Authenticity has recently emerged as an important issue in discussions of mental disorder. We show, on the basis of personal accounts and empirical studies, that many people with psychological disorders are preoccupied with questions of authenticity. Most of the data considered in this paper are from studies of people with bipolar disorder and anorexia nervosa. We distinguish the various ways in which these people view the relationship between the disorder and their sense of their authentic self. We discuss the principal (...) modern ac-counts of authenticity within the analytic philosophical tradition. We argue that accounts based on autonomous, or wholehearted, endorsement of personal characteris-tics fail to provide an adequate analysis of authenticity in the context of mental disorder. Significant elements of true self accounts of authenticity are required. The concept of authenticity is a basic one that can be of particular value, in the context of self-development, to people with mental disorder and to others experiencing substantial inner conflict. (shrink)

Open Peer Commentary on P. Zawadzki and A. K. Adamczyk's target article in AJOB Neuroscience on the potential of optogenetics for memory modification. I argue for a radically pluralistic understanding of the notion of authenticity, and highlight the need to further clarify the specific nature of the authors' concern about authenticity, as well as its policy implications.

In this paper, we show that it is not a conceptual truth about laws of nature that they are immutable (though we are happy to leave it as an open empirical question whether they do actually change once in a while). In order to do so, we survey three popular accounts of lawhood—(Armstrong-style) necessitarianism, (Bird-style) dispositionalism and (Lewis-style) ‘best system analysis’—and expose the extent, as well as the philosophical cost, of the amendments that should be enforced in order to leave (...) room for the possibility of changing laws. (shrink)

Derrida et Bergson ne se sont jamais rencontres, et l'oeuvre du premier ne refere qu'avec circonspection a celle du second. Un dialogue entre eux n'en est pas moins possible, portant entre autres sur la delicate question du fondement de l'intuition. Une connaissance immediate, non langagiere, integrale et certaine est-elle envisageable? Le probleme en est un de droit plutot que de fait: quid juris? a ce probleme lourd d'implications epistemologiques, Derrida et Bergson ont repondu de facons distinctes: l'un a mis en (...) doute la possibilite de l'intuition, l'autre a defendu les droits de la methode intuitive. Le present ouvrage est le premier a serrer de pres la relation entre ces deux philosophes, dont les pensees refletent a elles seules certains des tournants qu'a connus le xxe siecle. Son objectif est triple: circonscrire etroitement l'objet du litige entre Derrida et Bergson, trop peu souligne par les commentateurs, et dont ce livre montre qu'il n'est pas annule par un accord partiel; tirer au clair les diverses raisons qui amenent l'un a s'en prendre a l'intuition, l'autre a embrasser la methode intuitive; etablir que certains arguments de Bergson, bien qu'ils connaissent un regain d'interet et engagent la pensee dans des voies prometteuses, complementaires de celles du realisme speculatif, semblent meriter un nouvel etayage. (shrink)

Many believe that the treatment-enhancement distinction marks an important ethical boundary that we should use to shape public policy on biomedical interventions. A common justification for this purported normative force appeals to the idea that, whereas treatments respond to genuine medical needs, enhancements can only satisfy mere preferences or “expensive tastes”. This article offers a critique of that justification, while still accepting the TED as a conceptual tool, as well as some of the key ethical axioms endorsed by its proponents. (...) I begin by laying out the TED, the practical implications that tend to be drawn from it, and the justification just sketched for these implications. Using examples drawn from preventive medicine, biomedical technology, and other categories of biomedical interventions, I then go on to challenge both the presupposition of a fundamental dichotomy between treatments and enhancements, and the assumption that enhancements – barring rare exceptions – cannot serve legitimate medical needs. Finally, I consider some ways in which supporters of the TED might try re-formulating the distinction to blunt the force of my critique. I conclude that such a move cannot fully succeed, and that while the TED does have some degree of normative force, it nevertheless cannot play the role that its advocates expect from it. Seeking to justify a general presumption against enhancements based on the rationale I critique here would mean ignoring their various potential benefits, including medical or therapeutic, and would reflect a prejudice – which I refer to as “treatment fetishism”. (shrink)

This chapter addresses the claim that, as new types of neurointervention get developed allowing us to enhance various aspects of our mental functioning, we should work to prevent the use of such interventions from ever becoming the “new normal,” that is, a practice expected—even if not directly required—by employers. The author’s response to that claim is that, unlike compulsion or most cases of direct coercion, indirect coercion to use such neurointerventions is, per se, no more problematic than the pressure people (...) all find themselves under to use modern technological devices like computers or mobile phones. Few people seem to believe that special protections should be introduced to protect contemporary Neo-Luddites from such pressures. That being said, the author acknowledges that separate factors, when present, can indeed render indirect coercion to enhance problematic. The factors in question include lack of safety, fostering adaptation to oppressive circumstances, and having negative side effects that go beyond health. Nonetheless, the chapter stresses that these factors do not seem to be necessary correlates of neuroenhancement. (shrink)

Este trabalho apresenta e situa o pensamento do filósofo alemão Jürgen Habermas no discurso pós-metafísico em uma sociedade secularizada. Esta reflexão articula-se em dois momentos. Em um primeiro momento, trata-se de apresentar o discurso da Modernidade, evidenciando os principais aspectos da crítica à razão instrumental de Horkheimer e Adorno, a importância do conceito hegeliano de Modernidade, e Nietzsche como o ponto de inflexão para o discurso pós-metafísico. Em um segundo momento, apresenta-se, mais exatamente, o discurso pós-metafísico em uma sociedade secularizada. (...) À luz desse esboço, seguindo o procedimento metodológico de investigação baseado no método de abordagem analítico, pretende-se, a partir do pensamento de Habermas, apresentar, por um lado, um discurso filosófico ciente das dificuldades, e, também, de sua falibilidade, mas, por outro lado, da sua relevância na busca da construção do discurso filosófico com sentido a partir do consenso válido intersubjetivamente. Palavras-chave: Habermas. Modernidade. Sociedade. Pós-metafísico. Secularização. (shrink)

Many species rely on the three-dimensional surface layout of an environment to find a desired goal following disorientation. They generally do so to the exclusion of other important spatial cues. Two influential frameworks for explaining that phenomenon are provided by geometric-module theories and view-matching theories of reorientation respectively. The former posit a module that operates only on representations of the global geo- metry of three-dimensional surfaces to guide behavior. The latter place snapshots, stored representations of the subject’s two-dimensional retinal stimulation (...) at specific locations, at the heart of their accounts. In this paper, I take a fresh look at the debate between them. I begin by making a case that the empirical evidence we currently have does not clearly favor one framework over the other, and that the debate has reached something of an impasse. Then, I present a new explanatory problem—the representation selection problem—that offers the pro- spect of breaking the impasse by introducing a new type of explanatory consideration that both frameworks must address. The representation selection problem requires explaining how subjects can reliably select the relevant representation with which they initiate the reorientation process. I argue that the view-matching framework does not have the resources to address this problem, while a certain type of theory within the geometric-module framework can provide a natural response to it. In showing this, I develop a new geometric-module theory. (shrink)

What proper role should considerations of risk, particularly to research subjects, play when it comes to conducting research on human enhancement in the military context? We introduce the currently visible military enhancement techniques (1) and the standard discussion of risk for these (2), in particular what we refer to as the ‘Assumption’, which states that the demands for risk-avoidance are higher for enhancement than for therapy. We challenge the Assumption through the introduction of three categories of enhancements (3): therapeutic, preventive, (...) and pure enhancements. This demands a revision of the Assumption (4), alongside which we propose some further general principles bearing on how to balance risks and benefits in the context of military enhancement research. We identify a particular type of therapeutic enhancements as providing a more responsible path to human trials of the relevant interventions than pure enhancement applications. Finally, we discuss some possible objections to our line of thought (5). While acknowledging their potential insights, we ultimately find them to be unpersuasive, at least provided that our proposal is understood as fully non-coercive towards the candidates for such therapeutic enhancement trials. (shrink)

We commend Hempeler et al. (2024) on their important manuscript outlining a context-sensitive and patient-centered model for informal coercion in mental healthcare. Indeed, in clinical experience a...

Cybernétique et psychanalyse, deux mots qui formeraient presque un oxymore. Pourtant cet ouvrage propose de repenser les liens entre la psychanalyse et l'informatique. Il révèle que les apports de la psychanalyse à l'épistémologie et l'histoire de l'informatique sont restés enfouis depuis près de soixante ans, alors même qu'elle fut une des premières disciplines à conceptualiser l'informatique, qui ne portait pas encore ce nom. Il s'agit alors à la fois de montrer l'apport pour la psychanalyse des recherches de l'informatique naissante, et (...) la particularité de l'approche psychanalytique de l'informatique, plus particulièrement chez Jacques Lacan. Cet ouvrage propose des outils et des concepts au lecteur pour prendre des distances par rapport à la trop simple opposition entre les sciences cognitives, voire les neurosciences, qui seraient la psychologie à l'ère du numérique, et la psychanalyse contemporaine. (shrink)

Entry on "Neuroenhancement" in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online.

What proper role should considerations of risk, particularly to research subjects, play when it comes to conducting research on human enhancement in the military context? We introduce the currently visible military enhancement techniques and the standard discussion of risk for these, in particular what we refer to as the ‘Assumption’, which states that the demands for risk-avoidance are higher for enhancement than for therapy. We challenge the Assumption through the introduction of three categories of enhancements : therapeutic, preventive, and pure (...) enhancements. This demands a revision of the Assumption, alongside which we propose some further general principles bearing on how to balance risks and benefits in the context of military enhancement research. We identify a particular type of therapeutic enhancements as providing a more responsible path to human trials of the relevant interventions than pure enhancement applications. Finally, we discuss some possible objections to our line of thought. While acknowledging their potential insights, we ultimately find them to be unpersuasive, at least provided that our proposal is understood as fully non-coercive towards the candidates for such therapeutic enhancement trials. (shrink)

This article highlights major results of a study into the ethical norms and rules governing biobanks. After describing the methodology, the findings regarding four topics are presented: (1) the ownership of human biological samples held in biobanks; (2) the regulation of researchers’ use of samples obtained from biobanks; (3) what constitutes “collective consent” to genetic research, and when it is needed; and (4) benefit sharing and remuneration of research participants. The paper then summarizes key lessons to be drawn from the (...) findings and concludes by reflecting on the importance of such empirical research to inform future governance norms and practices. (shrink)

The following paper discusses Schiller’s interpretation of the German concept of Bildung. Bildung appears to be a central term in Germany’s culture, especially (but not limited to) the educational realm. As Bildung underwent massive transformations and has been re-interpreted multiple times throughout German history, this paper will start with a definitory exercise trying to organize the dynamics surrounding the term. Secondly, a two-fold historical context – firstly regarding the wider political and social dynamics of the time and secondly, a more (...) biographical approach focusing on Schiller – will be provided. These contextualizing efforts will be succeeded by elaborations on Schiller’s concept of Herzensbildung. The paper closes with a summary of key insights and further potential endeavors. (shrink)

BREVE RELATO DE UMA OUTRA EXPERIÊNCIA EDUCACIONAL: O ENSINO JURÍDICO NOS ESTADOS UNIDOS.

Many philosophers have adopted epistemic expressivism in recent years. The core commitment of epistemic expressivism is that epistemic claims express conative states. This paper assesses the plausibility of this commitment. First, we raise a new type of problem for epistemic expressivism, the epistemic motivation problem. The problem arises because epistemic expressivists must provide an account of the motivational force of epistemic judgment (the mental state expressed by an epistemic claim), yet various features of our mental economy seem to show that (...) they can’t do so. Second, we develop what we take to be the most promising response to that problem for expressivists. We end by noting that this response faces an important challenge pertaining to the psychology of epistemic criticism and praise. (shrink)

The enhancement of athletic performance using procedures that increase physical ability, such as anabolic steroids, is a familiar phenomenon. Yet recent years have also witnessed the rise of direct interventions into the brain, referred to as “neuro-doping”, that promise to also enhance sports performance. This paper discusses one potential objection to neuro-doping, based on the contribution to athletic achievement, particularly within endurance sports, of effortfully overcoming inner challenges. After introducing the practice of neuro-doping, and the controversies surrounding it, I describe (...) two major mechanisms some have proposed to explain how it might produce its putative performance-enhancing effects. I then clarify the notion of effort, and its relationship to neuro-doping. I also briefly address common concerns about access and safety. My central argument invokes considerations of effort to maintain that we have at least a significant reason for prohibiting the use of neuro-doping in officially regulated endurance competitions – though only conditional upon a specific set of empirical assumptions. I consider three possible objections: that neuro-doping is no different from widely accepted enhancement methods, that it can make athletic competition fairer, and that a broader range of factors can compensate for a reduced scope for effort than I recognize. I ultimately conclude that these objections do not refute the argument from effort, while stressing nonetheless that this argument applies more clearly to hypothetical improved forms of neuro-doping than to existing ones, and is not meant to offer a final overall verdict on how neuro-doping should be regulated. (shrink)

Examina-se as posições teórico-práticas de Maquiavel e sua contraposição à moralidade tradicional, a fim de entender como se estrutura a sua nova proposta ética. A novidade está pautada nas categorias políticas da conveniência e da aparência: admite-se recorrer a todos os meios necessários para atingir os fins estabelecidos, e para manter-se no poder, obter a honra e a glória, não importa aquilo que o Príncipe é, mas o que aparenta ser perante os súditos e aliados. Disto decorre a necessidade de (...) um Príncipe com o pulso firme e que defenda, sem medir esforços, a integridade e o bem-estar seu povo. A moral do governante será dirigida pela situação política e não pelo ideal de governante universal, abstrato e perfeito. O poder político tem uma origem mundana, nasce da própria malignidade que é intrínseca à natureza humana, mas se constitui, ainda que de modo precário e transitório, como a única possibilidade de enfrentar o conflito. Enfim, cabe ao Príncipe a utilização de um conjunto de expedientes e técnicas capazes de assegurar a máxima eficácia na preservação do Estado e na conservação de sua suprema finalidade - ordem e harmonia. (shrink)

Este artigo examina em âmbito fenomenológico as categorias da experiência fática da vida e do fenômeno histórico, a partir da primeira parte da preleção “Introdução à fenomenologia da religião”, proferida por Martin Heidegger, no semestre de inverno de 1920/1921. Elucida a peculiaridade dos conceitos filosóficos e a diferença de princípio que há entre filosofia e ciência. Apresenta a reelaboração do método fenomenológico, enquanto ponto de partida da filosofia, capaz de fazer jus à vida fática e à historicidade do Ser-aí. Examina (...) o significado do fenômeno histórico e a crítica à maneira habitual de pensá-lo, como “algo que transcorre no tempo” ou “uma propriedade geral aplicável a todo objeto temporal”. Conclui que as vias de afirmação da vida contra o histórico caem no modo teorético e não expressam o histórico em seu caráter imediato. Portanto, preservar o caráter fenomenológico e intranquilizador da história significa respeitar a historicidade viva e a força vital e multidirecional do sentido fático do Ser-aí. Palavras-chave: Fenomenologia. Filosofia. Ciência. Facticidade. Historicidade. (shrink)

O texto versa sobre alguns desafios encontrados no ensino da disciplina de Filosofia no cenário da educação básica brasileira. Aborda questões levantadas por pesquisadores nesta área que são corroboradas por experiência própria na docência em Filosofia. O objetivo aqui é refletir sobre as dificuldades encontradas no sentido de buscar conciliar a especificidade da Filosofia enquanto área do saber e a complexidade de seu ensino no nível médio. Trata-se de uma pesquisa bibliográfica, agregada com a experiência de acompanhamento dos estágios supervisionados (...) do curso Licenciatura em Filosofia (UNIFRA) e da Coordenação do Programa Institucional de Bolsa de Iniciação à Docência (PIBID/CAPES/UNIFRA) na área de Filosofia. (shrink)

O presente artigo tem por finalidade ensaiar uma reflexão sobre a aporia imposta pela catástrofe. Para isso, inicialmente, apresenta-se alguns dados de catástrofes a serem tomadas como exemplares: a cheia no Vale do Taquari (RS) e a seca nos rios da bacia amazônica (AM). A seguir, busca-se pensar a questão da catástrofe desde seu índice temporal, e para isso, se recorrerá a duas propostas: de Jean-Pierre Dupuy e de Alain Brossat. Intentou-se outra alternativa, ainda que não exclusiva: a de enfatizar (...) a espacialidade da catástrofe, sem necessariamente perder de vista sua temporalidade, mas de algum modo subordinando-a àquela do espaço, do local da catástrofe, evidenciando como a catástrofe pode ser tomada como questão biopolítica. Por fim, apoiando-se nessa correlação espaço-temporal da catástrofe, e tomando por apoio o terremoto no Haiti em 2010, ensaia-se algum pensamento que busca realocar a relação entre local e global/universal e, assim, subvertendo a lógica biopolítica de sua governamentalidade. (shrink)

Nosso intento aqui é o de expor os limites da filosofia especulativa a partir da análise crítica de Feuerbach nos Princípios de Filosofia do Futuro. Nesta obra Feuerbach apresenta-nos os fundamentos da filosofia especulativa, a fim de levar-nos a compreendê-la como uma verdadeira teologia racional. Tal afirmação feuerbachiana funda-se na latente submissão dos filósofos especulativos a temas sugeridos na reflexão teológica, surgidos no período que vai desde a filosofia mosaica aos primórdios do cristianismo, precisamente na filosofia neoplatônica. Analisamos emnosso trabalho (...) o argumento do filósofo alemão para desmascarar a inversão realizada pela filosofia especulativa, precisamente na herança neoplatônica assumida na modernidade pela filosofia de Hegel. (shrink)

Savulescu and colleagues propose a distinction between ‘future person embryo research’ and ‘non-future person embryo research’, which they hold can help decision-makers more efficiently discriminate between higher risk and lower risk embryo research.1 The authors’ proposed distinction does point to an ethically significant difference between different forms of embryo research, which they illustrate in an enlightening manner using a series of detailed case studies. In the following, I wish to comment, first, on the substance of the authors’ distinction, and second, (...) on the possibility of looking beyond the relatively narrow scope of their argument. A first point concerns the authors’ characterisation of FPE research as including ‘anything which is done to an embryo that will be or could be implanted into a woman’s uterus’. Insofar as they also emphasise the idea of research that can ‘affect’ a future person, this formulation might suggest that the key distinction here is between research procedures that causally impact the characteristics of a future person, and those that do not. However, this is not how the authors’ distinction between FPE and NFPE research should be understood. Indeed, they describe ‘observational research’, including the first test case they present, as an exception …. (shrink)

Nosso estudo retoma contribuições de Georges Bataille, Pierre Verger, Edgar Morin, Ronilda Iyakemi Ribeiro, Stefania Capone, Monique Augras com vistas a discutir Exu, deus nagô e dos terreiros de umbanda, ambíguo e paradoxal, macho e fêmea, sagrado e profano. Responsável pela ordem do universo tem caráter virulento, atrevido e sem vergonha. Vindo ao mundo com um porrete mágico, metonímia de seu falo ereto, choca o decoro, a moral e a cristandade. Constrange os proscritos e as normas, embaralha as dicotomias bem (...) marcadas do Ocidente. Rompe com os tabus e estabelece nova ordem, ação erótico-sagrada que remete à árvore da vida e ao gozo fértil de Exu. Quem incita à Vida é Exu, deus trickster a convidar: vem. Trabalharemos com textos de gêneros diversos, a saber, conto, poema, tela, fotografia para que deles salte um perigoso ambivalente como Madame Satã, Maria Navalha, Zé Pelintra, faces de Exu: travesti, travesso, erótico-sagrado, híbrido, cujas metamorfoses continuas plagiam a si mesmo, podendo até ser visto em calendário trans. (shrink)