Despite some important observations and after decades of widespread consensus around the big bang cosmology, Fred Hoyle, one of the proponents of the steady-state cosmology, continued to fight the big bang idea throughout his life. We can try to understand this persistent attitude of Hoyle through a Holtonian thematic approach, by admitting that personal preferences and choices of scientists are conditioned by themata. Thematic analysis shows that big bang cosmology is mainly based on a set of themata consisting of evolution, (...) finitude, life cycle (which has a beginning), and change; the steady-state cosmology is based on opposite themata: steady-state, infinity, continuous existence, and constancy. Personal preferences seem to have been important in the strong and passionate dispute between big bang and steady-state ideas, and Hoyle is a very illustrative example of a personal commitment remarkably long-lived to some themata, in this case to the opposite themata of the big bang cosmology. In his personal and persistent struggle against the big bang idea, Hoyle always refused the way how some experimental observations were considered decisive in favor of this cosmology. This is a typical thematic attitude: letting some personal thematic preferences influence the acceptance or rejection of scientific evidence. In this case, that corresponds to the existence of selection effects and biases regarding important cosmological observations, in order to sustain a persistent rejection of the big bang idea. (shrink)

In their recent book, Is Inequality Bad for Our Health?, Daniels, Kennedy, and Kawachi claim that to “act justly in health policy, we must have knowledge about the causal pathways through which socioeconomic (and other) inequalities work to produce differential health outcomes.” One of the central problems with this approach is its dependency on “knowledge about the causal pathways.” A widely held belief is that the randomized clinical trial (RCT) is, and ought to be the “gold standard” of evaluating the (...) causal efficacy of interventions. However, often the only data available are non-experimental, observational data. For such data, the necessary randomization is missing. Because the randomization is missing, it seems to follow that it is not possible to make epistemically warranted claims about the causal pathways. Although we are not sanguine about the difficulty in using observational data to make warranted causal claims, we are not as pessimistic as those who believe that the only warranted causal claims are claims based on data from (idealized) RCTs. We argue that careful, thoughtful study design, informed by expert knowledge, that incorporates propensity score matching methods in conjunction with instrumental variable analyses, provides the possibility of warranted causal claims using observational data. (shrink)

Clinical studies as well as hundreds of case reports have indicated that Yan Xin Life Science Technology has enabled human participants to live a normal life with little or no food intake for prolonged periods—a state referred to as bigu. Bigu is described in historical records as “taking in qi to avoid food,” and is regarded as a special technique to achieve a long and healthy life. In this study, experiments were designed to study whether cells in vitro can survive (...) without commonly acknowledged essential nutrients after receiving external qi treatments from Dr. Yan Xin, a chief physician and a renowned life scientist. Results reported here indicate that mouse hybridoma cells can survive in Dulbeco’s modified Eagles medium without serum or in phosphate-buffered saline buffer without other nutrient ingredients after qi treatment. These results are the first evidence that a cellular equivalent of the human bigu phenomenon or cellular bigu phenomenon may occur. (shrink)

Observation and experiment as categories for analysing scientific practice have a long pedigree in writings on science. There has, however, been little attempt to delineate observation and experiment with respect to analysing scientific practice; in particular, scientific experimentation, in a systematic manner. Someone who has presented a systematic account of observation and experiment as categories for analysing scientific experimentation is Ian Hacking. In this paper, I present a detailed analysis of Hacking’s observation versus experiment account. Using a range of cases (...) from various fields of scientific enquiry, I argue that the observation versus experiment account is not an adequate framework for delineating scientific experimentation in a systematic manner. (shrink)

"Margaret Cavendish's philosophical work is at last taking its rightful place in the history of seventeenth-century thought, but her writings are so voluminous and wide-ranging that introducing her work to students has been difficult—at least until this volume came along. This carefully edited abridgment of _Observations upon Experimental Philosophy_ will be indispensable for making Cavendish's fascinating ideas accessible to students. Marshall's Introduction provides a helpful overview of themes in Cavendish's natural philosophy, and the footnotes contain useful background information about (...) some of the texts and philosophers that Cavendish mentions. The additional selections from Descartes, Hobbes, Boyle, and Hooke also help contextualize Cavendish's views." —Deborah Boyle, _College of Charleston_. (shrink)

A striking feature of our memories of the personal past is that they involve different visual perspectives: one sometimes recalls past events from one’s original point of view (a field perspective), but one sometimes recalls them from an external point of view (an observer perspective). In philosophy, observer memories are often seen as being less than fully genuine and as being necessarily false or distorted. This paper looks at whether laypeople share the standard philosophical view by applying the methods of (...) experimental philosophy. We report the results of five studies suggesting that, while participants clearly categorize both field and observer memories as memories, they tend to judge that observer memories are slightly less accurate than field memories. Our results suggest, however, that in lay thought, the difference between field and observer memories is not nearly as clear-cut as philosophers have generally taken it to be. (shrink)

"Margaret Cavendish's philosophical work is at last taking its rightful place in the history of seventeenth-century thought, but her writings are so voluminous and wide-ranging that introducing her work to students has been difficult—at least until this volume came along. This carefully edited abridgment of _Observations upon Experimental Philosophy_ will be indispensable for making Cavendish's fascinating ideas accessible to students. Marshall's Introduction provides a helpful overview of themes in Cavendish's natural philosophy, and the footnotes contain useful background information about (...) some of the texts and philosophers that Cavendish mentions. The additional selections from Descartes, Hobbes, Boyle, and Hooke also help contextualize Cavendish's views." —Deborah Boyle, _College of Charleston_. (shrink)

We present an experiment designed to investigate three different mechanisms to achieve impartiality in distributive justice. We consider a first-person procedure, inspired by the Rawlsian veil of ignorance, and two third-party procedures, an involved spectator and a detached observer. First-person veiled stakeholders and involved spectators are affected by an initially unfair distribution that, in the stakeholders’ case, is to be redressed. We find substantial differences in the redressing task. Detached observers propose significantly fairer redistributions than veiled stakeholders or involved spectators. (...) Risk preferences partly explain why veiled stakeholders propose less egalitarian redistributions. Surprisingly, involved spectators, who are informed about their position in society, tend to favour stakeholders holding the same position as they do after the initial distribution. (shrink)

Research into robotic social learning, especially that concerned with imitation, often focuses at differing ends of a spectrum from observational learning at one end to following or matched-dependent behaviour at the other. We study the implications and differences that arise when carrying out experiments both at the extremes and within this spectrum. Physical Khepera robots with minimal sensory capabilities are used, and after training, experiments are carried out where an imitating robot perceives the dynamic movement behaviours of another model robot (...) carrying a light source. It learns the movement behaviour of the model by either statically observing the model, dynamically observing the model or by following the model. It finally re-enacts the learnt behaviour. We compare the results of these re-enactments and illustrate the differences and trade-offs that arise between static observational and reactive following learning methods. We also consider circumstances where, for this robotic embodiment, dynamic observation has both advantages and disadvantages when compared to static observation. We conclude by discussing the implications that arise from using and combining these types of social learning. (shrink)

We agree with Branigan & Pickering that structural priming experiments should supplant grammaticality judgments for testing linguistic representation. However, B&P overlook a vast linguistic literature that converges with – but extends – the experimental findings. B&P conclude that syntax is functionally independent of the lexicon. We argue that a broader approach to priming reveals cracks in the façade of syntactic autonomy.

One important lesson of Roberts' target article may be potentially obscured for some by the title's reference to “self-experimentation.” At the core of this work, the key investigative resource is sustained and systematic observation, not experimentation, and it is deployed in a fashion not necessarily restricted to self-examination. There is an important reminder here of a strategically important, but neglected, relationship between observation and experiment.

Margaret Cavendish's 1668 edition of Observations upon Experimental Philosophy, presented here in its first modern edition, holds a unique position in early modern philosophy. Cavendish rejects the Aristotelianism which was taught in the universities in the seventeenth century, and the picture of nature as a grand machine which was propounded by Hobbes, Descartes and members of the Royal Society of London, such as Boyle. She also rejects the views of nature which make reference to immaterial spirits. Instead she develops (...) an original system of organicist materialism, and draws on the doctrines of ancient Stoicism to attack the tenets of seventeenth-century mechanical philosophy. Her treatise is a document of major importance in the history of women's contributions to philosophy and science. (shrink)

New Methodological Perspectives on Observation and Experimentation in Science deals with a classic topic that is seen from new angles.

In “Flagpoles anyone? Causal and explanatory asymmetries”, James Woodward supplements his celebrated interventionist account of causation and explanation with a set of new ideas about causal and explanatory asymmetries, which he extracts from some cutting-edge methods for causal discovery from observational data. Among other things, Woodward draws interesting connections between observational causal discovery and interventionist themes that are inspired in the first place by experimental causal discovery, alluding to a sort of unity between observational and experimental causal discovery. (...) In this paper, I make explicit what I take to be the implicated unity. Like experimental causal discovery, observational causal discovery also relies on interventions, albeit interventions that are not carried out by investigators and hence need to be detected as part of the inference. The observational patterns appealed to in observational causal discovery are not only surrogates for would-be interventions, as Woodward sometimes puts it; they also serve to mark relevant interventions that actually happen in the data generating process. (shrink)

Margaret Cavendish's 1668 edition of Observations upon Experimental Philosophy, presented here in a 2001 edition, holds a unique position in early modern philosophy. Cavendish rejects the Aristotelianism which was taught in the universities in the seventeenth century, and the picture of nature as a grand machine which was propounded by Hobbes, Descartes and members of the Royal Society of London, such as Boyle. She also rejects the views of nature which make reference to immaterial spirits. Instead she develops an (...) original system of organicist materialism, and draws on the doctrines of ancient Stoicism to attack the tenets of seventeenth-century mechanical philosophy. Her treatise is a document of major importance in the history of women's contributions to philosophy and science. (shrink)

Abstract Philosophical discussions of experiment usually focus exclusively on testing predictions. In this paper I compare G. Morpurgo's experimental test of the Gell?Mann/ Zweig quark hypothesis with two neglected uses of experiment: constructing representations of new phenomena and inventing the instruments that produce such phenomena. These roles are illustrated by J. B. Biot's 1821 observations of electromagnetism and by Michael Faraday's invention of the first electromagnetic motor, also in 1821. The comparison identifies similarities between observation and experiment, showing how (...) both observation and experiment actively engage the natural world and how each engagement shapes representation and subsequent empirical work. This challenges the post?empiricist assumption of the sufficiency of knowing only the outcomes of experiments. I conclude that traditional views of observational access have looked in the wrong place for empirical constraints on theorizing. The active character of observation implies that a realist interpretation of experimenters? discourse should be grounded in the fine structure of experimental practice rather than the supposedly decisive, golden events favoured by hypothetico?deductive methodology. (shrink)

Experimental observations are often taken in order to assist in making a choice between relevant hypotheses ~H and H. The power of observations in this decision is here metrically defined by information-theoretic concepts and Bayes' theorem. The exact of a new observation to increase or decrease Pr the prior probability that H is true; the power of that observation to modify the total amount of uncertainty involved in the choice between ~H and H: the power of a new observation (...) to reduce uncertainty toward the ideal amount, zero; all these powers are systematically shown to be exact metrical functions ofwhere the numerator is the likelihood of the new observation given H, and the denominator is the “expectedness” of the observation. (shrink)

Although experimental philosophers have been busy kindling fires under well-worn armchairs in areas of philosophy as varied as epistemology, normative ethics, theories of reference, and the free will controversy, the philosophy of art has remained largely untouched. As Denis Dutton observes: “There is precious little reference to empirical psychology in contemporary philosophical aesthetics, almost as if philosophers of art have wanted to protect their patch from incursions by psychologists.” I intend to show how techniques borrowed from experimental psychology (...) can bring light as well as warmth to the old debate over “What is art?”. (shrink)

Experimental phenomenology is the study of appearances in subjective awareness. Its methods and results challenge quite a few aspects of the current debate on consciousness. A robust theoretical framework for understanding consciousness is pending: current empirical research waves on what a phenomenon of consciousness properly is, not least because the question is still open on the observables to be measured and how to measure them. I shall present the basics of experimental phenomenology and discuss the current development of (...) experimental phenomenology, its main features, and the many misunderstandings that have obstructed a fair understanding and evaluation of its otherwise enlightening outcomes. (shrink)

Among improvisers and composers today there is a resurgence of interest in experimental music (EM) practices that welcome contingency; engaging with unforeseen circumstances as an essential component of the music-making process, and a means to sonic discovery. I propose theExperimental Composition Improvisation Continua(ECIC) as a model with which to better understand these experimental musical works. The historical Experimental Music movement of the 1950s and 60s is briefly revisited, and the jazz tradition included as an essential protagonist; both (...) being important historical movements leading to the formulation of ideas around contingent musical practices. The ECIC model is outlined as providing a means to observe the interactions and continua between composition and improvisation on the one hand and more or less experimentally conceived music on the other. This model is applied as an investigative and comparative tool to three distinctive works in order to illuminate the presence or otherwise of various experimental interactions within them. The works are: “Spiral Staircase” – a composition by written by Satoko Fujii in late 2007, John Cage’s4′33″, and a performance of “My Favorite Things” by the John Coltrane Quartet. Further possible applications of the ECIC are suggested in the conclusion. (shrink)

Information about the structure of a causal system can come in the form of observational data—random samples of the system's autonomous behavior—or interventional data—samples conditioned on the particular values of one or more variables that have been experimentally manipulated. Here we study people's ability to infer causal structure from both observation and intervention, and to choose informative interventions on the basis of observational data. In three causal inference tasks, participants were to some degree capable of distinguishing between competing causal hypotheses (...) on the basis of purely observational data. Performance improved substantially when participants were allowed to observe the effects of interventions that they performed on the systems. We develop computational models of how people infer causal structure from data and how they plan intervention experiments, based on the representational framework of causal graphical models and the inferential principles of optimal Bayesian decision‐making and maximizing expected information gain. These analyses suggest that people can make rational causal inferences, subject to psychologically reasonable representational assumptions and computationally reasonable processing constraints. (shrink)

Most experimental studies of facial expression processing have used static stimuli (photographs), yet facial expressions in daily life are generally dynamic. In its original photographic format, the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces (KDEF) has been frequently utilized. In the current study, we validate a dynamic version of this database, the KDEF-dyn. To this end, we applied animation between neutral and emotional expressions (happy, sad, angry, fearful, disgusted, and surprised; 1,033-ms unfolding) to 40 KDEF models, with morphing software. Ninety-six human observers (...) categorized the expressions of the resulting 240 video-clip stimuli, and automated face analysis assessed the evidence for 6 expressions and 20 facial action units (AUs) at 31 intensities. Low-level image properties (luminance, signal-to-noise ratio, etc.) and other purely perceptual factors (e.g., size, unfolding speed) were controlled. Human recognition performance (accuracy, efficiency, and confusions) patterns were consistent with prior research using static and other dynamic expressions. Automated assessment of expressions and AUs was sensitive to intensity manipulations. Significant correlations emerged between human observers’ categorization and automated classification. The KDEF-dyn database aims to provide a balance between experimental control and ecological validity for research on emotional facial expression processing. The stimuli and the validation data are available to the scientific community. (shrink)

Sections include: experiments and generalised causal inference; statistical conclusion validity and internal validity; construct validity and external validity; quasi-experimental designs that either lack a control group or lack pretest observations on the outcome; quasi-experimental designs that use both control groups and pretests; quasi-experiments: interrupted time-series designs; regresssion discontinuity designs; randomised experiments: rationale, designs, and conditions conducive to doing them; practical problems 1: ethics, participation recruitment and random assignment; practical problems 2: treatment implementation and attrition; generalised causal inference: a (...) grounded theory; generalised causal inference: methods for single studies; generalised causal inference: methods for multiple studies; a critical assessment of our assumptions. (shrink)

In recent decades historians of science have argued that observation became something of a way of life in the early modern period. This article expands this analysis by shifting focus from observational practices within natural and experimental philosophy to a number of discourses and practices of self-examination and self-observation in eighteenth-century Germany. While the initial aim of these was therapeutic rather than scientific, therapeutic connotations were partly replaced by epistemic virtues and techniques adopted from natural and experimental philosophy (...) toward the end of the century. The article further argues that the subordination of self-observation to scientific modes of procedure reflected the increasingly radical interest in human subjectivity and, by extension, the emergence of a modern civic and individual self. (shrink)

We hear that a glass of red wine prolongs life, that alcohol is a carcinogen, that pregnant women should drink not a drop of alcohol. Major medical journals first claimed that hormone replacement therapy reduces the risk of heart disease, then reversed themselves and said it increases the risk of heart disease. What are the effects caused by consuming alcohol or by receiving hormone replacement therapy? These are causal questions, questions about the effects caused by treatments, policies or preventable exposures. (...) Some causal questions can be studied in randomized trials, in which a coin is flipped to decide the treatment for the next experimental subject. Because randomized trials are not always practical, nor always ethical, many causal questions are investigated in non-randomized observational studies. The reversal of opinion about hormone replacement therapy occurred when a randomized clinical trial contradicted a series of earlier observational studies. Using minimal mathematics - high school algebra and coin flips -- and numerous examples, Observation and Experiment explains the key concepts and methods of causal inference. Examples of randomized experiments and observational studies are drawn from clinical medicine, economics, public health and epidemiology, clinical psychology and psychiatry. (shrink)

ABSTRACTJacques Rohault is often considered to be one of the most meticulous followers of Descartes. Despite this, Rohault’s natural philosophy lacks much of the metaphysical bulwark that typifies Cartesian treatises of the seventeenth century. Instead, Rohault’s work, as well as his popular weekly meetings, strongly emphasized rigorous observation and experimentation. Traditionally, this emphasis on experiment over metaphysics is seen as a pragmatic omission to avoid the perils associated with censorship and Cartesian metaphysics. However, I find that the lack of explicit (...) metaphysics has real consequences that play out in the role Rohault assigns to experimentation. To show this, I highlight several areas where he adopts a broad experimental methodology even though Descartes explicitly rejects the relevancy of experiment on metaphysical topics. I place special emphasis Rohault’s extensive experiment on the void. In short, Rohault’s experimentation was designed to prove, through experimental mea... (shrink)

‘Dira’ is a novel experimental paradigm to record combinations of behavioural and metacognitive measures for the creative process. This task allows assessing chronological and chronometric aspects of the creative process directly and without a detour through creative products or proxy phenomena. In a study with 124 participants we show that (a.) people spend more time attending to selected versus rejected potential solutions, (b.) there is a clear connection between behavioural patterns and self-reported measures, (c.) the reported intensity of Eureka (...) experiences is a function of interaction time with potential solutions, and (d.) experiences of emerging solutions can happen immediately after engaging with a problem, before participants explore all potential solutions. The conducted study exemplifies how ‘Dira’ can be used as an instrument to narrow down the moment when solutions emerge. We conclude that the ‘Dira’ experiment is paving the way to study the process, as opposed to the product, of creative problem solving. (shrink)