A preference method probed infants` perception of object motion on an inclined plane. Infants viewed videotaped events in which a ball rolled downward (or upward) while speeding up (or slowing down). Then infants were tested with events in which the ball moved in the opposite direction with appropriate or inappropriate acceleration. Infants aged 7 months, but not 5 months, looked longer at the test event with inappropriate acceleration, suggesting emerging sensitivity to gravity. A further study tested whether infants appreciate that (...) a stationary object released on an incline moves downward rather than upward; findings again were positive at 7 months and negative at 5 months. A final study provided evidence, nevertheless, that 5-monthold infants discriminate downward from upward motion and relate downward motion in videotaped events to downward motion in live events. Sensitivity to certain effects of gravity appears to develop in infancy. (shrink)

This book begins with a survey of various readings of Locke as a materialist, as a substance dualist, and as a property dualist, and demonstrates that these inconsistent interpretations result from a general failure of modern commentators to notice the significance of Locke’s ‘mind-body nominalism’. By illuminating this largely overlooked aspect of Locke’s philosophy, this book reveals a common mistake of previous interpretations: that of treating what Locke conceives to be ‘nominal’ as real. The nominal symmetry that Locke posits between (...) mind and body is distinct from any form of metaphysical dualism, whether substance dualism or property dualism. It is a brand of naturalism, but does not insist that the material is ontologically more basic than the mental or that the former determines the latter. On this view, the material and the mental both relate solely to a certain set of functional roles, rather than to an intrinsic property that plays these roles. The term ‘matter’ is thus rendered vague, and materialism is conceived as a precariously grounded ontological doctrine. Elaborating on this interpretation of Locke’s Essay, this book examines the insightful readings of Locke developed by seventeenth- and eighteenth-century thinkers such as Richard Burthogge, William Carroll, and Joseph Priestley. This book also seeks to clarify what Locke’s position would look like in a modern setting by noting some significant parallels with the ideas of leading contemporary philosophers such as Donald Davidson, David Lewis, and Colin McGinn. (shrink)

This article contributes to normative debates about residential segregation and its relationship to inequality. It defends a position often disregarded in literature: that there is merit to advancing residential integration through some scenarios where advantaged individuals move to disadvantaged areas. It develops this case in dialogue with three other views. In relation to advocates of addressing the inequalities of residential segregation through redistribution, it defends integration as a means of tackling social and political factors that sustain injustice. It challenges those (...) who defend relocating disadvantaged individuals to advantaged areas by highlighting the burdens and demand for cultural assimilation this imposes on the disadvantaged. It considers the worry that advantaged individuals relocating to disadvantaged areas harbours the problematic features of gentrification. It responds that these concerns, while important in some cases, do not arise in all scenarios of this kind. (shrink)

A collection of original essays developing a Confucian political and legal theory, focusing on South Korea, traditionally the most Confucian East Asian country in its legal, political, and cultural practices.

1. T'oegye wa Hip'ok'ŭrat'esŭ ka mannagi kkaji -- 2. Taehwa e ch'amyŏ hasin pundŭl -- 3. Che 1-il. 'Kojŏn muksang' : kijon ŭi palgyŏndŭl ŭl ch'ulbalchŏm ŭro samaya -- 4. Che 2-il. 'Chonjaeron': mom an ŭi param ŭn hohŭp, mom pak ŭi param ŭn konggi -- 5. Che 3-il. 'Chŏngsŏ haengdongnon': chari ŭi ch'ai ro inhae sŏro tarŭda -- 6. Che 4-il. 'Kongburon': chonjae haji annŭn ŭisul ŭn ŏpta -- 7. Che 5-il. 'Chihaengnon': maŭm i p'yŏnhaji anŭl ttae nŭn han (...) kŏrŭm kŏrŏra -- 8. Che 6-il. 'Yulliron': kajang hullyunghan ŭihak ŭn ŭihak ŭl p'iryo ro haji ank'e hanŭn kŏt -- 9. Che 7-il. 'Chilli nŭn kat'ŭn kot e': modŭn kŏt ŭi sijak kwa kkŭt ŭn hana ida -- 10. Hip'ok'ŭrat'esŭ myŏngŏndŭl. (shrink)

Experiments using a preferential looking method, a perceptual judgment method, and a predictive judgment method investigated the development, from 7 months to 6 years of age, of sensitivity to the effects of gravity and inertia on inanimate object motion. The experiments focused on a situation in which a ball rolled off a flat surface and either continued in linear motion (contrary to gravity), turned abruptly and moved downward (contrary to inertia), or underwent natural, parabolic motion. When children viewed the three (...) fully visible motions, both the preferential looking method and the perceptual judgment method provided evidence that sensitivity to inertia developed between 7 months and 2 years, and that sensitivity to gravity began to develop after 3 years. When children predicted the future location of the object without viewing the motions, the predictive judgment method provided evidence that sensitivity to gravity had developed by 2 years, whereas sensitivity to inertia began to develop only at 5±6 years. These findings suggest that knowledge of object motion develops slowly over childhood, in a piecemeal fashion. Moreover, the same system of knowledge appears to be tapped both in preferential looking tasks and in judgment tasks when children view fully visible events, but a different system may underlie children's inferences about unseen object motions. (shrink)

In understanding Peirce's unique system of pragmatism following three theories are helpful: first, Herakleitos' saying that 'one can never step into a same river twice', second, Protagoras' saying that 'men are the measure of the world', and third, Darwin's theory of evolution. It is always the case that epistemology takes place on top the metaphysical and cosmological bases. Peirce's metaphysics and cosmology is considered to line up with above three theories. It is interesting fact that Peirce who started up his (...) work in science ended up with such somehow unscientific cosmology. Peirce believes that the world is constantly changing. Inknowing the world Peirce says that the subject of knowing takes a part doing a certain role. Peirce says that 'to believe A', 'to think of A' and 'to think of A as true' are all same sort of mental act. Therefore, to Peirce, truth is only a kind of 'opinion'. This means that the subject of knowing has something to do with truthfulness. In this kind of knowing process 'knowing truth' can only be acquired when possibility of 'inaccuracy' and 'onesideness' are opened. Thus, Peirce's definition of knowing or truth is quite indefinite definition. According to Peirce, we only know the world partially, and moreover, even we get the total sum data about the world,the world will move on forward changing. On this ground, it might be helpful that we look in to current matters in philosophy of mind in different angle. (shrink)

A general feature of language that appears to resist systematic semantic analysis is context-sensitivity. Since the birth of analytic philosophy, philosophers have thought the context-dependence of natural language renders it unsuitable for analysis by the semantic tools of the logician. And metaphor appears to pose a particularly vexing problem in that, in addition to being difficult to systematize for other reasons, it is also context-dependent. However in recent years, the problem of context-dependency has moved to the foreground in the philosophy (...) of language. And some theorists have taken on the daunting challenge of accounting forour context-variant intuitions about what is said by systematic means. The central point of this paper then is to show that the resources these theorists use are far more powerful than the theorists realize. I argue that if these theorists are correct about context-sensitivity, the same resources they use to make context-sensitivity compatible with semantic systematicity can be used to yield a systematic semantic account of metaphor. The paper can be viewed as either a powerful consideration against adopting the resources of theorists who seek to explain all contextsensitivity semantically, or a powerful consideration against those whobelieve metaphor to be merely a matter of language use. (shrink)