Studies presenting memory-facilitating effect of emotions typically focused on affective dimensions of arousal and valence. Little is known, however, about the extent to which stimulus-driven basic emotions could have distinct effects on memory. In the present paper we sought to examine the modulatory effect of disgust, fear and sadness on intentional remembering and forgetting using widely used item-method directed forgetting paradigm. Eighteen women underwent fMRI scanning during encoding phase in which they were asked either to remember (R) or to forget (...) (F) pictures. In the test phase all previously used stimuli were re-presented together with the same number of new pictures and participants had to categorize them as old or new, irrespective of the F/R instruction. On the behavioral level we found a typical directed forgetting effect, i.e. higher recognition rates for to-be-remembered (TBR) items than to-be-forgotten (TBF) ones for both neutral and emotional categories. Emotional stimuli had higher recognition rate than neutral ones, while among emotional those eliciting disgust produced highest recognition, but at the same time induced more false alarms. Therefore when false alarm corrected recognition was examined the directed forgetting effect was equally strong irrespective of emotion. Additionally, even though subjects rated disgusting pictures as more arousing and negative than other picture categories, logistic regression on the item level showed that the effect of disgust on recognition memory was stronger than the effect of arousal or valence. On the neural level, ROI analyses (with valence and arousal covariates) revealed that correctly recognized disgusting stimuli evoked the highest activity in the left amygdala compared to all other categories. This structure was also more activated for remembered vs. forgotten stimuli, but only in case of disgust or fear eliciting pictures. Our findings, despite several limitations, suggest that disgust have a special salience in memory relative to other negative emotions, which cannot be put down to differences in arousal or valence. The current results thereby support the suggestion that a purely dimensional model of emotional influences on cognition might not be adequate to account for observed effects. (shrink)

This is the précis of Artūrs Logins book Normative Reasons: Between Reasoning and Explanation (Logins 2022).

In this paper I examine Williamson’s (2000) claim that all evidence is propositional. I propose to reject this claim. I give two objections to two premises of Williamson’s argument. The first is a critique of Williamson’s claim that we choose between hypotheses on the basis of our evidence. The second objection is that Williamson’s claim that evidence is an explanandum of an hypothesis leads to counter-intuitive consequences and thus is not central to what evidence is, at least on an ordinary (...) understanding. (shrink)

Niniejszy artykuł powstał z myślą, aby dokonać analizy wybranych zagadnień Kantowskiej teorii własności. Należy bowiem zaznaczyć, że pomimo istniejącej już bogatej literatury poświęconej filozofii Immanuela Kanta, to część Nauki prawa, która dotyczy własności wciąż pozostaje w cieniu innych, dyskutowanych od lat problemów. Za taką sytuację odpowiada po części sam Kant, którego wykład poświęcony własności odnajdziemy jedynie w kilku paragrafach prawa prywatnego Nauki prawa. W kolejnych częściach w tym między innymi tych, które dotyczą prawa publicznego, pojęcie własności jest jedynie wzmiankowane. Pomimo (...) wrażenia, że może ono należeć do mniej istotnych zagadnień Kantowskiej filozofii prawa, to znaczenie, jakie filozof mu nadaje, zdaje się być niepodważalne. W swoim artykule postanowiłem skoncentrować się na tych elementach dzięki, którym mogłem dokonać wprowadzenia do Kantowskiej teorii własności. Wśród nich znalazło się m.in. pojęcie prawa wraz z podziałem nauki prawa. Zakreśliłem obszar badań do prawa nabytego, co pozwoliło mi przejść do pojęcie posiadania i pojęcia własności oraz usystematyzowania pojęcia nabywania. Na końcu wskazałem, że jedynie w stanie prawno-obywatelskim własność każdego poszczególnego podmiotu jest mu prawnie przydzielona i zapewniana. (shrink)

According to the knowledge view of evidence notoriously defended by Timothy Williamson (2000), for any subject, her evidence consists of all and only her propositional knowledge (E=K). Many have found (E=K) implausible. However, few have offered arguments against Williamson’s positive case for (E=K). In this paper, I propose an argument against Williamson’s positive case in favour of (E=K). Central to my argument is the possibility of the knowledge of necessary truths. I also draw some more general conclusions concerning theorizing about (...) evidence. (shrink)

This paper elaborates a new solution to the lottery paradox, according to which the paradox arises only when we lump together two distinct states of being confident that p under one general label of ‘belief that p’. The two-state conjecture is defended on the basis of some recent work on gradable adjectives. The conjecture is supported by independent considerations from the impossibility of constructing the lottery paradox both for risk-tolerating states such as being afraid, hoping or hypothesizing, and for risk-averse, (...) certainty-like states. The new proposal is compared to views within the increasingly popular debate opposing dualists to reductionists with respect to the relation between belief and degrees of belief. (shrink)

Author: Szutta Artur Title: WŁADYSŁAW TATARKIEWICZ’S CONCEPT OF THE ‘THIRD STATES’ (Stany trzecie w ujęciu Władysława Tatarkiewicza) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.13/14, number: 2011/2-3, pages: 617-627 Keywords: “THIRD STATES”, LEISURE, PHILOSOPHY, THEORY, INTELLECT, SENSE OF LIFE, WŁADYSŁAW TATARKIEWICZ, JOSEPH PIEPER Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:The article treats on the concept of “third states” (as opposed to the other two kinds of states: those of work and entertainment) introduced by (...) Władysław Tatarkiewicz in his treatise On Happiness. A thorough analysis of the passage on “third states” as well as of the very concept allows to see its relevance to the considerations on such important philosophical questions as those of the nature of doing philosophy, the meaning of life, intellectual intuition, theoria or contemplation. The paper consists of five parts. The first part is focused on Tatarkiewicz’s understanding of “third states” as well as on a phenomenological analysis of the concept itself. The second part is a kind of extension of the analysis enriched by Josef Pieper’s interpretation of the idea of leisure which I find very close to what Tatarkiewicz means by “third states”. In the light of the analysis the concept of the ‘third states’ turns out to be very inspiring and useful in dealing with a number of philosophical questions, which is shown in the fourth part of the paper. The final step consists of questioning the above conclusion by short outlining a possible naturalistic interpretation of the ‘third states’ in the light of which the picture of philosophy, human life or human cognition, based on the concept of the ‘third states’ might turn out to be a mere illusion. I do not give a final answer to this question but treat the conclusion of the paper as an invitation to a deeper consideration of the matter. (shrink)

Peter Achinstein has argued at length and on many occasions that the view according to which evidential support is defined in terms of probability-raising faces serious counterexamples and, hence, should be abandoned. Proponents of the positive probabilistic relevance view have remained unconvinced. The debate seems to be in a deadlock. This paper is an attempt to move the debate forward and revisit some of the central claims within this debate. My conclusion here will be that while Achinstein may be right (...) that his counterexamples undermine probabilistic relevance views of what it is for e to be evidence that h, there is still room for a defence of a related probabilistic view about an increase in being supported, according to which, if p > p, then h is more supported given e than it is without e. My argument relies crucially on an insight from recent work on the linguistics of gradable adjectives. (shrink)

Den Prozeß der Phänomenalisierung des Seins, des Weltwerdens der Welt kann nur angemessen verstehen, wer dessen struktureller Selbigkeit mit dem Geborenwerden/Geborensein des Daseins gewahr wird und ihr philosophisch Rechnung trägt. Diese an Hannah Arendt und Hans Saner einerseits sowie an Jacques Derrida und Jean-Luc Nancy andererseits anschließende These versucht der Beitrag im zweifachen Wege eines Aufweises entsprechender Überlegungen bei Husserl und einer Kritik an Heideggers bereits von Günther Anders notierten Tilgungsbemühungen der einschlägigen Implikationen seines Denkens zu plausibilisieren. Als thematischer Leitfaden (...) dient dabei die je unterschiedliche Konzeption der Räumlichkeit des Daseins im Verhältnis zu seiner Zeitlichkeit, von dessen Gewichtung das Gepräge eines Denkens als entweder natologisch-eröffnend oder thanatologisch-schließend mit abhängt. (shrink)

This book, Thales and the beginnings of European reflection, is more than a field guide to all major testimonies about Thales. It does not merely contain a summary and critique of the available literature on the subject, but also lays down a new, holistic interpretation of Thales from a perspective that brings to light several important, but previously overlooked issues."--Page [4] of cover.

Pri nekaterih obstoječih konceptih gena, in sicer pri sebičnem genu ter pri dveh klasičnih konceptih: občem in molekularnem genu; kot tudi pri nekaterih novih konceptih - časovno-molekularnem, organizmskem, vesoljnem in kvantnem genu - preverjamo njihovo moč za razlago altruizma. Pri vsakem od njih izpostavljamo zlasti njegove šibke točke. Kot kaže, pa je, predvsem znotraj tistih novih konceptov, ki obravnavajo gen z višjih ravni kompleksnosti, vendarle mogoče najti nekaj osnove za pojav altruizma.

As the title of the present publication suggests, the ten essays of this book try to approach an inconvenient trauma of global human reality and the uniformity of media and cyberspace in which human lives suffer harm, loss of inner identity and of broader meaning. Indeed, our postmodern and post-identity times are characterized by a flux of rapid social changes, uncertainty, vague and shaking moral values, by violence and frightening information with its contradictory truths and genuine ambiguity; finally by the (...) violence of unpredictable climate change resulting in various and frequent calamities and devastation of life. Doubt and time are the central concern of modern philosophy and remind us that violence is inherent in the human condition and that reflection on it, regardless of different cultural sensibilities, is ipso facto part of the mainstream of our individual and global concerns. These, and many other fascinating topics from Western and Chinese history, were explored and brought to light by a learned forum of distinguished scholars and experts whose contributions are contained in this publication. (shrink)