There is a common-sense view of language, which is held by Wittgenstein, Strawson Dummett, Searle, Putnam, Lewis, Wiggins, and others. According to this view a language consists of conventions, it is rule-governed, rules are conventionalised, a language is learnt, there are general learning mechanisms in the brain, and so on. I shall call this view the ‘ ordinary language ’ view of language. Chomsky’s attitude towards this view of language has been rather negative, and his rejection of it is a (...) major motivation for the development of his own theory. In this paper I shall review Chomsky’s long-standing criticisms. I shall show that Chomsky’s argument does not constitute a dismissal of the ‘ordinarylanguage’ view of language, Chomsky’s conclusions about language do not follow from his argument, and the ‘ ordinary language ’ view actually points to a promising way for us to understand the true nature of language and mind. (shrink)

Managers often ask why their firm should have an ethics program, especially if no one has complained about unethical behavior. The pursuit of business ethics can cost money, they say. It can lose sales to less scrupulous competitors and can drain management time and energy. But as Harvard business professor Francis Aguilar points out, ethics scandals (such as over Beech-Nut's erzatz "apple juice" or Sears's padded car repair bills) can severely damage a firm, with punishing legal penalties, bad publicity, (...) and irreparably injured customer relations. Equally important if less obvious, unethical behavior can undermine a firm's organizational spirit. On the other hand, Aguilar argues, in a well run firm, ethical programs can actually enhance corporate performance, strengthening the company at every level and supercharging employee risk taking and innovation. In Managing Corporate Ethics, Aguilar shows managers how to create ethical programs within their organizations that not only discourage large-scale wrongdoing, but can contribute substantially to the achievement of corporate excellence. Aguilar's program is down-to-earth and comprehensive, and based on his extensive research on highly successful, ethical companies, both large and small. He recommends action on three fronts: first, get senior management to provide effective ethical leadership; second, set up an ethics program that promotes concern for the interests of people affected by the firm's operations and that provides safeguards against corrupting business pressures; and third, staff the company with ethical people and surround the organization with ethical advisors (including legal, financial, accounting, tax, and marketing consultants). To illuminate this three-step program, Aguilar incorporates the lessons learned in his in-depth study of ten prominent firms with proven successful ethics programs--among them Hewlett-Packard, Johnson & Johnson, Nucor Steel, Cray Research, ServiceMaster, and Texas Instruments. He examines Lincoln Electric's attention to compensation and job security to ensure quality products and to reduce the pressure or temptation to act unethically. He shows how General Mills, while pushing product line managers to compete aggressively, uses corporate staff units to guard against illegal or unacceptable claims (testing cake recipes, for example, to see if a product's quality fails under the less-than-perfect conditions of a normal kitchen). And he details how Armstrong World Industries uses pep talks, inspirational stories, role models, and ready access to management to promote ethical standards among employees. Throughout, Aguilar demonstrates convincingly that an ethical program pays dividends: that employees, suppliers, customers, and the community at large know when they are being treated in a positive and constructive manner, and are likely to respond in kind. Packed with real life examples of successful (and failed) ethical programs, Managing Corporate Ethics is a valuable roadmap to an often overlooked source of business success. (shrink)

(although the FOF, unlike the CNF, is still a theorem). The correct version of Problem 62 is (following the format of (Pelletier, 1986)): Natural FOF Negated Conclusion CNF (Ax)r(Pet~(Px m Pf(x))) m Pf(f(x))] Pet Px+ P f(f(x)) + -Pa..

Beginning with an introduction to the life and times of Plato, this text is a dialogue between a fictional Plato and a contemporary college student with majors both in business and philosophy.

There are numerous occasions on which we need to reason about a finite number of events. And we often need to consider only those events which are given or which we perceive. These give rise to the Criteria of Finiteness and Closedness. Allen's logic provides a way of reasoning about events. In this paper I examine Allen and Hayes' axiomatisation of this logic, and develop two other axiomatisations based on the work by Russell and Thomason. I shall show that these (...) three axiomatisations are weakly equivalent, and that only the last two meet the Criteria of Finiteness and Closedness (to different degrees). I shall then examine two ways of constructing instants of time in a finite and closed world, i.e. the Russell construction and the Thomason construction. I shall prove that these two constructions are equivalent under certain conditions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Truthful Fiction: New Questions to Old Answers on Philostratus’ Life of ApolloniusJames A. FrancisWithin the past twenty years four extensive works have appeared treating Philostratus’ Life of Apollonius of Tyana (VA) from various literary, historical, and cultural perspectives. These include E. L. Bowie’s “Apollonius of Tyana: Tradition and Reality,” Maria Dzielska’s Apollo-nius of Tyana in Legend and History, Graham Anderson’s Philostratus: Biography and Belles Lettres in the Third Century (...) A.D., and my own lengthy chapter in Subversive Virtue: Asceticism and Authority in the Second–Century Pagan World.1 The popularity of what has often been considered an “offbeat” text is striking—and largely explicable given concurrent interest in such subjects as the Second Sophistic, the novel, holy men, and asceticism. At this juncture it is thus appropriate to ask: how far have these studies advanced our appreciation and understanding of this text? In answer to this question, I propose first to critique the assumptions and methods of this body of work on VA and, second, to suggest that new insights into the nature of ancient fiction would provide both a resolution to old scholarly impasses and a more fruitful agenda for research.Little is known about the historical Apollonius. He must have been born early in the first century c.e. in Tyana in Cappadocia and died sometime during or after the reign of Nerva (96–98). So little remains of sources prior to VA that the most that can be said further both with certainty and without fear of “contamination” from posthumous representations is that Apollonius appears to have been a wandering ascetic/philosopher/wonderworker of a type common to the eastern part of the early empire.2 Philostratus’ work, which appeared a century after [End Page 419] the death of its hero, is usually thought to have been published sometime after the death of the empress Julia Domna in 217.3 For a biography VA is extraordinarily long, eight books requiring two Loeb volumes. The work begins with a description of the birth of a “greater than Pythagoras” (1.2) and one who would “approach the gods” (1.5), then follows Apollonius’ prodigious youth through his devotion to piety and learning, especially in regard to the god Asclepius. With his early training perfected, Apollonius sets out to discover the source of piety and wisdom among the Brahmans of India, which allows Philostratus to provide his reader with two and one–half books full of travel, adventure, and esoteric philosophy.4 It is at the very beginning of this journey, while in Nineveh (1.19), that Apollonius first meets his lifelong companion and disciple Damis. Philostratus asserts that Damis kept a record of Apollonius’ ideas, discourses, and prophecies and that a descendant of Damis’ family presented these to Julia Domna (1.3). The empress, in turn, gave these “tablets” (deltoi) to Philostratus with the command that he recast them in more appropriate literary style.5 It is these memoirs which, according to Philostratus, form the authoritative basis of his own work.Upon his return from India, Apollonius is acclaimed by the Greek cultural world and becomes actively involved in the affairs of the cities of Asia Minor and Greece (4.2–33), even journeying to Rome to confront Nero (4.35–47), in an episode which presages Apollonius’ climactic [End Page 420] confrontation with Domitian. He journeys throughout the Mediterranean world, discoursing on true philosophy and religion, preaching Greek cultural ideals, prophesying, and performing the occasional miracle. He visits the gymnosophists of Egypt, and reaches the height of his reputation when Vespasian summons him to Alexandria to solicit his advice and blessing upon accession to imperial dignity (5.27–41). In the final two books, Apollonius is arrested and imprisoned by the unworthy son of Vespasian. Brought before Domitian, he refutes the accusations made against him and, as proof of both his innocence and his superior philosophical nature, simply vanishes from sight and materializes at the coast, where the faithful Damis has booked passage back to Greece. The episode allows Philostratus to deliver a reprise of the entire work and a virtual apologia in the form of a formal defense speech... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Chaos, Fractals, and the Pedagogical Challenge of Jackson Pollock's "All-Over" PaintingsFrancis Halsall (bio)IntroductionThe "all-over" abstract canvases that Jackson Pollock produced between 1943 and 1951 present a pedagogical challenge in how to account for their apparently chaotic structure. One reason that they are difficult to teach about is that they have proved notoriously difficult for art historians to come to terms with. This is undoubtedly a consequence of their abstraction. (...) In the face of an apparent disintegration of the traditional pictorial distinction between figure and ground, multiplicities of (sometimes contradictory) readings present themselves. The question, posed to students, as to what they represent is an open one. To many, recalling the opinions of the baffled audience of the 1950s, they are nothing but an inchoate mess. In 1950 Time magazine referred to them as "chaos," prompting Pollock to wire a heated reply, "NO CHAOS DAMN IT."1Pollock's claim of "no chaos" can, however, be unpacked. This article looks at how a scientific analysis based on Chaos Theory and fractal patterns can be used to demonstrate to students that the paintings are indeed chaotic, but that this in turn provides evidence of an internal structure, an order within the chaos. This order is mimetically similar to other chaotic patterns and systems, from coastlines to economic systems. My overall position in this article is one of skepticism as to what such analysis ultimately has to offer in art historical, aesthetic, or pedagogical terms.The ProblemFor a student encountering Pollock's work for the first time, especially after a standard first-year survey of Western art, it can seem incomprehensible. [End Page 1] The challenge of Pollock's work is that none of the multiple interpretations that have been brought to bear on the paintings have any special claim to validity. Given the suggestive ambiguity and "chaos" of the images, there is little in the work itself that challenges the numerous, often contradictory, readings that have been posited. In fact, how art historians approach such images tells students something about the way art history itself works and how art historians are faced with particular choices in applying their discursive models. They must choose whether these accounts "fit" or satisfy the conditions of "rightness," to evoke Nelson Goodman's terms.2The numerous questions that have been asked of what the paintings actually represent are themselves demonstrative of the wide variety of techniques that modern art historians have at their disposal. Analyses have been based upon observations that are couched in the vocabularies of the political (often Marxist theory), feminism, psychoanalysis, iconography, formalism, and so forth.3 At the time of the paintings' creation even the CIA was in on the act; apparently realizing the ambiguity of the work left it open to political manipulation, they secretly funded the promotion of abstract expressionism as a weapon of the cold war.4 Simultaneously, members of Congress such as George Dondero were actually claiming the opposite—that Pollock was making paintings that were a "means of espionage" (sic) and that "If you know how to read them... [they] will disclose weak spots in U.S. fortifications, and such crucial constructions as Boulder Dam."5Ernst Gombrich's celebrated frustration with abstract art highlights the problems that those following traditional art historical methods had with such art at the time. Writing on Pollock's Number 12 (1952), Gombrich also seemed perplexed in the face of chaos. His response to the lack of explicit representational content or apparently accountable meaning was to claim:It is quite consistent that these [action] painters must counteract all semblance of familiar objects or even of patterns in space. But few of them appear to realise that they can drive into the desired identification only those who know how to apply the various traditional consistency tests and thereby discover the absence of any meaning except the highly ambiguous meaning of traces.6Indeed, if there is any consensus to be communicated to students about the work, it is that a single, specific meaning will always allude them.All of the above reactions to the work makes the claims of three physicists to have found the... (shrink)

Martin Rees is a renowned astronomer who has written a number of thought-provoking books. On the Future tackles the question of humanity’s future and the challenges facing it. Unlike many other aut...

Taking its orientation from Peter Winch, this article critiques from a Wittgensteinian point of view some “theoreticist” tendencies within constructivism. At the heart of constructivism is the deeply Wittgensteinian idea that the world as we know and understand it is the product of human intelligence and interests. The usefulness of this idea can be vitiated by a failure to distinguish conceptual from empirical questions. I argue that such a failure characterises two influential constructivist theories, those of Ernst von Glasersfeld and (...) David Bloor. These are considered in turn. Both theories seek to give a general, causal account of knowledge: von Glasersfeld's in term of cognitive subjectivity, Bloor's in terms of social agreement. Ironically, given that both writers cite Wittgenstein as a source of theoretical inspiration, assumptions of both theories run counter to key Wittgensteinian arguments. To show that Wittgenstein's views offer no solace to the realist, the article closes with a brief consideration of John Searle's theory of knowledge. (shrink)

Kant, in The Critique of Judgment, distinguishes liking from approval by describing the former as peculiar to each person and the latter as universalizable. Everyone should be content with his own likes and dislikes; one should not demand that others agree. The adjective that corresponds with one's likes is "pleasant." Thus, if someone should say, "Brahms' 'Haydn Variations' are pleasant," one would accept the correction, "You mean that the 'Variations' are pleasant to you." But if one approves of a work (...) of art, if one finds it beautiful, then one demands that other persons agree, and one blames them if they judge otherwise. According to Kant, if an object of art is beautiful, then everyone ought to believe it to be so. The adjective that corresponds with approval is "beautiful." Thus, if someone said, "Titian's 'The Virgin with the Rabbit' is beautiful," he should not accept the statement, "You mean that it is beautiful to you." To call something "beautiful to me" Kant finds "laughable." If one calls something "beautiful" then one supposes that there should be the same satisfaction in everyone. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Council's Solar CalendarFrancis M. DunnIt is well known that for some time during the fifth century, the calendar used by the council in Athens to conduct its business ("prytany calendar") employed a year of a different length from that of the calendar used by the archon to schedule religious events ("festival calendar"). In the fourth century the archon's calendar consisted of twelve or thirteen lunar months, while the (...) council's calendar divided the same year of 354 or 383/4 days into ten prytanies, one for each tribe. For at least part of the fifth century, however, the two calendars ran for different periods, and began and ended at different times. The nature of this independent or noncoterminous year has been debated, and a consensus seems to be emerging that it was a schematic year of 366 days.1 In what follows I show that this schematic year is highly improbable and propose a new reconstruction of the council's calendar.In 1894 Bruno Keil demonstrated that in the late fifth century the archon's calendar of months did not begin or end at the same time as the council's calendar of prytanies.2 This finding was confirmed by subsequent scholars, who offered different explanations: Meritt (1928, esp. 72) argued that the council's calendar followed the solar year and was introduced by Cleisthenes, whereas Dinsmoor (1931, esp. 327–29) argued that it followed a precise astronomical scheme and was introduced by Meton. Meritt was able to show (1932, 152–58) that Dinsmoor's elaborate scheme was not consistent with known dates from the period, but he did not develop or explain his own hypothesis of approximate solar years. One crucial piece of evidence has been the Logistai Inscription (IG I3 369 [423/2]). From the accounts on this stone Kubicki and Meritt had shown that interest for the quadrennium 426/5 to 423/2 was calculated for 1,464 days, so that for those years the council's calendar averaged [End Page 369] 366 days.3 Meritt went on (1928, 70–71) to reconstruct four years of 366, 368, 365, and 365 days respectively for the period 426/5 to 423/2. This approximate solar year seemed to agree with the calendar equations for 423/2 ( = Prytany 10.2, IG I3 369 78–79) and 412/1 (Skirophorion 14 = Prytany 1.1, Arist. Ath. Pol. 32.1), from which he calculated an average of 365 4/11 days for the council's year during the period 423/2 to 412/1 (1928, 84–85). Meritt's view, in other words, was that the independent calendar of the council followed the solar (tropical) year, but because the council's calendar was not rigid or consistent, its agreement with the solar year was not exact.4Pritchett, however, has argued that the council's year consisted of fixed and regular prytanies.5 On this view, it follows that the quadrennium 426/5 to 423/2 consisted of four equal years, and Pritchett was able to show that the accounts on the Logistai Inscription were consistent with a schematic council calendar of 366 days comprising six 37–day prytanies followed by four 36–day prytanies in each year of the quadrennium.6 In support of this view, Pritchett added the negative argument (1964, 40–41, 49–50) that Meritt's average of 365 4/11 days for the subsequent period from 423/2 to 412/1 depends upon a contested reading of the Logistai Inscription and upon speculation concerning the calendar between 423/2 and 412/1. He added the positive argument (Pritchett and Neugebauer 1947, 95–96) that his own scheme is consistent with two additional inscriptions: rates of pay in the Erechtheum accounts imply that there were 37 days in Prytany 6 (IG I3 476 60–63 [408/7]) and 36 days in Prytany 8 (IG I3 476 266–70), while dates on the Choiseul Marble include Prytany 8.36, Prytany 9.36, and Prytany 10.36 (IG I3 375 29–34 [410/9]). The evidence is somewhat circumstantial, but taken as a whole it strongly... (shrink)

The live event grotesque -- Leitmotifs, tropes, and cliches -- Aggressive sensation -- The detail -- Not through the birth canal: religion -- Semen and ash -- The four hour erection -- Go home Socrates -- The vagina and the demon -- Life for sale: religion -- Becoming a lake or a sea.