Why does the world look to us as it does? As Nico Orlandi argues, it is simply because of how the world is. This answer emerges from understanding vision as situated in a structured environment, and it contrasts with the view that visual perception involves an inference.

This article attempts to clarify the commitments of a predictive coding approach to perception. After summarizing predictive coding theory, the article addresses two questions. Is a predictive coding perceptual system also a Bayesian system? Is it a Kantian system? The article shows that the answer to these questions is negative.

In this paper we ask whether the two-factor theory of delusions is compatible with two claims, that delusions are pathological and that delusions are adaptive. We concentrate on two recent and influential models of the two-factor theory: the one proposed by Max Coltheart, Peter Menzies and John Sutton (2010) and the one developed by Ryan McKay (2012). The models converge on the nature of Factor 1 but diverge about the nature of Factor 2. The differences between the two models are (...) reflected in different accounts of the pathological and adaptive nature of delusions. We will explore such differences, considering naturalist and normativist accounts of the pathological and focusing on judgements of adaptiveness that are informed by the shear-pin hypothesis (McKay and Dennett 2009). After reaching our conclusions about the two models, we draw more general implications for the status of delusions within two-factor theories. Are there good grounds to claim that delusions are pathological? Are delusions ever adaptive? Can delusions be at the same time pathological and adaptive? (shrink)

Self-control is normally, if only tacitly, viewed as an inherently practical capacity or achievement: as exercised only in the domain of action. Questioning this assumption, we wish to motivate the...

This paper outlines a theory and computer implementation of causal meanings and reasoning. The meanings depend on possibilities, and there are four weak causal relations: A causes B, A prevents B, A allows B, and A allows not‐B, and two stronger relations of cause and prevention. Thus, A causes B corresponds to three possibilities: A and B, not‐A and B, and not‐A and not‐B, with the temporal constraint that B does not precede A; and the stronger relation conveys only the (...) first and last of these possibilities. Individuals represent these relations in mental models of what is true in the various possibilities. The theory predicts a number of phenomena, and, contrary to many accounts, it implies that the meaning of causation is not probabilistic, differs from the meaning of enabling conditions, and does not depend on causal powers or mechanisms. The theory also implies that causal deductions do not depend on schemas or rules. (shrink)

Susanna Schellenberg's book is an ambitious project, providing a view of perception that makes sense of its content, its phenomenology, and its epistemic role. In these comments, I focus on her capacitist view and raise questions concerning this view's ability to offer an adequate account of the content and phenomenology of perceptual and hallucinatory experiences.

Delusions are usually considered as harmful and dysfunctional beliefs, one of the primary symptoms of a psychiatric illness and the mark of madness in popular culture. However, in recent times a much more positive role has been advocated for delusions. More specifically, it has been argued that delusions might be an answer to a problem rather than problems in themselves. By delivering psychological and epistemic benefits, delusions would allow people who face severe biological or psychological difficulties to survive in their (...) environment - although this has obvious epistemic costs, as the delusion is fixed and irresponsive to compelling counterevidence. In other words, it has been argued that delusions are biologically adaptive. The adaptiveness of delusions has been compared by Ryan McKay and Daniel Dennett to a shear pin, a mechanism installed in the drive engine of some machines which is designed to shear whenever the machine is about to break down. By breaking, shear pins prevent the machine from collapsing and allow it to keep functioning, although in an impaired manner. Similarly, when delusions form, they would allow a cognitive or psychological system which is about to collapse to continue its functioning, although in an impaired manner. However, this optimistic picture of delusions risks being undermined by both theoretical and empirical considerations. Using Sarah Fineberg and Philip Corlett’s recent predictive coding account as a paradigmatic model of the biological adaptiveness of delusions, I develop two objections to it: principles of parsimony and simplicity suggest that maladaptive models of delusions have an upper hand over adaptive models; and the available empirical evidence suggests that at least some delusions stand good chances of being psychologically adaptive, but it is unlikely that they also qualify as biologically adaptive. (shrink)

Bioethics, Volume 36, Issue 5, Page 486-493, June 2022.

Ambiguous figures pose a problem for representationalists, particularly for representationalists who believe that the content of perceptual experience is non-conceptual (MacPherson in Nous 40(1):82–117, 2006). This is because, in viewing ambiguous figures, subjects have perceptual experiences that differ in phenomenal properties without differing in non-conceptual content. In this paper, I argue that ambiguous figures pose no problem for non-conceptual representationalists. I argue that aspect shifts do not presuppose or require the possession of sophisticated conceptual resources and that, although viewing ambiguous (...) figures often causes a change in phenomenal properties, this change is accompanied by a change in non-conceptual content. I illustrate the case by considering specific examples. (shrink)

Standard models of visual perception hold that vision is an inferential or interpretative process. Such models are said to be superior to competing, non-inferential views in explanatory power. In particular, they are said to be capable of explaining a number of otherwise mysterious, visual phenomena such as multi-stable perception. Multi-stable perception paradigmatically occurs in the presence of ambiguous figures, single images that can give rise to two or more distinct percepts. Different interpretations are said to produce the different percepts. In (...) this paper, I argue that a non-inferential account of visual perception is just as capable of explaining multi-stable perception. I propose an embedded understanding of vision, and show how the embedded account can, after properly qualifying them, use the explanatory resources of the inferential view to explain just what such a view explains. (shrink)

The interest in Andronikos Kallistos, a leading personality among the Greek émigrés who participated in Italian Humanism, arose at the end of the nineteenth century within the frame of the studies on Byzantine scholars of the Renaissance. Researchers have only glimpsed the depth of Kallistos' erudite personality. To date, nearly 130 manuscripts have been found bearing evidence of his work as a copyist and philologist. However, research into both his scribal and scholarly activity remains fragmented into many isolated contributions, mainly (...) concerning specific chapters of the manuscript tradition of classical Greek authors. Adopting a synergistic approach to historical, philological, codicological, and paleographic data within this framework, this monograph study aims to fulfil the following tasks: outlining an updated biography; defining Kallistos' scribal activity better by means of a thorough examination of all surviving manuscript sources; attempting to reconstruct the development of his book collection; acknowledging Kallistos' scholarly activity both as a teacher and philologist; making an inventory of all the manuscripts which bear traces of his writing; and, finally, publishing Kallistos' works. (shrink)

L’article illustre les particularités procédurales qui caractérisent enquêtes et procès pour les infractions liées au crime organisé. Les règles spéciales édictées pour renforcer l’efficacité de la lutte contre les manifestations de la criminalité organisée sont examinées séparément selon qu’elles affectent directement le droit de la défense ou qu’elles augmentent le pouvoir d’investigation des organes d’enquête (police et ministère public), créant ainsi un grave déséquilibre entre accusation et défense. Même si l’on réduit les droits individuels pour mieux lutter contre le crime (...) organisé, il faut respecter la dignité humaine. Les mesures qui attentent à ces droits doivent être adoptées par un acte motivé de l’autorité judiciaire, dans les cas et selon les modalités prévus par la loi, dans le respect du principe de proportionnalité qui ne peut justifier un sacrifice des droits de la défense lors du jugement. (shrink)

Several theologians have pointed to resonances between the Greek Patristic doctrine of deification or theosis and recent transhumanist narratives: both discourses indicate death as the final enemy of humankind and invest heavily in a hoped-for transcendence of life as we know it. These resonances will be investigated further by comparing the approach to human nature found in Maximus the Confessor and in the prominent transhumanists Nick Bostrom and John Harris. In addition to sharing with transhumanists a disavowal of death and (...) a trajectory towards transcendence, Maximus also shares a view of human nature that is more dynamic and open-ended than is commonly attributed to his Late Antique context. On the other hand, Maximus also insists on the persistence of this dynamic nature in its integrity even into the eschaton. He does so for a number of reasons that should give Christians pause about any rhetoric that calls for an abandonment of human nature: (1) that theosis depends precisely on sharing a human nature with Christ; (2) that our vocation as mediators in creation depends on our physical bodies as the locus of shared existence with the material world; and (3) that corruption has a providential use in binding us together with our neighbors and in cultivating virtue as we strain for the incorruptible and supernatural gift of theosis. (shrink)

There is a certain excitement in vision science concerning the idea of applying the tools of bayesian decision theory to explain our perceptual capacities. Bayesian models are thought to be needed to explain how the inverse problem of perception is solved, and to rescue a certain constructivist and Kantian way of understanding the perceptual process. Anticlimactically, I argue both that bayesian outlooks do not constitute good solutions to the inverse problem, and that they are not constructivist in nature. In explaining (...) how visual systems derive a single percept from underdetermined stimulation, orthodox versions of bayesian accounts encounter a problem. The problem shows that such accounts need to be grounded in Natural Scene Statistics (NSS), an approach that takes seriously the Gibsonian insight that studying perception involves studying the statistical regularities of the environment in which we are situated. Additionally, I argue that bayesian frameworks postulate structures that hardly rescue a constructivist way of understanding perception. Except for percepts, the posits of bayesian theory are not representational in nature. bayesian perceptual inferences are not genuine inferences. They are biased processes that operate over nonrepresentational states. (shrink)

In Rita Charon's account of narrative medicine, empathy seems to be an essential element of the clinical relationship. However, empathy has not received much attention, which I believe is problematic. First, I show that not only is there no clear definition of what empathy is, but that this conceptual gap creates ambiguity about its role in the practice of narrative medicine. Second, I argue that certain passages in Charon's work seem to implicitly characterize empathy as a combination of cognitive empathy, (...) affective empathy, and sympathy, and that its inclusion in the practice of narrative medicine can be problematic. Third, following Dan Zahavi, I argue that a phenomenological account of empathy not only seems most compatible with the practices, values, and theoretical framework of narrative medicine, but is also capable of resolving the problems posed by alternative definitions of empathy and the ambiguity about the role of empathy in narrative medicine. (shrink)

Can one see one thing as another without possessing a concept of it? The answer to this question is intuitively negative. This is because seeing x as F is usually taken to consist in the application of the concept F to x . Seeing the duck-rabbit figure as a duck figure, for instance, involves applying the concept DUCK to the figure; thus, one cannot see the figure as the figure of a duck unless one has the concept of a duck (...) and is able to deploy it when looking at the figure. Nearly by definition, then, one cannot see x as F without possessing a concept of F. Contrary to this line of reasoning, this article treats the question of whether we can see x as F without possessing a concept of F as an open and partially empirical question. Seeing x as F involves seeing x in a certain way, namely as F, and whether concepts are required in order to see something in a certain way is an open question. Accordingly, what follows offers a proposal for an alternative way of understanding seeing–as that does not appeal to concept application. (shrink)

Philosophers of perception widely agree that sensory properties, like color, are represented in perceptual experience. Arguments are usually needed to establish that something other than sensory properties, for example three-dimensional objects or kind properties, are part of perceptual content. Call the idea that sensory properties are represented in perceptual experience the Sensation View (SV). Given its widespread acceptance, we may expect to find strong reasons for holding SV. In this paper, I argue that we lack such reasons: SV is largely (...) unjustified. We have surprisingly poor justification for thinking that sensory properties are represented in perception. By focusing on the case of vision, I show that an embedded understanding of visual perception, and empirical evidence in cognitive psychology, indicate that SV is far from warranted. (shrink)

Starting with Gottfried Leibniz, Isaac Newton's theology has often been caricatured as putting forward a “God of the gaps” argument for God's existence and continued involvement in the world. Peter Harrison has pointed out that this characterization of Newton's theology is “not entirely clear.” A closer look at Newton's letters and the drafts to the Opticks reveals that, rather than arguing God's providential ordering and care over the world, he takes these for granted and is reluctant to specify instances of (...) this order and care based on his physical research. He certainly believes in gaps in mechanical causes but is more eager to fill those gaps with nonmechanical natural causes than with God. Further, his system does not exhibit the two most prevalent weaknesses attributed to “God of the gaps” theologies: (1) that by describing God as intervening in natural causes his skill as a designer is maligned and (2) that by describing the physical details of God's involvement in the world one puts too much weight on theories likely to be replaced as science advances. Newton avoids the former weakness because it is only God's masterfulness as designer that he ties in any way to his theories of the physical world. He avoids the latter because he never points to God as the direct cause of any specific physical processes. Newton hoped that his system would cause his readers to marvel not only at God's providence but also at humankind's inability to sufficiently understand it. (shrink)

Delusions are usually depicted in one of two contrasting ways. They are either characterized as harmful and dysfunctional beliefs or as fostering engagement with the environment and sometimes even psychological wellbeing in the face of psychological or biological difficulties – something which, according to some accounts, would make them biologically adaptive. It is this “adaptive hypothesis” that I focus on in this paper, by empirically investigating the adaptiveness of delusions in a sample of people suffering from OCD. The paper shows (...) that delusions in OCD entertain complex and heterogeneous relationships with psychological wellbeing and engagement with the environment, highlighting some future directions that clinical and philosophical research on the topic should take. (shrink)

Um livro, uma criança, uma escritora louca, uma língua sem tradução literal: os sentidos descentram-se de um significado despótico. Todos são estrangeiros a todos. Não existe uma figura única do ser estrangeiro. Há, aí, uma condição poética. Aprender é traduzir: viver a irredutibilidade de ser outro. Indefinidamente. Desde um gesto pelo qual a educação se desenha na forma de interrogação das condições de im-possibilidade de leitura e de escrita da vida. Aprender faz-se no gesto de sobreviver, resistir, criar na experiência (...) de uma linguagem no entre-dois. (shrink)

Resumen: En el presente ensayo nos apoyaremos en algunos escritos fundamentales de Talcott Parsons, especialmente en lo referente a su disputa epistemológica contra el empirismo, para luego mostrar sus propias inconsistencias e ir más allá de él en la propuesta de una forma novedosa de trabajo teórico para las ciencias sociales: la teorización sistemática dinámico-estructuralista, como distinta a la teoría sistémica funcional-estructural. La idea principal es trascender las posturas representacionalistas y antiteoricistas en pos de miradas teóricas abiertas a la crítica (...) y la autocrítica. Así, frente a una mirada que confunde distintas dimensiones del continuo empírico-metafísico sin otorgarles su relativa autonomía analítica, que a nivel teórico-social y de modelos de la sociedad piensa en términos funcionales y sistémicos, que considera que cada uno de sus conceptos refiere de manera cabal a dicho mundo social y que cree que es factible la construcción de teorías acabadas, nuestra mirada busca distinguir dimensiones, complementar tradiciones plurales, y mantenerse siempre abierta a la crítica externa y la autocrítica.: In this essay we will rely on some of the key writings of Talcott Parsons, especially with regards to his epistemological dispute against empiricism, to show his own inconsistencies and go beyond him in proposing a new form of theoretical work for the social sciences: systematic and dynamic-structuralist theorizing, as distinct from functional-structural systemic theory. The main idea is to transcend the representationalist and anti-theoretical positions in favour of a view of theory open to criticism and self-criticism. In this way, and against those outlooks that confuse the different dimensions of the empirical-metaphysical continuum without giving them their relative analytic autonomy, that think in terms of functions and systems when talking about models of society, that consider each concept to be a representation of the social world, and that believe theories can be closed for good, our own outlook seeks to distinguish dimensions, complement plural traditions, and stay open to external critique and self-criticism. (shrink)

The article attempts to describe adonization, a specific tactic for exerting influence which employs physical attraction, as well as its determinants. The article presents a proprietary model of determinants and motivational mechanisms which constitute the basis of the attitude toward adonization. A cycle of 3 studies on individual determinants for the attitude toward adonization was described. Results of study 1 confirmed that male gender, psychological masculinity, narcissism, Machiavellianism and high self-monitoring were correlates of a positive attitude toward adonization. Study 2 (...) showed that extraversion was the predictor of a positive attitude toward adonization of men and women and that agreeableness was the predictor of a less positive attitude of women. In Study 3 it was established that there were no differences in the attitude toward adonization in young and middle-aged men. Comparison among young and middle-aged women proved that younger women had a more positive attitude toward adonization in the cognitive and in the affective components than older women. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to analyze how Niccolò Machiavelli conceptualizes the people in the Discorsi sopra prima deca di Tito Livio. For this purpose, in first place, we will sequentially restore the mentions on people that are linked to the passions. In second place, we will focus on the treatment of the different passions. Finally, we will illuminate what kind of people are at stake and how the people intervene in the construction of the political bond.

The aim of this article is to analyze La Mandragola di Niccolò Machiavelli and in particular the character of Lucretia, the female protagonist of the play. We will try to demonstrate that Machiavelli’s Mandragola exceeds the literary record and contains its own theoretical-political potential. For this purpose, we will first restore the textual mentions of Lucretia and analyze what Machiavelli says about her. Secondly, we will briefly focus on the Roman legend of Lucretia, as it appears in Tito Livio’s account (...) in order to illuminate the uniqueness of the Machiavellian Lucretia. Finally, we will outline the conclusions. (shrink)

resumo: O texto visa valorizar aspectos promissores do encontro filosófico entre Gilles Deleuze e Gilbert Simondon em torno da recriação do problema da individuação e da ênfase na problemática das disparações intensivas. abstract: The text aims to enrich promising aspects of the philosophical encounter between Gilles Deleuze and Gilbert Simondon around the recreation of the individuation problem and the emphasis in the intensive disparitions problematic.

Cet article aborde l’écriture à partir de la configuration actuelle de l’espace urbain, avec ses ensembles résidentiels sécurisés qui redistribuent et donnent sens à l’espace des villes, en provoquant une raréfaction des pratiques de sociabilité. Partant du principe qu’il est impossible de penser le fonctionnement du langage en le séparant de ses conditions matérielles et de la conjoncture dans laquelle celles-ci surgissent, il analyse le lien entre l’écriture urbaine et la façon dont cet espace de signification s’organise matériellement. L’analyse se (...) fonde sur la pratique des tags à Campinas, au Brésil. L’article aborde également le rapport de la population à l’école en tant que lieu d’institutionnalisation de l’écriture. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the years preceding Salvador Allende’s Popular Unity in Chile (1970-1973) and, more precisely, on the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR). Since 1969, this Marxist revolutionary group had actively participated in the class struggle in Chile. However its political and social activism was not oriented towards the working class, but instead towards marginalized social sectors (inhabitants of informal settlements and landless rural workers). The paper thus seeks to elucidate the process which led the MIR to invest social (...) sectors that should have been considered as “unorthodox,” from a Marxist organization’s point of view. More generally, the analysis of a political experience taking place in a country where the working class was not as coherent or as massive as it was in 20th Century Western Europe and the United States aims at “deprovincializing” history and at using the concepts of “class” and “class struggle” in a manner which distances them from their potentially economicist and sociologizing implications. (shrink)