Competition is pervasive in modern society, affecting work, education, and recreation. The question arises whether competition is consistent with scriptural teaching. The context for this enquiry is that Christians today disagree among themselves about whether Scripture has any normative content relating to competition. Some view competition as incompatible with Scripture, while for others it is compatible. On the basis of a given definition of competition, Christian contributions to the debate in the last decade are reviewed. Only six inputs were discovered, (...) with five arguing that Scripture takes no normative position toward competition. Most of this article is taken up with evaluating their cases that are found to be unpersuasive. A sixth paper claims that Scripture is incompatible with competition, examined in the penultimate section. From reviewing the six contributions to the debate, the conclusion is that that Scripture does not have a favorable attitude toward competition. (shrink)

Cooperation, meaning collaboration between people who assist each other to achieve common goals, is argued to be one of Jesus’ major normative themes. This proposal has not previously been made in Christian ethics. Jesus’ emphasis on cooperation occurs within His major undertaking, His practice of obedience to God. Outlined initially is the meaning of cooperation that aims for mutual help and partnership with others in a friendly, trusting and harmonious alliance. Following that, Jesus’ teachings relating to cooperation are assessed, as (...) interpreted by Biblical exegetes. These teachings include the Golden Rule, Jesus’ admonitions for forgiveness, the need for generosity, required relations between His disciples, and Jesus’ healings. In the penultimate section, objections to the extension of Jesus’ teachings on cooperation in the modern world are found to be unpersuasive. (shrink)

This paper considers the relevance of the Duhem-Quine thesis in economics. In the introductory discussion which follows, the meaning of the thesis and a brief history of its development are detailed. The purpose of the paper is to discuss the effects of the thesis in four specific and diverse theories in economics, and to illustrate the dependence of testing the theories on a set of auxiliary hypotheses. A general taxonomy of auxiliary hypotheses is provided to demonstrate the confounding of auxiliary (...) hypotheses with the testing of economic theory. (shrink)

Ontic structural realism (OSR) claims that all there is to the world is structure. But how can this slogan be turned into a worked-out metaphysics? Here I consider one potential answer: a metaphysical framework known as generalism (Dasgupta, 2009, 2016). According to the generalist, the most fundamental description of the world is not given in terms of individuals bearing properties, but rather, general facts about which states of affairs obtain. However, I contend that despite several apparent similarities between the (...) positions, generalism is unable to capture the two main motivations for OSR. I suggest instead that OSR should be construed as a meta-metaphysical position. (shrink)

Relationism is the view that our best physical theories can dispense with spacetime. To show the feasibility of relationism, philosophers have suggested a whole range of approaches, from the postulation of a physical plenum to the use of modality. Shamik Dasgupta has recently suggested using his Generalism to develop a relationist account of spacetime. This paper argues that Dasgupta’s Generalism offers no hope to the defenders of relationism. We first present Generalism in what we take to be its most perspicuous (...) formulation. We then discuss a recent argument by Sider (2020) against Generalism and show how to defuse it. Finally, we present a novel argument against Generalism based on Barrett’s criterion of parsimony (Barrett 2022). (shrink)

This paper is a defence of a holistic version of the generalist view of moral reasoning based on prima facie principles. In Section 1 I summarise Dancy’s arguments for particularism. Then I argue that particularism goes against strong intuitions regarding reasoning in general (Section 2), fails to account for the asymmetry of reasons (Section 3) and to make sense of compunction and moral imbecility (Section 4). I conclude (Section 5) that a holistic generalism is the right view of moral (...) reasoning. Then I discuss Dancy’s objections to it. I argue that Dancy’s appeal to default reasons is philosophically equivalent to a holistic version of generalism, and hence incompatible with particularism (Section 6) and that his resistance to accept holistic generalism is the result of a foundationalist view of reasoning (Section 7). As an alternative to foundationalism I defend an Aristotelian dialectical view of moral reasoning. (shrink)

A certain argument has been given in the literature to the effect that generalism (the view that all facts about all possible worlds can (in principle) be given in general terms, that is, without resorting to nonqualitative thisnesses) excludes transworld identitism (the view that there are numerical identities through possible worlds). It follows from this argument, among other things, that transworld identitism entails Scotistic haecceitism (acceptance of nonqualitative thisnesses), and that generalists subscribing to de reism (the view that there are (...) true modal statements de re) are committed to counterpartism (the view that sameness through worlds is not numerical identity). The purpose of this paper is to resist the argument in question by constructing generalist transworld identitism, that is, by providing an account involving identities through possible worlds, without resorting to nonqualitative thisnesses. (shrink)

AbstractBoardroom backscratching, or cronyism, is an unethical practice where CEOs conspire with directors to receive remuneration beyond performance- and market-related factors. Premised on the theory of planned behavior, this study investigates whether CEO generalist experience magnifies the likelihood of boardroom backscratching. Using 9482 firm-year observations spanning 1999–2018, our analysis shows that firms with greater CEO generalist managerial experience are more likely to engage in boardroom backscratching, via both cash- and equity-based compensation. We provide further evidence that backscratching firms (...) with CEOs that possess greater generalist experience tend to overinvest, particularly via non-capital expenditure, as a channel for empire building and private rent extraction. We also find that a higher portion of female independent directors sitting on the board and the compensation committee mitigates the positive relationship between CEO generalist managerial experience and boardroom backscratching, which we attribute to greater ethicality of, and increased monitoring exercised by, female independent directors. (shrink)

I defend moral generalism against particularism. Particularism, as I understand it, is the negation of the generalist view that particular moral facts depend on the existence of a comprehensive set of true moral principles. Particularists typically present "the holism of reasons" as powerful support for their view. While many generalists accept that holism supports particularism but dispute holism, I argue that generalism accommodates holism. The centerpiece of my strategy is a novel model of moral principles as a kind of (...) "hedged" principles that incorporate an independently plausible "basis thesis" concerning the explanation of moral reasons. The model implies that moral reasons requires the existence of a comprehensive set of true hedged principles, and so it captures generalism. But the model also offers an alternative explanation of holism, and so it undercuts much of the motivation for particularism. I defend this moderate (because holism-tolerating) form of generalism against a number of objections, and show how it can be used to defeat three distinct arguments from holism to particularism. (shrink)

Ontic structural realism claims that all there is to the world is structure. But how can this slogan be turned into a worked-out metaphysics? Here I consider one potential answer: a metaphysical framework known as ‘generalism’. According to the generalist, the most fundamental description of the world is not given in terms of individuals bearing properties, but rather, general facts about which states of affairs obtain. However, I contend that despite several apparent similarities between the positions, generalism is unable (...) to capture the two main motivations for OSR. I suggest instead that OSR should be construed as a meta-metaphysical position. 1Introduction 2Motivations 2.1Theory change 2.2Permutation invariance 3Metaphysics 4Generalism 4.1Quantifier generalism 4.2Algebraic generalism 5Why Generalism Is Not Ontic Structural Realism 6Ontic Structural Realism as Meta-metaphysics 7Conclusion. (shrink)

This book provides a broad framework for scholar-practitioners to assist parties in conflict to collaboratively and comprehensively analyze and address diverse conflicts using all-manner of conflict interventions and theories emerging out of the twin fields of conflict resolution and peace studies. The generalist approach, which emphasizes both ‘ways of doing’ and skills, as well as ‘ways of being’ and principles, rests on solid theoretical foundations and evaluation research is integral to the approach.

This study explored how the nature of CEOs’ human capital affects the scope of their firms’ corporate social responsibility initiatives. By integrating upper echelons theory with the attention-based view of the firm, the analyses showed that generalist CEOs with a broader range of knowledge and skills tend to aim their firms’ corporate social responsibility efforts toward a broader range of responsibility domains than do specialist CEOs with a narrower range of knowledge and skills. The difference is weaker when a (...) firm’s board has a sustainability committee or when industry peers are active in a broad range of corporate social responsibility domains. These findings are supported by data on S&P 1500 firms spanning 2000 to 2018. (shrink)

Moral principles play important roles in diverse areas of moral thought, practice, and theory. Many who think of themselves as ‘moral generalists’ believe that moral principles can play these roles—that they are capable of doing so. Moral generalism maintains that moral principles can and do play these roles because true moral principles are statements of general moral fact (i.e. statements of facts about the moral attributes of kinds of actions, kinds of states of affairs, etc.) and because general moral facts (...) explain particular moral facts (i.e. facts about the moral attributes of particulars). Moral holism maintains that what is a moral reason to φ in one case may not be one in another, and may even be a moral reason not to φ given suitable circumstances. Some ‘moral particularists’ maintain that moral holism motivates scepticism about the existence of and need for moral principles, along with scepticism about the viability of principle-based approaches to ethics and moral theory. But I argue that moral holism is itself a form of moral generalism, one that takes facts about the right- and wrong-making powers of (generic) moral factors to explain certain particular moral facts—namely, the rightness and wrongness of particular actions. I also argue that a moral-theoretic version of dispositionalism—the view that dispositions, powers, or capacities are the fundamental units of explanation—explains both why moral holism is true and why moral generalism is true. (shrink)

In “The Applied Epistemology of Official Stories” (2023), Tim Hayward offers a thorough and convincing rejection of Neil Levy’s claim that we ought to defer to official stories from relevant epistemic authorities. In this response, I take no issue with Hayward’s criticism of Levy. Rather, I suggest that Hayward’s position could go further, and he already implies a deeper problem with the concept of an ‘official story’. In fact, I’m so swayed by several of his claims against things called ‘official (...) stories’, that, in this essay, I investigate the feasibility of a generalist position towards ‘official stories’. (shrink)

W. D. Ross is commonly considered to be a generalist about prima facie duty but a particularist about absolute duty. That is, many philosophers hold that Ross accepts that there are true moral principles involving prima facie duty but denies that there are any true moral principles involving absolute duty. I agree with the former claim: Ross surely accepts prima facie moral principles. However, in this paper, I challenge the latter claim. Ross, I argue, is no more a particularist (...) about absolute duty than a utilitarian or a Kantian is. While this conclusion is interesting in its own right, it is also important, I argue, because it prevents us from overlooking Ross's criterion of moral obligation and because it may have implications on the broader debate between particularists and generalists. (shrink)

In his exclusive interview with our magazine, the Estonian sociologist, philosopher, expert in the field of education reform, professor emeritus of the University of Tartu, Ülo Vooglide, reflects on the role and purpose of education in educating a generalist of his own ideas, and not an executor of someone else’s decisions. The researcher believes that educational institutions should focus on creating an environment in which the child’s inner potential will be revealed, nurturing his individuality, taking into account dreams and (...) needs. A person and his talents are the main asset of the people. The scientist draws attention to the fact that the result of education is not the amount of acquired knowledge, but the ability and ability of a person to use the knowledge resource in solving practical tasks and life situations. The ability to make independent decisions, effectively solve practical situations and calculate the consequences of one’s actions, etc., is much more important than “filling the head” with ready-made information. Quality education becomes a global value and a categorical condition for competitive strategic development of society. At the same time, the creation and construction of quality education will contribute to the development of Ukrainian society, will allow education to be at the forefront of new social changes. (shrink)

Confucius endorses a balance between generalism and particularism in ethics and aesthetics. Rather than standards, his rules are defeasible guides for perception, thought, and action balanced by particularizing capacities of judgment. These rules have opaque and open-ended hedges that strengthen a generalization by restricting its application. A similar architecture for ethical and aesthetic rules reflects a broad view of ethics and aesthetics as intertwined and continuous. Hence, whether one chooses a generalist or particularist ethics depends on one's corresponding choices (...) in aesthetics, and vice versa. This fundamental finding about value theory invites philosophers everywhere to investigate the teachings of Confucius. (shrink)

This book provides a broad framework for scholar-practitioners to assist parties in conflict to collaboratively and comprehensively analyze and address diverse conflicts using all-manner of conflict interventions and theories emerging out of the twin fields of conflict resolution and peace studies. The generalist approach, which emphasizes both ‘ways of doing’ and skills, as well as ‘ways of being’ and principles, rests on solid theoretical foundations and evaluation research is integral to the approach.

Irreversible generalism, the view that reasons given for the evaluation of art are general and do not admit of exceptions, is defended from the criticisms levelled against it by George Dickie in ‘Reading Sibley’. The authors' view that Frank Sibley adhered to a form of reversible generalism, the view that reasons given for the evaluation of art are general but can sometimes become reasons to disvalue artworks, according to which there a criterion for distinguishing valenced from neutral aesthetic properties, is (...) also defended. (shrink)

This paper is a survey of the generalism-particularism debate in ethics. It's an updated version of "Moral Particularism", in Christian B. Miller (ed.), The Continuum Companion to Ethics (Continuum, 2011), pp. 247-260.

Moral philosophy has long been dominated by the aim of understanding morality and the virtues in terms of principles. However, the underlying assumption that this is the best approach has received almost no defence, and has been attacked by particularists, who argue that the traditional link between morality and principles is little more than an unwarranted prejudice. In Principled Ethics, Michael Ridge and Sean McKeever meet the particularist challenge head-on, and defend a distinctive view they call "generalism as a regulative (...) ideal.". (shrink)

A standard framework for business ethics views the inquiry as an application of major ethical theories to specific issues in business. As these theories are largely presented as being principled, the exercise therefore becomes one of applying general principles to business situations. Many adopting this standard approach have thus resisted the implementation of the most prominent development in ethical theory in recent history: that of particularism. In this article, I argue that particularist thinking has much to offer to business ethics (...) and that standard resistance to particularist business ethics is based largely on misunderstandings. I do so by illustrating how the harbinger of particularism, W. D. Ross, countenances the practical wisdom of particularist ethics while being 1) invulnerable to standard objections to particularist business ethics and 2) compatible with the generalism of the standard approach. The Rossian business ethic is therefore one that the standard approach should be eager to include. (shrink)

Noël Carroll proposes a generalist theory of art criticism, which essentially involves evaluations of artworks on the basis of their success value, at the cost of rendering evaluations of reception value irrelevant to criticism. In this article, I argue for a hybrid account of art criticism, which incorporates Carroll's objective model but puts Carroll-type evaluations in the service of evaluations of reception value. I argue that this hybrid model is supported by Kant's theory of taste. Hence, I not only (...) present an alternative theory of metacriticism, which has the merit of reinstating the centrality of reception value in art critics’ evaluations, but also show that, contrary to a common conception, Kant's aesthetic theory can house a fruitful account of art criticism. The benefit of this hybrid account is that, despite being essentially particularist, it should be appealing even to generalists, including Carroll. (shrink)

In this article I shall be supporting two main claims. The first is that the essence of the difference between particularism and generalism lies in where they locate ethical correctness. The second is that generalism, although to be preferred to particularism, is not the final resting place for ethical correctness. Ultimately, ethical correctness resides in ethical theories that provide the rationale for generalism. Particularism is presented as a theory that allows attention to be paid to specific cases and shows a (...) sensitivity to the particular case. Generalism, with its appeal to moral principles, is supposed to lack this sensitivity to specific cases. I argue that although this might be true of subsumptive generalism, it is not true of what I call judgmental generalism. This latter type of generalism retains an appeal to moral principles while requiring sensitivity to the particular case. I consider Kantian ethics as an example of this sort of generalism. Furthermore, I support the claim that this judgmental generalism is to be preferred to particularism. I argue against a prominent form of particularism, put forward by Jonathan Dancy, based on an appeal to the holism of reasons. This doctrine involves the claim that the value of a complex whole is not necessarily identical with the value of its parts. I show that Dancy’s discussion of this involves inconsistencies and also appears to incorporate subsumptive generalism. This statement of particularism is ultimately incoherent. (shrink)

The orthodox view of logic takes for granted the central importance of logical principles. Logic, and thus logical reasoning, is to be understood as a system of rules or principles with universal application. Let us call this orthodox view logical generalism. In this paper we argue that logical generalism, whether monist or pluralist, is wrong. We then outline an account of logical consequence in the absence of general logical principles, which we call logical particularism.

Many of the recent advances in the history of science have come from local microstudies, but with the unintended by‐product of a typically “postmodern” fragmentation of knowledge. The question for us post‐postmodernists is how to write a broader “general” history of science—a history for all of us specialists—without losing the advantages of case study. One way, this essay suggests, is to structure case studies around the activities or issues that are common to knowledge production generally: for example, issues of common (...) practices, role and identity, credibility and trust, fairness in participation and reward, and translocal circulation. Such studies would be particular and local yet transcend the singularities of period, place, and discipline. They would facilitate productive contest over the general meaning of science in its diversely varied forms. (shrink)

I argue for a kind of sub-category generalism about conspiracy theories. I identify four features that negatively contribute to the evaluation of any conspiracy theory that has them. I argue that particularism about conspiracy theories is in conflict even with this moderate position. I explain the implications of sub-category generalism for questions about the epistemic environment in which epistemic agents operate. I argue that even if there are pragmatic reasons for being vigilant about the possibility of malign conspiracies, this does (...) not support rejecting the claim that it is a prima facie epistemically wrong to believe a conspiracy with any of the four features I identify. I discuss how the favoured sub-category generalism may help to refine discussion about the relationship between the psychology of those who believe conspiracy theories and subjects who have delusions. There are grounds for thinking that believers in conspiracy theories display irrationality at least as bad as those suffering from delusions. This is not to pathologise believers in conspiracy theories but recognise the continuities between those who have delusions and believers who are not the subject of clinical attention. (shrink)

Western Michigan University’s Center for the Study of Ethics in Society has always had a “generalist” approach—that is to say, an interdisciplinary orientation toward studying a broad range of ethical issues. This article explains how the center’s “generalist” orientation developed and why it is desirable for promoting public reflection about ethical issues. It focuses on these dimensions: valuing an across-the-curriculum approach to promote understanding of complex ethical issues; adopting a broad, rather than narrow focus, when it comes to (...) ethics; committing to practical ethics, which bridges theory and practice to shed light on issues of practical relevance to all; and decentering philosophy as the arbiter for what counts as “doing ethics.” The article ends with a look at challenges concerning stable funding and administrative support for a center that does not fit neatly into a single academic unit or specialty and shares some lessons learned. (shrink)

Moral particularism denies that moral reasons present in particular cases depend on any suitable provision of moral principles. If they did, there should be invariable reasons. But reasons are holistic: whether a consideration is a reason may vary with the context. This work responds to particularism with a moderate form of generalism, according to which it is compatible with reasons holism that moral reasons are fundamentally determined by moral principles. The holism of reasons is explained by construing moral principles as (...) hedged: they determine reasons that are invariable, but only given the presence of certain suitable conditions. Both what may function as a reason and what may function as a suitable condition is determined by the given principle's normative basis---the basis on which we attribute to reasons normative force capable of justifying action. Such determinations don't happen fundamentally on a case-by-case basis, but instead set on the holism of reasons the sorts of antecedent constraints that particularism cannot accept. So, although the view rules out standard forms of generalism, it doesn't collapse into particularism. The moderate generalist view of moral metaphysics is argued also to ground better explanations of the relevant sorts of moral facts than its particularist rivals. It is also argued that generalism can regard moral principles as necessary for good moral deliberation without requiring that the deliberator represent them to herself in explicit propositional form. Psychologically, the grasp of moral principles that is required for proper responsiveness to reasons determined by principles may simply structure one's capacity to be responsive to reasons. Finally, on moderate generalism, overall moral verdicts about particular cases are a function of the relative strengths of the reasons present in them. It is argued, from the structure of value and evaluative comparisons, that the relative strengths of reasons are determined not by priority principles that order competing principles but by evaluative comparisons of the alternatives for which the competing principles specify reasons. A plausible moral epistemology is sketched on which the context-sensitivity of such comparisons doesn't make them too weak to justify moral verdicts. (shrink)

In this paper I argue for a particularist understanding of thick evaluative features, something that is rarely done and is fairly controversial. That is, I argue that sometimes that the fact that an act is just, say, could, in certain situations, provide one with a reason against performing the action. Similarly, selfishness could be right-making. To show this, I take on anti-particularist ideas from two much-cited pieces (by Crisp, and by McNaughton and Rawling), in the influential Moral Particularism anthology (eds.) (...) Hooker and Little (OUP). My paper has already been cited by other people working in the field. (shrink)

Cum arată un om moral? Este acesta un om care se află în posesia unor principii ferme și știe cum să le aplice? Sau este un om care, neavând nevoie de reguli morale, reușește de fiecare dată să ia decizia corectă? Poate fi moralitatea codificată într-un set de principii universale? Sau viața morală este mult prea complexă pentru a fi guvernată de reguli stricte? Dar dacă moralitatea nu constă în aplicarea unor standarde generale, ci în capacitatea de a lua decizii (...) corecte, cum știm că o decizie este corectă? Iar dacă explicațiile morale trebuie să fie structurate de crtierii universale, cum putem să dăm seama de pluralitatea și singularitatea contextelor etice? Toate aceste întrebări și dileme, care au configurat destinul eticii occidentale de la Platon și Aristotel până în zilele noastre, sunt abordate într-o cheie nouă în filosofia morală contemporană. Apologia principiilor morale și critica acestora constituie cei doi poli între care oscilează etica, împărțind filosofia morală contemporană în două concepții rivale: generalismul și particularismul. Ce argumente au filosofii generaliști și cum răspund susținătorii particularismului? Cât de valabile sunt raționamentele vehiculate și ce s-ar putea spune în plus? Nu cumva, în decursul istoriei, s-a pierdut ceva esențial pentru gândirea morală, ceva care face ca frământările etice ale omului contemporan să fie nesfârșite, sterile și înșelătoare? (shrink)

The practice of generalist medicine differs from the practice of other clinical disciplines. We postulate that the application of ethics in generalist practice similarly differs from its application in other healthcare settings. In contrast to the problem- focused practice of ethics in other medical specialties, the practice of ethics in generalist medicine blends habits of mind with behaviors applied routinely over time—an ethical way of being. Using a graphic summary and tabular matrix, we present five “T” habits (...) of mind (time, talk, tact, touch, and trust), associate them with applicable practice characteristics, and link them to observable clinician behaviors to demonstrate how the application of ethics in generalist practice is a day-to-day endeavor and not simply a means to resolve episodic conflicts. We textually review key aspects of the matrix and present two case studies that illustrate how such habits of mind and practice behaviors inform the ethical way of being we espouse. We invite generalist practitioners to incorporate the five “T” habits and associated behaviors into their daily care of patients, and we encourage clinical ethicists and other clinical faculty members to consider using them as a model for ethics education with medical students and resident physicians. (shrink)

The field of AI has undergone a series of transformations, each marking a new phase of development. The initial phase emphasized curation of symbolic models which excelled in capturing reasoning but were fragile and not scalable. The next phase was characterized by machine learning models—most recently large language models (LLMs)—which were more robust and easier to scale but struggled with reasoning. Now, we are witnessing a return to symbolic models as complementing machine learning. Successes of LLMs contrast with their inscrutability, (...) inaccuracy, and hallucinations, which underwrite concerns over the reliability and trustworthiness of these systems, motivating investigations into commonsense reasoning, AI explainability, and formal verification techniques. Moreover, proper assessments of hybrid machine learning/symbolic systems require novel strategies to facilitate comparisons of performance and guide future AI progress. The EDGeS AAAI 2023 Spring symposium brought together researchers focusing on novel assessments and benchmarks for evaluating hybrid and artificial general intelligence (AGI) systems. This symposium revealed what was already suspected: research concerning evaluation of machine learning/symbolic hybrids and AGI is, unfortunately, lacking. Even so, the discussion was fruitful. (shrink)

Dasgupta :35–67, 2009) has argued that material individuals, such as particles and laptops, are metaphysically objectionable and must be eliminated from our fundamental theories of the world. He proposes to eliminate them by redescribing all the fundamental facts of the world in a variant of predicate functor logic. We study the status, on this theory, of a putative fact particularly recalcitrant to a formulation within predicate functor logic: his own claim that there are no fundamental or primitive material individuals. We (...) consider three regimentations of the denial of primitive individuals and show that—under some plausible hypotheses about fundamental truths and the fundamentality operator—they cannot be consistently translated in predicate functor logic by Dasgupta’s usual strategy. We conclude by discussing two approaches to salvage Generalism, in the absence of such a translation. (shrink)

The debate between individualism and generalism (qualitativism) concerns, inter alia, the question of whether qualitative identity implies numerical identity. One important argument against the affirmative answer to this question is based on an analysis of cases known as symmetry-breaking indeterministic processes, including the case of a collapsing tower. Generalism implies that all processes of that kind are deterministic, contrary to our snap judgment. This article contains a multifaceted analysis of the above argument against generalism, taking into account its metaphysical, scientific (...) and modal aspects. It is suggested that the intuition of indeterminism regarding the considered cases can be explained by a distinct phenomenon of indeterminacy affecting the diachronic identity of participating objects. It is also observed that both individualism and generalism are unable to formulate a theory which could make definite predictions that are more specific than the ones made in purely qualitative language. This strongly suggests that the purported indeterminism of the considered scenarios is not genuine. Finally, the modal analysis shows how generalism is capable of expressing the idea of alternative possibilities without violating the fundamental assumption of determinism. This approach is based on the Lewisian counterpart semantics for quantified modal logic with same-world counterparts. (shrink)

This paper is a critical investigation about the historical origins of two contemporary approaches in ethics: moral particularism and moral generalism. Moral particularism states that there are no defensible moral principles and that moral thought doesn’t consist in the application of moral principles to cases, but in understanding the morally relevant features of an action, which vary from case to case. In opposition, moral generalism is the traditional claim that moral decisions are made by applying general rules to particular actions. (...) Plato is often seen as a moral generalist for his appeal to Forms which are universal standards, while Aristotle is regarded as a precursor of moral particularism for stressing the importance of the “the prudence”, which is the intellectual capacity to perceive the irreducible specificity of a context, and the importance of “the means” which differs from person to person. First I will take Plato into discussion, and I will briefly reconstruct his theoretical account on Justice and virtue in order to establish his “generalist” orientation. Then I will analyze Aristotle’s alleged particularism by appealing to his texts and assessing some considerations of a few contemporary authors. At the end of the paper, I will question both particularism and generalism for the appropriation of the two ancient philosophers, on the ground that modern moral philosophy which is an action centered ethics is hard to reconcile with ancient moral thought which was an agent centered one. (shrink)

I contrast two approaches to defining a generalist, as opposed to a specialist: one from the specialist’s point of view and another while starting from a paradigm case of a generalist.

The debate on the a fortiori and the universal that took place between April 1914 and April 1919 in the journal Mind has a double interest for argumentation theorists. First, the discussion is an example of a philosophical polylogue that exhibits the characteristics of a quasi-engaged dialogue (Blair Blair, J. A. (2012 [1998]). “The Limits of the Dialogue Model of Argument”. Argumentation 12, pp. 325–339. Reprinted in J.A. Blair, Groundwork in the Theory of Argumentation, pp. 231–244. Dordrecht: Springer, 2012.), confirming (...) Blair’s hypothesis that journal papers and scholarly monographs can be analyzed as turns in non-engaged or quasi-engaged dialogues. It could be said that philosophical argumentation is dialectical but not dialogical. Second, the debate is a discussion in argumentation theory. Generalism in the theory of argument claims that the very possibility of arguing depends on a suitable supply of general rules that specify what kinds of conclusions can be drawn from what kinds of data, while particularism denies this. Although the terminology may be alien, I will also show that the debate on the a fortiori and the universal was a debate on generalism and particularism. (shrink)

‘Particularism’ is a meta-ethical theory resulting from a holistic doctrine in the theory of reasons. According to Jonathan Dancy, the foremost contemporary proponent of particularism, ‘a feature that is a reason in favour of an action in one case may be no reason at all in another, or even a reason against’ (2004: 190). From this, Dancy claims, it follows that the ‘possibility of moral thought and judgement does not depend on the provision of a suitable supply of moral principles’ (...) (2004: 7). This doctrine is of significant interest and import in its own right, and accordingly is the subject of considerable critical attention. The concern of this paper, however, is not meta-ethics but semantics. (shrink)

Moral perception, for the purposes of this article, is taken to be the perception of moral properties, unless contexts dictate otherwise. While both particularists and generalists agree that we can perceive the moral properties of an action or a feature, they disagree, however, over whether rules play any essential role in moral perception. The particularists argue for a ‘no’ answer, whereas the generalists say ‘yes’. In this paper, I provide a limited defense of particularism by rebutting several powerful generalist (...) arguments. It is hoped particularism can thus be made more attractive as a theory of moral perception. Positive arguments for particularism will also be provided along the way. (shrink)

Saunders' recent arguments in favour of the weak discernibility of (certain) quantum particles seem to be grounded in the 'generalist' view that science only provides general descriptions of the worlIn this paper, I introduce the ‘generalist’ perspective and consider its possible justification and philosophical basis; and then look at the notion of weak discernibility. I expand on the criticisms formulated by Hawley (2006) and Dieks and Veerstegh (2008) and explain what I take to be the basic problem: that (...) the properties invoked by Saunders cannot be pointed to as ‘individuators’ of otherwise indiscernible (and thus numerically identical) entities because their ontological status remains underdetermined by the evidence and the established interpretation of the theory. In addition to to this, I suggest that Saunders does not deal adequately with bosons, and cannot do so exactly because he subscribes to PII and the generalist picture. The last part of the paper contains a critical examination of the claim (or at least implicit assumption) that the generalist picture should be regarded as obviously compelling by the modern-day empiricist. (shrink)