El proyecto mexicano de educación profesional antropológica tuvo un proceso formativo crucial a finales del gobierno posrevolucionario presidido por Lázaro Cárdenas del Río (1934-1940), pues estaba enmarcado por el programa político denominado Educación Socialista. Dicho programa dio cobijo a la fundación del Instituto Politécnico Nacional que tuvo en sus inicios un Departamento de Antropología, el cual fue transferido al Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia (INAH) en 1942, recibiendo el nombre de Escuela Nacional de Antropología (ENA). Aunque estos movimientos institucionales (...) parecieran solo reacomodos administrativos, dentro de ellos se modelaron interesantes perspectivas de trabajo antropológico e histórico, las cuales posicionaron a sus estudiantes en puestos clave de instituciones científicas, artísticas y gubernamentales que resultan elementales para la comprensión de las inquietudes y debates de la academia americana en las disciplinas antropo-históricas para las décadas venideras. Bajo tal contexto, este artículo identifica la potencialidad del proceso de formación académica y científica en la ENA a través de indicios contenidos en la documentación docente de Robert H. Barlow, profesor viajero estadounidense que, después de ser estudiante temporal, laboró en esta escuela entre 1945 y 1951. Consideramos sus registros como parte de un archivo vital, disperso en varias instituciones, que nos permiten rastrear algunos detalles sobre las personas que se encontraron en sus aulas durante este proceso de formación institucional de la ENA, contextualizándoles dentro del proyecto estatal de la profesionalización disciplinar, pero también en los inquietantes silencios que rodean las dispersas memorias andantes de este profesor migrante. (shrink)

Este artículo aborda la relevancia de algunos de los principales aspectos de Ortega y Gasset y plantea los puntos de vista teóricos de su pensamiento en conexión con los estudios interculturales que es tán afectando tan dramáticamente hoy en día. Ortega señala la necesidad de una visión integradora de las culturas donde la humanidad pueda cosechar relaciones de confianza con respecto a su cultura y la de los demás, con respeto y comprensión de la diversidad. Aunque tal condición de obertura (...) denota el “estatus” que pertenece a la estructura de la existencia humana; sin embargo, no determina de ninguna manera la naturaleza y la disposición buena o mala, positiva o negativa, pacifista o conflictiva de esta relación misma. La construcción real de un mundo que el espacio de una apertura hace po- sible es una tarea factual e inherente y exquisitamente humana. (shrink)

This paper explores the dialogue between Collingwood and Guido de Ruggiero on art and art criticism. The sense of identity of these two activities, it will be argued, can be understood only if one considers the criticism of living art: The art of one who also creates, who through a critical process transforms an outline into a work of art. Thus understood a work of art belongs to the life of the spirit, if considered from the dimension of becoming. Only (...) by reliving the past can it be transformed, yet this requires an understanding of the map of human experience. This is what constitutes specular phenomenology, a phenomenology reflected in the mirror of art and scientific analysis. (shrink)

The article deals with the views of the Fathers of the Church on relations between husband and wife between the end of the first century and the end of the third century, an age that is less studied in this respect, even though it offers good documentation concerning the subject. Four themes are considered: 1. adultery and separation; 2. the conjugal debt; 3. the division of tasks between husband and wife; 4. the faith life of the couple. Different opinions and (...) often original points of view are presented in regard to the lawfulness of the second marriage, the culpability of adultery, the value of sexuality in the marriage and the wife’s subordination to her husband. (shrink)

In the face of seemingly new truth-related political phenomena, Hannah Arendt’s theory of truth in politics has recently seen a flare of renewed attention. Central to her theory is the distinction between rational and factual truths, and the claim that the latter, unlike the former, belongs to the political. The coherence of this claim, however, has been the object of much discussion and criticism. This article intervenes in the debate by foregrounding her conception of factual truth as “the outcome of (...) action” and advancing that this is best understood as an “extended” conception, one that includes in its compass a future-regarding concern for the facts yet-to-be. In so doing it contributes to clarify why it can be said that Arendt does not—like her critics have maintained—exclude truth from the realm of politics, but that in fact it brings to light truth’s most political dimension. (shrink)

Despite the transformation it introduced in theories of democratic representation, the so-called ‘constructivist turn’ left unchallenged the epistemology that had characterised traditional accounts: the questions at stake in current debates on representation are still mostly elicited by a ‘passive’ image of representation as ultimately the phenomenon of being represented by others. Nowhere has the focus explicitly been placed on the experience of representing others. This article proposes a recalibration of current constructivist accounts of representation by introducing what I term the (...) representative standpoint, an epistemological perspective which discloses neglected aspects of the nature and the value of democratic representation. In particular, I suggest that from the representative standpoint, we are able to configure representation as the periodic motion between two spaces: the square, where the representative meets with their constituents, and the circle, where the representative meets with the representatives of other constituencies. The essence of democratic representation lies precisely in the constant moving back and forth between these two spaces. I finally suggest that, configured in these terms, representation may be acknowledged and valued also for providing liberal democracies with an in-built device for a kind of civic education, the beneficiaries of which are the representatives themselves. (shrink)

El Códice entrada de los españoles en Tlaxcala es un documento de contenido visual que, a pesar de sus anecdotarios, no ha sido debidamente atendido por los historiadores. Este artículo indaga a través del cotejo de sus sugerentes trazos con otras fuentes (como los conjuntos documentales del Lienzo de Tlaxcala, y la obra de Diego Muñoz Camargo) acerca de los problemas historiográficos que presenta este manuscrito: su autoría, su fecha de creación, y la intencionalidad con la que fue creado. Este (...) minucioso análisis deriva en una reflexión que esquematiza las líneas argumentales que comparte este manuscrito con otros documentos pertenecientes al corpus de fuentes tlaxcaltecas que relatan la conquista de la Nueva España. (shrink)

Music and its treatment occupy a substantially reduced space within the articulated, plentiful array of Ortega y Gasset’s philosophical writings. References are limited to the articles Musicalia e Apatía artística published in 1921 in the review “El Sol”, and his 1925 essay, La deshumanización del arte. There are, moreover, some more or less explicit references to music in Gasset’s other writings. This notwithstanding, Ortega’s reflections are of interest for reasons which are implicit within his thought’s configuration. Foremostly, Gasset’s reflections on (...) music concern a clarification of the dynamics linking life with the different constitutive forms of a cultural landscape. (shrink)

Through examining the BBC television series, Black and British: A Forgotten History, written and presented by the historian David Olusoga, and in extending Paul Gilroy’s assertion that the everyday banality of living with difference is now an ordinary part of British life, this article considers how Olusoga’s historicization of the Black British experience reflects a convivial rendering of UK multiculture. In particular, when used alongside Žižek’s notion of parallax, it is argued that understandings of convivial culture can be (...) supported by a historical importance that deliberately ‘shocks’, and subsequently dislodges, popular interpretations of the UK’s ‘white past’. Notably, it is parallax which puts antagonism, strangeness and ambivalence at the heart of contemporary depictions of convivial Britain, with the UK’s cultural differences located in the ‘gaps’ and tensions which characterize both its past and present. These differences should not be feared but, as a characteristic part of our convivial culture, should be supplemented with historical analyses that highlight but, also, undermine, the significance of cultural differences in the present. Consequently, it is suggested that if the spontaneity of conviviality is to encourage openness, then understandings of multiculturalism need to go beyond reification in order to challenge our understandings of the past. Here, examples of ‘alterity’ are neither ‘new’ nor ‘contemporary’, but instead, constitute a fundamental part of the nation’s history: of the ‘gap’ made visible in transiting past and present. (shrink)

Duncan Black made a significant contribution to the development of public choice theory during his lifetime. Upon his death it became apparent that much of his scholarship and critique of economics was never published. Formal Contributions to the Theory of Public Choice is a collection of Duncan Black's unpublished works, representing his continuing contribution to economics and political science. It provides an insight into Black's intellectual endeavors and introduces some new ideas and extensions of earlier work.

Author Max Black argues that language should conform to the discovered regularities of experience it is radically mistaken to assume that the conception of language is a mirror of reality.

It is a paradox, whose importance familiarity fails to diminish, that the most highly developed and useful scientific theories are ostensibly expressed in terms of objects never encountered in experience. The line traced by a draughtsman, no matter how accurate, is seen beneath the microscope as a kind of corrugated trench, far removed from the ideal line of pure geometry. And the “point-planet” of astronomy, the “perfect gas” of thermodynamics, or the “pure species” of genetics are equally remote from exact (...) realization. Indeed the unintelligibility at the atomic or sub-atomic level of the notion of a rigidly demarcated boundary shows that such objects not merely are not but could not be encountered. While the mathematician constructs a theory in terms of “perfect” objects, the experimental scientist observes objects of which the properties demanded by theory are and can, in the very nature of measurement, be only approximately true. As Duhem remarks, mathematical deduction is not useful to the physicist if interpreted rigorously. It is necessary to know that its validity is unaltered when the premise and conclusion are only “approximately true.” But the indeterminacy thus introduced, it is necessary to add in criticism, will invalidate the deduction unless the permissible limits of variation are specified. To do so, however, replaces the original mathematical deduction by a more complicated mathematical theory in respect of whose interpretation the same problem arises, and whose exact nature is in any case unknown. (shrink)

Jessica Brown effectively contends that Keith DeRose’s latest argument for contextualism fails to rule out contextualism’s chief rival, namely, classic invariantism. Still, even if her position has not been ruled out, the classic invariantist must offer considerations in favor of her position if she is to convince us that it is superior to contextualism. Brown defends classic invariantism with a warranted assertability maneuver that utilizes a linguistic pragmatic principle of relevance. I argue, however, that this maneuver is not as effective (...) as it might be. I propose a different warranted assertability maneuver—one that utilizes a pragmatic principle of strength—that affords a more successful defense of classic invariantism, and that helps to establish that classic invariantism is superior to contextualism. (shrink)

One of the chief innovations in medieval adaptations of Aristotelian psychology was the expansion of Aristotle's notion of imagination orphantasiato include a variety of distinct perceptual powers known collectively as the internal senses. Amongst medieval philosophers in the Arabic world, Avicenna offers one of the most complex and sophisticated accounts of the internal senses. Within his list of internal senses, Avicenna includes a faculty known as “estimation”, to which various functions are assigned in a wide variety of contexts. Although many (...) philosophers in the Arabic world as well as in the Latin West accepted Avicenna's positing of an estimative faculty, Avicenna's best-known critics, al-Ghazâlî and Averroes, found Avicenna's arguments in support of a distinct estimative faculty problematic. For different reasons, both Averroes and Ghazâlî raised the basic question of whether one needed to posit a distinct faculty of estimation to supplement the perceptual abilities of the other internal senses, and whether the notion of an estimative power as defined by Avicenna was internally coherent. Such criticisms suggest that the Avicennian conception of estimation is not entirely unambiguous, and that a correct understanding of Avicenna's motivations for delineating an estimative power requires a careful study of the diverse activities assigned to it throughout Avicenna's philosophical writings. (shrink)

These essays are intended to illustrate various ways in which ideas about language may be used to clarify philosophic problems. They contain careful interpretations and criticisms of theories of language.

I defend a sensitive neo-Moorean invariantism, an epistemological account with the following characteristic features: (a) it reserves a place for a sensitivity condition on knowledge, according to which, very roughly, S’s belief that p counts as knowledge only if S wouldn’t believe that p if p were false; (b) it maintains that the standards for knowledge are comparatively low; and (c) it maintains that the standards for knowledge are invariant (i.e., that they vary neither with the linguistic context of the (...) subject of knowledge nor with the linguistic context of the attributor of knowledge). I argue that this sort of account allows us to respond adequately to some difficult puzzles in epistemology, puzzles such as skeptical puzzles, as well as puzzles that inspire epistemological contextualism. I also maintain that by utilizing what Keith DeRose calls a warranted assertibility maneuver, sensitive neo-Moorean invariantism can account for our epistemic judgments in each of these puzzle cases. (shrink)

According to a Moorean response to skepticism, the standards for knowledge are invariantly comparatively low, and we can know across contexts all that we ordinarily take ourselves to know. It is incumbent upon the Moorean to defend his position by explaining how, in contexts in which S seems to lack knowledge, S can nevertheless have knowledge. The explanation proposed here relies on a warranted-assertability maneuver: Because we are warranted in asserting that S doesn’t know that p, it can seem that (...) S does in fact lack that piece of knowledge. Moreover, this warranted-assertability maneuver is unique and better than similar maneuvers because it makes use of H. P. Grice’s general conversational rule of Quantity—“Do not make your contribution more informative than is required”—in explaining why we are warranted in asserting that S doesn’t know that p. (shrink)