This article aims to highlight the productivity of falsehood in the context of its asymmetrical position with truth. The core of the discussion can be summarized in the following statement: if only truths can be drawn from truths, it cannot be said that truth cannot be drawn from falsehood. The central thesis of the text is that the asymmetrical behavior of falsehood promotes the dissociation between the criterion (based on the conservation of truth) and the field of validity so that (...) the latter, broader than the former, incorporates the movement not only from truth to truth, but also from falsehood to falsehood and, above all, from falsehood to truth. The distinction between the symmetrical and asymmetrical fields allows understanding, for example, the emergence of certain logical fallacies, the separation between demonstration and deduction, the thesis of Popperian fallibilism, and the use of the hypothetical-deductive method. Truth does not have functions analogous to those of falsehood. (shrink)

This text examines the determining characteristics of Descartes' methodological way of thinking. The first concerns the little importance Descartes attributed to the demonstrative expedient and its absorption into acquiring knowledge. The second is that the Cartesian method is resolutive rather than deductive, with knowledge generated by solving difficulties and problems. The third refers to the constitutive stages of resolution, summarized by the operations of analysis and construction. The fourth relates to Descartes' use of the unknown so that an epistemic structure (...) commanded by it generates knowledge. The fifth characteristic is that the method can be universalized, not only because of reason's unique way of operating but also because construction and resolution acquire determinations that can be adapted to the nature of the objects and the particularity of each domain. (shrink)

Wildlife conservation seems unaffected by decolonization movements that recently led to removing or vandalizing several statues of geographers and colonizers worldwide. Instead, we observe an increased emphasis on total protection of species and habitats that, although strategic in a period of environmental crisis, may have grossly negative impacts on living standards of local indigenous communities. In this regard, we should decolonize society, and specifically conservation, by adding new metaphoric statues to the old ones, preferably of those living side by side (...) with wildlife. In this essay, we suggest that zoos, as popular places where urbanized people meet biodiversity, should change their messages that too often reinforce the subtle colonial ideology pervading international environmentalism and often driven by increasing animal rights activism. For example, a new storytelling ethos in zoos should communicate that, in some sensitive contexts (e.g. most tropical countries), the current over-emphasis on protected areas and military law enforcement is also causing serious human rights violations. We need ‘humanised zoos’, i.e. places where conservation of biodiversity is put in a broader socio-ecological context and a central role for the future of ecosystems is given to local communities, ethnic minorities and ‘wise people’ (i.e. people having local traditional knowledge). Zoos should direct more resources toward community-based conservation; foremost, they should shape urban and ‘Western’ attitudes toward wildlife with a less colonized perspective, including spreading the importance of traditional ecological knowledge in ecosystem management. (shrink)

O artigo se propõe a cumprir dois objetivos: a) avaliar em que sentido podemos atribuir autossuficiência aos famosos quatro preceitos metodológicos da Segunda Parte do Discurso do Método; b) propor uma leitura destes preceitos que considere seu entorno, as outras obras metodológicas e o pensamento cartesiano como um todo, mas, principalmente, que reavalie elementos metodológicos tanto pouco quanto excessivamente valorizados. As conclusões correspondentes mais importantes são: (1) os quatro preceitos do Discurso contêm a totalidade do método, mas apenas de uma (...) forma condensada; e, como tais, eles não são autocompreensíveis; 2) uma boa compreensão do método deve englobar outros textos (a começar pelos que compuseram a publicação de 1637), mas principalmente deve calibrar o peso de cada preceito em razão de sua função e do que lhe é atribuído executar, sendo o segundo o mais depreciado dentre eles. (shrink)