Scientia nova veröffentlicht Originalarbeiten bahnbrechender Forscher oder allgemeinverständliche Einführungen in schwierige Spezialgebiete, die für die Philosophie, Logik und Mathematik von ebenso großer Bedeutung sind, wie für die Natur- und Sozialwissenschaften. Scientia nova ist eine Bibliothek des modernen wissenschaftlichen Denkens, die dazu beiträgt, die Zersplitterung der Forschung in Spezialgebiete zu überwinden und einem neuen Denkstil zum Durchbruch zu verhelfen.

Aus dem Inhalt: I. Maclean, Introduction M.J. B. Allen, In principio: Marsilio Ficino on the Life of Text D. Perler, Diskussionen uber mentale Sprache im 16. Jahrhundert E. Kessler, Die verborgene Gegenwart und Funktion des Nominalismus in der Renaissance-Philosophie: das Problem der Universalien A. De Pace, Copernicus against a Rhetorical Approach to the Beauty of the Universe. The Influence of the Phaedo on the De revolutionibus H. Mikkeli, Art and Nature in the Renaissance Commentaries and Textbooks on Aristotle's Physics U. (...) Langer, The Ring of Gyges in Plato, Cicero, and Lorenzo Valla: The Moral Force of Fictional Examples I. Maclean, Legal fictions and fictional entities in Renaissance jurisprudence M.-L. Demonet, Les etres de raison, ou les modes d'etre de la litterature M.L. Bianchi, Signs, Signaturae and Natursprache in Paracelsus and Bohme N. G. Siraisi, Disease and symptom as problematic concepts in Renaissance medicine J. Rohls, Schrift, Wort und Sache in der fruhen protestantischen Theologie C. Lohr, Possibility and Reality in Suarez's Disputationes metaphysicae Weitere Beitrage von: B. Vickers, C. Leijenhorst, M. Friedrich. (shrink)

The book deals with the changing nature and with the history of the concept of scientific determinism from the classical mechanics until the time immediately preceding quantum mechanics: such a historical-philosophical reconstruction is aimed at (1) signalizing and overcoming the deficiencies of the received opinion on the topic and (2) understanding better a concept which has influenced science from the beginning. -/- Before dealing with historical matters I develop in the first Chapter a kind of new, three-dimensional “measurement system” for (...) analyzing any concept of scientific determinism: many different concepts have been developed in the course of history, and we need a classification system which, on the one hand, is inclusive and broad enough to deal with different concepts; on the other hand, which makes possible to differentiate with some precision between them. My “measurement system” has three dimension or parameter: the “strength” (of the determining link between different states of the physical system), the “depth” (depending on how strong the ontological commitment of the particular concept of scientific determinism is), and the breadth (referring to the domain or the object, to which a deterministic evolution is ascribed). -/- In the second chapter I discuss briefly some main shortcomings of the received opinion about scientific determinism. Then I try to identify the “core” of scientific determinism at its origins while at the same time embedding it in the broader historical-cultural context especially of the Renaissance. On the one hand I show how the core of scientific determinism was mathematical, and this distinguished it from other related concepts, as mechanism, the principle of sufficient reason, and the aristotelic conception of science. On the other hand, precisely the support which these related concepts provided to scientific determinism, together with its mathematical nature, endowed it with an incredible resistance against empirical classification. -/- In the following three chapters I analyze the historic-philosophical development of scientific determinism along the three parameter of my measurement system. -/- In the third Chapter I reconstruct the weakening of scientific determinism with respect to its depth: the starting point is the question about the extent in which the deterministic mathematical descriptions do refer. In the development of mechanics into analytical mechanics the more and more formal character of its mathematical descriptions became evident and it became less obvious that these formal, deterministic structures also have an immediate material truth. Parallel developments within epistemology, starting with Kantian philosophy (which I deal with quite in detail), let the deterministic structures (principle, laws, equations, causal relations) appear less absolute and real and more as a product of reason, as conventions, or as models. A brief consideration of the interpretation of mechanics and its principles by Jacobi, Hertz, Mach and Poincaré shows the implications of these developments. -/- The fourth chapter reconstructs the weakening of scientific determinism with respect to the strength of the determining link: here my work deepens the track which has been opened by Ian Hacking, who interpreted the so-called “probabilistic revolution” in the 19th Century as the main reason for the erosion of determinism. The increasing pervasiveness of statistical methods in the social and natural sciences in the course of the 19th Century gave rise to a conception of scientific laws which could dispense with strict determinism. A new, empirical interpretation of probability (Frequentism) and the statistical explanation of thermodynamic phenomena in physics even suggested chance phenomena to be a necessary condition for the emergence of natural laws. -/- The last part of my work (Ch. 5, 6 and 7) considers the period (2nd half of the 19th century until ca. 1920) in which the concept of scientific determinism became explicit and was discussed as a world-picture or a world-view – that is, in its maximal breadth. I argue that there were two main reasons for the emergence of an explicit and ideological opposition “determinism vs. indeterminism” at that time: the first was the successful application of the deterministic paradigm to sociology, history, physiology and psychology in the course of the 19th Century, which provided scientific determinism with ethical implications (in particular with respect to the problem of free will, which scientific determinism seemed to deny). The second, related reason is that in the 19th Century natural scientists became public men, science was increasingly popularized and scientific issues were increasingly related to life-issues, to worldview-questions, and even to politics. In Chapter 6 I reconstruct the debates on the issue “determinism vs. indeterminism” in such a public, ideological and sometimes even political context. Among the discussants were Fechner, Du Bois-Reymond, Helmholtz, Bernard, Ostwald, Haeckel, Boussinesq, Maxwell, Boutroux, Poincaré, Renouvier, James und Peirce. Also in Vienna the debate on the issue of determinism was fervid and took ideological and political connotations: Michael Stöltzner and Deborah Coen have pointed to a particular tradition of “Vienna Indeterminism” (Stöltzner), or Viennese liberal probabilism (Coen), which was characterized by a strongly empirical conception of science and by the full acceptance and appreciation of statistical thinking in science. In the last Chapter of my work I focus on the early philosophy of Edgar Zilsel, a philosopher who stood near to the Vienna Circle and who has been much neglected in the literature by now, and I suggest considering it as part of the “Vienna Indeterminism”. First, I show how he gave an indeterministic foundation both to statistical and causal knowledge as well as to irreversibility in physics. Second, I inquire into his philosophy of probability and show how it developed in parallel to the ones of Hans Reichenbach and Richard von Mises. Finally, Zilsel happens to be a further, relevant case-study for pointing to the ideological and political side of the issue of determinism. -/- At the end of this reconstruction it should have become clear how no physical theory, no empirical evidence and no experimental confirmation can support or contradict scientific determinism in its non-trivial formulations. The validity of any such formulation depends strongly not only (from the systematical point of view) from the definition of other concepts (like time, physical state, causality etc.), but also from the particular conception of science which more or less implicitly constitutes its background, and which is subjected to historical change. -/- (ISBN: 9783495491034). (shrink)

Stories in which a hero defeats a semi-human ogre occur much more frequently in unrelated cultures than chance alone can account for. This claim is supported by a discussion of folk-tales from 20 cultures and an examination of the folk-tales from a random sample of 44 cultures. The tendency to tell these stories must, therefore, have its source in the innate human nature discussed by evolutionary psychologists. This essay argues that these stories reinforce innate positive biases in the perception of (...) self and ingroup and negative biases in the perception of outgroups. (shrink)

In exploring corporate perceptions of the business case for supplier diversity, this paper reports on a cross-national study of large purchasing organisations that had introduced, or were in the process of introducing, purchasing initiatives aimed at ethnic minority businesses. The research investigates how LPOs portray the benefits of this form of socially responsible purchasing and suggests a business case construct based on four component elements. It also highlights a number of contextual factors that appear to have shaped business case rationales. (...) The paper concludes with a discussion of issues of cost and contingent influences affecting SD programmes and points to possible areas for future research. (shrink)

Defining and measuring biodiversity is an important research area in biology, with very interesting theoretical and applied aspects. Numerous definitions have been proposed, and these definitions of biodiversity influence how it is measured. From the still commonly used measure of species diversity, through higher taxon diversity, molecular measures, ecological measures and indicator taxa, these measures have as their fundamental shortcoming the lack of an explicit consideration of the evolutionary context represented by phylogenies. Attempts have been made to incorporate phylogenetic considerations (...) into measuring biodiversity, but more hypothesis‐driven research needs to be done. A specific case study is presented of how this added emphasis on phylogeny‐based biodiversity measurement can influence the way in which research is directed and hypotheses are generated. The elucidation of the relationship of biodiversity to ecosystem functioning is a very timely concern with the unarguable loss of biodiversity this planet is experiencing, whichever way biodiversity is measured. (shrink)

The various tasks of this book are handled in four parts. In Part One, The Natural Sciences and the Social Sciences, two related questions will be addressed in order to contextualise the whole book's relevance and the legitimacy of the questions it asks and of the points it wishes to make. In five chapters in Part Two, The Holistic-Relational Sciences, I lay out the basic premises of the four 'dissenting' sciences -- quantum-holography, chaos theory, neo-evolutionary theory, and complexity theory/self-organised criticality (...) -- as well as demonstrate their shared holism in as a non-technical a jargon as possible and with special reference to the kinds of substantive and methodological interests that the social sciences tend to share. Part Three, Dimensions of Holistic-Relational Social Science, consisting of nine chapters, extends the discussion in Part Two by dealing with specific elements of the holistic-relational sciences in more detail, and by beginning to demonstrate how they apply to the social sciences as presently constituted and how they influence the debates which currently exercise the minds of both methodologists and philosophers in the social sciences. The final three chapters which make up Part Four, Holistic-Relational Social Science, Politics, and Economics, as already hinted at above, return to the subject-matter first raised in Chapter Two, that a holistic-relational science will necessarily lead to an alternative and complementary notion of politics and public policy. (shrink)

Ian Adams; Kant, Pestalozzi and the Role of Ideology in Educational Thought, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 24, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 257–269.

Leslie Armour is the author of numerous books and essays on epistemology, metaphysics, logic, Canadian philosophy and Blaise Pascal, as well as on ethics, social and political philosophy, the history of philosophy (especially seventeenth-century philosophy) and social economics. A fellow of the Royal Society of Canada, he has worked as a reporter for The Vancouver Province, briefly as a sub-editor at Reuters News Agency, and for several years as a columnist and feature writer for London Express News and Feature Services. (...) He has taught at universities in Montana, California, Ohio and Ontario. Now a researchprofessor of philosophy at the Dominican University College, Ottawa, an emeritus professor at the University of Ottawa, and editor of the International Journal of Social Economics, he and his wife, Diana, divide their time between Ottawa and London, U.K. (shrink)

I suggest an alternative basis for Heyes’ analogy between cultural learning of mindreading and text reading. Unlike text reading, mindreading does not entail decoding of observable stimuli. Like text reading, mindreading requires relevant inferences. Identification of relevant inferences is a deeply challenging problem, and the most important contribution of cultural learning to mindreading may be an apprenticeship in thinking like a mindreader.