In this paper we examine the notion of impersonality (das Man) presented in Heidegger's Being and Time. Taking as interpretative guideline the analysis of a comparison made by Heidegger between the das Man and the concept of ens realissimum, we maintain that the impersonality has a central ontological function within the program of the fundamental ontology. Like the concept of ens realissimum in the ontoteological tradition, which played the rolle of ground of determination for things in generall, the (...) impersonal manner of being represents the elemental source of all inteligibility. The parallel between the notions of impersonality and ens realissimum enables then a grasping of the social nature of the projection of being by the human understanding of being. (shrink)

El llamado "argumento de los posibles" desarrollado por Kant en el Beweisgrund está destinado a demostrar la existencia del ens realissimum de la tradición metafísica moderna. El presente estudio pretende explorar la importancia de esta prueba en el contexto global del pensamiento kantiano, a partir de la ambigüedad del concepto de realidad y de su precisión en la filosofía crítica.

Kant assents to Leibniz’s claim that purely positive concepts cannot contradict each other. Albeit counter-intuitive, this claim is well-grounded in Kant’s views on contradiction and conceptual content. First, according to Kant, a contradiction only occurs if a predicate is affirmed and negated; second, all concepts except of those that pertain to God covertly contain negative marks. Although I shall argue that Kant’s account fails, it is still interesting in that it tackles an overlooked problem, namely how implicit contradictions are possible.

The task of my inquiry is to lay out the main lines of Eugen Fink’s reading of Kant, focusing on his interpretation of the Transcendental Dialectic. In the first part, I explain Fink’s claim that the Transcendental Dialectic represents the very heart of the Kantian project, in as much it is in this section of the first Critique that the question of totality (on Fink’s account, the driving impetus of this work) first comes to the forefront. Secondly, I undertake an (...) examination of Fink’s argument regarding the proper outcome of the “Antinomies of Pure Reason,” according to which the failure of the attempts to determine the world with “innerworldly models” is not a sufficient reason to contend that the world is merely a subjective idea. Finally, I discuss Fink’s thesis concerning the construction of the “Transcendental Ideal” according to which the transition from the omnitudo realitatis to the ens realissimum is not necessary (neither objectively, nor subjectively). In this regard, Fink’s project can be understood as an attempt to think the omnitudo realitatis for itself, prior to and independent from any realization in a being (be it a supreme one). (shrink)

one important product of kant's pre-critical metaphysics is the proof of God's existence that he presented in The Only Possible Argument of 1763.1 Kant's proof moves from what I will call here the 'actualist principle', every real possibility must be grounded in actuality, to the conclusion that there exists a unique necessary being, i.e. an ens realissimum, which grounds all real possibility. The pre-critical proof deserves interest in its own right, for not only does it have an intriguing logical (...) structure, but it also allows us to observe Kant's first elaborate discussion of modal concepts. However, what has attracted particular scholarly attention in the last few decades is the perplexing attitude... (shrink)

François Lamy, a Benedictine monk and Cartesian philosopher whose extensive relations with Arnauld, Bossuet, Fénélon, and Malebranche put him into contact with the intellectual elite of late-seventeenth-century France, authored the very first detailed and explicit refutation of Spinoza’s Ethics in French, Le nouvel athéisme renversé. Regrettably overlooked in the secondary literature on Spinoza, Lamy is an interesting figure in his own right, and his anti-Spinozist work sheds important light on Cartesian assumptions that inform the earliest phase of Spinoza’s critical reception (...) in the seventeenth-century. I begin by presenting Lamy’s life and the contentious state of Spinoza’s French reception in the 1680 and 1690s. I then discuss a central argument in Lamy’s refutation, namely the Cartesian objection that Spinoza’s account of the conceptual independence of attributes is incompatible with the theory of substance monism. Contrasting Lamy’s objection with questions put to Spinoza by de Vries and Tschirnhaus, I maintain that by exhibiting the direction Spinoza’s views on substance and attribute took in maturing we may accurately assess the strength of Spinoza’s position vis-à-vis his Cartesian objector, and I argue that, in fact, Spinoza’s mature account of God as an expressive ens realissimum is not vulnerable to Lamy’s criticism. In conclusion, I turn to Lamy’s objection that Spinoza’s philosophy is question-begging in view of Spinoza’s account of God, and I exhibit what this point of criticism tells us about the intentions of the first French Cartesian rebuttal of the Ethics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:DOES KANT REDUCE THE COSMOLOGICAL PROOF TO THE ONTOLOGICAL PROOF? JOHN PETERSON The University of Rhode Island Kingston, Rhode Island KANT ARGUES in the Dialectic that the cosmological proof fails because it feeds on the central proposition of the ontological proof.1 The ontological proof he has in mind is that of Descartes.2 The proposition he refers to, call it H, is that the highest being is a necessary being. (...) In Descartes's proof in the fifth Meditation H is construed as asserting that existence is found in the concept of ens realissimum, the highest being. From the fact that I cannot conceive a triangle whose angles do not equal two right angles it does not follow that a triangle exists. This is because having angles that equal two right angles belongs to the concept of a triangle while existence does not. It follows in the view of Descartes that because I cannot conceive a non-existent ens realissimum existence belongs to the concept of an ens realissimum. Kant denies that the inconceivability of a non-existent ens realissimum implies that consequence. For the inference assumes that existence is a predicate and it is not. Otherwise, says Kant, the concept of a hundred real dollars is different from the concept of a hundred imaginary dollars and it is not. On this point Aquinas agrees with Kant. You can know perfectly well what a phoenix is, says Aquinas, even if you do not know there is a phoenix, showing that existence adds something to the essence or concept of a phoenix.3 Be that as it may, 1 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Norman Kemp Smith (London, 1958) A 603, B631ff; pp. 507 ff. 2 Ibid., A 602, B 630; pp. 507 ff. 3 St. Thomas Aquinas, On Being and Essence, translated by A. Maurer (Toronto, 1949), p. 46. 463 464 JOHN PETERSON as Kant believes that H falsely assumes that existence is a predicate, he concludes that the cosmological proof fails for the same reason the ontological proof fails. How the cosmological proof requires H Kant spells out by distinguishing two phases in the proof. The first phase gives the appearance that the proof is radically different from the ontological proof since, in the minor premise of this phase (CP1-2 below ), appeal is made to experience. At its onset, therefore, the cosmological proof does differ from the ontological proof which shuns experience altogether and proceeds by concepts alone. But in the view of Kant, this difference masks the ultimate dependence of the proof on the same proposition, H, which governs the ontological proof. And this is made evident in phase 2 of the proof. Phase 1 of the proof goes as follows : CPl 1 If anything exists, an absolutely necessary being must also exist. 2 Now I, at least, exist. 3 Therefore an absolutely necessary being exists. What at best CPl shows is that there is a necessary being and not that the necessary being is the highest being or God. What must be added is what Kant calls the nervus probandi of the cosmological proof, namely, that the necessary being is the highest being. But this final conclusion of the proof is deduced only by invoking H, says Kant. I here summarize Kant's review of phase 2 of the proof : CP2 1 If every necessary being is the highest being then some highest being is a necessary being (by conversion per accidens). 2 What is true of some highest being is true of any highest being. 3 Hence, if every necessary being is the highest being then any highest being is a necessary being (from 1 and 2). 4 But if " a necessary being is the highest being" implies " the highest being is a necessary being," then " the highest being is a necessary being " implies " a necessary being is the highest being " (from 3 and conversion simpliciter). 5 But, H, the highest being is a necessary being (by definition). 6 Therefore, a necessary being is the highest being (from 4 and 5). KANT ON THE COSMOLOGICAL PROOF 465 CPl-3 and CP2-6 are then joined to yield the final conclusion that God... (shrink)

Heidegger revisits German idealism after the “turn” in his thought in the mid-1930’s. There are a couple of reasons for this. One is philosophical, if not “theological” in his sense of that term. The other is personal. This later reason is emphasized by Otto Pöggeler, who suggests that after 1945 Heidegger sought to understand what had gone wrong in the tragic European debacle. Heidegger will lay the blame at the doorstep of what he terms onto-theology and the subjectivism he sees (...) as endemic to the German idealist tradition, above all as exemplified in Hegel’s “onto-theo-ego-logy.” The article explores Heidegger’s reading of this tradi­tion of German philosophy as it begins with Leibniz and culminates in Nietzsche. It is the Event itself that makes possible the overcoming of metaphysics and its onto-theology. As Heidegger says in Contributions to Philosophy (From the Event), the ens realissimum (das Seiendste) “is” no more. It is the Event (Ereignis) that is the “most real,” since it is the Event that shows up and manifests itself as the revelation of the truth of Beinge in Da-sein, the being that is there in the Event. (shrink)

§ 1. “To the mind of the philosopher”, according to Plato,1 “there belongs a vision of all time and all being"; and certainly many of the great thinkers have made it their business to speculate about the omnitudo realitatis or the ens realissimum—about the universe as a whole and in its wholeness, or about that which is supremely real—in short about ‘ the Absolute ‘. It may be that this interest in the Whole lies at the heart of all (...) genuine philosophy, giving to it its distinctive inspiration and character. It may be, on the other hand, that it is a misdirected solicitude—an anxiety to solve the inherently insoluble. The Absolute, we shall perhaps be told, is a vox nihili—a name for that which, being nothing, has no attributes ; or we, at least, can never hope to characterize it. All our available predicates, being drawn of necessity from a limited field, must ‘ come short‘must prove inadequate for so immense and so august a subject. (shrink)

As the title indicates, this most recent of Hartshorne's works blends doctrinal exposition with analyses of methodological issues. Each of the sixteen chapters can be read as an independent essay, although the entire work is intended as "an essay in systematic metaphysics." The paradox is resolved once we realize that Hartshorne does not separate substantive discussion and the examination of methodological principles--the text exemplifies the principles latent in "creative synthesis" as he understands it. Each chapter takes shape out of a (...) position-matrix in terms of which a number of possible positions on problems of relations, modality, and temporality are exhibited and finally sifted in order to determine the most viable for future philosophic inquiry. Portions of six of the chapters had previously been published, one as early as 1958; the remaining ten appear for the first time in this volume. Although much of the doctrinal content will be familiar to those who have read Hartshorne's earlier works, the clarity and coherence of these essays make it an especially valuable work for students of metaphysics, whether they accept the neoclassical position or not. In the first chapter, "A Philosophy of Shared Creative Experience," Hartshorne presents his case for the inclusive priority of "becoming" over "being"; in the next three chapters, he turns to a more detailed analysis of technical problems in metaphysics--the specification of the domain of metaphysical inquiry, the viability of the notion of inclusive contrast as the heart of "relativity", and the ultimate coincidence of modal and temporal categories as the summit of the analyses of "abstractions". Each of these chapters is an excellent example of Hartshorne's working through "position-matrices"; but for those who are unfamiliar with Hartshorne's work, or for those who desire a less 'naïve' approach to metaphysical inquiry it might be advisable to turn to Chapters V and VI immediately after Chapter I. In these two essays, Hartshorne presents a general exposition of the structure of his system, exposing and defending the conception of relativity which lies at the heart of his system: the triadicity [[sic]] of creative synthesis must be construed relatively, the contrast of relative and absolute being included within the relative member of the contrast. In the succeeding chapters, the difficulties which such a conception must face are explored in detail. Among the difficulties which Hartshorne focuses upon are the possibility of "non-restrictive or necessary existential truths", the psychological reeducation which a conception of the priority of events necessitates, the explanatory power of directed or asymmetrical relations as opposed to non-directed, symmetrical ones, and the critique of the notion of ens realissimum and its substitution by the universal forms of dependence and independence. It is interesting that at various places in this work Hartshorne indicates that the importance of the problem of the relations among contemporaries must be relegated to secondary status in the philosophy of shared creative experience. It becomes increasingly evident that were the author to stress its importance, he should have to turn to a conception of eternal objects functioning relationally or affirm interaction between God and any other individual in strictly simultaneous states. Either move would necessitate a major shift in his methodological principles and substantive doctrines. That he has struggled with the problem of the relations among contemporaries for so long shows his willingness to confront the possibility of such a shift. This is one of the major criteria for evaluating metaphysicians, as Hartshorne notes; in the light of this criterion, Hartshorne's newest work will be judged a significant contribution to metaphysical inquiry.--R. L. C. (shrink)

Kant's speculative theistic proof rests on a distinction between “logical” and “real” modality that he developed very early in the pre-critical period. The only way to explain facts about real possibility, according to Kant, is to appeal to the properties of a unique, necessary, and “most real” being. Here I reconstruct the proof in its historical context, focusing on the role played by the theory of modality both in motivating the argument (in the pre-critical period) and, ultimately, in undoing it (...) as a source of knowledge of God's existence (in the critical period). Along the way I examine Kant's version of the now-popular “actualist” thesis that facts about what is possible must be explained by facts about what is actual. I conclude by discussing why the critical Kant claims both that there are rational grounds for accepting the conclusion of his theistic proof, and that such acceptance can not count as knowledge. This is important, I argue, because the same considerations ultimately motivate his prohibition on knowledge of things-in-themselves generally. -/- . (shrink)

Markus Kohl, Ruben Schneider and (in substance) Marcus Willaschek have recently argued that Kant’s theoretical philosophy includes a radical negative theology. This article criticises this radical reading. On the one hand, it argues that different Kantian passages that seem to speak for the absolute incomprehensibility of the highest being can be interpreted as showing that Kant merely rejects comprehensibility according to the pattern of schematised cognition of the understanding (there is no concrete cognition of God). The paper goes on to (...) show that Kant advocates a form of ‘regulative deism’ (although he also associates deism with a form of atheism) and that the analytical conclusions of deistic transcendental theology are no less substantial in principle than those of the Transcendental Aesthetic of the KrV. What Kohl’s, Schneider’s and Willaschek’s interpretations lose sight of is the fact that Kant continuously characterises the highest being conceived by reason in the KrV as a “faultless ideal.”. (shrink)

Este ensayo interpreta KrV A592-602/B620-630 no sólo como la refutación al argumento ontológico, sino como el lugar donde Kant encara una cuestión más radical: cómo puede el entendimiento humano, considerado desde un punto de vista lógico-general, predicar la existencia. Esta primera parte analiza específicamente la refutación del argumento ontológico. Este análisis concluirá que se requiere de una facultad diferente del entendimiento para conocer lo existente como tal.

The Conversation that Descartes had with Burman on April 16, 1648 sheds light on the meaning of the phrase ens reale, which was common in modern scholastic treatises but unusual under his pen, and thus on the Cartesian concept of realitas. Ens verum et reale, such is the object of mathematics: no less real than that of physics, even if it does not exist out of the mind and requires imagination. As for the object of metaphysics, if it is no (...) less real than that of physics and mathematics, it is both existent and unimaginable. The answers given by Descartes that are examined here are significant samples which in addition show the need to re-edit the Conversation in the light of Clauberg's Opera. (shrink)

Neuere Studien zum Metaphysikentwurf des Suarez kongruieren zwar in der Erklärung der ideengeschichtlichen Grundlagen des Entwurfs und seiner Wirkung auf die Gestaltung der vorkantischen Transzendentaltheorie; dabei vertreten die Autoren jedoch durchaus unterschiedliche Auffassungen in bezug auf die Eigentümlichkeit und den inneren systematischen Zusammenhang des Grundlegungsversuchs, den Suarez in den Disputationes metaphysicae unternimmt.

This article tries to show that the ens rationis is nothing else but one of the most relevant cases of the pure object. To reach this conclusión, the different position regarding the pure object as those of Meinong, Hartmann Millán-Puelles and the Schoolmen are examined.

O presente artigo divide-se em duas partes. Na primeira, analisa-se a noção de um ser mental como sujeito da lógica. O principal objetivo dessa parte é fornecer algumas notas históricas sobre a origem e a importância de uma noção bastante difundida nos séculos XIII e XIV. A segunda parte concentra-se na filosofia de Avicena e procura mostrar como esse autor opõe-se à existência de um ser mental como sujeito da lógica.

Bakgrunn: Preimplantasjonsgenetisk diagnostikk er en genetisk undersøkelse av befruktede egg før de settes inn i livmoren i forbindelse med assistert reproduksjon. Hensikten med PGD er å unngå at det fremtidige barnet får en alvorlig arvelig sykdom, og at par som på grunn av arvelig sykdom har vansker med å få barn, kan få avkom. PGD er kontroversielt og et sentralt tema for den pågående vurderingen og revisjonen av bioteknologiloven.Metode: Paradoksteori anvendes for å identifisere og analysere noen av kontroversene ved PGD. (...) Det skilles mellom tilsynelatende paradokser, antinomier og aporier. Materialet er offentlige dokumenter, debattinnlegg og faglitteratur.Resultater: Det finnes en rekke tilsynelatende paradokser på PGD-ens område, slik som at PGD gjøres selv om det er svært liten sannsynlighet for at det blir født et alvorlig sykt barn, og at det gjøres PGD for mindre alvorlige sykdommer når forutsetningen for PGD er alvorlig arvelig sykdom. Samtidig finnes det også antinomier: At PGD gir rett til helsehjelp uten at det eksisterer noen pasient, og at PGD gjennomføres selv ved høye kostnader og lav suksessrate. Om embryoet og fosteret har moralsk status og rett på beskyttelse, synes å utgjøre en apori.Konklusjon: Å formulere moralske utfordringer som paradokser kan være en fruktbar måte å tydeliggjøre utfordringer og motsetninger på. Dessuten kan det styre innsatsen: Vi bør bestrebe oss på å rydde opp i tilsynelatende paradokser, jobbe hardere med grunnlagsutfordringene ved antinomier og til en viss grad akseptere motsetningene ved aporiene.Nøkkelord: Preimplantasjonsgenetisk diagnostikk, paradoks, antinomi, aporiEnglish summary: PGD's ParadoxesBackground: Pre-implantation genetic diagnosis is a genetic test of embryos before implantation as part of in vitro fertilization. The purpose of using PGD is to help people avoid having children with serious genetic disease and to help those with genetically based infertility to have children. PGD has been controversial and is assessed as part of the revision of the Norwegian biotechnology act.Method: Paradox theory is used to identify and analyse controversies with PGD. It distinguishes between resolvable paradoxes, antinomies and aporias. The material comprises official documents, public debates, and professional publications.Results: Many resolvable paradoxes are identified with PGD, such as that PGD is done even in cases where there is very little chance that a seriously ill child will be born and in case of diseases that are not considered to be «serious inheritable disease,» as required by the law. At the same time, there are antinomies: PGD is subsumed within a patient's rights even if there is no patient, and PGD is done even when the success rate is low and the expenses are high. Whether the embryo and the foetus have a right to protection appears to be an aporia.Conclusion: Analysing moral problems in terms of paradoxes may be a fruitful way of displaying challenges and conflicts. Moreover, it may give focus and direction to our endeavours. That is, we should try to resolve the resolvable paradoxes and work harder with the conflicts of the antinomies, and, to a certain extent, to accept the antagonisms of the aporias. (shrink)

O artigo aborda o tratado lógico de Geraldo Odon "De duobos communissimis principiis scientiarum" focando na noção de ens tertio adiacens: o ente significado pela totalidade da proposição e seu verificador. Odon o identifica ao sujeito dos princípios de não-contradição e terceiro excluído. O ens tertio adiacens também corresponde ao primeiro objeto adequado do intelecto e ao sujeito da lógica, a qual é entendida como a primeira ciência. Na segunda parte do artigo, localizamos Odon no debate historiográfico do realismo proposicional, (...) ao lado de Walter Burley. This paper deals with Geraldus Odonis' logical treatise "De duobus communissimis principiis scientiarum" by focusing on the concept of 'ens tertio adiacens': the being signified by the totality of the proposition and its truthmaker; Odonis identifies it to the subject of the principles of noncontradiction and excluded middle. The ens tertio adiacens also corresponds to the first adequate object of the intellect and to the subject of logic, which is understood as the first science. In the second part of the paper, we place Odonis in the historiographical debate of propositional realism, alongside Walter Burley. (shrink)

In this groundbreaking book, Daniel D. Novotny explores one of the most controversial topics of Suarez's philosophy: "beings of reason." Beings of reason are impossible intentional objects, such as blindness and square-circle.

This paper examines the multiple semantic functions Aquinas attributes to the verb ‘est’, ranging from signifying the essence of God to acting as a copula of categorical propositions to expressing identity. A case will be made that all these apparently radically diverse functions are unified under Aquinas’s conception of the analogy of being, treating all predications as predications of being with or without some qualification (secundum quid or simpliciter). This understanding of the multiplicity of the semantic functions of this verb (...) as conceived by Aquinas will enable us to have a better understanding of the meaning of his metaphysical claims and arguments. In particular, with this understanding of Aquinas’ conception of being, we will be able to see how Aquinas’s famous “intellectus essentiae” argument for the thesis of the real distinction between essence and existence in creatures can work, despite Anthony Kenny’s arguments to the contrary in his recent book Aquinas on Being. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the formulation of the concept of ‘reality’ between the XV and the XVI centuries by investigating the classification of being of reason and its distinction from real being in...

Las implicaciones de la interpretación suareciana de la metafísica como ontología podrían conferir a sus planteamientos el carácter de mayor centro de referencia para la metafísica anterior y posterior a él. Su exposición de la ratio ontologica y el depositum fidei desempeña en ello un papel fundamental en tanto constituye un verdadero círculo hermenéutico en el que coinciden las tareas y los problemas de la metafísica y la teología.

Although Abelard arrived at a view ofens nearer to Aristotle''s than his sources would suggest, unlike thirteenth-century thinkers he did not work out a view of transcendentals in terms ofens, its attributes and their convertibility. He did, however, regard unity (though not goodness or truth) as an attribute of every thing. At first, Abelard suggested that unity, being inseparable, could not be an accident according to Porphyry''s definition (that which can come and leave a subject without the subject being corrupted): (...) either it is some type of form not classified by Porphyry, or not a form at all. In his later logical work, Abelard argued differently. Unity, he said, is an accidental form, but Porphyry''s definition of an accident must be understood negatively, not as asserting something about what could happen in reality (since the form of unity could never leave its subject) but rather something about an absence of connection: were it,per impossible, to occur, the loss by a subject of its form of unity would not lead to the loss of its specific or generic status. (shrink)

Leibniz conceives of God as a “most perfect being.” That means a being whose essence is the conjunction of all perfections, where a perfection is a simple quality and a positive quality – so purely positive that it involves no limitation at all. He also holds that the attributes of all finite substances are derived by limitation from God's perfections. Among the issues examined here about these views is the relation between Leibniz's and Spinoza's conceptions of the relation between God (...) and finite things. The chapter concludes that the mature Leibniz has a solid conceptual basis for distinguishing his pluralism about substances from Spinoza's monism. (shrink)

In this paper, I address Francisco Suárez's solution to the problem of the angelic assumption of artificial bodies, dealing in particular with the discussion in his De Angelis (book 4, chapters 33-39). The peculiarity of Suárez's approach lies, in particular, in the fact that it is one of the last major attempts to reformulate scholastic angelology from the ground up, taking into account the new spirit of the Counter-Reformation. Despite this goal, Suárez consistently discusses these issues taking into account Aquinas' (...) earlier discussions, to which I refer presenting the Uncommon Doctor's ideas. I also provide some final remarks on the notion of the body that Suárez's angelology leaves to 17th-century philosophy. (shrink)

The ontological status of esse cognitum was at the center of complex debates throughout the Scotist tradition (Alnwick vs. Aesculo, Mastri vs. Punch). This article investigates the Scotist Angelo Volpe’s discussion of esse cognitum enjoyed by possible creatures in the divine intellect. Volpe responds to two religious warnings, one against assuming any eternal real being for merely possible creatures, and a second against depriving God’s eternal knowledge of a corresponding object, since that would endanger this knowledge itself. Volpe opts for (...) a solution that allows possible creatures the status of beings of reason (entia rationis) due to their own ontological merit, and the status of real beings (entia realia) due to God’s knowing that they as possibles are not in opposition to real existence. He rejects the view that esse cognitum is a kind of being that holds a middle position between real being and being of reason. Volpe’s historical significance is emphasized. (shrink)

There are many peculiar aspects of Aquinas’s metaphysics that have been explored since the revival of interest in his philosophical thought at the beginning of the twentieth century: his real distinction between essence and existence, his notion of participation and the solution to the problem of the one and the many, his arguments for the existence of God. However, Thomas’s notion of ens commune as the subject of metaphysics remains a relatively neglected field of investigation by contemporary commentators. Thus, my (...) intention in this article is to offer an analysis of the major instances in which Thomas employed the specific term ’ens commune’, and to offer some insight into the nature of what Thomas took to be the starting point of metaphysics. (shrink)

Est-il possible de parler de ce qui n’est pas ou d’y penser sans présupposer une forme d’être pour cela même que nous pensons ne pas exister? La vieille énigme parménidienne, qui hante toujours la philosophie contemporaine, est au cœur non seulement de la philosophie médiévale mais aussi des études médiévales, comme en témoigne le récent ouvrage d’Alain de Libera sur la référence vide. L’objet de cette étude est en comparaison beaucoup plus...