Nous voudrions montrer que, contrairement à une opinion que certains groupes de pression font tout pour répandre, le droit à la vie a pour corollaire la peine de mort comme pierre angulaire de la justice pénale. Nous passerons en revue quelques unes des raisons avancées pour l'abolition de cette peine: boucherie sauvage, rituel barbare, assassinat légal, et nous répondrons comme Socrate à Polos: « ce n'est pas un argument que tu nous opposes ici, c'est un épouvantail ». Nous montrerons ensuite (...) que quelque répugnance que doive éprouver tout homme de sens et de coeur à appliquer une telle peine, quelque disposition qu'il ait à la mansuétude et à la miséricorde, et en raison même de ces dispositions, il doit admettre aussi que la justice pénale est condamnée à perdre tout critère objectif lorsqu'on exclut ce principe qu'ôter la vie du prochain, ou la mutiler gravement, expose à perdre la sienne. Or il n'est pire danger pour le respect des droits humains que le subjectivisme moral et juridique: ce qui rend presque vaine la question de savoir si la peine de mort est un « déterrent » efficace ou inefficace. En outre si elle est juste, elle est respect du coupable qui la doit subir, et par conséquent, contrairement à ce qu'une certaine démagogie sen-timentale avance, signe et facteur d'humanité. Il est significatif que Socrate et Jésus, qui l'ont subie injustement, n'aient jamais mur-mure contre elle. Au contraire Robespierre, qui était pour l'abolition en 1789, fit de la guillotine la première institution de l'Etat en 1793. Une humanité abolitionniste peut craindre de connaître en pire le même destin. (shrink)

Si les relations des Regulae avec leurs sources antiques ou médiévales ont été bien traitées, leur mise en place dans l'environnement immédiat laisse à désirer. Pourquoi n'a-t-on jamais mis ce premier ouvrage de Descartes en relation avec les "Dialectiques" qui font du xvie siècle un "siècle logique"? Une documentation surabondante prouve que ces logiques renaissantes sont tombées dans les oubliettes de l'histoire. De multiples courants rendent très vivant le développement de ces ouvrages consacrés à l'invention, au jugement et à la (...) méthode. Leurs profils deviennent forts apparents à qui les étudie. Or les Regulae, dont le profil typique exige la considération d'autres concepts que celui de méthode, épousent les schèmes conceptuels du ramisme, sans références à d'autres courants. D'où cette étude qui consiste à prendre pour point de référence la Dialectique française de La Ramée et à tendre l'axe critique et spéculatif qui ne cesse d'être tracé entre La Ramée et Descartes. Mais ce n'est pas là seulement une rétrospection créatrice : c'est aussi une nouvelle entrée dans la philosophie cartésienne de "la lumière naturelle". Les œuvres mûres seront à reconsidérer sous cet éclairage. (shrink)

In The Quantum Self, Danah Zohar argues that the insights of modem physics can illuminate our understanding of everyday life -- our relationships to ourselves, to others, and to the world at large. Guiding us through the strange and fascinating workings of the subatomic realm to create a new model of human consciousness, the author addresses enduring philosophical questions. Does the new physics provide a basis by which our consciousness might continue beyond death? How does the material world (for instance, (...) ugly inner cities) impinge upon our sense of self? Is there a subatomic wellspring from which our creativity, our empathy with others, and our feelings of unity with the inanimate world originate?Most important, Zohar shows how the vitality of the new physics combats the alienation and fragmentation of twentieth-century life, and replaces it with a model of reality in which the universe itself may possess a type of consciousness, of which human consciousness is one expression. (shrink)

N'y a-t-il pas une contradiction dans l'oeuvre d'Arendt? On y trouve une description critique du totalitarisme national-socialiste, mais aussi l'apologie de Heidegger érigé, malgré son éloge de la "vérité interne et grandeur" du mouvement nazi, en roi secret de la pensée. L'étude des Origines du totalitarisme montre qu'Arendt développe une vision heideggérienne de la modernité. Dans Condition de l'homme moderne, la conception déshumanisée de l'humanité au travail et le discrédit jeté sur nos sociétés égalitaires procèdent également de Heidegger. En outre, (...) des lettres inédites montrent qu'Arendt a décidé de marcher sur les pas de Heidegger avant leurs retrouvailles de l'année 1950. Il s'agit d'une adhésion intellectuelle, irréductible à la seule passion amoureuse, et qui mérite d'être prise au sérieux. Certes, Arendt ne partage pas l'antisémitisme exterminateur de Heidegger confirmé par ses Cahiers noirs. Que devient cependant la pensée, instrumentalisée dans l'opposition - nouveau mythe moderne - entre Heidegger, le "penseur" retiré sur les hauteurs neigeuses de sa hutte de Todtnauberg, et Eichmann, l'exécutant sans pensée, le "clown" muré dans sa cage de verre? (shrink)

English summary: Etienne Gilson states that God is such a sure notion, that it would be useless to attempt to prove His existence. More interesting for this philosopher is to try to understand how a true atheist, one who dogmatically believes that god applies to nothing in reality, would explain such a belief. French description: J'ai souvent ete prie, parfois somme, quelque fois meme mis au defi de donner des preuves de l'existence de Dieu. Je n'ai jamais pu me passionner (...) pour la question. Je me sens si certain qu'une realite transcendante au monde et a moi-meme repond au mot Dieu, que la perspective de chercher des preuves de ce dont je suis si sur me semble denuee d'interet. Non seulement ces preuves ne m'apprendraient rien que je ne sache, mais j'aurais le sentiment de raisonner au profit d'une de ces certitudes acquises d'avance qui causent leurs demonstrations plutot qu'elles n'en resultent. Ceux qui prennent plaisir a gagner au jeu en trichant sont comprehensibles, car ils gagnent quelque chose, mais puisqu'une demonstration faussee ne prouve rien, son auteur n'a rien a gagner. En revanche, justement parce que l'existence de Dieu me parait spontanement certaine, je suis curieux des raisons que d'autres peuvent avoir de dire que Dieu n'existe pas. Pour moi, c'est la non-existence de Dieu qui fait question. Je desire donc connaitre et mettre a l'epreuve quelques-unes des raisons invoquees en faveur de l'atheisme. Je veux dire, de l'atheisme dogmatique et positif, c'est-a-dire de la doctrine qui, apres mure reflexion, conclut comme une certitude rationnelle que rien qui reponde au mot dieu n'existe en realite. Par rien, j'entends aucun etre. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:AN EARLY ACCOUNT OF DAVID HUME In New Letters of David Hume, Professor Klibansky and Mossner lamented the "dearth of information on Hume's early development". Though some new facts and documents have emerged since 1954, the early period of Hume's life, to 1740, remains the most obscure. The account of Hume in 1740 presented below adds nothing to our knowledge of the evolution of Hume's philosophy, but it does (...) give us an interesting picture of the young philosopher in society, and it suggests that those traits of character which later earned him the title of "le bon David" were already in evidence. The sketch below stresses, as many of his friends and adversaries were later to do, the divergence between the detached scepticism of his writings and his amiable engagement in the social life of a company. And if we take seriously the report that Hume was left in charge of the domestic "oeconomy" in the family he was visiting at Richmond, we might see this as foreshadowing his solicitude over, and constant interest in, the management of his own household and financial affairs in later years. The account printed here is an extract from a letter by William Mure of Caldwell to his sister Agnes, 2 dated "Richmond June 5th 1740". Mure has long been recognized as one of Hume's most intimate friends: Hume himself summed up the relationship when he wrote, on Mure' s death in 1776, "The Baron was among the oldest and best Friends I had 3 in the World." The document published here constitutes the earliest concrete evidence of their friendship yet recovered, ante-dating Hume's first published letter to Mure by more than two years. It appears that the two men were spending the summer of 17 40 in or near London, and possibly both staying at the house of some mutual friend. Mure had at this time just finished his study of law at Edinburgh University, and would probably have been vacationing in 79 London eri route to Leyden, where he was to complete his legal training. Hume may have been in the capital preparing to see Book III of his A Treatise of Human Nature, "Of Morals", through the press: it was published in November 1740. This, and the first two books of the Treatise, which had been published in 1739, were presumably the writings which he discussed with the company at Richmond. We have been here now these ten days, and pass our time in a very agreeable way, we have our aountrey man Mr. Hume the author of the Metaphysical books 7 that you heard so much of last summer as a party in our retirement, he is a very sensible young fellow and extreamly curious in most parts of learning and how much soever he has shown himself a Sceptick upon subjects of speculation and enquiry, he is as far from it as any man with regard to the qualities of a well natured friendly disposition, and an honest heart which are no doubt of greater consequence to the intrinsick worth of a character than any abstract opinions whatever. As he is very communicative of all his knowledge we have a great deal from him in the way of dispute and argument, and not a little too in the way of plain information we reason upon every point with the greatest freedom, even his own books, (which we are working at at present) we canvass with ease, and attack him boldly whereever we can get the least hold of him, and question or contradict his most favourite notions; all this goes on with thè greatest good humour, and affords us entertainment both within doors, and in the feilds at our walks in this delightful country, which is the finest that one can possibly imagine, and has the preference by people that has travel'd throw most of Europe, to any they ever saw. We make use of our Philosopher too in another way less becoming the dignity of his Character, as- we 80 keep family within ourselves, he provides the necessaries of household (¡economy and manages all the affairs of house keeping. From these... (shrink)

At the beginning of his influential De Nominum Analogia, Thomas de Vio Cajetan mentions three mistaken positions on analogy. He does not attach names to these positions, but each one was held by distinguished Thomists of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Furthermore, their proponents were responding to the same set of challenges from John Duns Scotus that set the agenda for the De Nominum Analogia. In this paper, I would like to do something that Cajetan did not do, and that (...) is, directly consider the merits of the first position in his list of mistaken accounts of analogy; namely, the position that analogy is constituted by disjunction. More specifically, this paper investigates the polemical use for which Hervaeus Natalis deployed analogy of disjunction; the reply of John Duns Scotus; and the implications of this back and forth for understanding the Thomist-Scotist dispute over the concept of being. (shrink)

This is a chapter of a collective volume of Rawls's and Harsanyi's theories of distributive justice. It focuses on Harsanyi's important Social Aggregation Theorem and technically reconstructs it as a theorem in welfarist social choice.

Ian C. Jarvie developed the idea of situational logic in a subtle and effective way. He was also interested in, as well as a contributor to, the institution of academic publication. This chapter provides a situational analysis of an important recurrent pattern in academic publishing, namely, the concentration of work around particular topics, despite the fact that most such work will be unrewarded in the economy of esteem that is meant to be in play.

Chronic pain patients often miss receiving acknowledgement for the multidimensional struggles they face with their specific conditions. People suffering from chronic pain experience a type ofinvisibilitythat is also borne by other chronically ill people and their respective medical conditions. However, chronic pain patients face both passive and active exclusion from social participation in activities like family interactions or workplace inclusion. Although such aspects are discussed in the debates lead by the bio-psycho-social model of pain, there seems to be a lack (...) of a distinct interest in assessing more specifically the social aspects regarding chronic pain. As a result, the social aspects have yet to be taken into a more thorough theoretical consideration of chronic pain and to be practically implemented to help affected patients. By addressing chronic pain patients’ struggle for recognition, this paper attempts to shed light on some of these social aspects. We base this attempt on a theoretical framework that combines patients’ statements with an adaptation of Axel Honneth’s social-philosophical work onrecognition. Thus, this paper tries to make a suggestion on how the bio-psycho-social model of pain can live up to its name by helping to address more adequately some of the more neglected aspects in chronic pain patients’ suffering than has been possible to date. (shrink)

It is almost universally believed that in quantum theory the two following statements hold: all transformations are achieved by a unitary interaction followed by a von-Neumann measurement; all mixed states are marginals of pure entangled states. I name this doctrine the dogma of purification ontology. The source of the dogma is the original von Neumann axiomatisation of the theory, which largely relies on the Schrődinger equation as a postulate, which holds in a nonrelativistic context, and whose operator version holds only (...) in free quantum field theory, but no longer in the interacting theory. In the present paper I prove that both ontologies of unitarity and state-purity are unfalsifiable, even in principle, and therefore axiomatically spurious. I propose instead a minimal four-postulate axiomatisation: associate a Hilbert space \ to each system \; compose two systems by the tensor product rule \; associate a transformation from system \ to \ to a quantum operation, i.e. to a completely positive trace-non-increasing map between the trace-class operators of \ and \; evaluate all joint probabilities through that of a special type of quantum operation: the state preparation. I then conclude that quantum paradoxes—such as the Schroedinger-cat’s, and, most relevantly, the information paradox—are originated only by the dogma of purification ontology, and they are no longer paradoxes of the theory in the minimal formulation. For the same reason, most interpretations of the theory interpret the same dogma, not the strict theory stripped of the spurious postulates. (shrink)

This "festschrift" brings together authors from various countries who are specialists in different disciplines within the humanities and who share a common vision of human life. These essays in philosophical speculation, political theory, literary criticism, and historical analysis are rooted in the western cultural heritage and Christian religious tradition. Major figures examined include Aristotle, Aquinas, Thomas More, John of the Cross, Donoso Cortes, and the Spanish Carlists. The interdisciplinary and cosmopolitan nature of this "festschrift" reflects the approach and style of (...) the man honored, Dr. Frederick D. Wilhelmsen. A special feature of the volume is a selection of critical studies of Professor Wilhelmsen's own work. (shrink)

We propose a kernel method for using combinations of features across example pairs in learning pairwise classifiers. Pairwise classifiers, which identify whether two examples belong to the same class or not, are important components in duplicate detection, entity matching, and other clustering applications. Existing methods for learning pairwise classifiers from labeled training data are based on string edit distance or common features between two examples. However, if two examples from the same class have few common features, these methods have difficulties (...) in finding these pairs and achieving high recall. One typical example is to check whether two abbreviated author names in different citations refer to the same person or not. Since similarities between examples from the same class become close to zero, classifiers fail to distinguish positive pairs from negative pairs. One approach to avoiding the problem of zero similarities is using conjunctions of different features across examples, but implementing this idea straightforwardly makes the computational cost prohibitive for practical problems. Using a kernel on pair instances, our method can use feature conjunctions across examples without actually doing feature mappings, which are computationally expensive. The kernel is a tensor product of two inner products on the original feature space. The corresponding feature mapping generates conjunctions of features only across the two different examples while that of the conventional polynomial kernel also generates conjunctions of features from the same example, which are irrelevant to pairwise classification and cause deterioration of accuracy. Our experiments on the author matching problem show that this method can give a precision 4 to 8 times higher than that of previous methods at medium recall levels. (shrink)

This article is a continuation of Part I, which looked at the relationship between Confucianism and Daoism by first introducing general approaches, before moving on to (1) perspectives on names and actualities; (2) cultivation, learning, the natural; and (3) conceptions of the person. Continuing with the theme‐based comparison of Confucianism and Daoism by looking specifically at the Lunyu 論語 (Analects of Confucius), Daodejing 道德經 (Classic of the Way and Virtuosity) or Laozi 老子 (Book of Master Lao), and the Zhuangzi 莊子 (...) (Book of Master Zhuang), this article looks at (1) politics, nonaction (wuwei 無為), and virtuosity (de 德); (2) morality, virtues, and human nature (xing 性); and finally (3) Dao 道, or “the way.” It references Part I, and while it can be read independently, it is best taken as a continuation of Part I. The conclusion included herein summarizes both Part II and Part I. (shrink)

Human aesthetic experiences are pervasive; they are triggered by faces, art, natural scenery, foods, ideas, theories, and decision-making situations, among many sources, and seem to be a distinctive trait of our species. Our moral sense, understood as our capacity to judge events, actions, or people as good or bad, appropriate or inappropriate, also seems to be an exclusively human endowment (Ayala 2010). As part of the scientific efforts to characterize the biological foundations of our human uniqueness, recently there has been (...) interest in the brain’s underpinnings of aesthetic reactions to art on the one hand, and in the neural correlates of moral judgment and decision-making on the other (Greene and Paxton .. (shrink)

T. 1. Metodologicheskie osnovanii︠a︡ i modeli, Bogopoznanie i nauchnoe znanie -- t. 2. Chislo. Garmonii︠a︡. Metafizika Sveta -- t. 3. Svet bogoslovskie osnovanii︠a︡ kreatologi.

In his Consciousness and Fundamental Reality (2017) Philip Goff defends his anti-physicalist argument against what he calls the "Dual Carving" objection—the idea that two representations of the very same fact could both be conceptually independent and "transparent," that is, revealing of the essences of the entities in question. His defense invokes a thesis he calls "Minimal Rationalism." I explore exactly how Minimal Rationalism is supposed to turn aside the objection and argue that the formulation of Minimal Rationalism on offer is (...) ambiguous between stronger and weaker readings. Goff needs the stronger reading to use it in defense of his argument, but only the weaker reading is warranted by the considerations he brings to bear in favor of his rationalism. His minimal rationalism is, in sum, insufficiently minimal. The upshot is not only that Goff is deprived of a way of turning back an important objection to his case against physicalism; we also gain a better sense of what kind of rationalist thesis is properly invoked in metaphysics. (shrink)