JEL Classification: B41, B53, B31, B2, P48, A12 Abstract: Wittgenstein’s rule-following paradox has important implications for two aspects of Austrian theory. First, it makes it possible to reconcile the Misesian, Rothbardian, and hermeneutical approaches to methodology; second, it provides a way of defending a stateless legal order against the charge that such an order lacks, yet needs, a final arbiter.

Multiple selves is a conventional assumption in behavioural welfare economics for modelling intrapersonal well-being. Yet an important question is which self has normative authority over others. In this paper, we advance an argument for what we call the ‘ontological approach’ to personal identity in behavioural welfare economics. According to this approach, ethical questions – such as which preference should be granted normative authority over another – can be informed by the ontological criterion of personal persistence, which aims at determining what (...) it takes for an individual to persist from one time to another. (shrink)

Hayek’s seminal contribution to theoretical neurosciences,The Sensory Order(1952) remains neglected in current efforts at integrating the neurosciences, psychology and economics. I defend the view that Hayek presents the case for an evolutionary alternative to leading paradigms in the field and look at two in more detail: the good-based model in neuroeconomics and the dual systems approach in behavioural economics. In both cases, essential Hayekian insights remain valid in the context of modern neuroscience, allow for taking account of recent research, and (...) sketch a dynamic and selectionist model of choice. (shrink)

Economists are often called upon as expert witnesses by the parties involved in antitrust litigation. One challenge they may face in US federal courts is compliance with the Daubert standard of admissibility of expert testimony. The interplay between model applicability and the Daubert standard is analyzed, suggesting the importance of distinguishing between weak applicability claims, those that state that a model’s critical assumptions are shared by the target, and strong applicability claims, those that connect empirical models and quantitative market features. (...) Recent antitrust cases in which expert testimonies based on economic models have been assessed following the Daubert standard are examined using this framework. Some normative implications are drawn concerning how to improve judges’ assessment of model-based arguments. (shrink)

Robert Sugden (2018. The Community of Advantage: A Behavioural Economist’s Defence of the Market. Oxford University Press) offers an alternative account for normative economics grounded in the view that it is in each individual’s interest to have more opportunity rather than less, irrespective of whether their decisions reveal well-ordered preferences. Our paper characterizes Sugden’s proposal as a step in the right direction, but as insufficient. His opportunity criterion does not go far enough in taking insights from psychology seriously. Sugden defends (...) an idea of agency understood as a person’s subjective sense of being in control of her actions. To realize this sense of being in control, we argue that a focus on opportunity-only is problematic; people also need agentic capabilities. We use self-determination theory (SDT) to develop a subjective account of agency that is grounded in psychological science. (shrink)

We propose a methodology for normative evaluation when preferences are context-dependent. We offer a precise definition of context-dependence and formulate a normative criterion of self-determination, according to which one situation is better than another if individuals are aware of more potential contexts of a choice problem. We provide two interpretations of our normative approach: an extension of Sugden’s opportunity criterion and an application of Sen’s positional views in his theory of justice. Our proposition is consistent with Muldoon’s and Gaus’ approaches (...) of public reason in social contract theory, which account for the diversity of perspectives in non-ideal worlds. (shrink)

Much work in game theory concerns mechanisms by which players can infer information about the utilities and beliefs of other players based on actions within games and pre-play signals. When game theory is applied to interactions among people, such analysis interprets them as ‘mindreading’. Recent work in cognitive science, however, suggests that human coordination rests more centrally on ‘mindshaping’, where interactants determine preferences jointly. As mindshaping is strategic, there is motivation to extend game theory to accommodate it. Conditional Game Theory (...) (CGT) is a strategic theory of mindshaping. We show how it can be used to help players of standard games identify correlated equilibrium, and thus solve games. We then extend CGT to address a challenge to the relevance of correlated equilibrium to empirical choice data, by showing how pre-play analysis using CGT can reconcile the Harsanyi Doctrine – assumed common priors among Bayesian players – with rank-dependent choice as observed in economic experiments. (shrink)

Cet article utilise la notion de convention afin de préciser une condition nécessaire à la performation du monde social. On considère ici que l’influence des théories économiques sur le monde social peut être analysée en termes de traduction de conventions scientifiques en conventions sociales. Une telle perspective nous amène à souligner un élément essentiel d’une telle traduction : pour performer le monde social, une notion théorique doit dans un premier temps prendre une posture empirique. On étudie plus particulièrement l’exemple emblématique (...) de la rationalité économique comme concept central d’un nouveau type de politique publique : l’économie des nudges. Classification J.E.L. : B41, C91, Z1. (shrink)

Les neurosciences sont utilisées en économie dans l’objectif d’améliorer la compréhension et la description des choix individuels. Elles permettent aussi d’évaluer la rationalité des décideurs et de réguler les comportements. Cet article analyse les implications normatives de la neuroéconomie, en dégageant les apports des neurosciences à l’économie du bien-être et à l’économie publique. L’interventionnisme économique défendu par les neuroéconomistes (par exemple, Bernheim et Rangel 2004) y est interprété comme une politique caractéristique du néo-libéralisme, au sens qu’en donne Michel Foucault (1978b). (...) Si la neuroimagerie ne permet pas de « manipuler » directement le cerveau des décideurs, elle offre en revanche la possibilité de détecter le caractère pathologique ou irrationnel de certaines conduites. Ce diagnostic justifie une régulation comportementale du bien-être, qui doit être distinguée du paternalisme libertarien de Sunstein et Thaler (2003). Dans les deux cas, c’est l’environnement plutôt que le décideur lui-même qui est la cible de l’intervention, mais la justification théorique n’est pas la même. Pour les neuroéconomistes, l’irrationalité d’un comportement tel que l’addiction ne résulte pas d’un biais cognitif de l’individu, mais de son interaction avec un environnement pathologique. Les réflexions normatives des neuroéconomistes s’inscrivent dans le prolongement théorique des réflexions de Michel Foucault sur la biopolitique et le néolibéralisme (Foucault 2004b). Notre étude vaut ainsi comme une contribution à l’étude de la gouvernementalité. Elle nous conduit à défendre une interprétation non-réductionniste des rapports entre savoir et pouvoir chez Foucault. Classification JEL : D87, H10, B41. (shrink)

Je soutiens qu’Héraclite développe une théorie implicite de l’action : l’accomplissement réussi d’une action intentionnelle dépend de la compréhension du logos, qui constitue une explication causale de toutes les choses dans le cosmos. Mon analyse d’Héraclite repose principalement sur le concept de gnome, qui, comme j’entends le montrer, est une manifestation de la convergence entre la compréhension du logos et l’action intentionnelle. Gnome, qui permet au feu divin de guider « tout à travers tout » en B41, se compose de (...) trois éléments : la capacité à élaborer un plan, le plan lui-même, et son exécution. J’illustre comment l’échec à accomplir une action réussie résulte d’un déficit de gnome en mettant l’accent sur deux aspects particuliers : l’exécution et le plan. J’examine la relation entre la compréhension et le contrôle, ainsi que la manière dont le (manque de) contrôle physique affecte l’exécution d’un plan pour l’homme ivre en B117. J’étudie en outre comment la connaissance peut influencer la pertinence du plan lui-même en examinant les fragments d’Héraclite sur la religion. (shrink)

C’est à la filiation que Jacques Rueff entretient avec les conventionnalistes français que cet article est consacré. Son premier écrit académique, Des sciences physiques aux sciences morales (1922) est un ouvrage épistémologique qui prévoit l’unification des sciences physiques et morales à partir d’une méthodologie unique et scientifique tirée des principes conventionnalistes. En effet, Rueff les prolonge et les complète en sortant du champ exclusif des sciences physiques ; son but est alors de rapprocher les sciences morales des sciences physiques, considérant (...) que « toutes les sciences [y compris morales] sont des sciences rationnelles » (Rueff 1922, 4).Codes JEL : B22, B23, B41. (shrink)

Résumé Le problème de Duhem-Quine a été considéré comme un problème majeur de la philosophie des sciences et a donné lieu au déploiement de nombreux efforts pour tenter de le circonvenir ou d’affaiblir ses implications. Plus récemment, le problème est devenu une question majeure au sein de la méthodologie de l’économie expérimentale. Dans cet article, l’auteur soutient que la plupart de ces discussions soit sacrifient trop du pouvoir explicatif de la science, soit ne réussissent pas à traiter proprement du problème. (...) Dans le prolongement de discussions récentes en philosophie des sciences, on peut voir que le meilleur moyen de traiter du problème est de critiquer la conception même de la science développée par Quine. JEL Classification : B41. (shrink)

Résumé Les questions d’échelle ont donné lieu à une large réflexion s’agissant de la modélisation et de l’expérimentation des systèmes physiques, mais elles n’ont pas été discutées dans le cadre des expériences économiques. Dans cet article, on distingue deux sortes d’expériences, les expériences « génériques » et « spécifiques ». Développant une comparaison entre deux études expérimentales en laboratoire portant sur l’« effet des prix postés », on montre que les questions d’échelle deviennent importantes dans les expériences spécifiques en raison (...) de la réduction aux dimensions du laboratoire de l’échelle de temps propre au marché cible. Cela impose des choix dans la configuration matérielle de l’expérience comme des changements de rôle pour les sujets expérimentaux. Notre discussion, donc, s’inscrit au sein de la littérature récente sur la validité externe et la matérialité des expériences. JEL Classification : B41, C90, L92, L98. (shrink)

À la fin des années 1990, plusieurs tendances convergentes en économie, psychologie et neuroscience ont préparé le terrain pour la naissance d’un nouveau champ scientifique qualifié de « neuroéconomie ». Comme pour toute discipline émergente – pensons par exemple à l’économie mathématique, l’économétrie ou l’économie expérimentale en d’autres temps – la neuroéconomie est plutôt controversée en économie. Elle soulève un grand nombre de questions d’ordre empirique, méthodologique et philosophiques donnant lieu à des débats et controverses que l’article identifie et discute (...) à travers trois questions majeures relatives aux connaissances produites : Sont-elles fiables? Sont-elles scientifiquement légitimes? Sont-elles utiles pour les économistes? Sans prétendre à l’exhaustivité, ce cadre analytique permet de comprendre l’essence des principales critiques adressées à la neuroéconomie. Dans le même temps, l’article éclaire la nature des réponses susceptibles d’être apportées à ces critiques au vu des progrès conceptuels et empiriques qu’a connus ce champ de recherche depuis son émergence et à la lumière du tournant apparu dans l’agenda de la neuroéconomie au cours de la dernière décennie. JEL Codes : A12, B41, C51, C81, C9, D03, D87. (shrink)

The rise of behavioral economics since the 1980s led to richer mutual influence between economic and psychological theory and experimentation. However, as behavioral economics has become increasingly integrated into the main stream in economics, and as psychology has remained damagingly methodologically conservative, this convergence has recently gone into reverse. At the same time, growing appreciation among economists of the limitations of atomistic individualism, along with advantages in econometric modeling flexibility by comparison with psychometrics, is leading economists to become more pluralistic (...) than psychologists about the ontology of behavioral causation and structures. This, combined with economists’ growing interest in network models, is drawing economists closer in theory and practice to sociologists who use quantitative or mixed methods. (shrink)

This paper examines methods for narrating consciousness in game theory. In order to represent how players process their environment, posture towards one another, and hold themselves accountable to their own thinking, I find two distinct ways that game theorists narrate the consciousness of their players. Quoted monologue is a player’s internal language, which can be articulated to show a player’s perspective to the reader. The other narrative mode is psycho-narration, which puts the external technical skills of the game-theorist into the (...) narrator’s hands to describe a player’s mental activity with more complexity than quoted monologue. Quoted monologue and psycho-narration communicate players’ thoughts in ways that convince the readers of the players’ positions, clarify game solution concepts, and enliven the written text. (shrink)

A common narrative among some behavioural economists and policy makers is that experimental psychology highlights that individuals are more like Homer Simpson than the Mr Spock imagined by neoclassical economics, and that this justifies policies aiming to ‘correct’ individual behaviours. This narrative is central to nudging policies and suggests that a better understanding of individual cognition will lead to better policy prescriptions. I argue that this Homer economicus narrative is methodologically flawed, and that its emphasis on cognition advances a distorted (...) view of public policies consisting in fixing malfunctioning individuals, while ignoring the characteristics of the socio-economic environment that influence individuals’ behaviours. (shrink)

Whereas many others have scrutinized the Allais paradox from a theoretical angle, we study the paradox from an historical perspective and link our findings to a suggestion as to how decision theory could make use of it today. We emphasize that Allais proposed the paradox asa normative argument, concerned with ‘the rational man’ and not the ‘real man’, to use his words. Moreover, and more subtly, we argue that Allais had an unusual sense of the normative, being concerned not so (...) much with therationality of choicesas with therationality of the agent as a person. These two claims are buttressed by a detailed investigation – the first of its kind – of the 1952 Paris conference on risk, which set the context for the invention of the paradox, and a detailed reconstruction – also the first of its kind – of Allais’s specific normative argument from his numerous but allusive writings. The paper contrasts these interpretations of what the paradox historically represented, with how it generally came to function within decision theory from the late 1970s onwards: that is, as an empirical refutation of the expected utility hypothesis, and more specifically of the condition of von Neumann–Morgenstern independence that underlies that hypothesis. While not denying that this use of the paradox was fruitful in many ways, we propose another use that turns out also to be compatible with an experimental perspective. Following Allais’s hints on ‘the experimental definition of rationality’, this new use consists inletting the experiment itself speak of the rationality or otherwise of the subjects. In the 1970s, a short sequence of papers inspired by Allais implemented original ways of eliciting the reasons guiding the subjects’ choices, and claimed to be able to draw relevant normative consequences from this information. We end by reviewing this forgotten experimental avenue not simply historically, but with a view to recommending it for possible use by decision theorists today. (shrink)

In this article, we reassess two of Mises’ core methodological claims. The first claim is that action is necessarily rational. The second claim is that all human minds share a logical structure. Neither claim can be unreservedly accepted but, we argue, both contain truth: Mises’ reflections remain important contributions to our understanding of action and the mind, hence to economics.

Randomized control trials (RCTs) are recognized as the preferred tool of analysis in modern development economics literature/research and policy evaluation. This may lead to methodologies, including case studies, tabular analysis, simple regressions, taking a back seat. This survey explores the implications of such a methodological hierarchy and the implications of preoccupation with a particular evidence/methodology for research and policy. Similar developments in macroeconomic modelling are also discussed. Major advantages and limitations of RCTs and the attempts to address them are highlighted. (...) The article argues that preoccupation with a methodology can sometimes lead to important inquiries for research and policy getting side-lined on methodological considerations. This leads to inferences favouring a particular technique/methodology or issue. Focusing solely on methodologies that emphasize quantifying the ‘effect’ may not be appropriate to address all questions relevant to development. As policies involve multiple and conflicting social concerns, methodological pluralism may be preferable. (shrink)