of improving well-being through public policy. Consequently, even if what we ought to care about is lifetime well-being, we should use temporal measures of well-being and focus on temporal well-being policies. (shrink)

Organ transplantation remains one of modern medicine's remarkable achievements. It saves lives, improves quality of life, diminishes healthcare expenditures in end-stage renal patients, and enjoys high success rates. Yet the promise of transplantation is substantially compromised by the scarcity of organs. The gap between the number of patients on waiting lists and the number of available organs continues to grow. As of January 2006, the combined waiting list for all organs in the United States was 90,284. Unfortunately, thousands of potential (...) organs are lost each year, primarily due to lack of consent to donation from the deceased before death, or from the family thereafter. Only fifty percent of potential donors – the “conversion” rate – become actual donors. The costs attributed to organ shortage are substantial – Medicare paid over $15.5 billion in 2002 for treating patients with end-stage renal-disease, who predominate on organ waiting lists. (shrink)

Tarski characterized logical notions as invariant under permutations of the domain. The outcome, according to Tarski, is that our logic, which is commonly said to be a logic of extension rather than intension, is not even a logic of extension—it is a logic of cardinality. In this paper, I make this idea precise. We look at a scale inspired by Ruth Barcan Marcus of various levels of meaning: extensions, intensions and hyperintensions. On this scale, the lower the level of meaning, (...) the more coarse-grained and less “intensional” it is. I propose to extend this scale to accommodate a level of meaning appropriate for logic. Thus, below the level of extension, we will have a more coarse-grained level of form. I employ a semantic conception of form, adopted from Sher, where forms are features of things “in the world”. Each expression in the language embodies a form, and by the definition we give, forms will be invariant under permutations and thus Tarskian logical notions. I then define the logical terms of a language as those terms whose extension can be determined by their form. Logicality will be shown to be a lower level analogue of rigidity. Using Barcan Marcus’s principles of explicit and implicit extensionality, we are able to characterize purely logical languages as “sub-extensional”, namely, as concerned only with form, and we thus obtain a wider perspective on both logicality and extensionality. (shrink)

In _The Play within the Play: The Enacted Dimension of Psychoanalytic Process_ Gil Katz presents and illustrates the "enacted dimension of psychoanalytic process." He clarifies that enactment is not simply an overt event but an unconscious, continuously evolving, dynamically meaningful process. Using clinical examples, including several extended case reports, Gil Katz demonstrates how in all treatments, a new version of the patient’s early conflicts, traumas, and formative object relationships is inevitably created, without awareness or intent, in the here-and-now of the (...) analytic dyad. Within the enacted dimension, repressed or dissociated aspects of the patient’s past are not just remembered, they are re-lived. Katz shows how, when the enacted dimension becomes conscious, it forms the basis for genuine and transforming experiential insight. (shrink)