Resumen En la crítica del Cantar de los Cantares no hay acuerdo acerca del problema estructural del libro. Las teorías se dividen en aquellas que abogan por un carácter fragmentario contra otras que ven un carácter unitario de los poemas. El estudio intenta revisar esta problemática y proponer que el Cantar de los Cantares es una colección de poemas sueltos que un redactor/recopilador juntó e intentó poner en cierto orden, incorporando el conjuro de 2,7; 3,5; 5,8; 8,4 como estribillo con (...) función articuladora, de tal manera que el conjuro quedó puesto como hito divisorio entre grandes bloques poéticos que se relacionan entre sí por un tema común u otro recurso de mano redaccional, configurando así un ordenamiento estructural de todo el libro.In the criticism of the Song of Songs there is no agreement on the structural problem of the book. Theories are divided into those advocating a fragmentary against others who see a unitary character of poems. The study attempts to revise this problems and propose that the Song of Songs is a loose collection of poems that a compiler gathered and tried to give some order, incorporating the adjuration of 2, 7; 3,5; 5,8; 8,4 as refrain with articulate function, such that the adjuration was set as milestone dividing between large blocks poetic that interrelate by a common theme or other resource or literary technique thus configuring a structural arrangement of the whole book. (shrink)

Ces six textes sont six chemins qui s'enfoncent dans le domaine inexploré de la pensée.

Es necesario distinguir entre útil, cosa y obra de arte. Lo que nos circunda en la óptica de un "para" apunta al conjunto de los útiles. La cosa es aquello de lo que se habla. Aunque las relaciones entre útil y cosa son estrechas, es posible hablar de las cosas que nos circundan desde perspectivas que no se reducen a la óptica del "para". Una cosa no se reduce a ser para algo. Una obra tiene un tipo de presencia singular; (...) ella no está ahí sino para aquellos que, por su lado, están expresamente abiertos a ella. El origen de la obra de arte es la verdad. Ésta no tiene que entenderse como la adecuación de lo que nosotros decimos a lo que es en realidad. Heidegger invita a escuchar el nombre griego de la verdad –alétheia. Ἀλήθεια [alétheia] hace reparar en el alfa privativa y el tema que deriva del verbo λανθάνω [lantháno]: escapar. (shrink)

Rassemble l'ensemble des textes qui ont directement rapport avec l'engagement de Heidegger, en 1933-1934, pour la "révolution nationale" à laquelle Hitler, en prenant le pouvoir, avait appelé les Allemands. Leur étude permettra de se faire une idée exacte de l'erreur qu'a commise Heidegger en 1933 et qu'il reconnaissait dès 1937.

L'intraduisible ne signifie pas que la traduction soit impossible mais qu'elle doit se mesurer à l'intraduisible qui marque la limite de toute langue. Ainsi, il est impossible de rendre dans les mots la distinction kantienne Verstand/Vernunft, les sens du mot Aufhe-bung chez Hegel, ou encore la différence entre le substantif der Tod et le verbe sterben. Mais cela ne signifie pas qu'il soit impossible de traduire les textes dans lesquels se trouvent ces mots. Il ne faut pas confondre « traduire (...) des mots » et « traduire un texte ». Toutefois cette opposition elle-même doit à son tour être dépassée, pour en venir à la traduction proprement dite, à une sorte de traduction primordiale, à propos de laquelle certains textes de Proust sont particulièrement éclairants. L'intraduisible n'est plus, alors, ce qui se refuse à être traduit mais ce que, par négligence, nous laissons échapper. The untranslatable does not imply that translating is impossible, but the translation is meant to tackle to the untranslatable which stresses the limit of any language. Thus it is impossible to translate with the right words the Kantian distinction between Verstand and Vernunft, Hegel's Aufhebung, or the difference between the noun der Tod and the verb sterben. But it does not imply that texts in which these words are to be found cannot be translated. One must not mistake translating texts and translating words. Yet this very opposition must, in its turn, be overtaken since one should ponder over translation as such, i.e. some kind of primal translation which is indeed even enlightened through some of Proust's texts. The untranslatable becomes thus no longer what cannot be translated but rather what we, through negligence, let escape. (shrink)

daUniversidade de Valparaíso. Tive a sorte de participar de dois seminários que ali deu:um sobre as teses a Feuerbach de Marx e outro sobre Arthur Rimbaud. Me chamarama atenção profundamente algumas ideias que Fédier fazia pensar. Uma delas foi: “épreciso ser absolutamente modernos”, de Rimbaud; a outra, “falar por falar, tal é afórmula da liberação”, de Novalis. Um tanto desapontado, me perguntava se essejovem professor, acompanhado por seus estudantes de khâgne – homens e mulheres –, não estaria esquecendo-se da crítica (...) de Heidegger à modernidade e o seuquestionamento do se diz, da fala cotidiana. O fato de estar usando calças boca de sinoaumentava a minha estranheza interiorana diante do visitante. Por sorte, a admiraçãoe respeito que suscitava entre os grandes mestres da filosofia no Chile fizeram comque tal suspeita se dissipasse rapidamente. (shrink)

El siguiente texto busca hallar pistas bibliográficas y conceptuales, que permitan generar consideraciones preliminares para una correcta entrada a la lectura del texto de Martin Heidegger ¿Qué significa pensar? de los años 1951-1952. El avance hacia dichas clases, impartidas por el autor en la Universidad de Friburgo de Brisgovia, será conducido por tres modalidades del pensamiento que permiten una aproximación al pensar: Gelassenheit, Einfache y Kuinzige. Algunas preguntas que se abordan guardan relación con las interrogantes ¿qué es pensar? ¿qué es (...) el sentido? ¿qué es la serenidad? Estos análisis requieren de la exploración en otras fuentes bibliográficas para pesquisar giros interpretativos que Heidegger acuña con determinados términos. Las fuentes anexas serán: Ciencia y meditación (1954), Ser y Tiempo (1927), Seminario de Le Thor (1969), Carta sobre el Humanismo (1947) y los análisis del filósofo François Fédier que realiza en su libro Voz del amigo y otros ensayos en torno a Heidegger (2017) Con esta primera base se propone la primera hipótesis de estudio: en términos ontológicos, pensar es meditar. Palabras clave: Heidegger, pensar, gelassenheit, kuinzige, sentido. (shrink)

This volume puts forward a distinct new theory of direct reference, blending insights from both the Fregean and the Russellian traditions, and fitting the general theory of language understanding used by those working on the pragmatics of natural language.

Cumulative technological culture (CTC) refers to the increase in the efficiency and complexity of tools and techniques in human populations over generations. A fascinating question is to understand the cognitive origins of this phenomenon. Because CTC is definitely a social phenomenon, most accounts have suggested a series of cognitive mechanisms oriented toward the social dimension (e.g., teaching, imitation, theory of mind, and metacognition), thereby minimizing the technical dimension and the potential influence of non-social, cognitive skills. What if we have failed (...) to see the elephant in the room? What if social cognitive mechanisms were only catalyzing factors and not thesufficient and necessaryconditions for the emergence of CTC? In this article, we offer an alternative, unified cognitive approach to this phenomenon by assuming that CTC originates in non-social cognitive skills, namely technical-reasoning skills which enable humans to develop the technical potential necessary to constantly acquire and improve technical information. This leads us to discuss how theory of mind and metacognition, in concert with technical reasoning, can help boost CTC. The cognitive approach developed here opens up promising new avenues for reinterpreting classical issues (e.g., innovation, emulation vs. imitation, social vs. asocial learning, cooperation, teaching, and overimitation) in a field that has so far been largely dominated by other disciplines, such as evolutionary biology, mathematics, anthropology, archeology, economics, and philosophy. (shrink)

I argue that immunity to error through misidentification primarily characterizes thoughts that are 'implicitly' de se, as opposed to thoughts that involve an explicit self-identification. Thoughts that are implicitly de se involve no reference to the self at the level of content: what makes them de se is simply the fact that the content of the thought is evaluated with respect to the thinking subject. Or, to put it in familiar terms : the content of the thought is a property (...) which the thinking subject self-ascribes (as in the Loar/Lewis/Chisholm analysis). After answering an objection (to the effect that immunity can affect explicit de se thoughts), I extend the analysis to demonstrative thoughts, which also exhibit the property of immunity to error through misidentification. (shrink)

Theoreticians that defend a form of realism regarding natural kinds minimally entertain the belief that the world features divisions into kinds and that the natural kind concept is a useful tool for philosophy of science. The objective of this paper is to challenge these assumptions. First, we challenge realism toward natural kinds by showing that the main arguments for their existence, which rely on the epistemic success of natural kinds, are unsatisfactory. Second, we show that, whether they exist or not, (...) natural kinds are expendable when it comes to describing and analyzing scientific explanations accurately. (shrink)

Thinking involves many elements of sound that philosophical tradition has repressed. Breathing, rhythms and collateral noises participate in the making of idealities, even the most abstract. In order to hear them, the voice needs to be considered as one sound among others and as multiple, even when it comes from the same speaker, following different protocols of enunciation. Listening to the recordings of seminars and studying the role played by modern sound technologies make it possible to hear subterranean meanings and (...) tensions at the heart of mental elaboration. Thinkers and writers could be defined by the way they handle the acoustic environments favourable to the way they speak and write, whether by selection, mixing or silence. An ‘acousmatic’ reading aims to listen to this sonic investment in texts and to hear the complex vibrations of their thought. (shrink)

If we accept the idea that the value of a “logic” depends on its ability to fit the usual meaning of the “logical constants” which it formalises and the inferences we draw on their basis, we may ask if the meaning of “possible” is well captured by normal modal logic. We are faced with the following puzzle: if is meaningful and non contradictory is it not a logical truth that ? First, it is shown why there is no logical law (...) of the form , being a neutral wff, and then some philosophical conclusions are drawn: “possible” relative to truth must be distinguished from possible “relative” to meaning, and the former only is formalised in modal logic. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to analyze the hermeneutical nature of the concept of the understanding-of-being that grounds Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. I first consider the merging between ontology and hermeneutics that takes place in Being and Time and then interpret the hermeneutical sections of Being and Time (§§ 31–32) in order to clarify the ontological scope of under­standing, interpretation, and meaning. This allows me to examine the three dimensions of the “understanding-of-being principle” (according to which our encounter with entities (...) is made possible by an understanding-of-being): the semantic, the ontological, and the transcendental. Finally, I try to make sense of the problematic use Heidegger makes of the concept of understanding for both the ontic encounter with entities and the ontological access to being. (shrink)

This book is a sequel to Recanati’s Mental Files (OUP 2012), and pursues the exploration of the mental file framework for thinking about concepts and singular reference. Mental files are based on 'epistemically rewarding' relations to objects in the environment. Standing in such relations to objects puts the subject in a position to gain information regarding them—information which goes into the file based on the relevant relation. Files do not merely store information about objects, however. They refer to them and (...) serve as singular terms in the language of thought, with a relational (nondescriptivist) semantics. Crucially, files also play the role of ‘modes of presentation’. They are used to account for cognitive significance phenomena illustrated by so-called ‘Frege cases’. This book considers what happens to mental files in a dynamic setting. Mental files are construed as both continuants (dynamic files) and as time-slices thereof (static files). Dynamic files are needed to account for confusion, recognition and tracking. The book considers what happens to the relation of coreference de jure, central to the functional characterization of files, when one adopts a dynamic perspective. Only a weak form of coreference de jure is said to hold between stages of the same dynamic file. The second part of the book argues that communication involves interpersonal dynamic files. Special attention is paid to the communication of indexical thoughts (de se contents), and to communication using proper names. (shrink)

La poétique de l'ironie prend conscience de la déréliction dans laquelle vit l'homme contemporain : s'il existe un bonheur sociétal, il existe aussi en contrepartie un malheur sociétal. C'est une affaire d'existence que d'affronter poétiquement ce malaise de l'être humain. La vision utilitaire du monde nous fait oublier la liberté du réel, ainsi que la liberté de notre pensée, de notre langage et de notre vécu, bref, la notion d'être en présence du monde, d'autrui et de nous-mêmes. La poétique de (...) tout poète, à l'instar de celle de Novalis, produit une exacerbation des sens face aux conflits que l'existence provoque. Son ironie face au destin de l'existence consiste donc à promouvoir un sensualisme poétique plus grand encore que le malaise absurde que suggère l'existence. Là est tout le rôle, l'amplitude du contrôle ironique du poète. Il est à la recherche d'une indépendance sociale et d'un idéalisme de la vie où il jouirait de la sérénité ataraxique qu'il produit. La poétique de l'ironie entend bien aussi convertir tout philosophe à sa propre hybris. Aussi François Breteau convoque-t-il ici les poètes philosophes les plus vénérés : Parménide et Héraclite, ainsi que les chantres modernes et contemporains de l'ironie philosophique : Hegel, Novalis, Heidegger, Habermas, Lyotard et Rorty pour leur faire percevoir, au coeur de cette déréliction, tout ce qui leur permet encore de faire de l'existence humaine, leur oeuvre ainsi que de s'en réjouir. (shrink)

Théorie économique élaborée dans les années 1960, l'hypothèse d'instabilité financière postule que le système capitaliste est instable par essence : toute phase d'équilibre apparent ne fait qu'encourager les acteurs du marché à prendre davantage de risques, qui provoquent de nouvelles crises. Décriée à l'époque, cette analyse est aujourd'hui considérée comme l'une des plus à même d'expliquer la crise actuelle. Elle offre une première approche passionnante d’une oeuvre dense, jusqu’à présent méconnue en France.

Journal Name: Semiotica Issue: Ahead of print.

Animal ethicists often distinguish between direct and indirect defenses of speciesism, where the former appeal to species membership and the latter invoke other features that are simply associated with it. The main extant charge against indirect defenses rests on the empirical claim that any feature other than membership in our species is either absent in some humans or present in some nonhumans. This paper challenges indirect defenses with a new argument, which presupposes no such empirical claim. Instead, the argument from (...) discordance resorts to the following principle: a certain feature can only justify discriminating on the basis of that feature. (shrink)