Discuter de leurs propres doctrines selon une méthode “scolaire”, qui consiste à retrouver les doctrines de Platon afin de construire par ce moyen leur propre pensée, est une caractéristique commune aux médio-platoniciens. Un tel procédé est donc conditionné par l’exégèse de Platon ; d’ailleurs, l’exégèse elle-même devient un objet de discussion durant le moyen-platonisme, où surgit le problème très controversé de la meilleure interprétation de Platon. Une enquête sur la présence du Phèdre – qui était l’un des dialogues les plus (...) lus de Platon – chez ces philosophes doit prendre en compte diverses méthodes d’interprétation mise en place, notamment l’interprétation grammaticale, l’interprétation physique et l’interprétation épistémologique, que cet article s’efforce de mettre en lumière. (shrink)

La presencia de Platón y del pensamiento platónico se ha mantenido de manera incesante a lo largo de la historia de la cultura. En esta historia, el siglo XX refleja el rechazo y la aceptación, la recepción, en suma, de un modo inusitado tal vez porque, durante este siglo, la humanidad se vio cara a cara con los infiernos que supo crear: un mundo en ruinas hacía imposible intuir la perfecta quietud de las Formas. La recepción de Platón en el (...) siglo XX bucea en la recepción de Platón en aquel mundo contradictorio: ¿cómo se integra su pensamiento fundacionalmente metafísico con la deconstrucción de la metafísica? ¿Cuáles son los alcances de la crítica que la teoría política hace, desde la época de los totalitarismos, al autor de la República? ¿Qué valor cognoscitivo y pedagógico puede tener en mito platónico para filósofos cristianos que se ocupan del pensamiento platónico? ¿Cómo recibe la poesía hispanoamericana su voz de demiurgo? Estas preguntas, de las que se ofrecen diversas respuestas en este libro, son tratadas con rigor académico y confrontadas doblemente con las fuentes: en primer término, con Platón y luego con quienes son estudiados en el presente volumen, aunque desde ángulos muy diversos: M. Heidegger, H. G. Gadamer, K. Popper, E. Cassirer, L. Marechal. La seguridad del tratamiento metodológico y lingüístico que se refleja en esta obra hace que sea altamente recomendable para alumnos de grado y de posgrado en Filosofía, Teoría Política, Literatura y Humanidades en general. (shrink)

This paper assesses the philosophical heritage of Jacob Klein’s thought through an analysis of the key tenets of his Greek Mathematical Thought and theOrigin of Algebra. Threads of Klein’s thought are distinguished and subsequently singled out (phenomenological, epistemological, and anti-ontological; historical, ontological, and critical), and the peculiar way in which Klein’s project brings together ontology and history of mathematics is investigated. Plato’s theoretical logistic and Klein’s understanding thereof are questioned—especially the claim that the Platonic distinction between practical and theoretical (...) logistic is historically neglected because of Plato’s understanding of the manner of being of mathematical objects—in order to advance the claim that Klein ontologically overdetermines the history of mathematics in a manner that ends up limiting some of his most brilliant analyses of the Greek conception of “numbers” and the philosophical meaning of the notion of “multiplicity.”. (shrink)

Griffiths and Matthewson (2018) employ the selected effects theory to contend that disease involves the impairment of the normal functioning of biological items. Since the selected effects theory focuses on the past effects of those items, I refer to their proposal as “aetiological naturalism”. In this paper, I argue that aetiological naturalism cannot constitute an adequate theory of disease. This is due to the fact that the selected effects theory, which lies at the heart of aetiological naturalism, is flawed. One (...) promise of the selected effects theory is indeed that it is able to account for our normative intuitions about dysfunctional biological items by grounding them on the concept of natural selection incorporated in the selected effects theory itself, where this promise rests upon its claim that appealing to the fitness-enhancing effect of biological items can always explain why they persisted in a population. However, I contend that the naturalisation of normativity cannot be cashed out in terms of biological items’ past effects by discussing two biological phenomena: phenotypic plasticity and negative frequency-dependent selection. I illustrate that in both cases the selected effects theory cannot recognise adaptive items as having a selected effects function, therefore preventing the possibility to assign them any dysfunction. The normative force of the selected effects theory is consequently much diminished, leading in turn to a weakening of aetiological naturalism, given that such project actually relies on the assumed normative force of the selected effects theory itself. (shrink)

The selected effects theory is supposed to provide a fully naturalistic basis for statements about what biological traits or processes are for without appeal to final causes or intelligent design. On the selected effects theory, biologists are allowed to say, for instance, that hindwing eyespots on butterfly wings serve to deflect predators’ attacks away from vital organs because a similar fitness-enhancing effect explains why eyespots themselves were favoured by natural selection and persisted in the population. This is known as the (...) explanatory dimension of the selected effects theory. According to it, appealing to the fitness-enhancing effect of a certain trait or process is sufficient to explain its current presence in a population, namely, why it persisted and still exists in that population. In this paper, however, I will call such a claim into question, and I will do so by discussing a mathematical Hawk-Dove example and a real case scenario taken from evolutionary biology, that of Perissodus microlepis. These are scenarios in which the selective filter does not allow variants with the highest fitness at a certain moment to prevail over their available alternatives. In similar cases, I will argue, citing fitness-enhancing effects does not represent an adequate explanation of what happens in the population, undermining the explanatory dimension of the selected effects theory. (shrink)

Neste trabalho, a autor expõe o argumento apresentado por Adorno e Horkheimer na Dialética do esclarecimento, considerando decisiva a identificação feita por eles entre esclarecimento e racionalidade instrumental. Em seguida, em forma de excurso, recorre a Kant para demonstrar os limites do argumento daqueles dois autores. Por último, apresenta o argumento de Habermas sobre a racionalidade comunicativa e, a partir dele, busca evidenciar aspectos fundamentais de sua crítica a Adorno e Horkheimer. O trabalho assume, como fio condutor, o tema da (...) modernidade. (shrink)

Logic and Knowledge -/- Editor: Carlo Cellucci, Emily Grosholz and Emiliano Ippoliti Date Of Publication: Aug 2011 Isbn13: 978-1-4438-3008-9 Isbn: 1-4438-3008-9 -/- The problematic relation between logic and knowledge has given rise to some of the most important works in the history of philosophy, from Books VI–VII of Plato’s Republic and Aristotle’s Prior and Posterior Analytics, to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and Mill’s A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive. It provides the title of an important collection of (...) papers by Bertrand Russell (Logic and Knowledge. Essays, 1901–1950). However, it has remained an underdeveloped theme in the last century, because logic has been treated as separate from knowledge. -/- This book does not hope to make up for a century-long absence of discussion. Rather, its ambition is to call attention to the theme and stimulating renewed reflection upon it. The book collects essays of leading figures in the field and it addresses the theme as a topic of current debate, or as a historical case study, or when appropriate as both. Each essay is followed by the comments of a younger discussant, in an attempt to transform what might otherwise appear as a monologue into an ongoing dialogue; each section begins with an historical essay and ends with an essay by one of the editors. -/- Carlo Cellucci is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the University of Rome ‘La Sapienza,’ Italy. He is currently completing a book entitled, Remaking Logic: What is Logic Really? -/- Emily Grosholz is Professor of Philosophy at the Pennsylvania State University, USA. She is the author of Representation and Productive Ambiguity in Mathematics and the Sciences (Oxford University Press, 2007). -/- Emiliano Ippoliti is a Research Fellow at the University of Rome ‘La Sapienza,’ Italy. His main interests are heuristics, the logic of discovery, and problem-solving. He is currently working on a book, Ampliating Knowledge: Data, Hypotheses and Novelty. -/- TABLE OF CONTENTS -/- Foreword .................................................................................................... ix Acknowledgements ................................................................................. xxv -/- Section I: Logic and Knowledge -/- Chapter One................................................................................................. 3 The Cognitive Importance of Sight and Hearing in Seventeenthand Eighteenth-Century Logic (Mirella Capozzi) Discussion .............................................................................................. 26 (Chiara Fabbrizi) Chapter Two .............................................................................................. 33 Nominalistic Content (Jody Azzouni) Discussion ............................................................................................... 52 (Silvia De Bianchi) Chapter Three ............................................................................................ 57 A Garden of Grounding Trees (Göran Sundholm) Discussion.......................................................................................... .. 75 (Luca Incurvati) Chapter Four .............................................................................................. 81 Logics and Metalogics (Timothy Williamson) Discussion.......................................................................................... 101 (Cesare Cozzo) Chapter Five ............................................................................................ 109 Is Knowledge the Most General Factive Stative Attitude? (Cesare Cozzo) Discussion.......................................................................................... 117 (Timothy Williamson) Chapter Six .............................................................................................. 123 Classifying and Justifying Inference Rules (Carlo Cellucci) Discussion.......................................................................................... 143 (Norma B. Goethe) -/- Section II: Logic and Science -/- Chapter Seven.......................................................................................... 151 The Universal Generalization Problem and the Epistemic Status of Ancient Medicine: Aristotle and Galen (Riccardo Chiaradonna) Discussion.......................................................................................... 168 (Diana Quarantotto) Chapter Eight........................................................................................... 175 The Empiricist View of Logic (Donald Gillies) Discussion.......................................................................................... 191 (Paolo Pecere) Chapter Nine............................................................................................ 197 Artificial Intelligence and Evolutionary Theory: Herbert Simon’s Unifying Framework (Roberto Cordeschi) Discussion.......................................................................................... 216 (Francesca Ervas) Chapter Ten ............................................................................................. 221 Evolutionary Psychology and Morality: The Renaissance of Emotivism? (Mario De Caro) Discussion.......................................................................................... 232 (Annalisa Paese) Chapter Eleven ........................................................................................ 237 Between Data and Hypotheses (Emiliano Ippoliti) Discussion.......................................................................................... 262 (Fabio Sterpetti) -/- Section III: Logic and Mathematics -/- Chapter Twelve ....................................................................................... 273 Dedekind Against Intuition: Rigor, Scope and the Motives of his Logicism (Michael Detlefsen) Discussion.......................................................................................... 290 (Marianna Antonutti) Chapter Thirteen...................................................................................... 297 Mathematical Intuition: Poincaré, Polya, Dewey (Reuben Hersh) Discussion.......................................................................................... 324 (Claudio Bernardi) Chapter Fourteen ..................................................................................... 329 On the Finite: Kant and the Paradoxes of Knowledge (Carl Posy) Discussion.......................................................................................... 358 (Silvia Di Paolo) Chapter Fifteen ........................................................................................ 363 Assimilation: Not Only Indiscernibles are Identified (Robert Thomas) Discussion.......................................................................................... 380 (Diego De Simone) Chapter Sixteen ....................................................................................... 385 Proofs and Perfect Syllogisms (Dag Prawitz) Discussion.......................................................................................... 403 (Julien Murzi) Chapter Seventeen ................................................................................... 411 Logic, Mathematics, Heterogeneity (Emily Grosholz) Discussion.......................................................................................... 427 (Valeria Giardino) -/- Contributors........................................................................................ ..... 433 Index............................................................................................... ......... 437 -/- Price Uk Gbp: 49.99 Price Us Usd: 74.99. (shrink)

O principal objetivo desse artigo é interpretativo. Trata-se de historiar as tradicionais teorias descritivistas dos nomes próprios sugeridas por Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein e Searle, demonstrando que, diversamente do que é suposto, elas não constituem teorias diversas a competir entre si, mas apresentações algo diversas de um mesmo modo de ver.

Contemporary debate on Kant’s practical philosophy has focused on racial claims appearing primarily in transcripts of students’ notes taken during his lectures. But was Kant – the champion of world citizenship – really a racist? It is certainly hard to defend him from the charge of racial prejudices. However, a universally exclusivist standard of rationality such as the one he promoted leads at worst to cultural imperialism. It is more doubtful whether this amounted also to a full racist theory, as (...) this would have implied seeing some races as inherently incapable of full rationality. Kant’s biological theory of races – the investigation of race being a theoretical rather than practical task – did not serve such a racist purpose. This article argues that Kant was ultimately interested in scientific distinctions, assuming the point of view of a naturalist researcher (Naturforscher). Accordingly, he cannot be said to be a biological racist. (shrink)

In the present work we try to return to the problem of Merleau-Ponty’s historic and political evaluation of action in the light of his accounts in Humanism and Terror and their updating in the last years by commentators such as Alexandre Hubeny, Leonardo Eiff and Jérôme Melançon. We will present some arguments against two very close related theses by Merleau-Ponty: that of the “objective” evaluation of action, which holds that the subjects behavior can be described as constituing a “betrayal” or (...) a “crime” independently of any attribution of intentions to the agents and the thesis of the “objective” responsibility of the agent, that is, the tenet that affirms that the historic and political subjects can be “responsible” or “guilty” for an outcome of their actions, that they cannot have foreseen or can be the exact opposite for what they intended. (shrink)

Develops a "global theory" on the nature of philosophy.

In Machiavelli’s Prince there appears to be a link between Chap.IX on the civil principality and the hope for a unification of Italy by a new prince – a theme presented in the final Exhortation. In both sections, Machiavelli’s unusual lack of historical illustrations suggests the hypothesis that the civil principality and the new prince play a symbolic function. The reading here proposed argues that there is an ideal relation between Machiavelli’s Prince and the Discourses on Livy regarding the opportunity (...) of a regime change from popular principality to Republic. The possibility to switch from one form of government to the other is due to Machiavelli’s idealizations of the civil principality and the new prince. Accordingly, it is argued that Machiavelli’s method follows a strategy of mythologizing realism. In the civil principality the tension between the new prince and his people is not resolved, nor that between the plebs and the nobles. The paper concludes that Machiavelli emphasis on ‘the solitude’ of the prince is what ultimately justifies a transition from the civil principality to the Republic. (shrink)

Resumen: Ofreceré un análisis de la célebre crítica de la fenomenología de Merleau-Ponty en términos de una presunta oscilación entre “positivismo” y “escatología”. Como intentaré demostrar, atribuir al fenomenólogo francés una reducción “positivista” de la epistemología equivaldría a pasar por alto su insistencia en que nos apartemos de la autocomprensión que las ciencias empíricas ofrecen de sus propios resultados; esto es, a pasar por alto sus objeciones fenomenológicas a los marcos ontológicos ingenuos del “pensamiento objetivo”. En cuanto al cargo de (...) “escatología”, al parecer en virtud de sus deudas con el pensamiento marxista, intentaré probar que, no se puede sostener una vez que se toma en consideración el carácter matizado de su aceptación de ciertos aspectos del materialismo histórico.: I will attempt to analyze Foucault’s famous critique of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology in terms of an alleged oscillation between “positivism” and “eschatology”. As I will try to prove, attributing to Merleau-Ponty a “positivistic” reduction of epistemology would amount to overlooking his insistence on moving away from the self-interpretations that empirical sciences offer of their own results; that is to say, overlooking his phenomenological objections against the naïve ontological frames of “objective thinking”. As for the charge of “eschatology”, presumably applied to the phenomenologist by virtue of his debts to Marxist thought, I will try to show that -either understood in a strictly epistemological sense or in connection with an alleged Merleau-Pontyan adhesion to a philosophy of history- it proves untenable once we take into consideration the nuanced character of his acceptance of certain aspects of historical materialism. (shrink)

Machiavelli’s Prince has often been the subject of study limited to individual chapters or topics. In this reading, I guide the reader through an alternative route, a deconstructive analysis unfolding chapter-by-chapter, and revealing a dynamic of logical failure of the principalities. A positive moment is regained only at the end of the book where in the Exhortatio ad capessendam Italiam the urgency for a new political leader to constitute a unifying state is declared. This structural dynamic of The Prince allows (...) to postulate that the solution to the crisis of Italian politics resides outside the forms of the same principalities presented in The Prince. In this respect, more support is gained for the connection between the best form of civil popular principality with the exaltation of the Roman republic as treated in Machiavelli’s Discourses on Livy. (shrink)

In this article I present some implications for a concept of transitional justice through the comparison of two approaches: retributive vs. restorative theories. Notwithstanding their profound differences in perspective, both models are grounded upon a strong notion of the public sphere. Accordingly, after showing why neither of the two approaches exhausts the problems of transitional justice, I will demonstrate how a ‘complete’ justification requires a certain view of public reason based upon rights as truth-constraints of the public sphere.

This contribution has two main goals which might be labelled for convenience as a pars construens and pars denstruens reversing the usual order of these terms. The first aim is to offer an overview of the main tenets of the book, while the second aim is to raise some critical concerns while remaining sympathetic to the author’s overall project. With regard to the first point, I present the context of intellectual debate where Buchanan’s contribution fits comfortably: Darwin’s evolutionary theory, anthropology, (...) psychology, moral analysis etc. The target here is to show the internal complexity and different layers of analysis of the book. These initial reconstructions are, next, used to formulate some thoughts on what I consider possible problematic points in need of clarification. In particular, first, I hold that Buchanan presents too narrow oppositional views between intergroup relations whereupon the notion of “tribalism” is constructed. Such strong identitarian conception does not seem to depict adequately the sociological dynamics of intergroup relations. Second, I consider the terms in which it can be addressed the notion of the rise of the moral mind in evolutionary terms. The suggestion is to consider in a milder form the author’s key concept of a “Great Uncoupling” for the moral reason. (shrink)

In this paper the relevance of so-called "propositional knowledge" is at first compared witho ther forms of knowledge. Secondly,the traditional and standard definition of propositional knowledge as justified true belief is discussed and defended against its most relevant objections. The third and main focus of this paper is a discussion of Gettier's objection to the tradicional definition and some answers to it,with the purpose of developing a more elaborate version of the traditional definition, one which makes it immune to counter-examples, (...) such as those of the Gettier type. (shrink)

In this paper an improved formulation of the classical tripartite view of knowledge is proposed and defended. This formulation solves Gettier's problem by making explicit what is concealed by the symbolic version of the tripartite definition, namely, the perspectival context in which concrete knowledge claims are evaluated.

Esse ensaio tematiza a absorcçáo do dominio da imaginacáo filosófica pelo da investigaçáo cientifica, considerando duas maneiras de ver contrastantes: a concepçáo de A. Comte, segundo a qual a metafisica faz parte de um estágio intermediario da evoluçáo do saber situado entre religiáo e ciencia, e a opiniáo de A. Kenny de que ao menos em seus temas centrais a filosofia ha de permanecer para sempre irredutivel a ciencia. Em minha conclusáo favorereço Comte contra Kenny. De um lado, esse ultimo (...) n áo consegue apresentar um suporte satisfatório para as suas ideias; de outro, basta uma breve olhada no vertiginoso e cada vez mais abrangente progresso contemporâneo da ciencia, para nos apercebermos de que certas ideias defendidas por Comte merecem reavaliac áo . Ele estava apontando para a direc áo certa, ainda que pudesse enganar-se seriamente quanta as dimensõe s e a natureza do território a ser percorrido. A novidade desse trabalho n áo está, todavia, em seu argumento geral, mas na tentativa de uma analise da natureza dos conceitos metafisicos com base em Comte (secáo 4). (shrink)

This paper provides a new compatibilist definition of free will, which is an elaboration of the classic compatibilist view of free will as absence of restriction, with the help of the causal theory of action and some special categories. This new definition enables us to neutralize a very wide range of counterexamples in a systematic and compelling way, including those left unanswered by hierarchical definitions.1.

In der Arbeit wird eine "konservative" Lösung von Gettiers Problem entwickelt, wonach die klassische Wissensdefinition nicht erweitert oder ersetzt wird, sondern auf eine vereinigende Weise interpretiert. Die Hauptidee ist, daß Gettiers Beispielen prinzipiell geantwortet werden können, wenn die logische Verbindung zwischen der Bedingung der Wahrheit der Aussage und die Bedingung der Rechtfertigung des Glaubens an dieser Wahrheit explizit gemacht wird.

This paper aims to show that the ‘I'm thinking’, to really be the awareness of an act of thought, must refer to or indicate particular thought‐contents that are not actually being focused on in the consciousness. A consequence of this is that the ‘I'm thinking’ lacks the absolute incorrigibility necessary to justify its role as a premise for the cogito.

Existem dois tipos de criterio de identidade pessoal, criterios de continuidade mental (geralmente memoria) e criterios de continuidade fisica (como continuidade corporal). Depois de examinar os papeis desempenhados pelos criterios principais, 0 autor sugere uma regra criterial (RECIP) que quando aplicada a urn conjunto de criterios fundamentais fisicos e mentais parece adequar-se a nossas intuicoes acerca do que e ou nao ser a mesma pessoa.

Este artigo trata do problema da epistemologia do mental. Co-mo é possível nosso conhecimento de nossos conteúdos fenomenais, como é possível nosso conhecimento dos conteúdos fenomenais de ou-tras mentes? A resposta consiste no regresso a velhas idéias, como a do conhecimento de outras mentes por analogia e de nosso conhecimento por introspecção de nossas próprias mentes, embora colocando-os den-tro de um referencial teórico e crítico mais sofisticado.This paper deals with the epistemological problem of the knowledge of the mental. How is (...) it possible our knowledge of the phe-nomenal contents of other minds? The answer is to regress to old ideas, like that of the knowledge of other minds by analogy and our knowledge by introspection concerning our own minds, although setting them within a more sophisticated theoretic and critical background. (shrink)

Este artigo contém uma refutação do argumento da terra-gêmea de Putnam, do qual se conclui que o significado está “fora da cabeça”, além de uma breve refutação à sugestão de Kripke de que “Água é H2O” exprime uma identidade necessária a posteriori. Essas refutações baseiam-se no desenvolvimento de uma análise neofregeana e neodescritivista mais elaborada do conceito de água no início do artigo.

Neste artigo o conceito de sentido da vida é analisado em termos da felicidade ou do bem que a vida de uma pessoa trás para ela mesma e para as outras pessoas. No curso do argumento essa tese é discutida e justificada em algum detalhe.

Normal 0 21 false false false PT-BR X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Tabela normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin-top:0cm; mso-para-margin-right:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:10.0pt; mso-para-margin-left:0cm; line-height:115%; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-fareast-language:EN-US;} Freud explains not only the neurotic symptoms and dreams as products of the primary process; works of art are also products of it. Althought being the product of a primary process can’t be a sufficient condition for the identification of an (...) artwork, it can be conceived as a necessary condition of it; a condition that works as well in the creation of artworks as in its correct apprehension by us. (shrink)

In this paper is developed a reconstructive analysis of the conditions for both utterances constative and performative. These conditions were not presented by Austin (in that way), but we must deal with them, if we want that the distinction works. Under the light of this analysis is shown -against Austin -no compelling ground for the rejection of the distinction.

Normal 0 21 false false false MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 O objetivo desse artigo é mostrar que o princípio da verificaçáo náo está táo morto quanto geralmente se acredita. Retornando à metodologia e assunções de Wittgenstein, que afinal foi quem primeiro sugeriu o princípio, respostas às principais objeções sáo sugeridas.

O trabalho apresenta os três principais pontos de vista éticos que são predominantes, hoje, nas discussões da filosofia moral, a saber, a ética de virtudes, a deontologia e o conseqüencialismo. Ele revela os principais traços de cada teoria apontando os seus pontos positivos e negativos. Posteriormente, ele argumentaem favor de um enfoque conseqüencialista, isto é, por uma forma particular de utilitarismo.The paper presents the three main ethical views, namely virtue ethics, deontology andconsequencialism, which are predominant in moral philosophy nowadays. It (...) sorts out the main features ofeach theory pointing to the main advantages as well as to the main disadvantages of each approach.Afterwards, it argues for a consequentialist account of morals, that is, a particular form of utilitarianism. (shrink)

The following paper contains a new refutation of the skeptical argument concerning our knowledge of the external world. The central idea is that the argument fails because it presupposes ambiguous attributions of reality. Once these ambiguities are identified, they make the argument either trivial or equivocal. Differently from others, this refutation does not lead us to undesired results.

Esse artigo contém uma leitura da semântica fregeana na qual sentidos são parafraseados como regras cognitivas e a existência e a verdade em termos da aplicabilidade dessas regras. Nesse contexto ideias objetáveis da semântica fregeana são substituídas por outras mais intuitivas e plausíveis, sendo as consequências disso especulativamente consideradas.

Resenha do livro de: COLLIN, McGinn, The Making ofa Philosopher: My Journey through Twentieth-Centurv Philosophy. New York: Harper Collins, 2002. 241 paginas.