Copied in 80 manuscripts and printed in 25 editions Logica Parva was the most widely read logic book in 15th century Italy. By transmitting Oxford logic to Italy it influenced the course of science, philosophy and theology in the Renaissance.

A number of enigmatic manuscripts of Plato have been identified during the last few decades. Thus Mercati , 35) showed that Angelicus c.1.9 , which L. A. Post was unable to trace, is identical to Rossianus 17; N. G. Wilson , 393 n.2) proved that the long-lost Hassistenianus is no other than the Lobcovicianus in Prague University Library Here is the solution of a thirdpuzzle.

R. W. Sharples provides a new edition, with introduction and commentary in English, of the Greek text. The Mantissa is a collection of short discussions, transmitted as a supplement to the treatise On the Soul by the Aristotelian commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias (c.200 AD).The collection includes discussion of a range of topics, among them the nature of soul and intellect, theories of how seeing takes place, issues in ethics, and the nature of fate. The text is based upon a new (...) collation of the principal manuscript, the ninth century Venetus Marcianus graecus 258, and the apparatus corrects Bruns' misreportings of the principal manuscript and of the others that he used. Account has also been taken of the medieval Arabic and Latin versions of some of the sections which circulated independently, notably On Intellect which had a substantial influence on medieval philosophy. The introduction is chiefly concerned with the manuscripts and the relation between them. The commentary is based on the notes to the editor's English translation of the work (London: Duckworth and Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004); however, the commentary also takes into account more recent work on the collection by various scholars. (shrink)

É comumente aceito, atualmente, que Aristóteles não teria enfrentado ou tentado seriamente resolver o famoso paradoxo do mentiroso, embora ele tenha sido formulado por Eubúlides de Mileto, membro da escola megárica e rival filosófico de Aristóteles. No máximo, assim reza a visão tradicional, ele parece apenas fazer uma menção desse paradoxo nas Refutações sofísticas, Capítulo 25, talvez esboçando a sua solução. O meu intento, no presente artigo, é desafiar essa opinião geral mostrando que o Estagirita fornece uma explicação implícita para (...) duas versões do paradoxo do mentiroso, a saber, a versão autorreferencial, e a versão anafórica. A minha alegação é que a solução aristotélica para essas duas versões do paradoxo encontra-se no núcleo de sua refutação de duas teses, as quais denominei como tese da synalethia e como tese da sympseudia. Tal refutação é realizada no oitavo capítulo do quarto Livro da Metafísica, um texto até agora subestimado pelos intérpretes modernos, mesmo sendo a parte final de um dos mais importantes escritos de Aristóteles. A solução aristotélica, assim defendo, é levada a cabo por meio dos seguintes princípios: toda declaração é sempre precedida por um operador de verdade da forma ‘é verdade que...’, ou seja, toda declaração, qualquer que seja o que ela possa declarar a mais, primariamente assevera a sua própria verdade; e, em conformidade com o princípio anterior, toda declaração que assevera a sua própria falsidade ou acarreta a verdade de sua contraditória é necessariamente falsa. Através desses princípios, a refutação de Aristóteles da synalethia e da sympseudia é bem-sucedida. Mostrarei que obtemos uma boa solução para as versões do mentiroso acima mencionadas, apenas aplicando esses mesmos princípios a elas. Esse tipo de solução ao mentiroso tanto quanto para as teses antes citadas é muito parecido com aquele explicitamente encontrado nas obras de diversos filósofos, a saber, Guilherme de Sherwood, Tomás Bradwardine, João Buridano, Alberto da Saxônia, Paulo Venetus, Charles S. Peirce e Arthur Prior. Assim, também defendo que essa linhagem tem as suas raízes na solução de Aristóteles. (shrink)

1. Date of birth once again. 2. The name of Bessarion’s mother was Theodora. 3. A retraction: B. Venetus was not Bessarion Venetus.

In the second Nekyia Hermes conducts to Hades the souls of the suitors slain by Odysseus: Even in antiquity the identification of the Λευκς πέτρη was a conundrum. It would seem that no ancient Greek scholar could plausibly locate this rock. According to the scholion in the codex Venetus Marcianus 613, one of the many reasons Aristarchos gave for athetising the whole of the second Nekyia was λλ' οδ οικεν ες Ἅιδου λευκν εναι πέτραν. Certainly Hades had πέτραι, but (...) traditionally they were ‘black-hearted’ or ‘blood-red’, not λευκαί. As an example of the lengths to which scholiasts were driven to justify the epithet Λευκάς, the scholion in the British Library codex Harley 5674 has the unhelpful explanation ο γρ νεκροί κλείψαντος το αματος λευκοειδες ρνται. Eustathios' attempt is not much better; he writes στέον δ τι Λευκάδα μέν πέτραν μθος πρς τ Ἅιδπλάττει ἢ κατ ντίρασιν, μλας γρ κε σκότος, ἢ κα δι τούς σχάτους τς κε γς τόπους, ος εκς τν ᾓλιον τι διαλευκαίνειν δυόμενον. At Od. 10.515, in commenting on the πέτρη where the Pyriphlegethôn and the Kôkytos flow into the Acherôn, he ventures the suggestion σως δ εη ν ατη ν τος μετ τατα λεχθησομένη Λευκς πέτρα, which is obviously a mere guess. It would be a waste of time to record the conjectural attempts of modern scholars to locate the Λευκς πέτρη in Hades, for if the ‘Rock Leukas’ was across the Ocean, near the ‘Gates of the Sun’ and the ‘Land of Dreams’, we cannot reasonably hope to identify it. (shrink)

It is shown, first, that Georgius Benignus [Juraj Dragišić, ca 1445-1520] at the end of the 15th century almost fully disposed with the theory of the fourth syllogistic figure. Prantl's view on Benignus' logic is critically examined. Besides, Benignus' doctrines on the supposition of terms and logical consequences are examined with respect to his two versions of logic (1488/1489 and 1519) and to the main influences (e.g., Strodus, Paulus Venetus, Ferebrich, Paulus Pergolensis). A reduction of the rules of consequences (...) of Benignus' logic 1488/1489 to the rules of logic 1519 is reconstructed. Benignus rejects the reasoning ex impossible quodlibet and e quolibet necessarium in what he defines as material consequences. (shrink)

Aristophanes' Peace is preserved in ten manuscripts, the oldest and most complete of which are the tenth-century Ravennas 429 and the eleventh-century Venetus Marcianus 474 . A third manuscript, Venetus Marcianus 475 , is almost certainly a direct copy of V and can therefore be eliminated. The seven remaining manuscripts of the play, along with the Aldine edition of 1498, share numerous variant readings, as well as lacunae at 948–1011 and 1076b, and can accordingly be described as a (...) family. As I will argue in detail below, the stemmatic relationship among the members of this family can be most economically represented as shown in Figure 1. (shrink)