Este artigo discute alguns aspectos historiográficos acerca da importância dos artistas, como foco para a construção da narrativa sobre arte no tempo. Nas origens da historiografia da arte, com Giorgio Vasari, as biografias de artistas constituíram o fio condutor do texto. Porém, já se considerava o artista como parte de um sistema do qual faziam parte o ateliê, os mecenas, personagens e contextos sociais que transcendiam à individualidade do artista criador. O texto vasariano foi um modelo a ser seguido e (...) um esquema a ser superado durante os séculos XVII e XVIII, observando os escritos de Bellori ou de Luigi Lanzi. As biografias de artistas foram sendo, portanto, adaptadas aos conceitos de estilo, escola e gênero. A criação do gênero monográfico no final do século XIX, por Carl Justi, permitiu a biografia de um único artista, em lugar do conjunto de vidas. Se, contudo, no início do século XX, pareceu possível construir uma história da arte que ofuscasse o papel do artista, em nome da obra de arte entendida como um objeto em sua pura visibilidade, por autores como Wölfflin; iniciou-se, em contrapartida, uma reconstrução historiográfica na qual o artista voltava a ocupar um papel central na narrativa, porém agora como parte de uma categoria social, em obras como as de Wackernagel, Baxandall ou Warnke.Palavras-chave: Historiografia da arte. História social da arte. Artista. Biografia. (shrink)

There is increasing attention to the centrality of idealization in science. One common view is that models and other idealized representations are important to science, but that they fall short in one or more ways. On this view, there must be an intermediary step between idealized representation and the traditional aims of science, including truth, explanation, and prediction. Here I develop an alternative interpretation of the relationship between idealized representation and the aims of science. In my view, continuing, widespread idealization (...) calls into question the idea that science aims for truth. I argue that understanding must replace truth as the ultimate epistemic aim of science. Additionally, science has a wide variety aims, epistemic and non-epistemic, and these aims motivate different kinds of scientific products. Finally, I show how these diverse aims---all rather distant from truth---result in the expanded influence of social values on science. (shrink)

The concept of hierarchical organization is commonplace in science. Subatomic particles compose atoms, which compose molecules; cells compose tissues, which compose organs, which compose organisms; etc. Hierarchical organization is particularly prominent in ecology, a field of research explicitly arranged around levels of ecological organization. The concept of levels of organization is also central to a variety of debates in philosophy of science. Yet many difficulties plague the concept of discrete hierarchical levels. In this paper, we show how these difficulties undermine (...) various implications ascribed to hierarchical organization, and we suggest the concept of scale as a promising alternative to levels. Investigating causal processes at different scales offers a way to retain a notion of quasi-levels that avoids the difficulties inherent in the classic concept of hierarchical levels of organization. Throughout, our focus is on ecology, but the results generalize to other invocations of hierarchy in science and philosophy of science. (shrink)

One of biology's fundamental aims is to generate understanding of the living world around—and within—us. In this chapter, I aim to provide a relatively nonpartisan discussion of the nature of explanation in biology, grounded in widely shared philosophical views about scientific explanation. But this discussion also reflects what I think is important for philosophers and biologists alike to appreciate about successful scientific explanations, so some points will be controversial, at least among philosophers. I make three main points: (1) causal relationships (...) and broad patterns have often been granted importance to scientific explanations, and they are in fact both important; (2) some explanations in biology cite the components of or processes in systems that account for the systems’ features, whereas other explanations feature large-scale or structural causes that influence a system; and (3) there can be multiple different explanations of a given biological phenomenon, explanations that respond to different research aims and can thus be compatible with one another even when they may seem to disagree. (shrink)

Causal accounts of scientific explanation are currently broadly accepted (though not universally so). My first task in this paper is to show that, even for a causal approach to explanation, significant features of explanatory practice are not determined by settling how causal facts bear on the phenomenon to be explained. I then develop a broadly causal approach to explanation that accounts for the additional features that I argue an explanation should have. This approach to explanation makes sense of several aspects (...) of actual explanatory practice, including the widespread use of equilibrium explanations, the formulation of distinct explanations for a single event, and the tight relationship between explanations of events and explanations of causal regularities. (shrink)

A common argument against explanatory reductionism is that higher‐level explanations are sometimes or always preferable because they are more general than reductive explanations. Here I challenge two basic assumptions that are needed for that argument to succeed. It cannot be assumed that higher‐level explanations are more general than their lower‐level alternatives or that higher‐level explanations are general in the right way to be explanatory. I suggest a novel form of pluralism regarding levels of explanation, according to which explanations at different (...) levels are preferable in different circumstances because they offer different types of generality, which are appropriate in different circumstances of explanation. (shrink)

Levels of organization and their use in science have received increased philosophical attention of late, including challenges to the well-foundedness or widespread usefulness of levels concepts. One kind of response to these challenges has been to advocate a more precise and specific levels concept that is coherent and useful. Another kind of response has been to argue that the levels concept should be taken as a heuristic, to embrace its ambiguity and the possibility of exceptions as acceptable consequences of its (...) usefulness. In this chapter, I suggest that each of these strategies faces its own attendant downsides, and that pursuit of both strategies (by different thinkers) compounds the difficulties. That both kinds of approaches are advocated is, I think, illustrative of the problems plaguing the concept of levels of organization. I end by suggesting that the invocation of levels may mislead scientific and philosophical investigations more than it informs them, so our use of the levels concept should be updated accordingly. (shrink)

The value of optimality modeling has long been a source of contention amongst population biologists. Here I present a view of the optimality approach as at once playing a crucial explanatory role and yet also depending on external sources of confirmation. Optimality models are not alone in facing this tension between their explanatory value and their dependence on other approaches; I suspect that the scenario is quite common in science. This investigation of the optimality approach thus serves as a case (...) study, on the basis of which I suggest that there is a widely felt tension in science between explanatory independence and broad epistemic interdependence, and that this tension influences scientific methodology. (shrink)

The optimality approach to modeling natural selection has been criticized by many biologists and philosophers of biology. For instance, Lewontin (1979) argues that the optimality approach is a shortcut that will be replaced by models incorporating genetic information, if and when such models become available. In contrast, I think that optimality models have a permanent role in evolutionary study. I base my argument for this claim on what I think it takes to best explain an event. In certain contexts, optimality (...) and game-theoretic models best explain some central types of evolutionary phenomena. ‡Thanks to Michael Friedman, Helen Longino, Michael Weisberg, and especially Elliott Sober for comments on earlier drafts of this paper. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-2155; e-mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

Scientific explanations must bear the proper relationship to the world: they must depict what, out in the world, is responsible for the explanandum. But explanations must also bear the proper relationship to their audience: they must be able to create human understanding. With few exceptions, philosophical accounts of explanation either ignore entirely the relationship between explanations and their audience or else demote this consideration to an ancillary role. In contrast, I argue that considering an explanation’s communicative role is crucial to (...) any satisfactory account of explanation. (shrink)

Philip Woodward's review of The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality (PBI) raises objections to the specific version of the phenomenal intentionality theory proposed in PBI, especially to identity PIT, representationalism, the picture of derived mental representation, some tentative proposals regarding intentional structure, and the matching theory of truth and reference. In this reply, I argue that the version of PIT defended in PBI can withstand these objections.

The fate of optimality modeling is typically linked to that of adaptationism: the two are thought to stand or fall together (Gould and Lewontin, Proc Relig Soc Lond 205:581–598, 1979; Orzack and Sober, Am Nat 143(3):361–380, 1994). I argue here that this is mistaken. The debate over adaptationism has tended to focus on one particular use of optimality models, which I refer to here as their strong use. The strong use of an optimality model involves the claim that selection is (...) the only important influence on the evolutionary outcome in question and is thus linked to adaptationism. However, biologists seldom intend this strong use of optimality models. One common alternative that I term the weak use simply involves the claim that an optimality model accurately represents the role of selection in bringing about the outcome. This and other weaker uses of optimality models insulate the optimality approach from criticisms of adaptationism, and they account for the prominence of optimality modeling (broadly construed) in population biology. The centrality of these uses of optimality models ensures a continuing role for the optimality approach, regardless of the fate of adaptationism. (shrink)

My chapter aims to advance the debate on a problem often raised by philosophers who are skeptical of implied narrators in movies. This is the concern that positing such elusive narrators gives rise to absurd imaginings (Gaut 2004: 242; Carroll 2006: 179-180). -/- Friends of the implied cinematic narrator reply that the questions critics raise about the workings of the implied cinematic narrator are "silly ones" to ask. -/- I examine how the "absurd imaginings" problem arises for all the central (...) arguments for the elusive cinematic narrator and discuss why the questions critics pose about this narrator are legitimate ones to ask. (shrink)

An historically important conception of the unity of science is explanatory reductionism, according to which the unity of science is achieved by explaining all laws of science in terms of their connection to microphysical law. There is, however, a separate tradition that advocates the unity of science. According to that tradition, the unity of science consists of the coordination of diverse fields of science, none of which is taken to have privileged epistemic status. This alternate conception has roots in Otto (...) Neurath’s notion of unified science. In this paper, I develop a version of the coordination approach to unity that is inspired by Neurath’s views. The resulting conception of the unity of science achieves aims similar to those of explanatory reductionism, but does so in a radically different way. As a result, it is immune to the criticisms facing explanatory reductionism. This conception of unity is also importantly different from the view that science is disunified, and I conclude by demonstrating how it accords better with scientific practice than do conceptions of the disunity of science. (shrink)

The tremendous philosophical focus on how to characterize explanatory metaphysical dependence has eclipsed a number of other unresolved issued about scientific explanation. The purpose of this paper is taxonomical. I will outline a number of other questions about the nature of explanation and its role in science—eight, to be precise—and argue that each is independent. All of these topics have received some philosophical attention, but none nearly so much as it deserves. Furthermore, existing views on these topics have been obscured (...) by not distinguishing among these independent questions and, especially, by not separating them from the question of what metaphysical dependence relation is explanatory. Philosophical analysis of scientific explanation would be much improved by attending more carefully to these, and probably still other, elements of an account of explanation. (shrink)

Michael Strevens offers an account of causal explanation according to which explanatory practice is shaped by counterbalanced commitments to representing causal influence and abstracting away from overly specific details. In this paper, I challenge a key feature of that account. I argue that what Strevens calls explanatory frameworks figure prominently in explanatory practice because they actually improve explanations. This suggestion is simple but has far-reaching implications. It affects the status of explanations that cite multiply realizable properties; changes the explanatory role (...) of causal factors with small effect; and undermines Strevens’ titular explanatory virtue, depth. This results in greater coherence with explanatory practice and accords with the emphasis that Strevens places on explanatory patterns. Ultimately, my suggestion preserves a tight connection between explanation and the creation of understanding by taking into account explanations’ role in communication. (shrink)

Recent philosophy of science has witnessed a shift in focus, in that significantly more consideration is given to how scientists employ models. Attending to the role of models in scientific practice leads to new questions about the representational roles of models, the purpose of idealizations, why multiple models are used for the same phenomenon, and many more besides. In this paper, I suggest that these themes resonate with central topics in feminist epistemology, in particular prominent versions of feminist empiricism, and (...) that model-based science and feminist epistemology each has crucial resources to offer the other's project. (shrink)

When game theory was introduced to biology, the components of classic game theory models were replaced with elements more befitting evolutionary phenomena. The actions of intelligent agents are replaced by phenotypic traits; utility is replaced by fitness; rational deliberation is replaced by natural selection. In this paper, I argue that this classic conception of comprehensive reapplication is misleading, for it overemphasizes the discontinuity between human behavior and evolved traits. Explicitly considering the representational roles of evolutionary game theory brings to attention (...) neglected areas of overlap, as well as a range of evolutionary possibilities that are often overlooked. The clarifications this analysis provides are well-illustrated by—and particularly valuable for—game theoretic treatments of the evolution of social behavior. (shrink)

Ideological language is widespread in theoretical biology. Evolutionary game theory has been defended as a worldview and a leap of faith, and sexual selection theory has been criticized for what it posits as basic to biological nature. Views such as these encourage the impression of ideological rifts in the field. I advocate an alternative interpretation, whereby many disagreements between different camps of biologists merely reflect methodological differences. This interpretation provides a more accurate and more optimistic account of the state of (...) play in the field of biology. It also helps account for biologists' tendency to embrace ideological positions. (shrink)

O Transtorno do Espectro Autista (TEA) é caracterizado pela presença de déficits persistentes na comunicação e interação social, além de padrões restritos e repetitivos de comportamentos, interesses e atividades. Como forma de viabilizar a inclusão das crianças autistas no ambiente escolar, a orientação dos professores que atuam com este público é de suma importância. O objetivo do estudo é apresentar a experiência de orientação feita para os professores que lecionam para alunos autistas, acompanhados pelo Núcleo de Atenção ao TEA, da (...) cidade de Monte Alto-SP, no período de junho de 2022 a junho de 2023. Trata-se de um estudo descritivo, do tipo relato de experiência, embasado na ciência ABA (Análise do Comportamento Aplicada) e relacionado às vivências com os professores em orientações, realizadas mensalmente. Como resultado, observou-se a dificuldade dos docentes em acolher estes alunos, direcionar atividades, lidar com comportamentos disruptivos e no manejo das atividades de vida diária. Discute-se a importância de uma ferramenta de apoio para proporcionar aos docentes maior respaldo teórico à prática com alunos autistas, para contribuir na inclusão, aprendizagem e socialização no ambiente escolar. Esta experiência ampliou as vivências sobre a perspectiva do professor na inclusão escolar de crianças com TEA, lançando luz sobre a necessidade de formação teórica e instrumentalização dos docentes, considerando as particularidades de neurodesenvolvimento e comportamento desta população e contribuindo para a maior eficácia da assistência educacional inclusiva. (shrink)

The hum of a ceiling fan, the mechanical grind of an escalator, Pilates repetitions, treadmills and stationary bicycles, waiting room Muzak and its tedious refrain: such experiences of monotony are ubiquitous. Continuous, unchanging, regular, repetitious: truly predictable, the sameness of monotony is particularly unbearable for it does not stop. Its tedium is an expression of its unbending relationship to time, an excessive duration. Monotony never wavers, never falters, never surprises. Monotony cannot seduce; there is no attraction of fleeting adventure or (...) freedom in monotony, which is absolute prolongation without hesitation or variation, entirely anticipatable.Monotony is often a cause of boredom, yet it is... (shrink)

Neuroscientists, psychologists, educators, and management scholars propose that the current emphasis on intellect and reason in education and business over values such as love, connectedness, and compassion are at the root of many business ethical failures and societal problems. They argue not that reason should be abandoned in education and business management but rather that it needs to be balanced with values such as love because these attributes are innately human, enabling wise decision-making. This is a difficult task in the (...) context of the current ethos of intellect and reason that dominates education and management. To correct the imbalance, we must explore ways of preparing future managers to accept the relevance and importance of learning to develop and embody love. Through our research, we provide an experience of community love by creating a caring, receptive, personal container. We engaged in the practice of Collaborative Autoethnography, integrating the Nguni South African concept of Ubuntu, to explore, research, and demonstrate the experience of love in a community setting. To support this practice, we framed it against the background of integrative justice, focusing on authentic engagement without exploitative intent as per Santos and Laczniak’s (2015) Integrative Justice Model (IJM) and built upon some common contexts from which love is considered such as Catholic Social Thought (CST) and indigenous cultures. We analyzed why and how love might be implemented in education and management and how Collaborative Autoethnography can be applied in connecting with others to research, learn from, and build upon the experience of love and connectedness. (shrink)

Ao observar as traduções do relato anafórico institucional da terceira edição típica do Missal Romano nas diversas línguas vernáculas, nota-se que não há mais consenso a respeito da tradução da expressão pro multis como havia nas traduções das edições anteriores. Tal expressão tem sua origem no “Quarto Poema do Servo” de Isaías e vem utilizada nas palavras pronunciadas sobre o cálice nos relatos institucionais de Marcos e Mateus, estabelecendo-se uma relação intertextual. O presente artigo almeja ser uma contribuição que aprofunde (...) o entendimento dessa relação para uma melhor compreensão do pro multis, sem ter, no entanto, a pretensão de apresentar uma solução definitiva para as questões que envolvem a sua tradução. Para isso, propõe-se apresentar os principais pontos que abarcam o debate a respeito da referida tradução; validar a relação intertextual entre o texto isaiano e os textos neotestamentários que são objeto deste estudo através de critérios apropriados; buscar no contexto veterotestamentário do termo hebraico, que se traduziu por multi, o seu sentido original e, em posse desses dados, verificar que sentido o termo adquire e que efeitos de sentido produz essa relação intertextual nas palavras pronunciadas sobre o cálice em Marcos e Mateus e na liturgia da Igreja latina. (shrink)

Un tema recurrente en aproximaciones marxistas al estudio de la relación entre subjetividad y trabajo es la cuestión de cómo el poder capitalista configura a los individuos en la coyuntura histórica actual. En este trabajo sostenemos que la vinculación entre poder y subjetivación es históricamente contingente, mientras que el poder específicamente capitalista exige necesariamente, por sus condiciones históricas, mecanismos de subjetivación. Solo en el modo capitalista de organizar el metabolismo social es necesaria la producción generalizada de sujetos con vistas a (...) dos objetivos principales: (1) auto-generar las condiciones de existencia para su reproducción como sistema, y (2) garantizar la acumulación privada en forma de capital. Estos objetivos requieren una forma específica de poder, a saber, como dominación social a través de una lógica impersonal. Esta particularidad distingue al capitalismo de modos de producción anteriores, y se basa en la capacidad del capital para insertarse en la brecha entre la vida y sus condiciones de posibilidad. Por tanto, si podemos mostrar que los mecanismos de subjetivación dependen de las condiciones históricas del modo de producción capitalista, entonces es justo pensar que el modo de salir de este paradigma requiere la necesaria superación de dicha formación social. (shrink)

O presente trabalho tem por finalidade analisar alguns aspectos relacionados à técnica e ao estilo que foram utilizados por Longo Sofista para compor a sua obra prima intitulada Dáfnis e Cloé. Para tal análise serão utilizados alguns excertos do Livro I da obra.

Ao contemplar a realidade do enriqueci-mento de muitos, somada à corrupção, à violência e à impunidade, o homem justo e honesto sente-se seduzido pelo enriqueci-mento rápido e tentado a reproduzir a mesma prática do injusto. O Salmo 37 é expressão da verdadeira sabedoria, que ilumina o justo para manter-se firme, em seu caminho, vivendo a não-violência, confiando e mostrando a alternativa de um mundo diferente.

One of the central aims of science is explanation: scientists seek to uncover why things happen the way they do. This chapter addresses what kinds of explanations are formulated in biology, how explanatory aims influence other features of the field of biology, and the implications of all of this for biology education. Philosophical treatments of scientific explanation have been both complicated and enriched by attention to explanatory strategies in biology. Most basically, whereas traditional philosophy of science based explanation on derivation (...) from scientific laws, there are many biological explanations in which laws play little or no role. Instead, the field of biology is a natural place to turn for support for the idea that causal information is explanatory. Biology has also been used to motivate mechanistic accounts of explanation, as well as criticisms of that approach. Ultimately, the most pressing issue about explanation in biology may be how to account for the wide range of explanatory styles encountered in the field. This issue is crucial, for the aims of biological explanation influence a variety of other features of the field of biology. Explanatory aims account for the continued neglect of some central causal factors, a neglect that would otherwise be mysterious. This is linked to the persistent use of models like evolutionary game theory and population genetic models, models that are simplified to the point of unreality. These explanatory aims also offer a way to interpret many biologists’ total commitment to one or another methodological approach, and the intense disagreements that result. In my view, such debates are better understood as arising not from different theoretical commitments, but commitments to different explanatory projects. Biology education would thus be enriched by attending to approaches to biological explanation, as well as the unexpected ways that these explanatory aims influence other features of biology. I suggest five lessons for teaching about explanation in biology that follow from the considerations of this chapter. (shrink)

Paul Dicken’s Getting Science Wrong: Why the Philosophy of Science Matters is an engaging journey through deep philosophical waters. Dicken, a philosopher of science, works his way through some historic and recent episodes related to science and touches on philosophical debates as he goes. His book is written for a broad audience and many parts are gripping and fun. Yet Dicken weaves together both well-established philosophical ideas and his own particular controversial ideas without signaling which is which. In sum, Dicken (...) leads us through many ideas about science that are important and interesting, and he makes it a fun journey. Some of the turns on this journey, however, struck me as questionable detours. (shrink)

This volume presents the first Italian translation with commentary of the Doric Pseudo-Pythagorean texts, which are ascribed to Archytas and Brontinus and deal with metaphysical, logical, and epistemological questions. These texts probably date from the 1st century BCE and are the product of a re-emerging dogmatic interpretation of Plato's dialogues.

O presente artigo pretende analisar os usos da imaginação em duas narrativas astronômicas do século xvii: o Sonho, de Kepler, e os Diálogos sobre a pluralidade dos mundos, de Fontenelle. Com isso, pretende-se mostrar, por um lado, como ambos concebem a imaginação positivamente e dentro de um quadro de crítica à superstição, guardadas as diferenças de cosmologia; de outro, procura-se apresentar o uso singular que cada um faz da imaginação: Kepler e sua exigência de uma nova concepção da observação científica, (...) Fontenelle e a abordagem das ciências em perspectiva histórica. (shrink)

Uma boa parte dos textos que versam acerca da beleza em Agostinho tem, como pano de fundo os ataques à beleza do mundo desenvolvido pelos maniqueus. Assim, o pensador objetivando defender a tese de um cosmos belo, procura construir uma definição de beleza sensível deveras ampla, que possa abarcar criaturas aparentemente despidas de beleza segundo a ótica humana. No presente artigo, estudaremos a categoria do belo da congruentia partium, que nosso filósofo desenvolve em uma definição da beleza sensível, expostas em (...) dois textos, notadamente a Epístola III e no Sobre a Cidade de Deus. Nos mencionados textos, o pensador parte da estrutura da definição de beleza enquanto simetria apresentada pelo filósofo Cícero em sua obra Tusculanae Disputationes, todavia, utiliza-a para teorizar um conceito de congruentia partium, conceito esse bem mais amplo que a simetria, e, portanto, mais útil ao debate que ele enfrentava. (shrink)