This article deals with the relation between a theory of law and a theory of legal reasoning. Starting from a close reading of Chapter VII of H. L. A. Hart's The Concept of Law, it claims that a theory of law like Hart's requires a particular theory of legal reasoning, or at least a theory of legal reasoning with some particular characteristics. It then goes on to say that any theory of legal reasoning that satisfies those requirements is highly implausible, (...) and tries to show that this is the reason why not only Hart, but also writers like Neil MacCormick and Joseph Raz have failed to offer a theory of legal reasoning that is compatible with legal positivism as a theory of law. They have faced a choice between an explanation of legal reasoning that is incompatible with the core of legal positivism or else strangely sceptical, insofar as it severs the link between general rules and particular decisions that purport to apply them. (shrink)

Este artículo discute la relación entre la teoría democrática y las instituciones que pretenden realizarla. Dada la relación entre ambas, en toda explicación de las instituciones democráticas es posible leer, a pesar de sus autores incluso, una teoría de la democracia y viceversa. Este punto es ilustrado por una comprensión “realista” de la democracia, usando como ejemplo la defendida por Hans Kelsen en su Esencia y valor de la democracia. La crítica “populista” a la democracia realmente existente tiene una inesperada (...) continuidad con una teoría realista como esa. La pregunta entonces discutida es si esa continuidad muestra algo acerca de la imposibilidad de la democracia en nuestra época, que sería por eso la época del populismo. (shrink)

This article discusses the concept of constituent power and its application to the situation in Chile after the 18th October 2019. In particular, it discusses the relation between constituted and constituent powers, with a view to understanding the significance of the 15 November Agreement that opened the way for the ongoing constituent process.

This paper studies the formality of law and legal reasoning. It argues that, though the law (and its application) is indeed formal in that it does not take into account a significant number of considerations that should in principle be relevant for an all–things–considered decision, this is not to be explained on the basis of some ontology of rules (i.e., rules as exclusionary reasons), but upon the nature of legal discourse when viewed as a social practice. How the law is (...) applied to particular cases, when substantive considerations not referred to by the rules are important enough to defeat their application to the case and questions of this kind are not answered by the legal material (which includes or might include rules, principles etc.), but by beliefs that underlie legal practice, beliefs about the world and its relation to human beings and society. Insofar as these beliefs have impact upon practices we recognise as legal they are termed “images of law.” Legal reasoning cannot be understood without paying due attention to the nature and evolution of images of law. (shrink)