Shared agency is of central importance in our lives in many ways. We enjoy engaging in certain joint activities with others. We also engage in joint activities to achieve complex goals. Current approaches propose that we understand shared agency in terms of the more basic phenomenon of shared intention. However, they have presented two antagonistic views about the nature of this phenomenon. Some have argued that shared intention should be understood as being primarily a structure of attitudes of individual participants (...) and their interrelations (Bratman, Searle, Tuomela and Miller). Others have claimed that shared intention should be regarded as being primarily a normative transaction which gives rise to interpersonal obligations (Gilbert). In contrast to these approaches, I propose a compromise view. I argue that shared intention involves a complex socio-psychological structure which ensures, in the absence of special circumstances, the existence of relevant moral obligations. My argument involves two main steps. First, I show that shared intention includes important relations of mutual reliance between the participants. Then, I argue that the existence of these relations of mutual reliance in shared intention helps us explain why, failing special circumstances, shared intention generates those obligations. This provides, in my view, a solution to the vexed question of the relation between shared intention and interpersonal obligations. (shrink)

Philosophers have in general offered only a partial view of the normative grounds of reliance. Some maintain that either one of evidence or of pragmatic considerations has a normative bearing on reliance, but are silent about whether the other kind of consideration has such a bearing on it as well. Others assert that both kinds of considerations have a normative bearing on reliance, but sidestep the question of what their relative normative bearing is. My aim in this article is to (...) offer a more systematic and comprehensive view of reasons for reliance. (shrink)

In this article I attempt to provide a conceptual framework for thinking about reliance in a systematic way. I argue that reliance is a cognitive attitude that has a tighter connection to the guidance of our thought and action than ordinary belief does. My main thesis is that reliance has a ‘constitutive aim’: namely, it aims at guiding our thought and action in a way that is sensible from the standpoint of practical or theoretical ends. This helps explain why reliance (...) is, in contrast to belief, typically formed and revised in response to pragmatic considerations. (shrink)

In this article I propose an original view of the nature of shared intention. In contrast to psychological views (Bratman, Searle, Tuomela) and normative views (Gilbert), I argue that both functional roles played by attitudes of individual participants and interpersonal obligations are factors of central and independent significance for explaining what shared intention is. It is widely agreed that shared intention (I) normally motivates participants to act, and (II) normally creates obligations between them. I argue that the view I propose (...) can explain why it is not a mere accident that both (I) and (II) are true of shared intention, while psychological and normative views cannot. The basic idea is that shared intention involves a structure of attitudes of individuals –including, most importantly, attitudes of reliance – which normally plays the relevant motivating roles and creates the relevant obligations. (shrink)

Philosophers of action of different persuasions have suggested that there is a tight connection between the phenomenon of intending and the phenomena of “being settled on” and of “settling” a course of action. For many, this connection supports an important constraint on intention: one may only intend what one takes one’s so intending as settling. Traditionally, this has been understood as a doxastic constraint on intention: what one takes one’s intention as settling is what one believes one’s so intending as (...) settling. This paper proposes an alternative conception of such a constraint. The idea is to conceive of it in terms of the attitude of reliance, rather than of belief. The aim of the paper is three-fold: to clarify the connection between intending to act and the phenomena of being settled on and of settling a course of action, to provide support for the reliance conception of the cited constraint, and to show that this conception drives a wedge in the familiar dispute, between doxastic and conative accounts of intention, as to whether intending to act necessarily involves the belief that one will so act. (shrink)

We often appeal to the notion of an agent’s commitment to action to characterize, e.g., an agent’s faithfulness to a promise she has given to another, her robust disposition to pursue a goal she values or cares about, and her determination to stick to that goal. In the philosophy of action, that notion is often associated with the idea of an agent’s intention to act. In ethics, it is associated primarily with the idea of an agent’s commitment to, or endorsement (...) of, a certain norm. This essay argues that both these ideas, of intention and of normative endorsement, are central to the –or, at least, an—ordinary notion of an agent’s (psychological) commitment to action. In so doing, the essay also sheds light on important features of intention. -/- Keywords: commitment – intention – normative endorsement – stability across contexts – coordination. (shrink)

This is a survey article on reductive views of shared intention.

Intention plays a central role in coordinating action. It does so, it is commonly thought, by allowing one to plan further actions for the future on the basis of the belief that it will be executed. Doxasticists about intention (Harman, Velleman) conclude from this that accounting for this role of intention requires accepting the thesis that intention involves belief. Conativists (Bratman, Brunero, Mele) reject that conclusion. I argue that Doxasticists are right in calling attention to the existence of a cognitive (...) aspect to intention-based coordination, but that such an aspect is better understood in terms of the attitude of reliance than of belief. I also argue that an appeal to reliance affords Conativists with useful resources for explaining that aspect of intention-based coordination in a way that is compatible with their rejection of the aforementioned thesis. (shrink)

Doxasticism is the thesis that intention is or involves belief in the forthcoming action (Velleman, Harman). Supporters claim that it is only by accepting that thesis that we can explain a wide array of important phenomena, including the special knowledge we have of intentional action, the roles intention plays in facilitating coordination, and the norms of rationality for intention. Others argue that the thesis is subject to counterexample (Davidson, Bratman). Yet some others contend that the thesis can be reformulated in (...) a way that avoids such counterexamples and preserves its explanatory significance (Pears, Setiya). Their suggestion is that we view intention as involving partial –rather than full—belief. I argue that while the move from full to partial doxasticism helps to accommodate such counterexamples, it does so in a way that undermines the ability of the resulting view to explain the coordinating roles of and rationality norms for intention. (shrink)

Shared intention normally leads to joint action. It does this, it is commonly said, only because it is a characteristically stable phenomenon, a phenomenon that tends to persist from the time it is formed until the time it is fulfilled. However, the issue of what the stability of shared intention comes down to remains largely undertheorized. My aim in this paper is to remedy this shortcoming. I argue that shared intention is a source of moral and epistemic reasons, that responsiveness (...) to such reasons on the part of each individual reinforces her own relevant attitudes, and that this enhances the stability of the shared intention as a whole. We thus discover an important self-reinforcing and stability-enhancing mechanism at the heart of shared intention and action. It follows from this proposal that the psychological commitment that an individual exhibits in joint action is normally a function not only of her own participatory intention, as often maintained, but also of her endorsement of the reasons created by her group’s shared intention to so act. (shrink)

El presente trabajo se centra en la ética de la IA y en los principios que la inspiran. Antes de las normas que regulan la IA es necesario conocer las cuestiones éticas relacionadas con el desarrollo, la implementación y el uso responsable de los sistemas de IA. El concurso de estos fundamentos éticos es necesario para proteger los derechos y la dignidad de las personas, garantizar la equidad en el acceso y tratamiento de datos, minimizar los sesgos y riesgos asociados (...) con los algoritmos, promover la transferencia en las decisiones automatizadas y auspiciar la confiabilidad en la tecnología, el beneficio humano y el bienestar social.También se propone el estudio de la ética de la IA desde un punto de vista omnicomprensivo que integre tanto la ética aplicada como la metaética de la IA. (shrink)

This article identifies a double allusion to the tragic characters of Phaedra and Eriphyle in Amm. Marc. 14.1.3 and considers its possible meanings. In combination, these allusions evoke the double nature of the story of Eriphyle, therefore functioning as a reference to the double nature of Caesar Gallus’ depiction in Ammianus. The double allusion consequently forms part of Ammianus’ tragic style throughout Book 14. Having identified the presence of this double allusion, the article illuminates its possible meaning by connecting Ammianus’ (...) passage to the Virgilian rewriting of the description of Eriphyle in Homer. (shrink)

Este artículo reseña: Francisco Javier ANSUÁTEGUI ROIG, Norme, giudici, Stato costituzionale. Frammenti di un modelo giuridico, G. Giappichelli Editore, Torino, 2020, 221 pp.

When, on December 7, 2000, the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission proclaimed solemnly in Nice the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, many thought that European integration was practically guaranteed and that the Charter would soon be made into a binding legal text. Since then, the two attempts to enact a European consitution - the Constitutional Treaty for the European Union of 2004 and the arguably less ambitious Treaty of Lisbon of 2007 - both failed. Further (...) efforts at unification have stagnated, in part due to the 2008 economic crisis and the European Union’s inability to coordinate responses to issues as serious as immigration, the refugee crisis, and terrorism. In this paper, I examine a theoretical counterpoint to that bleak perspective for European unification, to wit, Jürgen Habermas’ eurofederalist proposal of the postnational democracy and European constitutional patriotism. (shrink)

El pensamiento filosófico ha sido siempre un saber en duda, cuestionado sobre su utilidad. Esta debilidad permanente se ha acentuado en nuestros días. Ahora bien, ¿es cierto que la filosofía carece de sentido o utilidad en el mundo actual? Nada más lejos de la realidad, intenta argumentar este artículo. La filosofía es un saber para nuestro tiempo como tiempo de fractura y de identidades cerradas. Es un saber de frontera y migrante para el encuentro y la comprensión del otro, para (...) el diálogo y la escucha. Ese es su valor, pero en su camino de conocimiento y comprensión precisa de la literatura. En la propia frontera entre filosofía y literatura reside su sentido. Quizá el pensamiento hecho en español sea ejemplo de ello. En definitiva, ¿existe mayor utilidad para un saber que ser un instrumento para el encuentro y la comprensión de los demás? ¿cómo puede ser la filosofía un saber de tales características? (shrink)

En el presente artículo se pretende realizar un análisis en términos prospectivos de las principales claves e interrogantes suscitados a propósito de una de las más enigmáticas fases de la historia de la filosofía clásica: la génesis de la moral cristiana pos-evangélica, en donde pueden hallarse vínculos indisolubles en la tradición iusnaturalista greco-romana.

En el presente artículo, el autor pretende hacer una reivindicación del proyecto humanista-cosmopolita de Immanuel Kant como un sistema adecuado para la integración de los intereses o fines individuales con los valores particulares y universales, aparentemente tan irreconciliables entre sí. En esta especie de "aldea global" que es nuestro mundo, no cabe obstaculizar la difusión general de los derechos humanos, y menos aún si esa limitación se lleva a cabo en aras de cualquier relativismo ético-cultural o soberanismo de estricta observancia. (...) Como contrapunto al concepto romántico de "comunidad nacional" -orgánica, monolítica, y estructurada jerárquicamente- que algunos intentan recuperar desde planteamientos localistas y excluyentes, reivindicamos los valores humanistas y universales de la Ilustración, en clara consonancia con las aspiraciones de un modelo de sociedad civil, abierto y plural como el que impera en el mundo occidental. Este hecho constituye también un motivo adecuado para evocar la modernidad del pensamiento político kantiano, en el cual se asientan las bases de una futura constitución cosmopolita que garantice a la humanidad una convivencia pacífica, racional y democrática. (shrink)

La primera parte del presente estudio (J.M. Panea) aborda el pensamiento de Giambattista Vico en torno a conceptos como utopía, historia y deber; y muestra cómo Vico nos abre a una concepción trágica de la acción. La segunda parte (F.H. Llano) pretende realizar, desde un marco iusfilosófico, un análisis introspectivo que ponga de manifiesto los principales hitos y fundamentos del pensamiento jurídico viquiano, destacando en particular aquellos aspectos que, por su incidencia en la actual Teoría del Derecho, presentan un mayor (...) interés científico. (shrink)

Recent studies have problematized on the lack of agreement between self-reported and proxied data in the field of road safety-related behaviors. Overall, and although these studies are still scarce, most of them suggest that the way we perceive our own road behavior is systematically different from the perspective from which we perceive others' behavior, and vice versa. The aim of this review paper was to target the number and type of studies that have researched the behavioral perceptions of different groups (...) of road users, contrasting self-reported behavioral data with those reported by other users, and their outcomes. This systematic review followed the PRISMA methodology, which allows for the identification of relevant articles based on the research term. A total number of 222 indexed articles were filtered, and a final selection of 19 articles directly addressing the issue was obtained. Search strategies were developed and conducted in MEDLINE, WOS, Scopus and APA databases. It is remarkable how road users perceive themselves as behaviorally “safer” than the rest of road users in what concerns the knowledge of traffic norms and their on-road performance. In addition, and regardless of the type of user used as a source, self-reported data suggest their perceived likelihood to suffer a traffic crash is lesser if compared to any other user. On the other hand, proxied reports tend to undervalue third users' performance, and to perceive riskier behaviors and crash-related risks among them. The outputs of this systematic review support the idea that the perception of road users' behavior and its related risks substantially differ according to the source. It is also necessary to increase the number, coverage and rigor of studies on this matter, perhaps through complementary and mixed measures, in order to properly understand and face the bias on road users' risk-related behaviors. (shrink)

Congreso Internacional sobre Inteligencia Artificial, Robótica y Filosofía del Derecho. Sevilla, 1-2 de diciembre de 2021.