The starting-point of my essay is conviction of wide-spread crisis of western civilization. The analysis of this crisis was achieved basing on the Horkheimer's theoretical settlements which are leading to show typical of Plato character of western culture. Basing on the example of 'solar myth' presented by Plato in "Politeia", it is shown totalitarian and captivating human-beings paideia model, which is being realized till the present day in the Mediterranean culture region. Dictatorial, anti-humanistic and oppressing elements of Platonism and related (...) to it civilization, are shown from the G. Bataille's settlements point of view. In his project, ones are suspecting the chance of liberation of human-being. (shrink)

Punktem odniesienia mojego tekstu jest wystąpienie Ryszarda Panasiuka poświęcone idei świeckości państwa, którą traktuję jako składnik nowoczesności. W kontekście kryzysu wywołanego rozwojem nowoczesności stawiam pytanie o możliwość podjęcia działań prewencyjnych. Utrzymuję, że ich skuteczność zależy od tego, czy możliwe jest spojrzenie na obecną sytuację z perspektywy zewnętrzności (transgresja), do której odnoszą się światopoglądy często pozostające ze sobą w konflikcie. Twierdzę, że świeckie państwo stwarza szansę na owocny dialog tych światopoglądów stwarzając szansę na realizację działań prewencyjnych.

The author rejects Marek Witkowski’s conclusion to the effect that no one is morally responsible for anything. This conclusion is based on the implication “x is morally responsible à x’s will is free” and the claim “no one’s will is free” which is justified, in its turn, by pointing out that there are only two possibilities of how it comes about that one wants something: either one’s state is necessitated according to a certain law or it is coincidental, both the (...) possibilities entailing, in Marek Witkowski’s opinion, the absence of the freedom of the will as he understands it. (shrink)

The semantic rules governing natural language quantifiers (e.g. "all," "some," "most") neither coincide with nor resemble the semantic rules governing the analogues of those expressions that occur in the artificial languages used by semanticists. Some semanticists, e.g. Peter Strawson, have put forth data-consistent hypotheses as to the identities of the semantic rules governing some natural-language quantifiers. But, despite their obvious merits, those hypotheses have been universally rejected. In this paper, it is shown that those hypotheses are indeed correct. Moreover, data-consistent (...) hypotheses are put forth as to the identities of the semantic rules governing the words "most" and "many," the semantic rules governing which semanticists have thus far been unable to identify. The points made in this paper are anticipated in a paper, published in the same issue of the Journal of Pragmatics, by Andrzej Boguslawski. (shrink)

On the basis of arguments put forth by (Kripke, 1977a) and (Kripke, 1980), it is widely held that one can sometimes rationally accept propositions of the form "P and not-P" and also that there are necessary a posteriori truths. We will find that Kripke's arguments for these views appear probative only so long as one fails to distinguish between semantics and presemantics—between the literal meanings of sentences, on the one hand, and the information on the basis of which one identifies (...) those literal meanings, on the other. This same failure, it will be argued, underlies the popular thesis that intersubstituting co-referring terms sometimes turns true sentences into false ones and vice versa. Though seemingly plausible, this thesis has a number of counterintuitive consequences, among them that the occurrence of “snow” in “it is true that snow is white” doesn’t refer to snow. An understanding of the distinction between semantics and presemantics suggests a way to develop a semantic system that doesn’t have these consequences and that, moreover, reconciles our intuitions concerning cognitive content with some powerfully argued theses of contemporary philosophy of language. Some of this paper's main contentions are anticipated by Andrzej Boguslawski in his 1994 paper “Sentential Complementation and Truth.”. (shrink)

The book is not only dedicated to linguists, but also to readers who are not familiar with notations developed in linguistics. The first part of the study presents philosophical justifications for linguistic settlements. These are based on the phenomenological reduction of Edmund Husserl, Karl R. Popper's falsificationism, the moderate rationalism of science of Izydora Dąmbska and Andrzej Bogusławski's lack of the nomological explanation in linguistics. The second part presents a re-examination of the solutions proposed in the field of linguistics, some (...) new philosophical explanations and a discussion of the truth of linguistic propositions. (shrink)