Transitional justice in Colombia has evolved, reflecting the political, social, and academic changes in the country. This study is a systematic review of the literature through articles indexed in Web of Science, applying the PRISMA protocol. Out of 3819 articles published in the last five years (2019-2024), 109 articles were selected following strict exclusion criteria. The methodology includes a quantitative analysis complemented with the visual analysis tool Posit PBC™ for bibliometric analysis in Biblioshyni. The study addresses the research question on (...) the evolution of the main research interests in the field of Transitional Justice in Colombia. The results show that initially, analyses on transitional justice focused on documenting the atrocities of the armed conflict, with a focus on truth and reparation, grounding legal mechanisms such as the Justice and Peace Law of 2005; with the 2016 Peace Agreement, research expanded into more complex issues, including the interaction between transitional justice and development, and the importance of civil society and victim engagement. The inclusion of the gender perspective, particularly after the 2016 Peace Agreement, led to studies on how women and LGBTI+ communities were differentially affected by the conflict. In addition, recent research has focused on the comparison between the peace processes with the AUC and the FARC-EP, analyzing the differences in their transitional justice frameworks and the challenges of implementing these agreements in a context of persistent violence. (shrink)

Academic entrepreneurship and the formation of spin-offs from educational institutions have been consolidated as essential elements to promote innovation and stimulate economic growth worldwide. However, the evolution of these initiatives shows marked differences between developed countries and emerging economies, such as Colombia. This study focuses on analyzing how research in this area has progressed, identifying the key factors that determine the success of spin-offs and suggesting a framework for action for Colombia in comparison with international dynamics. The findings reveal a (...) shift in research attention from prioritizing the creation of spin-offs to a greater focus on their long-term performance and sustainability. At the international level, the relevance of technology transfer, strategic alliances between universities and industry and the efficient management of technological resources are highlighted. On the other hand, in the Colombian context, research tends to focus on institutional aspects, cultural factors and support regulations, underestimating the analysis of the performance of spin-offs after their creation. This paper aims to contribute to the formulation of policies and strategies that promote not only the emergence but also the sustainability of academic spin-offs in Colombia, seeking to align their practices with international standards in order to maximize their impact on the economic and social development of the country. (shrink)

This article explores medical responsibility and negligence from an ethical and legal perspective within the Colombian context. It highlights causes of negligence such as deficiencies in professional training and organizational problems. The article emphasizes "objective imputation as key to determining the criminal responsibility of the physician" (Alvarado D. 2019). The objectives include analyzing the current legal framework in Colombia and assessing the link between medical ethics and legal responsibility. The methodology builds upon a thorough examination of specialized literature, including peer-reviewed (...) scientific articles in medicine and law, as well as legal documents and ethical regulations. A targeted search was conducted across various bibliographic databases including Google Scholar, Redalyc, Scielo, Dialnet, Biomed Central, Miguel De Cervantes Virtual Library, and BVS virtual health library. (shrink)

ABSTRACTPrior research has found a relationship between perceived facial attractiveness and perceived personal trustworthiness. We examined the time course of attractiveness relative to trustworthiness evaluation of emotional and neutral faces. This served to explore whether attractiveness might be used as an easily accessible cue and a quick shortcut for judging trustworthiness. Detection thresholds and judgment latencies as a function of expressive intensity were measured. Significant correlations between attractiveness and trustworthiness consistently held for six emotional expressions at four intensities, and neutral (...) faces. Importantly, perceived attractiveness preceded perceived trustworthiness, with lower detection thresholds and shorter decision latencies. This reveals a time course advantage for attractiveness, and suggests that earlier attractiveness impressions could bias trustworthiness inferences. A heuristic cognitive mechanism is hypothesised to ease processing demands by relying on simple a... (shrink)

Literary space is that of the text; it is there that it exists, and it is there that it has an operative force. What is not in the text though is reality itself, irreducible to a written form. One of the functions of the narrative “I” is to produce this verbal space, to give a context for the motion which constitutes the novel; a space that is not a reflection of anything, but, rather, an invention of the invention which is (...) the narrator, whose perceptions engender it. Manuscript corrections as well as page proofs modified by the author show that these perceptions are progressively refined so as to be more convincing. Ricardo Gullón is the author of numerous books and articles on Latin American, English, French, Spanish, and American literature, art, and critical theory and has lectured extensively in the Americas and in Europe. Direcciones del Modernismo; Galdós, novelista moderno; and García Marquez, o el arte de contar are among his more influential books. A critical study of his works, La obra crítica de Ricardo Gullón, by Barbara Bockus Aponte was recently published in Spain. See also: "Spatial Form in Literature: Toward a General Theory" by W. J. T. Mitchell in Vol. 6, No. 3. (shrink)

María Lugones was a feminist philosopher whose work spanned four decades, two continents, and multiple languages. Over the course of her career, her writing made major contributions to feminist ethics, the philosophy of race, lesbian epistemology, and decolonial thought. She passed away on July 14, 2020, after many years of poor health, leaving behind an influential legacy and a substantial body of unpublished work.

In recent work, Williamson has defended a suggestive account of assertion. Williamson claims that the following norm or rule (the knowledge rule) is constitutive of assertion, and individuates it: (KR) One must ((assert p) only if one knows p) Williamson is not directly concerned with the semantics of assertion-markers, although he assumes that his view has implications for such an undertaking; he says: “in natural languages, the default use of declarative sentences is to make assertions” (op. cit., 258). In this (...) paper I will explore Williamson’s view from this perspective, i.e., in the light of issues regarding the semantics of assertion-markers. I will end up propounding a slightly different account, on which, rather than KR, what is constitutive and individuating of assertion is an audience-involving transmission of knowledge rule: (TKR) One must ((assert p) only if one’s audience comes thereby to be in a position to know p) I will argue that TKR, of which KR is an illocutionary consequence (but not the other way around), has all the virtues that Williamson claims for his account and no new defect. (shrink)

I examine the meaning and merits of a premise in the Exclusion Argument, the causal closure principle that all physical effects have physical causes. I do so by addressing two questions. First, if we grant the other premises, exactly what kind of closure principle is required to make the Exclusion Argument valid? Second, what are the merits of the requisite closure principle? Concerning the first, I argue that the Exclusion Argument requires a strong, “stringently pure” version of closure. The latter (...) employs two qualifications concerning the physical sufficiency and relative proximity of the physical cause required for every physical effect. The second question is addressed in two steps. I begin by challenging the adequacy of the empirical support offered by David Papineau for closure. Then I assess the merits of “level” and “domain” versions of stringently pure closure. I argue that a domain version lacks adequate and non-question-begging support within the context of the Exclusion Argument. And I argue that the level version leads to a puzzling metaphysics of the physical domain. Thus, we have grounds for rejecting the version of closure required for the Exclusion Argument. This means we can resist the Exclusion Argument while avoiding the implausible implications that come with rejecting one of its other premises. That is, because there are grounds to reject causal closure, one can reasonably affirm the non-overdeterminative causal efficacy of conscious mental states while denying that the latter are identical with physical states. (shrink)

I provide a variation on ideas presented by Walton and Currie, elaborating the view that fictive utterances are characterized by a specific form of illocutionary force in the family of directives – a proposal or invitation to imagine. I make some points on the relation between the proposal and the current debates on intentionalist and conventionalist views, and I discuss interesting recent objections made by Stacie Friend to the related, but crucially different, Gricean view of such force advanced by Currie (...) and others. (shrink)

John MacFarlane has formulated a version of truth-relativism, and argued for its application in some cases – future contingents, knowledge attributions and epistemic modals among them. Mark Richard also defends a version of relativism, which he applies to vagueness-inducing features of the semantics of gradable adjectives. On MacFarlane’s and Richard’s characterization, truth-relativist claims posit a distinctive kind of context-dependence, the dependence of the evaluation of an assertion as true or otherwise on aspects of the context of the evaluation itself – (...) in contrast with the context of the assertion. The paper follows Evans in distinguishing two forms of truth-relativism, a moderate one concerning the evaluation of contents or propositions, an a radical one concerning the evaluation of acts; it argues against Richard’s truth-relativist proposals for gradable adjective, which is understood to be of the second kind, while accepting a form of moderate content-relativism for those cases. (shrink)

On the traditional view, Butler maintains that forgiveness involves a kind of “conversion experience” in which we must forswear or let go of our resentment against wrongdoers. Against this reading, I argue that Butler never demands that we forswear resentment but only that we be resentful in the right kind of way. That is, he insists that we should be virtuously resentful, avoiding both too much resentment exhibited by the vices of malice and revenge and too little resentment where we (...) merely condone the wrongdoer and leave ourselves open to future injury. I argue that this Butlerian approach offers us a more attractive account of forgiveness as a “virtue” than many recent discussions. In the final section, I address Butler’s challenging thesis that forgiveness is an unconditional moral duty. I argue against those who claim that forgiveness is supererogatory (Kolnai/Calhoun) or else merely morally conditional and even morally blameworthy in some cases (Murphy/Hampton/Novitz/Richards). By contrast, I defend a context-sensitive account of forgiveness which recognizes that it takes place on many different levels. I conclude by taking up the difficult issue of whether anybody can be ultimately “unforgivable”, offering some Butlerian and Strawsonian reflections that might help mitigate our judgments about such matters. (shrink)

In a series of papers, Robin Jeshion has forcefully criticized both Donnellan's and Evans’ claims on the contingent a priori, and she has developed an “acquaintanceless” account of singular thoughts as an alternative view. Jeshion claims that one can fully grasp a singular thought expressed by a sentence including a proper name, even if its reference has been descriptively fixed and one’s access to the referent is “mediated” by that description. But she still wants to reject “semantic instrumentalism”, the view (...) that “there are no substantive conditions of any sort on having singular thought. We can freely generate singular thoughts at will by manipulating the apparatus of direct reference.” Her account of singular thoughts is a psychological one, rejecting any epistemic requirement. Having singular thoughts is for her a matter of deploying “mental files” or “dossiers” that play a significant role in the cognitive life of the individual. This paper elaborates on an alternative descriptivist-friendly view, which has important points of contact with Jeshion’s. It differs, particularly in that it is an epistemic view; it is only a broadly understood acquaintance view, as it will transpire, but this does not make it a mere terminological variation on Jeshion’s acquaintanceless one. To argue for it, the paper discusses some relevant aspects of the semantics of fictional discourse. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Peacocke (2001) continues an ongoing debate with McDowell and others, providing renewed arguments for the view that perceptual experiences and some other mental states have a particular kind of content, nonconceptual content. In this article I want to object to one of the arguments he provides. This is not because I side with McDowell in the ongoing debate about nonconceptual content; on the contrary, given the way I understand it, my views are closer to Peacocke’s, and (...) have been strongly influenced by him. It is just that I am not persuaded by the particular argument I will be questioning here. (shrink)

My general aim in this paper is to shed light on the controversial concept of a bare particular. I do so by arguing that bare particulars are best understood in terms of the individuative work they do within the framework of a realist constituent ontology. I argue that outside such a framework, it is not clear that the notion of a bare particular is either motivated or coherent. This is suggested by reflection on standard objections to bare particulars. However, within (...) the framework of a realist constituent ontology, bare particulars provide for a coherent theory of individuation—one with a potentially significant theoretical price tag, but one that also has advantages over rival theories. (shrink)

This paper uses tools of philosophical analysis critically to examine accounts of the nature of racism that have recently been offered by writers including existentialist philosopher Lewis Gordon, conservative theorist Dinesh D'Souza, and sociologists Michael Omi and Howard Winant. These approaches, which conceive of racism either as a bad-faith choice to believe, a doctrine, or as a type of 'social formation', are found wanting for a variety of reasons, especially that they cannot comprehend some forms of racism. I propose an (...) account that conceives racism chiefly as a motivational/volitional matter, in short, as a form of moral viciousness. I show how this approach offers a unified account that comprises inter alia individual and institutional racism, expressed and unexpressed racism. I point out advantages that my view has over Thomas Schmid's somewhat similar suggestion, and use the account to examine a number of claims made about racism by H. L. Gates, Jr, Elizabeth Young-Bruehl, Gertrude Ezorsky, and others. Finally, I defend this approach from the general criticism that Benjamin DeMott has levelled against any effort so to understand racism. Key Words: Benjamin DeMott • Dinesh D'Souza • existentialism • Lewis Gordon • moral concepts • Michael Omi • racism • social formation • Howard Winant. (shrink)

My aim in this article is to contribute to the larger project of assessing the relative merits of different theories of substance. An important preliminary step in this project is assessing the explanatory resources of one main theory of substance, the so-called bundle theory. This article works towards such an assessment. I identify and explain three distinct explanatory challenges an adequate bundle theory must meet. Each points to a putative explanatory gap, so I call them the Gap Challenges. I consider (...) three bundle-theoretic strategies for meeting these challenges. I argue that none of them goes very far. The upshot is that, absent other strategies for meeting the challenges, bundle theory involves a significant amount of stipulation. This black box makes bundle theory relatively weak with respect to its explanatory power—unless, of course, rival theories of substance are unable to do better. (shrink)

Since the publication of Hartry Field’s influential paper “Tarski’s Theory of Truth” there has been an ongoing discussion about the philosophical import of Tarski’s definition. Most of the arguments have aimed to play down that import, starting with that of Field himself. He interpreted Tarski as trying to provide a physicalistic reduction of semantic concepts like truth, and concluded that Tarski had partially failed. Robert Stalnaker and Scott Soames claimed then that Field should have obtained a stronger conclusion, namely that (...) Tarski’s failure in his allegedly intended physicalistic reduction was total. From another front, Hilary Putnam argued for an even more sweeping thesis: “[a]s a philosophical account of truth, Tarski’s theory fails as badly as it is possible for an account to fail.” Scott Soames followed suit also on this count, endorsing Putnam’s argument in section iii of the aforementioned paper; and John Etchemendy used a very similar argument to contend that “a Tarskian definition of truth [...] cannot possibly illuminate the semantic properties of the object language.” The paper argues that these contentions are based on several misunderstandings about the nature of a definition like Tarski’s. Regarding the Putnam-Soames-Etchemendy argument, we must apply a distinction Frege found natural to draw—and is natural to draw anyway—between what he called “constructive” definitions, definitions properly so called, which are mere stipulations, and what he described as “analytic” definitions, definitions which aim to make explicit the meaning of a term already in use. Regarding the Field-Soames-Stalnaker criticism, the paper contends that the true aims of a Tarskian truth definition are perfectly well fulfilled without Field’s amendments. (shrink)

In this article I examine the compatibility of a leading trope bundle theory of substance, so-called Nuclear Theory, with trope theory more generally. Peter Simons (1994) originally proposed Nuclear Theory (NT), and continues to develop (1998, 2000) and maintain (2002/03) the view. Recently, building on Simons’s theory, Markku Keinänen (2011) has proposed what he calls the Strong Nuclear Theory (SNT). Although the latter is supposed to shore up some of NT’s weaknesses, it continues to maintain NT’s central tenet, the premise (...) that tropes are variously existentially interdependent. I argue that the central tenet of NT frustrates several important aims of trope theory. If my arguments go through, they also implicate SNT. Because of this, I largely set aside other aspects of NT and SNT and focus on their shared central tenet. (shrink)

The idea that natural selection acts on many levels—and not only at the level of organisms or individual genes—is increasingly accepted among biologists. However, it is not easy to reconcile this idea with the strictly “individualistic” conception of the evolutionary process that has always characterized Darwinian thought. Moreover, the individuality of some forms of life is a vague concept and therefore controversial. This is the case of Candidatus Magnetoglobus multicellularis, whose discovery immediately inspired the following question: Does the concept of (...) individuality have degrees? Alternatively, how far is this structure of prokaryotic cells from deserving to be called an organism? In this article, we propose a new conceptual scheme based on an idea of individuality that is not limited to organisms and that makes sense in terms of Darwinian evolution. In this conceptual scheme, selection at levels above that of the individual organism is interpreted as the evolutionary emergence of higher-level individuality. This proposal may serve as a basis on which to construct a promising hierarchical evolutionary theory. (shrink)

Business ethics is one of the most significant demands made by institutional and individual investors, who usually require the participation of the board of directors in the planning and implementation of ethical behaviour in corporations. This is done by drawing up an ethics code and then monitoring its fulfilment. This study has a dual objective: first, to analyse the role played by the composition of the board of directors, and by that we mean its independence and the diversity of its (...) members, on the implementation and scope of an EC, and, second, to detect whether the corporate governance system moderates the level of involvement of the board in ethical issues. The findings obtained from a data panel sample made up of 760 listed companies from 12 countries for the years 2003–2009 show that the largest companies with large-sized and diverse boards implement the most developed ECs. Nevertheless, the extent of involvement of the independent directors is conditioned by the level of shareholder orientation characteristic of the system of CG in the corporation’s country of origin. (shrink)

This paper will concentrate mainly on the analysis of some features present in Putnam's internal realism and in his "natural realism" that he shares with the pragmatist thinkers Peirce and James. Following the middle way which Putnam tries to reach between "reactionary metaphysics" and "irresponsible relativism," the first part of the paper deals with what is the positive insight of traditional realism, i. e., the reality of external things as independent from our mind, as it is emphasized by Putnam. It (...) also analyzes how this idea of the mind-independent character of reality has been very well worked out in Peirce's thought through the category of Secondness. The second part focuses on the right insight of relativism that Putnam wants to maintain: How our notion of reality changes and evolves together with our language, our life and our handling the world. The attention that H. Putnam pays to W. James is, also, especially important in relation to his way of understanding reality. (shrink)

Este artículo es un intento de dilucidación y delimitación historiográfico-conceptual que pretende aportar un enfoque alternativo a los estudios sobre la teoría política realista. Mi propósito es presentar un bosquejo del sentido histórico del concepto de realismo político situándolo en los contextos de la Realpolitik alemana y de la escuela realista de las relaciones internacionales. De este modo, pretendo mostrar las relaciones contextuales del realismo político, la localización de su antagonismo con el liberalismo y la invención retrospectiva de una tradición (...) realista como resultado de una serie de apropiaciones intelectuales y políticas. This article is a historiographical and conceptual attempt of clarification and delimitation to offer an alternative view to the studies of the realist political theory. I pretend to put forward an outline of the historical sense of the concept of political realism, placing it on the contexts of German Realpolitik and the realist school of international relations. Thus, I pretend to show the contextual relations of political realism, the location of its antagonism against liberalism and the retrospective invention of a realist tradition as a result of a set of intellectual and political additions. (shrink)

Castañeda, Perry and Lewis argued that, among singular thoughts in general, thoughts about oneself ‘as oneself’—first-personal thoughts, which Lewis aptly called de se—have a distinctive character that traditional views of contents cannot characterize. Drawing on Anscombe, Annalisa Coliva has argued that a feature she calls Real Guarantee marks apart de se thoughts—as opposed to others including Immunity to Error through Misidentification that have been proposed for that role. I'll argue that, while her work points to a truly distinguishing feature of (...) the de se, we need an account of the notion other than hers and Echeverri's recent development of it. I'll offer an alternative, drawing on Léa Salje's work. Finally, I'll briefly outline how, thus understood, the Real Guarantee feature could be adequately explained by theories of de se thoughts like the one I favour, even if it is an open option to just explain it away. (shrink)

Either a person's claim to subsistence goods is held against institutions equipped to distribute social benefits and burdens fairly or it is made regardless of such a social scheme. If the former, then one's claim is not best understood as based on principles setting out a subsistence goods entitlement, but rather on principles of equitable social distribution — a fair share. If, however, the claim is not against a given social scheme, no plausible principle exists defining what counts as a (...) reasonable burden for any of the available agents to secure subsistence. No justifiable principle exists implying generalised perfect duties any agent could clearly follow or clearly breach that secure subsistence conditions for others. At best we can justify rescue duties under very specific conditions, or general but imperfect duties to improve arrangements. Neither of these obviously correlates with human rights standards. Attempts in the literature to overcome the dilemma by claiming basic rights can correlate with imperfect duties or can generate duties to work towards institutions that ‘perfect’ our imperfect duties, are faulty. I then show how the dilemma can be avoided by accounts of human rights focusing on minimum respectful treatment rather than goods or interests. (shrink)

This is a review of Emma Borg's Pursuing Meaning.

Descriptive semantic theories purport to characterize the meanings of the expressions of languages in whatever complexity they might have. Foundational semantics purports to identify the kind of considerations relevant to establish that a given descriptive semantics accurately characterizes the language used by a given individual or community. Foundational Semantics I presents three contrasting approaches to the foundational matters, and the main considerations relevant to appraise their merits. These approaches contend that we should look at the contents of speakers’ intuitions; at (...) the deep psychology of users and its evolutionary history, as revealed by our best empirical theories; or at the personal‐level rational psychology of those subjects. Foundational Semantics II examines a fourth view, according to which we should look instead at norms enforced among speakers. The two papers aim to determine in addition the extent to which the approaches are really rival, or rather complementary. (shrink)

Este artículo pretende establecer los nexos y asociaciones de los conceptos fundamentales que sustentan la obra filosófica, pero sobre todo la critica literaria de Rafael Gutiérrez Girardot. Hegel y Schlegel aparecen como pilares que fundamentan sus interpretaciones criticas y sobre los cuales se abre el horizonte de América Latina; a través de autores como Jorge Luis Borges, Alfonso Reyes y César Vallejo.

In this dissertation I consider the merits of certain nominalist accounts of phenomena related to the character of ordinary objects. What these accounts have in common is the fact that none of them is an error theory about standard cases of predication and none of them deploys God or uniquely theistic resources in its explanatory framework. -/- The aim of the dissertation is to answer the following questions: -/- • What is the best nominalist account on offer? • How might (...) it be improved? • Does it ultimately succeed? -/- I will argue that while so-called trope theory is the best account on offer, it can be significantly improved—or replaced—by a novel version of nominalism that is modeled after trope theory. Ultimately, however, I will argue that even the novel version fails. -/- The dissertation unfolds as follows. In Chapter 1, I introduce Austere Nominalism (AN), which is perhaps the most extreme version of nominalism that falls within the scope of the dissertation. AN is often described as the view that there exist only concrete particulars. According to AN, it is unnecessary to posit any entities other than ordinary objects—turkeys, tables, and the like—in order to account for explananda related to the character of those objects. (Such explananda include the phenomenon of attribute agreement, of attribute possession, of true subject-predicate sentences, etc.) In this chapter I argue that AN fails to provide an adequate account of these explananda. In addition, introducing and criticizing AN serves an important heuristic role for the rest of the dissertation. To understand this role, we must distinguish between the basic explanatory strategy deployed by the austere nominalist and the type of explananda for which she deploys that strategy. The austere nominalist deploys the strategy to account for the character of ordinary objects. As I argue in Chapter 1, this deployment is a failure. As I go on to show in Chapter 2, the widespread rejection AN has led to a variety of rival accounts of the character of ordinary objects. In rejecting AN, however, these accounts also tacitly reject its basic explanatory strategy. Thus goes the baby with the bathwater, since, arguably, there are some attractive features of AN’s basic explanatory strategy. Indeed, those who defend the most prominent version of nominalism—trope theory—seem to overlook the advantages of AN’s basic strategy, and by so doing, make an unnecessary concession to the realist. Or so I argue in Chapter 3. And, as I will argue in Chapter 4, the strongest version of nominalism is a novel account, modeled after trope theory, that deploys AN’s basic strategy at a more fundamental level than that of ordinary objects. This novel account—troper theory—is closer in spirit to AN than is traditional trope theory. (Thus, AN serves as a foil for the discussion of other nominalist views.) Finally, in the Afterword I indicate how troper theory is equally vulnerable to some of the traditional objections that plague trope theory. Thus, if you are not convinced that traditional objections to trope theory are conclusive and you want to be a nominalist, then you should abandon trope theory and adopt troper theory. If you take traditional objections against trope theory to have significant force, then you should reject both theories. (shrink)

In the course of his discussion of perception, Searle criticizes representative theories in general. In this paper I will argue that, even though his criticisms may be adequate regarding a certain form of these theories, perhaps the most frequently defended by philosophers of perception, a version I will outline here scapes to them. A second issue I raise concerns Searle’s claim that his theory of perception is a form of direct realism. I will raise difficulties for Searle’s attempt to maintain (...) at the same time a “token-reflexive” theory of perception and the thesis of direct realism. (shrink)

Castañeda, Perry and Lewis argued in the 1960’s and 1970’s that thoughts about oneself “as oneself” – de se thoughts – require special treatment, and advanced different accounts. In this paper I discuss Ernest Sosa’s approach to these matters. I first present his approach to singular or de re thought in general in the first section. In the second, I introduce the data that need to be explained, Perry’s and Lewis’s proposals, and Sosa’s own account, in relation to Perry’s, Lewis’s, (...) and his own views on de re thought. In the third section I present the account I prefer – a “token-reflexive” version of Perry’s original account that Perry himself came to adopt in reaction to Stalnaker’s criticisms. In the final section I take up Recanati’s recent arguments, from a viewpoint on de se thought very similar to Sosa’s, to the effect that such an account is in a good position to explain the phenomenon of immunity to error through misidentification. I argue there that that is not the case, and I conclude by suggesting that the token-reflexive account fits better both with the data and with Sosa’s Fregean take on de re thought in general. (shrink)

The American Society for Bioethics and Humanities promulgated standards for clinical ethics consultants and is currently developing a national Quality Attestation in Clinical Ethics Consultation to assist facilities in ensuring that those performing clinical ethics consultations meet minimum standards. As the field moves towards such professionalization, there is a need to provide access to qualified clinical ethicists at a broad range of medical facilities. Currently, however, there are insufficient numbers of trained clinical ethicists to staff all healthcare facilities, and many (...) facilities lack the necessary resources to hire staff clinical ethicists. In this review, we describe several models for providing expert clinical ethics support to remote facilities that lack access to qualified clinical ethicists. Based on this analysis, we recommend telemedicine as the optimal model providing expert support to local ethics committee members tasked with providing clinical ethics consultation services. (shrink)

Este artículo muestra los paralelismos y las divergencias del giro ontológico y de la antropología fenomenológica. Ambas corrientes, en fidelidad al dato etnográfico, comparten el rechazo al régimen de representación y ambas corrientes cuestionan los compromisos epistémicos del investigador. Sin embargo, el giro ontológico presenta una orientación conceptual, que deriva a menudo en tipología, mientras que la antropología fenomenológica atiende a las relaciones perceptivas del mundo de la vida desde una apertura hermenéutica.

The concept of well-being of rural families is part of a theory under construction in which new theoretical elements are constantly being incorporated. This research aims to determine the influence of farmers’ knowledge on the well‑being of cocoa growing families in the departments of Santander, Huila, Meta and Caquetá, Colombia. Four categories of farmers were identified with different levels of knowledge in the management of cocoa cultivation obtained through a cluster analysis. The well-being of cocoa farmers, understood as the balance (...) in the capital endowment of rural households, was obtained through the application of a semi-structured interview with 49 variables of human, cultural, social, political, natural, built, and financial capitals. The results show that cocoa knowledge is heterogeneous in the study area, with a slight improvement towards harvesting, post-harvest and transformation links. There is a positive relationship between cocoa knowledge and the well-being of cocoa farming families. Thus, producers with greater integral knowledge, with emphasis on post-harvest and bean transformation links, showed greater well-being. The Random Forest analysis identified that human capital (political, social, human, and cultural) made the greatest contribution to well-being. The findings show that cocoa knowledge contributes to the well-being of rural households to the extent that it favors vertical relationships (linkages with local governments) and horizontal relationships of producers (participation of association managers, sharing knowledge with friends, neighbors and partners, and cocoa training). (shrink)

El presente artículo sostiene la siguiente hipótesis: la inmensa mayoría de las conceptualizaciones teóricas con las que, a inicios del siglo XXI, se intenta dar cuenta de la subjetividad contemporánea son explícita o subrepticiamente reelaboraciones del concepto de superhombre. De ciborgs a posthumanos, pasando por una amplia y variada gama de sujetos contemporáneos, se puede apreciar que el concepto de Übermensch aporta las claves fundamentales con las cuales deconstruir el concepto de identidad fija que pone en juego el universalismo abstracto. (...) Siguiendo la teorización de Nietzsche, estas nuevas posiciones teóricas proponen una forma particular y concreta de vida como alternativa a las dicotomías y trasmundos con que la metafísica construyó a los sujetos del pasado. Sin embargo, estas propuestas han pasado por alto algo fundamental. Para demostrarlo, proponemos una relectura de Nietzsche y de dichos conceptos con el objetivo de plantear una nueva manera de pensar sobre la vida. (shrink)

Gómez-Torrente’s papers have made important contributions to vindicate Tarski’s model-theoretic account of the logical properties in the face of Etchemendy’s criticisms. However, at some points his vindication depends on interpreting the Tarskian account as purportedly modally deflationary, i.e., as not intended to capture the intuitive modal element in the logical properties, that logical consequence is (epistemic or alethic) necessary truth-preservation. Here it is argued that the views expressed in Tarski’s seminal work do not support this modally deflationary interpretation, even if (...) Tarski himself was sceptical about modalities. (shrink)

The aim of the present research was to test whether involvement in a 14-days training program in the performing arts could reduce implicit biases. We asked healthy participants to complete an Implicit Association Test to assess biased attitudes to physical illness in two separate sessions, before and after the training program. Two separate control groups matched by age, gender and educational level completed the two IAT sessions, separated by same number of days, without being involved in the training program. Results (...) showed that participants who were involved in the training program reduced their implicit bias toward illness measured through IAT in the second session. This reduction in IAT measures was not observed in the control samples, despite the two IAT measures being matched in temporal delay with the experimental group. These findings suggest that an interventional program based on the performing arts could be effective in reducing levels of implicit biases among the general population. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss Künne’s Modest Theory of truth, and develop a variation on a worry that Field expresses with respect to Horwich’s related view. The worry is not that deflationary accounts are false, but rather that, because they take propositions as truth-bearers, they are not philosophically interesting. Compatibly with the intuitions of ordinary speakers, we can understand proposition so that the proposals do account for a property that such truth-bearers have. Nevertheless, we saliently apply the truth-concept also to (...) entities such as utterances or assertions , and the de flationary accounts do not provide a similarly deflationary account for those applications. In fact, there are good reasons to suspect that no such account would be forthcoming; we need something more substantive or in flationary there. (shrink)