Reducing health disparities and improving health outcomes are fundamental principles in global health. Environmental justice remains underrecognized and undervalued as a key driver of health dispar...

The idea that the world is made of particles — little discrete, interacting objects that compose the material bodies of everyday experience — is a durable one. Following the advent of quantum theory, the idea was revised but not abandoned. It remains manifest in the explanatory language of physics, chemistry, and molecular biology. Aside from its durability, there is good reason for the scientific realist to embrace the particle interpretation: such a view can account for the prominent epistemic fact that (...) only limited knowledge of a portion of the material universe is needed in order to make reliable predictions about that portion. Thus, particle interpretations can support an abductive argument from the epistemic facts in favor of a realist reading of physical theory. However, any particle interpretation with this property is untenable. The empirical adequacy of modern particle theories requires adoption of a postulate known as permutation invariance — the claim that interchanging the role of two particles of the same kind in a dynamical state description results in a description of the identical state. It is the central claim of this essay that PI is incompatible with any particle interpretation strong enough to account for the epistemic facts. This incompatibility extends across all physical theories. To frame and motivate the inconsistency argument, I begin by fixing the relevant notion of particle. To single out those accounts of greatest appeal to the realist, I develop the logically weakest particle ontology that entails the epistemic fact that the world is piecewise predictable, an ontology I call ‘minimal atomism’. The entire series of scientific conceptions of the particle, from Newton’s mechanically interacting corpuscles to the ‘centers of force’ in classical field theories, all comport with MA. As long as PI is left out, even quantum mechanics can be viewed this way. To assess the impact of PI on this picture, I present a framework for rigorously connecting interpretations to physical theories. In particular, I represent MA as a set of formal conditions on the models of physical theories, the mathematical structures taken to represent states of the world. I also formulate PI — originally introduced as a postulate of non-relativistic quantum mechanics — in theory independent terms. With all of these pieces in hand, I am then able to present a proof of the inconsistency of PI and MA. In the second part of the essay, I survey responses to the inconsistency result open to the scientific realist. The two most plausible approaches involve abandoning particles in one way or another. The first alternative interpretation considered takes the property bearing objects of the world to be regions of space rather than particles. In this view, the properties once attributed to particles in quantum states are attributed instead to one or more regions of space. PI no longer obtains in this case, at least not as a statement about the permutation symmetry of property bearers. Rather, the new interpretation naturally imposes an analogous constraint on quantum states. The second major approach to evading the inconsistency result is to dispense with objects altogether. This is the recommendation of so-called ‘Ontic Structural Realism’. The central OSR thesis is that structure rather than entities are the basic ontological components of the world. OSR is intended to embrace the ‘miracle’ argument in favor of scientific realism while avoiding the pessimistic meta-induction. I demonstrate that one principal motivation for OSR based on the under-determination of interpretations in QM is actually dissolved by the incompatibility result. At the same time, I suggest reasons to think that OSR fares no better with respect to the pessimistic meta-induction than traditional realism does. Thus, while PI and MA may be incompatible, object ontologies remain the best option for the realist. (shrink)

Parallel moral luck problems exist in three different normative domains: criminal law, tort law, and conventional moral thinking. In all three, the normative status of an actor’s conduct seems to depend on matters beyond the actor’s control. Criminal law has historically imposed greater punishment on the murderer who kills his intended victim than on the identically behaved would-be murderer whose shot fortuitously misses. Tort law imposes liability on the negligent driver who injures someone, but no liability if, through good fortune, (...) the negligence injures no one. And, as BernardWilliams and Thomas Nagel have famously argued, conventional moral thinking often attributes greater blame to an actor for wrongful conduct if that conduct ripens into a terrible event than if it fortuitously causes no harm at all. This Article distinguishes two different dimensions of responsibility and then uses this distinction to explain the problem in all three areas. One dimension is called "fault-expressing responsibility": it is a matter of the degree to which one’s acts constitute conduct that can express one’s character or faultiness. A second dimension of responsibility is called "agency-linking responsibility." In this dimension, the degree to which a person is responsible for some event is dependent upon whether that event is an action of that person. Responsibility can differ in the agency-linking dimension even if it remains the same in the fault-expressing dimension. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Pushed by Problems in Law and Policy The Nature of the Criminal Law Jurisprudence and Legal Theory Moral and Political Philosophy Conclusion References.

Sex differences in reproductive strategy and the sexual division of labor resulted in selection for and maintenance of sexual dimorphism across a wide range of characteristics, including body size, hormonal physiology, behavior, and perhaps spatial abilities. In laboratory tasks among undergraduates there is a general male advantage for navigational and mental-rotation tasks, whereas studies find female advantage for remembering item locations in complex arrays and the locations of plant foods. Adaptive explanations of sex differences in these spatial abilities have focused (...) on patterns of differential mate search and routine participation in distinct subsistence behaviors. The few studies to date of spatial ability in nonindustrial populations practicing subsistence lifestyles, or across a wider age range, find inconsistent results. Here we examine sex- and age-based variation in one kind of spatial ability related to navigation, dead-reckoning, among Tsimane forager horticulturalists living in lowland Bolivia. Seventy-three participants (38 male) aged 6–82 years pointed a handheld global positioning system (GPS) unit toward the two nearest communities and the more distant market town. We find no evidence of sex differences in dead reckoning (p = 0.47), nor do we find any evidence of age-related decline in dead-reckoning accuracy (p = 0.28). Participants were significantly more accurate at pointing toward the market town than toward the two nearest villages despite its being significantly farther away than the two nearest communities. Although Tsimane do show sexual dimorphism in foraging tasks, Tsimane women have extensive daily and lifetime travel, and the local environment lacks directional cues that typically enhance male navigation. This study raises the possibility that greater similarity in mobility patterns because of overlapping subsistence strategies and activities may result in convergence of some male and female navigation abilities. (shrink)

In a naïve realist approach to reading an ontology off the models of a physical theory, the invariance of a given theory under permutations of its property-bearing objects entails the existence of distinct possible worlds from amongst which the theory cannot choose. A brand of Ontic Structural Realism attempts to avoid this consequence by denying that objects possess primitive identity, and thus worlds with property values permuted amongst those objects are really one and the same world. Assuming that any successful (...) ontology of objects is able to describe a universe containing a determinate number of them, I argue that no version of OSR which both retains objects and understands ‘structure’ in terms of relations can be successful. This follows from the fact that no set of relational facts is sufficient to fix the cardinality of the collection of objects implied by those facts. More broadly, I offer reasons to believe that no version of OSR is compatible with the existence of objects, no matter how ontologically derivative they are taken to be. Any such account would have to attribute a definite cardinality to a collection of objects while denying that those objects are possessed of a primitive identity. With no compelling reason to abandon the classical conception of cardinality, such an attribution is incoherent. (shrink)

Scientific practice involves two kinds of induction. In one, generalizations are drawn about the states of a particular system of variables. In the other, generalizations are drawn across systems in a class. We can discern two questions of correctness about both kinds of induction: what distinguishes those systems and classes of system that are ‘projectible’ in Goodman’s sense from those that are not, and what are the methods by which we are able to identify kinds that are likely to be (...) projectible? In answer to the first question, numerous theories of ‘natural kinds’ have been advanced, but none has satisfactorily addressed both questions simultaneously. I propose a shift in perspective. Both essentialist and cluster property theories have traditionally characterized kinds directly in terms of the causally salient properties their members possess. Instead, we should focus on ‘dynamical symmetries’, transformations of a system to which the causal structure of that system is indifferent. I suggest that to be a member of natural kind it is necessary and sufficient to possess a particular collection of dynamical symmetries. I show that membership in such a kind is in turn necessary and sufficient for the presence of the sort of causal structure that accounts for success in both kinds of induction, thus demonstrating that has been answered satisfactorily. More dramatically, I demonstrate that this new theory of ‘dynamical kinds’ provides an answer to with methodological implications concerning the discovery of projectible kinds. (shrink)

It has been suggested that puzzles in the interpretation of quantum mechanics motivate consideration of entities that are numerically distinct but do not stand in a relation of identity with themselves or non-identity with others. Quite apart from metaphysical concerns, I argue that talk about such entities is either meaningless or not about such entities. It is meaningless insofar as we attempt to take the foregoing characterization literally. It is meaningful, however, if talk about entities without identity is taken as (...) elliptical for either nominal or predicative use of a special class of mass terms. (shrink)

The work of the contemporary French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy has impacted across a range of disciplines. His writings on psychoanalysis, theology, art, culture and, of course, philosophy are now widely translated and much discussed. His L'Experience de la Liberte is considered to be one of the landmarks of contemporary continental philosophy. Jean-Luc Nancy and the Future of Philosophy is the first genuine introduction to Nancy's ideas and a clear and succinct appraisal of a burgeoning reputation. The book summarises topically the (...) primary conceptual areas of Nancy's thought and explores its relevance for contemporary issues like nationalism, racism and media rights. Nancy's indebtedness to Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Bataille is examined as well as how his ideas compare to those of his contemporary continental thinkers. Three major areas of Nancy's work are emphasised: freedom and morality; community and politics; and arts and the media. The reader is guided through a chosen theme without being lost in a welter of allusive language, jargon is avoided where possible and when unavoidable it is clearly explained. The book concludes with a new interview with Nancy, which discusses the future of philosophy. The book will be an important addition to the readings lists for courses on contemporary continental thought and political philosophy. (shrink)

I introduce a new method for validating models—including stochastic models—that gets at the reliability of a model’s predictions under intervention or manipulation of its inputs and not merely at its predictive reliability under passive observation. The method is derived from philosophical work on natural kinds, and turns on comparing the dynamical symmetries of a model with those of its target, where dynamical symmetries are interventions on model variables that commute with time evolution. I demonstrate that this method succeeds in testing (...) aspects of model validity for which few other tools exist. (shrink)

The authenticity of the Additamentum Aldinum (Sil. Pun. 8.144–223) has long been a matter of debate. While many scholars have expressed doubts that it is by Silius and suggest rather that it is from the hands of a skilful humanist, it has not, up to this time, been possible to provide solid evidence to support their intuition. This paper not only re-examines the standard arguments for and against authenticity but brings the latest computational stylometric techniques to bear on the question. (...) These analyses reveal that the style of the Additamentum differs in statistically significant terms from the rest of Silius’ Punica.1. (shrink)

Genetic studies in the social sciences could be augmented through the additional consideration of functional (transcriptome, methylome, metabolome) and/or multimodal genetic data when attempting to understand the genetics of social phenomena. Understanding the biological pathways linking genetics and the environment will allow scientists to better evaluate the functional importance of polygenic scores.

One novel example and/or perspective in support of “Why the learning account fails” is the impressive ability of humans to recognize and memorize facial features and accurately and reliably connect those to related identities. Furthermore, neuroimaging analysis presents an example in support of the crucial role of standardization in the lack of adoption of ideography.

We suggest that the inclusion of anxiety, as one relevant mood factor, could enhance the implementation of the integrative memory model in research and the clinic. The role of anxiety in Alzheimer's disease neuroanatomy, symptomology, and progression is used as an example. Customization of the integrative memory model can establish strong foundations for pathology-specific models of memory deficits, enhancing the development of precision medicine applications.

There are several facets of second-person neuroscience which can benefit from comparisons with animal behavioral neuroscience studies. This commentary addresses the challenges involved in obtaining quantitative data from second-person techniques, the role of stress in inducing robust responses, the use of interactive functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), and the value of applying interactive methods to studies of aggression and depression.

Despite their centrality to the scientific enterprise, both the nature of scientific variables and their relation to inductive inference remain obscure. I suggest that scientific variables should be viewed as equivalence classes of sets of physical states mapped to representations (often real numbers) in a structure preserving fashion, and argue that most scientific variables introduced to expand the degrees of freedom in terms of which we describe the world can be seen as products of an algorithmic inductive inference first identified (...) by William W. Rozeboom. This inference algorithm depends upon a notion of natural kind previously left unexplicated. By appealing to dynamical kinds—equivalence classes of causal system characterized by the interventions which commute with their time evolution—to fill this gap, we attain a complete algorithm. I demonstrate the efficacy of this algorithm in a series of experiments involving the percolation of water through granular soils that result in the induction of three novel variables. Finally, I argue that variables obtained through this sort of inductive inference are guaranteed to satisfy a variety of norms that in turn suit them for use in further scientific inferences. (shrink)

Most attempts to answer the question of whether populations of groups can undergo natural selection focus on properties of the groups themselves rather than the dynamics of the population of groups. Those approaches to group selection that do emphasize dynamics lack an account of the relevant notion of equivalent dynamics. I show that the theory of ‘dynamical kinds’ I proposed in Jantzen :3617–3646, 2014) can be used as a framework for assessing dynamical equivalence. That theory is based upon the notion (...) of a dynamical symmetry, a transformation of a system that commutes with its evolution through time. In the proposed framework, structured sets of dynamical symmetries are used to pick out equivalence classes of systems. These classes are large enough to encompass the range of phenomena we associate with natural selection, yet restrictive enough to guarantee a sort of causal homogeneity. By characterizing dynamical kinds via symmetry structures in this way, the question of levels of selection becomes a precise question about which populations respect the dynamical symmetries of Darwinian evolution. Standard population genetic models suggest that populations undergoing evolution by natural selection are partially characterized by a group of fitness-scaling symmetries. I demonstrate conditions under which these symmetries may be satisfied by populations of individuals, populations of groups of individuals, or both simultaneously. (shrink)

The emergence of innovative neuroimaging technologies, particularly highly portable magnetic resonance imaging (pMRI), has the potential to spawn a transformative era in neuroscience research. Resourced academic institutional review boards (IRBs) with experience overseeing traditional MRI have a special role to play in ethical governance of pMRI research and should facilitate the collaborative development of nuanced and culturally sensitive guidelines and educational resources for pMRI protocols. This paper explores the ethical challenges of pMRI in neuroscience research and the dynamic leadership role (...) that IRBs should play to promote ethical oversight of emerging pMRI research. (shrink)

Framed as a critique of David Hume’s analysis of miracles, Peirce offers a sustained argument against an approach to historical inference he calls the “Method of Balancing Likelihoods‘ (MBL). In MBL the posterior probability that a disputed historical event has occurred is computed on the basis of the prior probability of that event occurring and the probability that each purported witness of the event has given accurate testimony. Peirce’s critique of this method is hierarchical: he denies that an objective probability (...) obtains for the truthfulness of witness testimony. Conceding this point, he asserts that, even if such objective probabilities exist, it is implausible to believe that witnesses are independent of one another. Conceding the first two points, Peirce argues that the very sampling process inherent to history necessarily introduces a strong probabilistic dependence that makes MBL unreliable. Finally, irrespective of the success of his first three criticisms, Peirce argues that MBL can be shown by empirical means to fail as a reliable method of inference. I reconstruct this hierarchical critique from a handful of Peirce’s manuscripts, and emphasize its continuing relevance for modern accounts of judgment aggregation. (shrink)

The brain's reliance on glucose as a primary fuel source is well established, but psychological models of cognitive processing that take energy supply into account remain uncommon. One exception is research on self-control depletion, where debate continues over a limited-resource model of self-control depletion. This model argues that transient reduction in self-control after exertion of prior self-control is caused by the depletion of brain glucose, and that self-control processes are special, perhaps unique, in this regard. This model has been argued (...) to be physiologically implausible in several recent reviews. This paper attempts to correct some inaccuracies that have occurred during debate over the physiological plausibility of this model. We contend that not only is such limitation of cognition by constraints on glucose supply plausible, it is well established in the neuroscience literature across several cognitive domains. Conversely, we argue that there is no evidence that self-control is special in regard to its metabolic cost. Mental processes require physical energy, and the body is limited in its ability to supply the brain with sufficient energy to fuel mental processes. This article reviews current findings in brain metabolism and seeks to resolve the current conflict in the field regarding the physiological plausibility of the self-control glucose-depletion hypothesis. (shrink)

Increasing attention has been paid to Platonism in Rousseau’s moral and political thought; however, there has been incomplete consideration of his annotated Platonis Operum – a Ficino Latin translation. Addressing this lacuna, the article details Rousseau’s study of Plato’s works. It can be shown that Rousseau’s reading of Plato commenced no earlier than the summer of 1737 during his residence at Les Charmettes. At this time, Rousseau had been considering a set of largely seventeenth-century philosophical texts, which allows contextualisation of (...) his encounter with Plato and the themes he drew upon. As part of a cluster of intellectual activities, Rousseau canvassed Platonic tropes of sublimated Eros and disinterestedness. Meanwhile, he conceptualised ideas as objects of the understanding typical of Locke and a seventeenth-century discourse known as the ‘way of ideas’. These interests challenge existing accounts of Rousseau’s Platonism; moreover, Rousseau’s mature works attempt to reconcile Platonic beliefs on sublime love with ideas conceptualised under a demi-Lockean episteme. (shrink)

I introduce a thin concept of ad hoc identity -- distinct from metaphysical accounts of either relative identity or absolute identity -- and an equally thin account of concepts and their content. According to the latter minimalist view of concepts, the content of a concept has behavioral consequences, and so content can be bounded if not determined by appeal to linguistic and psychological evidence. In the case of counting practices, this evidence suggests that the number concept depends on a notion (...) of identity at least as strong as ad hoc identity. In the context of nonrelativistic QM in particular, all of the counting procedures appealed to in the existing literature on nonindividuality are shown to involve ad hoc identity. I then show that Goyal Complementarity and the associated derivation of a strong symmetrization principle in QM can be understood in terms ad hoc identity. Specifically, persistence and non-persistence models of quantum processes are seen to be complementary in the sense that they involve two relations of ad hoc identity that occasionally overlap in empirically meaningful ways. Finally, I attempt to draw out consequences for theories of nonindividuality from the above conceptual analysis. The upshot is that counting and definite cardinality are incompatible with nonindividuality, and that none of the counting procedures cited for quantum phenomena offer positive support for an interpretation in terms of nonindividuals. (shrink)

Scientists routinely solve the problem of supplementing one’s store of variables with new theoretical posits that can explain the previously inexplicable. The banality of success at this task obscures a remarkable fact. Generating hypotheses that contain novel variables and accurately project over a limited amount of additional data is so difficult—the space of possibilities so vast—that succeeding through guesswork is overwhelmingly unlikely despite a very large number of attempts. And yet scientists do generate hypotheses of this sort in very few (...) tries. I argue that this poses a dilemma: either the long history of scientific success is a miracle, or there exists at least one method or algorithm for generating novel hypotheses with at least limited projectibility on the basis of what’s available to the scientist at a time, namely a set of observations, the history of past conjectures, and some prior theoretical commitments. In other words, either ordinary scientific success is miraculous or there exists a logic of discovery at the heart of actual scientific method. (shrink)

This collection opens with an inquiry into the assumptions and methods of the historical study of culture, comparing the new cultural history with the old. Thirteen essays follow, each defining a problem within a particular culture. In the first section, Biography and Autobiography, three scholars explore historically changing types of self-conception, each reflecting larger cultural meanings; essays included examine Italian Renaissance biographers and the autobiographies of Benjamin Franklin and Mohandas Gandhi. A second group of contributors explore problems raised by (...) the writing of history itself, especially as it relates to a notion of culture. Here examples are drawn from the writings of Thucydides, Jacob Burckhardt, and the art historians Alois Riegl and Josef Strzygowski. In the third section, Politics, Nationalism, and Culture, the essays explore relationships between cultural creativity and national identity, with case studies focusing on the Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian I, the place of Castile within the national history of Spain, and the impact of World War I on work of Thomas Mann. The final section, Cultural Translation, raises the complex questions of cultural influence and the transmission of traditions over time through studies of Philo of Alexandria's interpretation of the Hebrew Bible, Erasmus' use of Socrates, Jean Bodin's conception of Roman law, and adaptations of the Hebrew Bible for American children. (shrink)

Aristotle’s account of voluntariness (to hekousion) lacks a sufficiently precise positive definition of ‘voluntary’. This is a problem: in Aristotle’s ethics, voluntariness is an important and unifying joint between psychological (character) and practical matters (action). I contend that Aristotle implicitly defines voluntariness as positive causal relation to an agent’s desire, where one’s character is the state of one’s faculty of desire. Since desires always have particular ends (final causes), a voluntary action is one which originates in the agent’s desire for (...) that action’s end. Using this interpretation, I answer questions about ‘mixed’ actions, culpable ignorance, and non-voluntariness. Without this interpretation, these questions cannot be systematically answered. (shrink)

The history of design arguments stretches back to before Aquinas, who claimed that things which lack intelligence nevertheless act for an end to achieve the best result. Although science has advanced to discredit this claim, it remains true that many biological systems display remarkable adaptations of means to ends. Versions of design arguments have persisted over the centuries and have culminated in theories that propose an intelligent designer of the universe. This volume is the only comprehensive survey of 2,000 years (...) of debate, drawing on both historical and modern literature to identify, clarify and assess critically the many forms of design argument for the existence of God. It provides a neutral, informative account of the topic from antiquity to Darwin, and includes concise primers on probability and cosmology. It will be of great value to upper-level undergraduates and graduates in philosophy of religion, theology, and philosophy of science. (shrink)

Middle childhood, the period from 6 to 12 years of age, is defined socially by increasing autonomy and emotional regulation, somatically by the development of anatomical structures for subsistence, and endocrinologically by adrenarche, the adrenal production of dehydroepiandrosterone (DHEA). Here I suggest that DHEA plays a key role in the coordinated development of the brain and body beginning with middle childhood, via energetic allocation. I argue that with adrenarche, increasing levels of circulating DHEA act to down-regulate the release of glucose (...) into circulation and hence limit the supply of glucose which is needed by the brain for synaptogenesis. Furthermore, I suggest the antioxidant properties of DHEA may be important in maintaining synaptic plasticity throughout middle childhood within slow-developing areas of the cortex, including the insula, thamalus, and anterior cingulate cortex. In addition, DHEA may play a role in the development of body odor as a reliable social signal of behavioral changes associated with middle childhood. (shrink)