In a fluent, easy-to-read style, Frondizi presents a useful, elementary analysis of the nature of value; the basic problems of value theory; an historical survey of the various solutions to these problems; and finally, his own theory concerning the answers to these issues. The basic problem of axiology is exposed by the author as the dilemma between subjectivism and objectivism. It is in this frame of reference that the views of R. B. Perry, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Ayer, and Russell are briefly (...) outlined as examples of subjectivist doctrines. The material apriorism of Max Scheler is described in detail as illustrative of objectivism. Because the theories of Scheler are not too well-known among English-speaking philosophers, the exposition of his doctrines by Frondizi in this text are particularly useful and interesting. Between the Scylla of 'de gustibus non est disputandum' and the Charybdis of absolute standards of value Frondizi asserts the theory that "value is a Gestalt quality, the synthesis of objective and subjective contribution, and which exists and has meaning only in concrete human situations." Value is viewed as open-ended--able to be "furthered by the constant exercise of man's imagination, intelligence and action." Although it may be an open question as to whether the notion of Gestalt somehow resolves basic problems in axiology, it is, nevertheless, interesting to consider Frondizi's account. The book is also useful for its inclusion of a bibliography at the end of each chapter.--S. C. (shrink)