Przekaz legendarnego Orfeusza już przez autorów starożytnych identyfikowany był z niejasną i trudną symboliką. Język ten, pomimo swojej niejasności, był najlepszą drogą do komunikacji pomiędzy bogami a ludźmi. Niniejszy artykuł jest kolejną próbą, na podstawie starożytnych przekazów, współczesnej literatury krytycznej i refleksji autora, opisania orfizmu: starożytnego fenomenu łączącego ze sobą przekaz religijny, filozoficzny, antropologię i teologię. Zjawisko to wciąż nie jest dostatecznie rozumiane, mimo, że odgrywa kluczową rolę w kształtowaniu się mentalności i duchowości współczesnego człowieka. Orfizm jako starożytna via-religia do (...) zbawienia i samopoznania wymaga nieustających studiów bazujących wyłącznie na oryginalnych greckich tekstach, stanowiących niezgłębioną kopalnię wiedzy na temat religijności starożytnych Greków. (shrink)

Malapportionment—electoral districts with divergent ratios of people to representation—was ruled to be unconstitutional in a widely venerated series of cases before the Warren Court. Those cases held that a principle of political equality, ‘one person, one vote’, is required by the Constitution. But what is the content of that principle? Many Justices and commentators declare that it is vague, empty, circular, or meaningless. This creates a murder mystery. Malapportionment was killed; but by what, exactly? This Article seeks an answer by (...) focusing on the Court’s commitments about the scope and strictness of one person, one vote: it is a broad (rather than narrow) principle of rough (rather than exact) equality. As such, one person, one vote requires an equal number of people per district and an equal number of votes per voter; and it requires a roughly equal number of people per district. These commitments are attractive in isolation. But, this Article shows, they are objectionable in conjunction: they entail that one person, one vote is too permissive, as it only requires a roughly equal number of votes per voter. If your vote is roughly equal to mine when your district is fractionally more populous than mine, your vote is also roughly equal to mine when I can cast fractionally more votes than you. -/- Since this problem follows inexorably from the Court’s commitments about the scope and strictness of one person, one vote, there are two possible solutions. First, one person, one vote could be broad a principle of exact equality; administrability may then justify underenforcing the principle in distributing voters to districts, but not in distributing votes to voters. Second, one person, one vote could include a narrow principle requiring rough equality in apportionment, as well as a distinct principle requiring exactly equal votes per voter. These solutions have important constitutional implications—including for resolving the population baseline at issue in malapportionment, which remains uncertain after Evenwel v. Abbott. But neither provides an easy way out. Each makes one person, one vote either too restrictive or too permissive. -/- This puzzle brings to light why the operative principle in a venerated series of cases is deeply unclear and unsettled. But it has a special significance beyond that. One person, one vote lies at the heart of America’s constitutional democracy, which is already under considerable threat. On the one hand, if the content of the principle is too restrictive (or too uncertain), then objections to its constitutionality are considerably strengthened. On the other hand, if it is too permissive, then one person, one vote provides little constraint on Vice-President J.D. Vance’s recent proposal to give extra votes to parents, as well as myriad similar policies and procedures that would erode voters’ equality at the ballot box. (shrink)

According to anti-haecceitism, facts about particular things are modally fixed by qualitative matters. According to qualitativism, such facts are metaphysically second-rate, perhaps because grounded in qualitative matters. Qualitativism seems to imply anti-haecceitism, so objections to the latter threaten the former. The most powerful sort of apparent counterexample to anti-haecceitism, I think, consists in a pair of situations that seem the same, and qualitatively symmetric, for a stretch of time, but that differ in how that symmetry breaks. I examine this sort (...) of candidate counterexample in depth, and argue that the prospects for resisting it are heavily sensitive to broader metaphysical considerations, specifically ones about ontology, time, and causation. So, anti-haecceitism’s and qualitativism’s prospects are heavily sensitive to such considerations. (shrink)

According to qualitativism, thisness is not a fundamental feature of reality; facts about particular things are metaphysically second-rate. In this paper, I advance an argument for qualitativism from ideological parsimony. Supposing that reality fundamentally contains an array of propertied things, non-qualitativists employ a distinct name (or constant) for each fundamental thing. I argue that these names encode a type of worldly structure (thisness structure) that offends against parsimony and that qualitativists can eliminate without incurring a comparable parsimony-offense.

Critiques the higher-order hyperintensional theory developed by Cian Dorr in "To be F as to be G" as an exercise in overfitting.

An important feature of many conventions is that the agents use an asymmetry to coordinate their behaviour. We call these ‘correlated conventions’. However, a puzzle arises: since any asymmetry works as well as any other, what are the relevant asymmetries on which a given population founds its correlated conventions? In order to gain traction on this question we need an account of both the invention and evolution of correlated conventions. Invention has remained largely unexplored in the literature. In this article (...) we provide a simple model of the origin and subsequent dynamics of correlated conventions. This model can serve as a base for future investigation. (shrink)

Michel Foucault's death in 1984 coincided with the fading away of the hopes for social transformation that characterized the postwar period. In the decades following his death, neoliberalism has triumphed and attacks on social rights have become increasingly bold. If Foucault was not a direct witness of these years, his work on neoliberalism is nonetheless prescient: the question of liberalism occupies an important place in his last works. Since his death, Foucault's conceptual apparatus has acquired a central, even dominant position (...) for a substantial segment of the world's intellectual left. However, as the contributions to this volume demonstrate, Foucault's attitude towards neoliberalism was at least equivocal. Far from leading an intellectual struggle against free market orthodoxy, Foucault seems in many ways to endorse it. How is one to understand his radical critique of the welfare state, understood as an instrument of biopower? Or his support for the pandering anti-Marxism of the so-called new philosophers? Is it possible that Foucault was seduced by neoliberalism? This question is not merely of biographical interest: it forces us to confront more generally the mutations of the left since May 1968, the disillusionment of the years that followed and the profound transformations in the French intellectual field over the past thirty years. To understand the 1980s and the neoliberal triumph is to explore the most ambiguous corners of the intellectual left through one of its most important figures. (shrink)

In the first book-length study of American philosophy at the turn of the century, Daniel J. Wilson traces the formation of philosophy as an academic discipline. Wilson shows how the rise of the natural and physical sciences at the end of the nineteenth century precipitated a "crisis of confidence" among philosophers as to the role of their discipline. Deftly tracing the ways in which philosophers sought to incorporate scientific values and methods into their outlook and to redefine philosophy itself, (...) Wilson moves between close analysis of philosophical texts and consideration of professional careers of illustrative philosophers, such as Charles Sanders Peirce, John Dewey, and Josiah Royce. The author situates the emergence of professional philosophy in the context of the professionalization of American higher education and articulates, in the case of philosophy, the structures and values of a professional discipline. One of the most important consequences of this transformation was a new emphasis on communal theories of truth. Peirce, Dewey, and Royce all developed sophisticated and important theories of community as they were engaged in reshaping and redefining the limits of philosophy. This book will be of great importance for those interested in the history of philosophy, the rise of professions, and American intellectual and educational history, and to all those seeking to understand the contemporary revival of pragmatic thought and theories of community. (shrink)

Cross-situational word learning, like any statistical learning problem, involves tracking the regularities in the environment. However, the information that learners pick up from these regularities is dependent on their learning mechanism. This article investigates the role of one type of mechanism in statistical word learning: competition. Competitive mechanisms would allow learners to find the signal in noisy input and would help to explain the speed with which learners succeed in statistical learning tasks. Because cross-situational word learning provides information at multiple (...) scales—both within and across trials/situations—learners could implement competition at either or both of these scales. A series of four experiments demonstrate that cross-situational learning involves competition at both levels of scale, and that these mechanisms interact to support rapid learning. The impact of both of these mechanisms is considered from the perspective of a process-level understanding of cross-situational learning. (shrink)

I argue that neutral free logic and existence hedging are incompatible. Primarily, I respond to proposals by James Pryor intended to reconcile the two. Consideration of those proposals will reveal that on any neutral free logic either some existence hedges will entail some undesired existence claims, or they will not entail some desired existence claims.

Artificial intelligence is now widely accessible and already being used by healthcare researchers throughout various stages in the research process, such as assisting with systematic reviews, supporting data collection, facilitating data analysis and drafting manuscripts for publication. The most common AI tools used are forms of generative AI such as ChatGPT, Claude and Gemini. Generative AI is a type of AI that can generate human-like text, audio, videos, code and images based on text-based prompts inputted by a human user. Generative (...) AI is trained on large amounts of data, and the outputs are sophisticated and can be indistinguishable from a response from a skilled human. In this article, we outline several AI applications that can be used in healthcare research, examining their benefits, limitations and outline best practices for maintaining research integrity and ethical standards. (shrink)

Scientific fields frequently need to exchange data to advance their own inquiries. Data unification is the process of stabilizing these forms of interfield data exchange. I present an account of the epistemic structure of data unification, drawing on case studies from model-based cognitive neuroscience (MBCN). MBCN is distinctive because it shows that modeling practices play an essential role in mediating these data exchanges. Models often serve as interfield evidential integrators, and models built for this purpose have their own representational and (...) inferential functions. This form of data unification should be seen as autonomous from other forms, particularly explanatory unification. (shrink)

. Between 1833 and 1835, Victor Cousin and F.W.J. Schelling engaged in an “amical but serious critique” of each other’s philosophies. I argue that, despite perceptions to the contrary, key to this exchange is a common vision of an atypical, speculative empiricism. That is, against the grain of most commentaries, I contend that there are significant similarities between Cousin’s and Schelling’s philosophies of the early 1830s—similarities that converge on the possibility of a post-Kantian speculative empiricism, which they respectively dub metaphysical (...) psychology or a priori empiricism. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Moral hazards are ubiquitous. Green ones typically involve technological fixes: Environmentalists often see ‘technofixes’ as morally fraught because they absolve actors from taking more difficult steps toward systemic solutions. Carbon removal and especially solar geoengineering are only the latest example of such technologies. We here explore green moral hazards throughout American history. We argue that dismissing (solar) geoengineering on moral hazard grounds is often unproductive. Instead, especially those vehemently opposed to the technology should use it as an opportunity to (...) expand the attention paid to the underlying environmental problem in the first place, actively invoking its opposite: ‘inverse moral hazards’. (shrink)

I explore how endurantists are to handle cases of synchronic bi-location, in which a thing bi-locates at a time (such as by time-travel). I argue that endurantists face significant pressure to posit distinct but structurally identical facts (DSIFs), and critique the fragmentalist approach to bi-location in Simon (2018). Both the positive argument and critique are animated by the observation that handling bi-location cases requires perspicuously describing their spatiotemporal and causal structure. Accordingly, the argument proceeds by considering how endurantists are to (...) think about the metaphysics of place and causation, two issues that are important independent of the thesis about DSIFs. (shrink)

This survey explores interactions between syntax and discourse, through a case study of patterns of extraction from coordinate structures. The theoretical breadth of the volume makes it the most complete account of extraction from coordinate structures to date: at first glance, it appears to be a syntactic matter, but the survey raises theoretical and empirical questions not just for syntax, but also across semantics, pragmatics, and discourse structure. Rather than promoting a single analysis, Daniel Altshuler and Robert Truswell outline (...) reasonable hypotheses that allow theoretical conclusions to be deducted from empirical facts. The theoretical conclusions show that coordinate structures have the potential to discriminate between current syntactic theories, and to inform work on the interfaces between syntax, semantics, pragmatics, and discourse. In many cases, however, the necessary empirical work has not yet been carried out, and too much of the literature revolves around the same handful of primarily English examples. The volume offers a starting point for further research on extraction from coordinate structures, particularly in understudied languages, and provides a guide to how to tease out the theoretical implications of empirical findings. (shrink)

I investigate the semantics of conditionals with proposition-taking attitude expressions in their consequents. I defend a “face-value” interpretation of non-doxastic versions, arguing that everyone is committed to the truth of such interpretations in circumstances that would otherwise prompt theorists to interpret them in other ways. I do this by arguing from the obvious acceptability of attitude ascriptions with ‘ever’ free relatives. Doxastic conditionals require complicating my account somewhat; I show how to demarcate the class, and then argue that we aren’t (...) committed to the truth of a face-value interpretation of such conditionals. I then provide the details of all the relevant interpretations; one main benefit of my account is that it requires little or no semantic novelty, despite the difficulty of the data I attempt to account for. (shrink)

In the current bioethical debates on authenticity and enhancement, the discourse is dominated by a binary distinction between self-discovery and self-constitution. The self-discovery model views authenticity as staying true to a preexisting, intrinsic nature, while self-constitution frames it as being faithful to self-imposed goals and freely chosen aspirations. However, I argue that a threefold distinction could enrich this debate and offer more nuanced perspectives on authenticity. I propose a new taxonomy consisting of three models. First, the expressivist model, aligned with (...) self-discovery, sees authenticity as expressing a natural, inner self. Second, the decisional model focuses on existential commitment, where authenticity arises from firm life choices and perseverance in the face of challenges. Lastly, the experimentalist model, inspired by Nietzsche, views life as a continuous process of self-reinvention, where authenticity is achieved through experimentation and embracing change. In the final section, I examine both sides of the enhancement debate. Supporters, using the experimentalist model, can argue that enhancement technologies allow for personal growth and creative self-exploration. However, critics, drawing on Nietzschean insights, warn that these technologies might provide superficial shortcuts, bypassing the deep struggles essential for authentic self-transformation. Moreover, they could lead to conformity, limiting individual uniqueness. My tripartite model offers a pluralistic view, suggesting that while enhancement can be ethically valuable, it also requires caution to avoid undermining the very process of self-overcoming that defines true authenticity. (shrink)

Este artigo aborda sobre as clássicas concepções do atual modelo de sociedade em meio a um contexto de pandemia viral. Para tanto, a questão que o permeia é a seguinte: O que caracteriza uma “sociedade em rede”, alterada pelo “meio técnico-científico-informacional” e imersa numa “modernidade líquida”? Essa abordagem, sobretudo num latente contexto de crises, revela-se imprescindível para a compreensão do que venha a ser progresso na sociedade contemporânea. Adotando como pano de fundo o contexto da pandemia do novo Coronavírus no (...) Brasil, objetiva-se desvelar os paradoxos desse modelo de sociedade. Caracteriza-se, metodologicamente, como uma revisão de literatura que traz à tona paradoxos de uma “modernidade líquida”. Para tanto, ancora-se em fundamentos filosóficos, históricos, geográficos e socioculturais que envolvem o tema. Como principais resultados, evidencia que o contexto pandêmico, adotado como caso empírico de análise, se faz necessário: pensar os atributos inerentes a uma “modernidade líquida”, os quais, paradoxalmente, estão vinculados à noção daquilo que se idealizou por chamar de progresso e/ou visão de futuro; desvelar a falsa consciência de seres autossuficientes e a importância que possui o sentimento de alteridade em qualquer sociedade; e romper com a ilusão de que o homem é, em si, o único responsável por sua própria existência. Conclui-se defendendo uma complementariedade entre a sentença aristotélica sobre natureza social humana e os postulados hegelianos acerca da ontologia do Ser. (shrink)

Why would businesses advocate for a tax increase? They may take such a position, this article argues, when tax cuts threaten their long-term economic interests. In 2012, Kansas eliminated taxes on many business owners but destabilized the economy and exposed small business to the harshness of market forces. Small businesses rely more on state services than large businesses and are more situated in local communities. The literature suggests two main reasons for small businesses’ “enlightened self-interest” perspective. First, many benefited only (...) marginally from the tax cuts. Second, the savings were offset by fiscal damage to state services that small businesses rely on. They advocated for higher taxes on themselves neither out of altruism nor entirely out of self-interest but recognizing that they had to pay taxes in order to stabilize the economic environment. In that position, small businesses in Kansas may occupy the moderating political role once occupied by a now-fractured corporate elite. (shrink)

1. pte. Introducción al estudio del derecho y ciencias sociales.

Giving Voice To Values (GVV) serves as a framework to teach individuals methods to speak up when they witness actions that are contrary to their professional and personal values. This essay illustrates how GVV serves as a catalyst to advance both research and teaching activities.

Scientific advancement is inextricably linked to cultural advancement, and historically the arts have worked hand in hand with technological change. This essay explores some of the connections that exist between science, technology, and the arts, privileging instances where technological change resulted in new forms of artistic creation. Although the role of the arts in contemporary society has ebbed in comparison to that of technology and science, the essay argues that quality, meaningfulness, and longevity are key components in how the arts (...) can retain cultural value in today’s technocentric world. It explores significant instances from the history of music and visual art as the authors make the case that the methods of science and art are both distinct yet commensurate in their ability to shape the values and ideas of contemporary society. (shrink)

Human rights are a construct of international law. Their legitimacy depends on them being informed by the deep-seated fact of global cultural pluralism and the concern of establishing a system that recognizes this pluralism, transcends a narrow parochial perspective and thus avoids the accusation of cultural or moral colonialism. There are two broad strategies to do this: by invoking an individualist-moral conception of HR designed to promote well-being and by invoking a social-political conception of HR aimed at preserving world peace (...) and stability. Economic rights are rights to commodify—to sell one’s labor, to buy goods and services and so on—under fair terms. That is to say, to take part in economic activities such as production and consumption within a distinctive social form by which they are mediated through exchange. I argue that endorsing rights of commodification is incompatible with a genuine concern with parochialism. Economic rights are neither necessary to protect some natural interest shared by all humans, nor the stability of a peaceful world order. Hence, economic rights should not be considered human rights. (shrink)

Medo e esperança aparecem na história da filosofia como problemas situados na dimensão temporal da existência. Espinosa acompanha essa tradição, bem como o uso da filosofia como uma medicina animi, porém reserva para si algumas diferenças. Ressaltando o papel da imagem na constituição de medo e esperança, demarca a via pela qual estes dois afetos são necessariamente produzidos pela limitação da imaginação à duração dos corpos. No entanto, quando livre dos impedimentos à sua potência, a mente é capaz de ordenar (...) e concatenar as afecções do corpo, considerando a si mesma sem relação ao corpo, sob uma nova perspectiva. O tratamento do problema do medo, portanto, não se localiza no tempo presente, mas sim na eternidade. (shrink)

In his recent book, (Bias: A Philosophical Study, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2022). Thomas Kelly argues that various phenomena that look initially like examples of how irrational we are in thinking about bias—especially our own biases—turn out to be exactly what you’d expect from ideally rational agents. The phenomena he discusses which I’ll focus on are (1) our inability to introspectively identify our biases, and (2) our tendency to respond to accusations of bias with counteraccusations. In this paper, I’ll concede (...) that Kelly is right about how ideally rational agents would think about their biases, while raising questions about whether the fact that we think similarly is best explained by our rationality. In §2, I’ll explain how Kelly’s “perspectival account of bias attributions” predicts that rational agents would be unable to identify their own biases, and would respond to accusations of bias with counter-accusations of bias. In §3, I’ll describe how a certain sort of irrational agent would behave differently—these irrational agents would respond to accusations of bias with searching introspection, and that introspection might reliably turn up evidence of bias, which would then lead them to change their views in the direction of being less biased. We are clearly not such agents, since we do exhibit (1) and (2). I’ll argue that the sort of behavior we exhibit could be explained either because we’re more rational than the agents described, or because we’re less rational than them—just as incoherent, but also worse at introspectively noticing our incoherence. I’ll argue that it’s an empirical question, to which Kelly’s arguments don’t speak, whether the fact that we exhibit (1) and (2) is best explained by our rationality, or our irrationality. (shrink)

Ce texte constitue la première partie de l'introduction du recueil de textes de K. Marx, Les Crises du capitalisme, Paris, Demopolis, 2009. Daniel Bensaïd y explique la conception marxienne des crises cycliques du capitalisme, tout en abordant au passage celle de la « temporalité propre du capital ». Le tour de force de Marx, contemporain de la première grande expansion bancaire des années victoriennes et du Second empire, c'est d'avoir traversé les apparences, la surface confuse des choses, pour (...) (...) - Économie – Nouvel article. (shrink)

Kidfluencing, a social media business in which children serve as primary influencers of audience opinions or behavior, is a rapidly growing entrepreneurial phenomenon where parents build enterprises around the likability and antics of their children. Proponents argue that kidfluencing is simply monetizing the existing antics of kids, critics argue that it is child labor. We explore the ethical implications of kidfluencing through the abductive lens of four leading kidfluencer cases—Ryan’s World, Vlad and Nicki, Ninja Kidz, and The Bucket List Family—in (...) light of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Through a comparative case analysis of these four highly successful kidfluencing channels, we demonstrate both the ethical challenges as well as the trade-offs between rewards and rights risks within kidfluencing. We develop a model of five fundamental threats to the rights and freedoms of children involved in social media influencing, proposing a framework by which parents, platforms, and policy-makers can assess and regulate this industry. In so doing, we make contributions to the literatures of child labor and the ethics of care. (shrink)

That [John] Cage’s challenge to our musical beliefs, attitudes, and practices is posed from the difficult perspective of a Zen master has often been discussed. What has been neglected both by Cage himself and by others is another equally potent challenge to the ordinary which Cage formulates in a related but distinct voice: that of the philosopher. Through his relentless inquiry into new music, Cage had defined certain radical possibilities for musical change. What is in effect his skepticism about music (...) as we know it contains a cogent analysis of our musical concepts and practices: of what it is for us ordinarily to believe that something is music as opposed to not music, and of how those beliefs about music connect with styles of feeling and treating what we hear when we hear it as music. Indeed it is Cage’s genius to have established the topic of skepticism about music as an issue for philosophy and cultural criticism. Cage’s radical perspective on our musical beliefs allows us to consider both what those beliefs are and whether and how they might be justified. This invitation to philosophical response is an important feature of the avant-garde which Cage shares with Duchamp in plastic art, Gordon Matta-Clarke in architecture, and others. I wish to give it its due by outlining and addressing Cage’s skepticism about music. Daniel A. Herwitz is an assistant professor of philosophy at California State University, Los Angeles. He is currently at work on a book exploring philosophical tendencies in twentieth-century music, art, and architecture. (shrink)

Substituted judgment is widely used at the bedside, but the moral value that underpins its use needs examination. I argue that this value is the value of leading an authentic life. I then argue that an authentic life has multiple axes and that patients (like all human beings) vary widely in how they score on these axes. This entails that the moral weight of the value of authenticity in bedside decision-making also varies widely. And that means that, at the bedside, (...) substituted judgment should not be seen as a moral trump. Put differently, when a surrogate must make a bedside decision, the answer to the “What would the patient choose?” question should not be morally decisive for that decision. The answer to that question should be a part, but only a part, of a more complex decision-making process. (shrink)

This is a presentation of recent work on the Kalam Cosmological Argument for general, non-technical audiences. We examine whether the universe might be uncaused and we examine whether there's a good philosophical or scientific case for the universe's beginning.