Demonstrates the fertility of the phenomenological tradition of philosophy for intergenerational justice and climate ethics.--In the face of the current environmental crisis, relations with future people—overlapping generations and more distant ones—have moved to the top of political and scholarly agendas. The anthology proposed here seeks to demonstrate the enormous fertility of philosophical phenomenology in accounting for relations among different generations. This is due to phenomenology’s rich reflections on the role of time in the constitution of the social-historical world and its (...) relation to the environment. The volume will boast 11 chapters from different authors across the spectrum of phenomenological currents and subfields, from Husserl and Heidegger to Jonas, Merleau-Ponty and Levinas. A connecting thread will be the relations among mortality, natality, and generativity in connecting as well as separating generations. Authors will reflect on the social-ontological and normative significance of these connections, paying particular attention to political and environmental obligations to people living in the future. (shrink)

In the aftermath of the publication of the Black Notebooks, the debate on "Heidegger and Politics" seems, more than ever, to be colonized by the sole question regarding the connection between his thought and his involvement with Nazism and its anti-Semitic ideology. Far from relativizing the importance of such a debate, the book opens up a different approach to the political implications of Heidegger's philosophy: his early work devoted to a phenomenology of life in all its facticity. This early work (...) has a genuine, although implicit, political character, which - as Ferdinando Menga argues - can be made explicit and developed in a way that yields inspiring material for a true and proper theory of democracy. Lässt sich mit Heidegger noch politische Philosophie betreiben? Seit der Veröffentlichung der Schwarzen Hefte scheint dies unmöglich oder zumindest sehr kontrovers. Ohne die Relevanz der um die Hefte entstandenen Debatte in Frage zu stellen, wird hier ein anderer Weg eingeschlagen, um, diese politische Dimension zu erkunden. Dieser alternative Zugang thematisiert die frühen phänomenologischen Schriften (1919-1923) des Autors, die um die fundamentale Frage nach einem Denken des Ursprungs kreisen. Es handelt sich um ein Denken, das für sich in Anspruch nimmt, einen genuinen und adäquaten Zugang zur ursprünglichen Struktur der faktischen Lebenserfahrung gefunden zu haben. Die zentrale These Mengas lautet nun, dass die Vorrangigkeit des Politischen gerade in dieser phänomenologischen Dimension entdeckt, weiter entfaltet und kritisch erörtert werden kann - bis hin zu Spuren einer Demokratietheorie in Heideggers früher Philosophie. (shrink)

While in the realm of scholarly debate on intergenerational justice the mechanism of a transgenerational intertwinement has been often adopted as a chief conceptual device in view of overcoming ethical short-termism and legitimizing duties towards future generations, this paper aims at showing that there are good reasons for considering the opposite outcome. Drawing on three paradigmatic examples taken from three mainstream approaches in the debate—Rawls’s contractualism, Gauthier’s contractarianism, and indirect reciprocity—I will show how the grammar of presentism is still largely (...) operative under the surface of theories explicitly recurring to such a device and thereby advocating a chain of duties capable to reach the remote future. A short closing section will be devoted to endorsing a radical reorientation in ethics, such that a direct link to future invocations will be considered as a promising strategy for genuinely justifying intergenerational obligations. (shrink)

In light of the recent revival of the debate on radical democracy, this paper seeks to show how a critical reappropriation of Chantal Mouffe’s theory of agonistic politics can explain the structure of a conflict-based understanding of democratic orders. In explicit convergence with Mouffe, I argue that a radical democratic project by no means needs to abandon—as many absolute democracy and multitude theorists claim—the modern political paradigm. I also show, diverging from her account, that Mouffe’s defence of a radical democratic (...) project based on pluralism and agonism would have been better served by a critical reception of Arendt’s thinking rather than that of Schmitt. The relevance of this alternative strategy—so I will argue—lies in the fact that it delivers an apt design for a politico-legal order which permits true and proper conflicts, on the one hand, while simultaneously allowing that they be dealt with democratically, on the other. (shrink)

This article offers a response to massive environmental destabilization by linking the promising accounts of intergenerational justice as turn-taking with the proposals for a geokinetic view of earth and the idea of a second Copernican revolution. The argument will proceed in four steps. First, I suggest that recent proposals calling on us to respond to the Anthropocene by ‘being geologically human’, that is, by situating lived human time in geological time, should be supplemented by generational time, and thus, by the (...) ethics of human generations following one another. To conceptualize intergenerational justice, I review the proposals for human generations taking turns with the earth. I then suggest that, however, the earth is not an external, exchangeable object of turn-taking (as e.g. a bicycle would be). Rather than being an object that we may choose to use or not, earth is constitutive of generations being able to come about and take turns in the first place. In this constitutive sense, earth also takes turns with us. To further specify this idea, I discuss the so-called ‘second Copernican revolution’, according to which the earth not only moves around the sun, but is internally on the move, its geokinetic processes co-constituting human generations. If the argument goes through, the environmental crises in our very midst should be understood as demanding a reconceptualization of time as always already intergenerational and space as counter-Copernican. (shrink)

This article offers a response to massive environmental destabilization by linking the promising accounts of intergenerational justice as turn-taking with the proposals for a geokinetic view of earth and the idea of a second Copernican revolution. The argument will proceed in four steps. First, I suggest that recent proposals calling on us to respond to the Anthropocene by ‘being geologically human’, that is, by situating lived human time in geological time, should be supplemented by generational time, and thus, by the (...) ethics of human generations following one another. To conceptualize intergenerational justice, I review the proposals for human generations taking turns with the earth. I then suggest that, however, the earth is not an external, exchangeable object of turn-taking (as e.g. a bicycle would be). Rather than being an object that we may choose to use or not, earth is constitutive of generations being able to come about and take turns in the first place. In this constitutive sense, earth also takes turns with us. To further specify this idea, I discuss the so-called ‘second Copernican revolution’, according to which the earth not only moves around the sun, but is internally on the move, its geokinetic processes co-constituting human generations. If the argument goes through, the environmental crises in our very midst should be understood as demanding a reconceptualization of time as always already intergenerational and space as counter-Copernican. (shrink)

Every order lies on the claim or pretension to give itself as an accomplished realm, i.e. as a closed scene which is capable to give shape, orientation and sense to the totality of elements embraced by it. Yet, from the same operation of ordering, a paradox soon arises, in that no order can avoid its contingent genealogy, that means: it cannot avoid the fact that, in enclosing and including something, it must simultaneously exclude something else, which, therefore, can always challenge (...) and threaten its stability or total “delimitation”. In this sense, that which is excluded can be seen as an alien element, which structurally prevents order from a definite closure and thus keeps it in a permanent movement. Now, what I would like to convey in my following reflections is that this dynamics of impossible closure of order, given to a non-appropriable alienness, is exactly the one operative in the realms of translation and tragedy, so that, once we carefully investigate these realms, we may dare to affirm that saying that orders are unclosed scenes is as much true as to say that they are constantly “in translation”, always “in tragedy”. (shrink)

In this article I intend to trace and discuss a contradiction, which – I believe – lies in Arendt’s thought: the one between her concept of plurality and her concept of power. In a more specific way, I will argue that Arendt, by admitting only an intransitive understanding of power, betrays her vision of plurality, as this one cannot exclude a transitive conception of power. Furthermore, I will try to detect how this same contradiction reflects itself in another topical place (...) of Arendt’s thought, i.e. her critical opposition to political representation. Here the direction of my arguing can be expressed by a simple question: isn’t maybe representation a much more adequate way to correspond plurality than Arendt’s tendency to acclaim an aggregative and quasi-organic collective participation? (shrink)

Intergenerational justice represents a crucial theme in the on-going debate in ethics, politics and law. In what follows, I would like to show that a determined phenomenological perspective drawing from the motive of alterity can shed new light on such a topic. Importantly, my concern will be to display how this approach can provide a thorough justificatory underpinning for a responsibility towards future generations, while denouncing the main shortcomings that mainstream approaches reveal when dealing with this issue.

Several attempts, which have recently tried to empower again the philosophical crossing between phenomenology and hermeneutics, call for a re-examination of the main topics and themes at stake in such a project, which has dominated in many ways part of the 20th Century Continental Philosophy. However, given such a perspective, what I would like to show in the following essay is that, far from insisting again on the primacy of the thought of an author like Hans-Georg Gadamer, it could be (...) of higher suitability to address the thought of another philosopher: Paul Ricoeur. Particularly, by reconsidering the main steps of his phenomenological- hermeneutical project, I would like to stress how Ricoeur’s philosophy, in comparison to Gadamer’s approach, is not only able to display a larger spectrum of confrontations, but also a stronger theoretical structure, which has its pivotal point in the notion of an interpretative deconstruction of the titanic subject through the appropriative mediation of the narrative text. (shrink)

The environmental crisis, one of the great challenges of our time, tends to disenfranchise those who come after us. Arguing that as temporary inhabitants of the earth, we cannot be indifferent to future generations, this book draws on the resources of phenomenology and poststructuralism to help us conceive of moral relations in connection with human temporality. Demonstrating that moral and political normativity emerge with generational time, the time of birth and death, this book proposes two related models of intergenerational and (...) environmental justice. The first entails a form of indirect reciprocity, in which we owe future people both because of their needs and interests and because we ourselves have been the beneficiaries of peoples past; the second posits a generational taking of turns that Matthias Fritsch applies to both our institutions and our natural environment, in other words, to the earth as a whole. Offering new readings of key philosophers, and emphasizing the work of Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida in particular, Taking Turns with the Earth disrupts human-centered notions of terrestrial appropriation and sharing to give us a new continental philosophical account of future-oriented justice. (shrink)

In the context of the recent proliferation of nationalisms and enemy figures, this paper agrees with the desirability of retaining some of the explanatory and motivational potential of an agonistic account of politics, but gives reasons not to accept too much of Carl Schmitt's account of citizenship. The claim as to the necessarily antagonistic exclusion of concrete others can be supported neither on its own terms nor on Derridian grounds, as Chantal Mouffe, in particular, attempts to do. I then indicate (...) that différance may nonetheless account for strong (but not necessary) tendencies toward exclusion as well as for the intrinsic contradictions of liberal universalism. (shrink)

This paper draws out what Derrida’s work—in particular as concerns law, democracy, and intergenerational justice in the context of the European heritage—can contribute to constitutionalism and the legal relation to future people, at the national level and the supranational one of the European Union. The first section outlines some of Derrida’s contributions to legal scholarship and European identity, and then, in the following two sections, argue for two main points. First, Derrida can help us understand the much-discussed double bind of (...) the constitutional relation to future people as merely an instance of a more general aporia. The double bind consists in the fact that the constitutional promise to safeguard future freedom also limits and binds future people. I will show how this aporia results from the temporal structure of the constitutional founding of law. Accordingly, the double bind cannot be resolved, either conceptually or in constitutional practice, but only be negotiated with greater awareness. Second, the same aporia of time entails that future generations are already implicated in the founding and re-founding of law here and now. Because the present moment is constitutively related to the past and the future, the meaning of a constitutional founding can become legible only from the future. Hence, the present generation, whose unity is never given, cannot but draw an advance credit on the future whose cooperation it anticipates. As a result, the political promise of Europe depends on its relation to its geographical, but also to its temporal others. (shrink)

In questo testo desidero discutere da un’ottica strutturale il punto di consistenza della differenza tra paradigma del multiculturalismo e paradigma dell’interculturalità. Il primo esprime se stesso come differenziazione tra ordini culturali, che prevede comunque la presenza di un ordine o di un meta-ordine globale, il quale governa, in qualità di fondamento universale, lo svolgersi della coesistenza. Il secondo nega proprio questa possibilità, prevedendo come unica strada percorribile il lavoro contingente e situazionale di “traduzione” da un ordine culturale a un altro. (...) Questo testo si propone di valutare proprio le ragioni in base alle quali del paradigma dell’interculturalità possa essere un candidato migliore per illuminare, ma anche per sottoporre a critica, la struttura titanica della globalizzazione. (shrink)

This chapter looks at Daoism from Heidegger’s perspective, seeing what use he makes of “way” and “dao” in reference to the critical understanding of what he calls technology. As I am not a scholar of Daoism, my goal is not to contribute to our understanding of Daoism; nor am I doing what I think is standard work in “comparative philosophy.” My goal is more focused: I am interested in the conceptual work carried out for Heidegger by the notion of dao, (...) of way in the sense of the non-enduring “mother of heaven and earth” in accounting for the normative source of his critique of technological modernity. (shrink)

Argues for a closer connection between memories of injustice and promises of justice as a means to overcome violence.

Time has often been understood as either linear or cyclical, sometimes in Eurocentric ways that enclose Indigenous peoples in natural cycles with little or no historical development. This article explores an alternative to the line and the circle. In the context of environmental destruction, Indigenous scholars have suggested that traditional Indigenous accounts of spiraling time, from the Anishinaabe and Māori to the Aztecs and Muskoke, better connect nature with human history as well as more appropriately link human generations, including ancestors (...) and descendants. Exploring its connection with the hermeneutic circle and other notions, I will propose the spiral as indeed a promising way to grasp these important connections. In conclusion, I will discuss the question of whether Indigenous spiral ontologies can be proposed for all of humanity beyond knowledge extractivism. (shrink)

Seeking to contribute to the recent emergence of critical phenomenology by clarifying the relation between ontology and ethics, this article offers a new account of the sources of normativity in the context of Heidegger’s critique of technological enframing (Gestell) and Derrida’s political philosophy. I distinguish three levels of normativity in Heidegger and show how moving between the levels permits the critical deployment of the affirmation (Zusage) in response to being’s address. On this view, not only are humans constitutively claimed by (...) being, but the claim calls for its express hearing and critical elaboration. I then show how Derrida reconceives Heidegger’s normativity by developing a notion of double affirmation that communicates with key concepts from his moral-political work, such as the gift, the advance, and friendship. I conclude by indicating what double affirmation entails for critique today. (shrink)

One of the major political problems the world faces at the moment of its so-called globalization concerns the possibilities of maintaining, transforming, and expanding democracy. Globalization, as the extension of neo-liberal markets, the formation of multi-national, non-democratic economic powers, and the ubiquitous use of teletechnologies, threatens the modus vivendi of older democracies in ways that call for the reinvention of an old idea. Inasmuch as teletechnical globalization transforms space and time so as to put into question their very presence, and (...) inasmuch as deconstruction has always sought to rethink the constitution as well as deconstitution of the metaphysics of presence, I will here examine the concept of democracy that Jacques Derrida developed over the last few years of his life. (shrink)

In the context of current environmental crises, which threaten to seriously harm living conditions for future generations, liberal-capitalist democracies have been accused of inherent short-termism, that is, of favouring the currently living at the expense of mid- to long-term sustainability. I will review some of the reasons for this short-termism as well as proposals as to how best to represent future people in today’s democratic decision-making. I will then present some ideas of my own as to how to reconceive the (...) idea of democracy and the responsibilities of citizenship in the face of increasing obligations to sustain both the environment and democratic institutions for future people. I argue that taking turns between governing and governed is a key dimension of democracy, and that it implies in-principle consent to others governing after my turn, including future generations. Thus, future people must be better represented than they generally are today, in particular when democratic institutions find themselves squeezed between an overburdened environment in which they are embedded, and a fast-paced and short-termist globalizing economy. (shrink)

This book draws on a spectrum of philosophical cultures to provide new perspectives on environmental ethics and intergenerational justice.

This paper argues that Derrida’s aporetic conclusions regarding moral and political concepts, from hospitality to democracy, can only be understood and accepted if the notion of différance and similar infrastructures are taken into account. This is because it is the infrastructures that expose and commit moral and political practices to a double and conflictual (thus aporetic) future: the conditional future that projects horizonal limits and conditions upon the relation to others, and the unconditional future without horizons of anticipation. The argument (...) thus turns against two kinds of interpretation: The first accepts normative unconditionality in ethics but misses its support by the infrastructures. The second rejects unconditionality as a normative commitment precisely because the infrastructural support for unconditionality seems to rule out that it is normatively required. In conclusion, the article thus reconsiders the relation between a quasi-transcendental argument and its normative implications, suggesting that Derrida avoids the naturalistic fallacy. (shrink)

While it is generally accepted that deconstruction’s principal target is the “metaphysics of presence” and thus a presentist conception of time and being, it is less well known that Derrida connected the deconstruction of presence to an idea of justice that is from the beginning intergenerational, that is, concerned with the dead and the unborn. The first section of this paper re-inscribes the idea of “my life” or “our life” in Derrida’s concept of life as “living-on” to show that justice (...) arises with a disjointed time that began before me and is already in the process of outstripping my life toward a future without me. In the second section, I sketch a concept of indirect intergenerational reciprocity in conversation with Derrida as well as with extant work on reciprocity in normative theory and economics. While Derrida’s ideas can be operationalized and fleshed out with the help of this other literature, the disjointed time pertaining to living-on permits new responses to some common objections to intergenerational reciprocity. (shrink)

This chapter offers an overview of the serious challenges with which democracies must contend in the face of increasing climate destabilization and menacing environmental breakdown. After a brief introduction, the second section will discuss various accounts of what democracyDemocracy is or should be, from liberal and republican to deliberative and radical, and briefly indicate which difficulties these accounts face. The third section diagnoses democracy’s climate-related weaknesses. As a global and long-term intergenerational problem that is connected to deeply entrenched economic fossil (...) fuel infrastructure, climate change challenges national and usually short-termist democratic governments to consider noncitizens (especially the global poor, nonhuman beings, and future generations) as well as safeguard the basic safety of the populace and secure constitutionally guaranteed rights of citizens. The fourth and fifth sections provide an overview of the many remedies found in the literature, including eco-authoritarian proposals for less democracy, which some authors either recommend or predict and fear. Section “More Democracy” discusses a host of proposals for more democracy, from expansion to previous noncitizens and deeper citizen participation, including climate disobedience, to institutional reforms, especially regarding future people. The chapter ends with suggestions for how climate change might force democracies to adapt, including the alternative between eco-fascism and eco-socialism that some see as a likely prospect. (shrink)

A collection bringing together a wide-varietyof world-renowned scholars on the import of Derrida's philosophy with respectto the current environmental crisis, our ecological relationships to 'nature'and the earth, our responsibilities with respect to climate change, pollution, and nuclear destruction, and the ethics and politics at stake in responding tothese crises.

In response to the claim that democracies are inherently short-termist, this article argues for a new way to understand them as being committed to future generations. If taking turns among rulers and ruled is a normative idea inherent to the concept of democracy, then such turn-taking commits democrats to a fair turn with future generations.