We review recent developments in ethical pluralism, ethical particularism, Kantian intuitionism, rights theory, and climate change ethics, and show the relevance of these developments in ethical theory to contemporary business ethics. This paper explains why pluralists think that ethical decisions should be guided by multiple standards and why particularists emphasize the crucial role of context in determining sound moral judgments. We explain why Kantian intuitionism emphasizes the discerning power of intuitive reason and seek to integrate that with the comprehensiveness of (...) Kant’s moral framework. And we show how human rights can be grounded in human agency, and explain the connections between human rights and climate change. (shrink)

Zaradi svoje vsenavzočnosti v izkustvu ima estetska čutnost mnoge manifestacije, tako očitne kot prikrite. Članek preučuje nekatere večinoma skrite načine, v katerih sta okus in estetska sodba, ki se kažeta v čutnem izkustvu, prefinjeno prisvojena in izrabljena. Te postopke opisujem kot prilastitev estetske čutnosti in imajo škodljive posledice za zdravje, družbo in okolje. Omenjene prakse so oblika estetske negacije, ki izkrivlja čutno izkustvo in manipulira z njim, kot je v interesu množičnega trženja in njegovih dobičkov. Ta vzorec imenujem prilastitev čutnosti. (...) Tovrstne prakse imajo resen etičen pomen in nosijo družbene ter politične implikacije. Estetska analiza navadnega življenja ima pomen, ki sega onstran akademske vednosti in sugerira drugo vlogo estetike, in sicer kritično: estetika kot orodje družbene analize in politične kritike. (shrink)

Sir Karl Popper is well known for explicating science in falsificationist terms, for which his degree of corroboration formalism, C(h,e,b), has become little more than a symbol. For example, de Queiroz and Poe in this issue argue that C(h,e,b) reduces to a single relative (conditional) probability, p(e,hb), the likelihood of evidence e, given both hypothesis h and background knowledge b, and in reaching that conclusion, without stating or expressing it, they render Popper a verificationist. The contradiction they impose is easily (...) explained--de Queiroz and Poe fail to take account of the fact that Popper derived C(h,e,b) from absolute (logical) probability and severity of test, S(e,h,b), where critical evidence, p(e,b), is fundamental. Thus, de Queiroz and Poe's conjecture that p(e,hb) = C(h,e,b) is refuted. Falsificationism, not verificationism, remains a fair description of the parsimony method of inference used in phylogenetic systematics, not withstanding de Queiroz and Poe's mistaken understanding that "statistical" probability justifies that method. Although de Queiroz and Poe assert that maximum likelihood has the power "to explain data", they do not successfully demonstrate how causal explanation is achieved or what it is that is being explained. This is not surprising, bearing in mind that what is assumed about character evolution in the accompanying likelihood model M cannot then be explained by the results of a maximum likelihood analysis. (shrink)

In this article I respond to James Martel’s essay ‘ Amo: Volu ut sis : Love, willing, and Arendt’s reluctant embrace of sovereignty’. Martel offers us a provocative account of how Arendt might have attenuated her most severe rejections of the concept of sovereignty in light of the necessity of some version of sovereignty in modern times. However, I argue that Martel misreads Arendt, drawing inferences from Arendt’s inner/outer distinction that do not follow from Arendt’s own logic. Instead of this (...) distinction, I claim that Arendt’s rejection of sovereignty must be understood in the context of her affirmation of natality, and that a consistent reading of Arendt reveals an unstinting rejection of sovereignty, for both good and ill. (shrink)

Die Katholische Kirche gehort zu den scharfsten Kritikern der Biowissenschaften. Sie erkennt wohl die positiven Fortschritte an, bemangelt aber Grenzuberschreitungen, die aus ihrer Sicht dem Menschen letztlich nicht dienen. Vor allem die Forschung mit humanen embryonalen Stammzellen und die vorgeburtliche Diagnostik stossen auf Ablehnung. In den biomedizinischen Wissenschaften fallen die Bewertungen, die Vielfalt ethischer Werthaltungen ist naturgemass grosser als im kirchlichen Bereich. Viele Biowissenschaftler und Mediziner befurworten die Stammzellforschung und die vorgeburtliche Diagnostik. Die Beitrager Analysieren dieses Spannungsverhaltnuis und fragen, wie (...) es gelingen kann, die Gegensatze zwischen Kirche und Biowissenschaft zu entscharfen und mehr gegenseitiges Verstandnis aufzubauen? (shrink)

Matthias Vogel challenges the belief, dominant in contemporary philosophy, that reason is determined solely by our discursive, linguistic abilities as communicative beings. In his view, the medium of language is not the only force of reason. Music, art, and other nonlinguistic forms of communication and understanding are also significant. Introducing an expansive theory of mind that accounts for highly sophisticated, penetrative media, Vogel advances a novel conception of rationality while freeing philosophy from its exclusive attachment to linguistics. Vogel's media of (...) reason treats all kinds of understanding and thought, propositional and nonpropositional, as important to the processes and production of knowledge and thinking. By developing an account of rationality grounded in a new conception of media, he raises the profile of the prelinguistic and nonlinguistic dimensions of rationality and advances the Enlightenment project, buffering it against the postmodern critique that the movement fails to appreciate aesthetic experience. Guided by the work of Jürgen Habermas, Donald Davidson, and a range of media theorists, including Marshall McLuhan, Vogel rebuilds, if he does not remake, the relationship among various forms of media -- books, movies, newspapers, the Internet, and television -- while offering an original and exciting contribution to media theory. (shrink)

Amidst the politically-charged climate of seventeenth-century England, a small, but influential makeshift group of Baptist divines developed an eschatological system that both encouraged their congregations to greater holiness and threatened the very existence of the proto-denomination. Even as most of the nascent group of dissenting congregations known as Baptists sought acceptance by the more mainstream dissent, those divines who accepted this particular form of millenarianism garnered unwanted attention from the authorities as they pressed remarkably close to the line of radical (...) dissidence. Three of those Baptist divines—Vavasor Powell, Hanserd Knollys, and Benjamin Keach—provide helpful insights both into the range of millenarianism adopted by this group of Baptists and into the legitimacy of the charges of radicalism. This article examines the published works of these three ministers, comparing their visions for the eschatological future and analyzing the charges of radicalism placed against them by their contemporaries. (shrink)

Carnap in the 1930s discovered that there were non-normal interpretations of classical logic - ones for which negation and conjunction are not truth-functional so that a statement and its negation could have the same truth value, and a disjunction of two false sentences could be true. Church ar-gued that this did not call for a revision of classical logic. More recent writers seem to disa-gree. We provide a definition of "non-normal interpretation" and argue that Church was right, and in fact, (...) the existence of non-normal interpretations tells us something important about the condi-tions of extensionality of the classical logical operators. (shrink)

If I desire to drink some stuff thinking it is hot chocolate when actually it is hot mud, my desire is not a real one - it’s mistaken or only apparent. This example illustrates how a desire must always depend on a belief about its object, a belief about what it is and what it’s like. But beliefs are correctable, so desires are correctable. This leads us directly to a very sweeping principle - that I only really desire what I (...) would be desiring with a perfect grasp of everything involved. If there’s something that I desire only because my grasp of it is less than perfect, then it is not something that I really desire. I have no real reason for wanting it, and it would not be in my real self-interest to get it. The hypothetical perfect grasp that defines a real desire would have to have a God-like reach into all the relevant realities in all their actuality and all their potential. And it would have to include perfectly within it all the desires of all those affected by what the grasp was of. Therefore what would be wanted in a perfect grasp would be a reconciliation of all the systems of desire contained within it - not as they happen to be but as they would be corrected by a perfect grasp. This reconciliation of systems of desire is that which morality requires. Therefore what I really want - my own fully-corrected self-interest - is precisely the same as the requirements of morality. This sameness explains and justifies morality’s categorical character and over-riding authority. (shrink)

Deduction leads to causal explanation in phylogenetic inference when the evidence, the systematic character, is conceptualized as a transformation series. Also, the deductive entailment of modus tollens is satisfied when those kinds of events are operationalized as patristic difference. Arguments to the contrary are based largely on the premise that character-states are defined intensionally as objects, in terms of similarity relations. However, such relations leave biologists without epistemological access to the causal explanation and explanatory power of historical statements. Moreover, the (...) prediction-making to which those kinds of relations are limited in practice can lead to a category error—the mental conversion of an abstraction into a thing . The latter practices and problems characterize pattern cladistics, taxa being interpreted as homeostatic property cluster natural kinds, and other instrumentalist research programs. (shrink)

Mathematical models are a well established tool in most natural sciences. Although models have been neglected by the philosophy of science for a long time, their epistemological status as a link between theory and reality is now fairly well understood. However, regarding the epistemological status of mathematical models in the social sciences, there still exists a considerable unclarity. In my paper I argue that this results from specific challenges that mathematical models and especially computer simulations face in the social sciences. (...) The most important difference between the social sciences and the natural sciences with respect to modeling is that in the social sciences powerful and well confirmed background theories (like Newtonian mechanics, quantum mechanics or the theory of relativity in physics) do not exist in the social sciences. Therefore, an epistemology of models that is formed on the role model of physics may not be appropriate for the social sciences. I discuss the challenges that modeling faces in the social sciences and point out their epistemological consequences. The most important consequences are that greater emphasis must be placed on empirical validation than on theoretical validation and that the relevance of purely theoretical simulations is strongly limited. (shrink)

The broad scope and coherence of Natural Beauty are among its major strengths. Moore's syncretic theory tries to integrate diverse and sometimes conflicting theoretical strands. Of special importance is his recognition that the natural world is a social institution embodying perceptions that are conditioned, experiences communicated through language, and social beliefs and conventions. These lead him to consider the natural world as actually artifactual, and he terms it the 'natureworld'. Among the consequences of this is the reciprocity of natural and (...) artistic beauty, one indication of the inclusiveness that runs through his theory. My central concern is whether Moore's syncretic theory can successfully combine disparate features of conflicting theories, such as cognitivism and non-cognitivism, and subjectivism and objectivism. Another concern is whether his syncretism can resolve problems such as the apparent inconsistencies raised by his discussion of framing. Here, alternatives that Moore had presumably settled reappear, as when objects, which had presumably been replaced by experiences, re-emerge in his discussion of framing. These comments identify such difficulties and ask whether the way out may be to reframe not natural beauty but the terms of the question. (shrink)

Rorty’s rejection of Kantian universalism will upset some people for a laudable moral reason. They will feel that one cannot abandon the belief in a universal human rationality without abandoning the belief in human dignity and without giving indirect support to the particularistic ideology of groups who aim at the enslavement or destruction of other groups. However, those who are somewhat acquainted with Rorty’s work know that he is by no means attracted to a dangerous kind of particularism and that (...) he is deeply attached to the ideals of the Enlightenment.His point is not that we should only care about those who are in some way dear or near to us. He would not deny that our capacities to sympathize with others and to understand their outlook are severely limited, but it is certainly not his purpose to tell us that we should be particularly pleased with these limitations. Rorty is positively interested in the possibilities we have of enlarging our loyalties and of getting to understand outlooks which used to be foreign to us.What he denies, however, is that we need the concept of rationality in order to make sense of these processes. It is not because we wish to be rational that we sometimes manage to extend our sympathies or to widen our outlook. This negative thesis is very similar to the pragmatist position Rorty defends with respect to scientific knowledge. The growth of scientific knowledge is undeniable, but one should not describe it in terms of the thesis that it is the aim of science to bring us closer to the objective, absolute truth. Scientists do not need the belief in such an ideal terminus in order to be seriously committed to scientific progress. (shrink)

De latere Wittgenstein maakt een onderscheid tussen betekenissen die zich wel en betekenissen die zich niet laten parafraseren. Dit onderscheid tussen zwak en sterk belichaamde betekenissen is van groot belang bij het begrijpen van poëzie, muziek en religieuze taal, aangezien daar sprake is van sterk belichaamde betekenissen. Deze wekken bij ons een emotionele respons op, die echter niet in woorden te vatten is. Zo blijft het thema van het onzegbare ook bij de latere Wittgenstein een rol spelen.

External reality is not moved by our personal dramas; even when our world is collapsing, the world continues its normal course, as if nothing had happened. Of course we know that the most poignant human suffering will not stop the sun from shining or the world from turning. Yet there are moments when the disharmony between objective reality and our own emotional state is painful and even surprising. It seems as if the world is provocatively uninterested in what is most (...) dear to us.The awareness of this rift is evoked in the first sentence of Borges’ well-known story translated into Dutch under the title De Aleph, "On the harrowing morning in February when Beatriz Viterbo died... I saw that the iron poster boards in the Plaza Constitución were being pasted over with some type of advertising for light cigarettes; this struck me, for I understood that the restless, enormous universe was already withdrawing from her, and that this was the first change in an endless series".What is the theoretical relevance of this experience, often roused by poetry and prose, but seldom discussed by philosophers? Is Borges referring to a purely subjective experience from which no conclusion can be drawn, or does he speak of an experience containing an important theoretical insight? Regardless, our ability to undergo this experience is evidently independent of our favourite philosophical concepts. Even someone who adheres to a theory that accepts a meaningful reality can experience this rift when he observes the sun shining triumphantly on a day of mourning. Similarly, someone having no metaphysical belief in a meaningful reality can remain immune to the type of rift Borges describes.Yet it cannot be denied that this rift experience is strengthened and legitimized by an important development in knowledge. The science has evoked a world view that strictly separates objective facts from subjective values. The reality presented by science, is not an inspired relationship or meaningful construction where humanity finds its place and from which it derives its dignity. Laws discovered by science say nothing of good or evil and contain no message on the meaning of life. Science is a source of trustworthy information not elevating, inspiring or comforting concepts. From a scientific viewpoint, knowledge of objective reality has nothing to do with insights people use to orient their lives.This separation of knowledge and wisdom contrasts sharply with a traditional view where knowledge of the most fundamental characteristics of reality also offers an insight in the meaning of human life. Nietzsche described this contrast as follows: while people have always tended to believe that what concerns them most also lies at the heart of reality, they must now realize that their moral, religious or aesthetic values merely form a superficial world of appearances; what elicits wonder or strong emotion is only a blossom on a reality that, in its deeper roots, is not at all beautiful or moving.The disenchantment brought on by science creates a breach or rift. Everything we experience as mysterious, enchanted or moving, appears also to exist as a reality coldly and neutrally described by science. Science demystified the rainbow that once appeared as a mysterious, divine phenomenon: what had always seemed wondrous can apparently be explained by the same natural laws that regulate the most banal or prosaic phenomena. (shrink)

Influential contemporary thinkers have declared that the belief in individual autonomy rests on an illusion. They have argued that our subjectivity is shaped by the language we speak and the traditions to which we belong. One should not, however, overestimate the impact of these theoretical criticisms. The idea of individual autonomy is part of a larger pattern of belief which has not ceased to exert its influence on our habits of thinking and behaving.The belief that we are fully autonomous subjects (...) is associated with the belief that we should identify ourselves with the detached, objectifying attitude which is an essential element of the scientific outlook. We like to believe that our real self is to be distinguished from any role we happen to fulfill or any position we happen to occupy. Instead of admitting that we are constituted in our deepest self by our commitments and allegiances, we would prefer to see these commitments and allegiances as the expressions of our individual desires and free decisions. The kind of individualism which is related to the idea of individual autonomy need not be amoral or egoistic, but it can easily be combined with a kind of moral universalism. A commitment to an abstract ideal is not incompatible with individual autonomy. (shrink)

When I was asked to formulate some questions or remarks about Prof. Barry’s paper, it was probably assumed that I would not confine myself to the expression of pure agreement. And yet, that is what I am inclined at first to do. I do agree that the view he criticizes is wrong for the reasons he mentions. And I admire the clarity and vigour of his arguments. However the reasons one has for agreeing with a thesis may belong to a (...) context that is very different from the context the thesis itself belongs to. Prof. Barry’s paper can be read at one level as the defence of a certain policy — it contains political recommendations. It is at that level that I entirely agree with it. But his recommendations are probably part of a theoretical outlook I do not share.The question I would like to deal with is: “How should the position which is the target of Brian Barry’s criticism be characterized?” One could say that it is anti-liberal. It is certainly opposed to the liberalism Brian Barry advocates. But there are, I think, also good reasons for characterizing it as a kind of liberalism. It is a sort of excessive, perverse, loony liberalism, but liberalism nevertheless. For the sake of convenience I call it quasi-liberalism. (shrink)