Wittgenstein’s use of the word ‘phenomenology’ to describe his own work in Philosophical Remarks and The Big Typescript has occasioned much puzzlement and confusion. This paper seeks to shed light on what Wittgenstein meant by the word through a close analysis of key passages in those two works. I argue against both the view of Nicholas Gier that Wittgenstein held ‘grammatical’ phenomenological remarks to be synthetic a priori and that expressed by Moritz Schlick that Wittgenstein held grammar to (...) be tautological. I also take issue with the claim by Merrill and Jaakko Hintikka that Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus ought to be regarded as a work of phenomenology. Wittgenstein’s adoption of a variant of Husserlian phenomenology, I argue, lasted no more than a few months, from February to October 1929, during which he conceived of phenomenology as something that sought to establish what one might call ‘analytic a posteriori’ truths through something like the Husserlian method of ‘bracketing’. By the end of 1929, I claim, he had abandoned that in favour of the view expressed in the slogan ‘phenomenology is grammar’, where ‘grammar’ is not confined to the tautological, but is rather intimately linked to Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘the understanding that consists in seeing connections’. (shrink)

What is common to all languages is notation, so Universal Grammar can be understood as a system of notational types. Given that infants acquire language, it can be assumed to arise from some a priori mental structure. Viewing language as having the two layers of calculus and protocol, we can set aside the communicative habits of speakers. Accordingly, an analysis of notation results in the three types of Identifier, Modifier and Connective. Modifiers are further interpreted as Quantifiers and (...) Qualifiers. The resulting four notational types constitute the categories of Universal Grammar. Its ontology is argued to consist in the underlying cognitive schema of Essence, Quantity, Quality and Relation. The four categories of Universal Grammar are structured as polysemous fields and are each constituted as a radial network centred on some root concept which, however, need not be lexicalized. The branches spread out along troponymic vectors and together map out all possible lexemes. The notational typology of Universal Grammar is applied in a linguistic analysis of the ‘parts of speech’ using the English language. The analysis constitutes a ‘proof of concept’ in (1) showing how the schema of Universal Grammar is capable of classifying the so-called ‘parts of speech’, (2) presenting a coherent analysis of the verb, and (3) showing how the underlying cognitive schema allows for a sub-classification of the auxiliaries. (shrink)

What is common to all languages is notation, so Universal Grammar can be understood as a system of notational types. Given that infants acquire language, it can be assumed to arise from some a priori mental structure. Viewing language as having the two layers of calculus and protocol, we can set aside the communicative habits of speakers. Accordingly, an analysis of notation results in the three types of Identifier, Modifier and Connective. Modifiers are further interpreted as Quantifiers and (...) Qualifiers. The resulting four notational types constitute the categories of Universal Grammar. Its ontology is argued to consist in the underlying cognitive schema of Essence, Quantity, Quality and Relation. The four categories of Universal Grammar are structured as polysemous fields and are each constituted as a radial network centred on some root concept which, however, need not be lexicalized. The branches spread out along troponymic vectors and together map out all possible lexemes. The notational typology of Universal Grammar is applied in a linguistic analysis of the ‘parts of speech’ using the English language. The analysis constitutes a ‘proof of concept’ in (1) showing how the schema of Universal Grammar is capable of classifying the so-called ‘parts of speech’, (2) presenting a coherent analysis of the verb, and (3) showing how the underlying cognitive schema allows for a sub-classification of the auxiliaries. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Setting the stage Leitmotifs External guidelines Necessary propositions and norms of representation Concerning the truth and falsehood of necessary propositions What necessary truths are about Illusions of correspondence: ideal objects, kinds of reality and ultra‐physics The psychology and epistemology of the a priori Propositions of logic and laws of thought Alternative forms of representation The arbitrariness of grammar A kinship to the non‐arbitrary Proof in mathematics Conventionalism.

Although Ordinary Language Philosophy is widely believed to have disappeared leaving scarcely a trace in this era of formal semantics, it is very much the formal semantics of ordinary language that dominates the scene. More common ground than one might have supposed proves thus to be available for the unreconstructed ordinary language philosopher, in the present volume, to enter into the thick of current discussion. The prevailing tone of the work is certainly much more formal than anything one recalls from (...) the heyday of ordinary language philosophy, and in its episodic fashion the central topics—e.g., reference, opacity, identity, propositions—are standard enough, though by the end an effort has been made to reinstate synonymy, analyticity, and even verificationism. On the specific side of grammar the nominalization of sentences receives extended attention, and it is in that connection that Bede Rundle queries the postulation of propositions as metaphysical objects for the so-called propositional attitudes. The deepest, most pervasive theme of the book turns out to be that of ontological commitment. In an uncharacteristic, refreshing moment of testiness Rundle confides that serious controversy as to whether there are or are not events "just cannot get going unless our ordinary language is supplanted... by the grandiose but ill-defined jargon of ‘ontology'." The focus of the work tends to be blurred owing to a tacit assimilation of Quine to the formal semanticists of ordinary language. If the Quinean framework of ontological commitment would seem to be almost ubiquitous today, the semantic emphasis on the ontological commitments of ordinary language renders the current fashion almost as alien to Quine as to the later Wittgenstein. Rundle is thus faced with a shifting target. His excellent anti-Fregean, quasi-nominalistic discussion of number brings out some of the difficulty. Sensitive to the difference between the nonreferential and referential uses of number words in ordinary language, Rundle argues that one can only go so far with the former. Accordingly, he will allow that "by ordinary standards there quite clearly are numbers", a thesis that neither Wittgenstein nor Quine—for very different reasons—would accept. At the outset of his book Rundle writes as follows, "We could look more favorably upon the pragmatic approach if there were room for a choice, if the analysis of the meaning of, say, sentences seemingly alluding to certain abstractions, left the question of existence undecided. There are reasons for thinking that this cannot be so, and the arguments to come will, I hope, bear out the general objection in particular cases." The discussion of number fails to connect with Quine who readily concedes ordinary language to the nominalist. It is only when one consults such items as sets, which Quine takes to have scarcely any footing in ordinary language, that his pragmatism comes properly into its own. Are the axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory analytic or synthetic? Are they perhaps synthetic a priori? Shall we indeed accept them as true? It can hardly be supposed that pre-Quinean approaches, whether empiricist or rationalist, have proved very fruitful here. And what guidance can linguistic analysis provide? (shrink)

Available from UMI in association with The British Library. Requires signed TDF. ;Even among Wittgenstein's admirers, his conception of philosophy as a therapy for conceptual confusion is generally considered to be the weakest part of his later work. It seems to consist of slogans, which are unsupported by argument and belied by his own 'theory construction'. It may even be self-refuting--a philosophical theory that denies the possibility of philosophical theory. ;Unless these objections can be met, current attempts to apply Wittgenstein's (...) philosophical methods remain problematic. I have therefore sought to provide a systematic account and defense of Wittgenstein's position. I have identified the common ground between Wittgenstein and the philosophical tradition, distinguished five basic features of his position and shown how they are linked. ;I go on to argue that his conception of philosophy is consistent and appears untenable only because of a failure to appreciate its connection with other aspects of his work, notably his understanding of logical necessity and of language. I have not examined Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy in isolation, for only by pitting it against its major rivals can its cogency be properly assessed. Throughout, I have examined the links between methodological issues and problems in philosophical logic, epistemology and metaphysics. ;The principle threat to Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy is Quine's assimilation of philosophy and science. His rejection of the distinctions between the a priori and the empirical and between analytic and synthetic propositions represent a profoundly important challenge to Wittgenstein's normative conception of language. However, I argue the challenge can be met by reducing Quine's behaviorist model of language to absurdity. (shrink)

The debate between Husserl and Marty focuses on the notion of general grammar. Nevertheless, there doesn’t seem to have been a clear outcome, and the terms of the debate remain quite unclear. Moreover, while both authors make striking use of historical references, their entanglement seems to call for some clarification. This paper aims to shed light on this debate, by considering it from an historical perspective. In doing so, two putative candidates will be introduced as (conceptual) precursors of the (...) ‘allgemeine Grammatik’: the Grammaire générale et raisonnée of Port-Royal (1660), and the medieval grammatica speculativa, which included a group of late thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century philosophers of language known as the Modistae. I will first identify Husserl’s and Marty’s respective critiques, distinguishing, between Husserl’s critique of the conflation of the a priori and empirical, and Marty’s of the conflation of meaning and forms of expression. Second, I will place these critiques in an arrangement involving two types of cross-reference: on the one hand, Marty and Husserl can be seen as standing in opposition to their historical predecessors; on the other hand (and more significantly), Marty and Port-Royal can be seen as standing in opposition to Husserl and the speculative grammarians. (shrink)

Analytical commentary -- Fruits upon one tree -- The continuation of the early draft into philosophy of mathematics -- Hidden isomorphism -- A common methodology -- The flatness of philosophical grammar -- Following a rule 185-242 -- Introduction to the exegesis -- Rules and grammar -- The tractatus and rules of logical syntax -- From logical syntax to philosophical grammar -- Rules and rule-formulations -- Philosophy and grammar -- The scope of grammar -- Some morals (...) -- Exegesis 185-8 -- Accord with a rule -- Initial compass bearings -- Accord and the harmony between language and reality -- Rules of inference and logical machinery -- Formulations and explanations of rules by examples -- Interpretations, fitting and grammar -- Further misunderstandings -- Exegesis 189-202 -- Following rules, mastery of techniques and practices -- Following a rule -- Practices and techniques -- Doing the right thing and doing the same thing -- Privacy and the community view -- On not digging below bedrock -- Private linguists and private linguists : Robinson Crusoe sails again -- Is a language necessarily shared with a community of speakers? -- Innate knowledge of a language -- Robinson Crusoe sails again -- Solitary cavemen and monolinguists -- Private languages and private languages -- Exegesis 203-37 -- Agreement in definitions, judgements, and form of life -- The scaffolding of facts -- The role of our nature -- Forms of life -- Agreement : consensus of human beings and their actions -- Exegesis 238-42 -- Grammar and necessity -- Setting the stage -- Leitmotifs -- External guidelines -- Necessary propositions and norms of representation -- Concerning the truth and falsehood of necessary propositions -- What necessary truths are about illusions of correspondence : ideal objects, kinds of reality, and ultra-physics -- The psychology of the A priori -- Knowledge -- Belief -- Certainty -- Surprise -- Discoveries and conjectures -- Compulsion -- Propositions of logic and laws of thought -- Alternative forms of representation -- The arbitrariness of grammar -- A kinship to the non-arbitrary -- Proof in mathematics -- Conventionalism. (shrink)

This paper proposes a learning-efficiency explanation of modular structure in language. An optimal grammar arises as the solution to the problem of learning a language from a minimal number of observations of instances of the use of the language. Agents face symmetry constraints that limit their ability to make a priori distinctions among symbols used in the language and among objects (interpreted as facts, events, speaker’s intentions) that are to be represented by messages in the language. It is (...) shown that if it is commonly known that the object space is modular and messages are strings, then modularity of the language is sufficient and (essentially) necessary for learning efficiency. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72. (shrink)

This article discusses some difficulties of the theory of color propounded by Meinong in his Re-marks on the Color Solid and the Mixture Law of 1903. First, I argue that Meinong’s geometrical approach faces at least three sets of difficulties related to the following assumptions: colors pos-sess a “nature” that can be grasped through intuition; they are separated from each other by continua in color space; there are an infinite number of a priori relations between colors. Second, I confront (...) the geometrical approach with Wittgenstein’s grammatical approach, contending that the latter escapes these difficulties. (shrink)

The syntagmatic paradigmatic model is a distributed, memory‐based account of verbal processing. Built on a Bayesian interpretation of string edit theory, it characterizes the control of verbal cognition as the retrieval of sets of syntagmatic and paradigmatic constraints from sequential and relational long‐term memory and the resolution of these constraints in working memory. Lexical information is extracted directly from text using a version of the expectation maximization algorithm. In this article, the model is described and then illustrated on a number (...) of phenomena, including sentence processing, semantic categorization and rating, short‐term serial recall, and analogical and logical inference. Subsequently, the model is used to answer questions about a corpus of tennis news articles taken from the Internet. The model's success demonstrates that it is possible to extract propositional information from naturally occurring text without employing a grammar, defining a set of heuristics, or specifying a priori a set of semantic roles. (shrink)

What does ordinary language philosophy contribute to the solution of the problems it diagnoses as violations of linguistic use? One of its biggest challenges has been to account for the epistemic asymmetry of mental states experienced by the subject of those states and the application of psychological properties to others. The epistemology of other minds appears far from resolved with reference to how sensation words are used in everyday language. In this paper, I revisit the Wittgensteinian arguments and show how (...) they engage the ordinary language method (in the modified form of grammatical investigation) to ‘dissolve’ the problem. Several important results are generated by way of this reconstruction. An expressive view of the vocabulary of sensation is defended which facilitates a discussion of sensation discourse emphasising the normative grammatical conditions for the communication of psychological states. This motivates a reassessment of criterial justification for the ascription of psychological concepts in the third person. In the final sections, I mobilise a normative approach to expose the moral relevance of the epistemology of other minds. Even if it is conceded that belief in other minds lacks warrant from an epistemological standpoint, this does not justify adopting the skeptical attitude from an ethical standpoint. In light of this, a normative justification for the a priori belief that others are subjects of consciousness is defended. (shrink)

One of the major challenges in the philosophy of religion is theological fatalism—roughly, the claim that divine omniscience is incompatible with free will. In this article, I present new reasons to be skeptical of what I consider to be the strongest argument for theological fatalism. First, I argue that divine foreknowledge is not necessary for an argument against free will if we take into account divine knowledge of contingent a priori truths. Second, I show that this argument can be (...) generalized so that ordinary human knowledge of contingent a priori truths also leads to an argument against free will. This, I believe, results in an absurd conclusion that is unacceptable to both theists and non-theists. But if there is something wrong with this argument, there is something wrong, too, with the argument for theological fatalism. Although there is a range of possible responses, I suggest that the core issue in all cases is a closure principle—specifically, the principle that ‘no choice about’ is closed under entailment (or strict implication). (shrink)

The attempt to hold both anti-individualism and privileged self-knowledge may have the absurd consequence that someone could know a priori propositions that are knowable only empirically. This would be so if such an attempt entailed that one could know a priori both the contents of one’s own thoughts and the anti-individualistic entailments from those thought-contents to the world. For then one could also come to know a priori the empirical conditions entailed by one’s thoughts. But I argue (...) that there is no construal of a priori knowledge that could be used to raise an incompatibility problem of this sort. First, I suggest that the incompatibilist a priori must be a stipulative one, since in none of the main philosophical traditions does knowledge of the contents of one’s thoughts count as a priori. Then, I show that under various possible construals of a priori, the incompatibilist argument would be invalid: either a fallacy of equivocation or an argument without a plausible closure principle guaranteeing transmission of epistemic status from premises to conclusion. Finally, I maintain that the only possible construal of the property of being knowable a priori that avoids invalidity is one that fails to generate the intended reductio. (shrink)

ABSTRACT There is general agreement that Kant’s thought strongly influenced Heidegger’s. Nevertheless, there is still much work to be done in order to fully appreciate this influence. A central theme to disclose the relation between these authors is the role they give to the transcendental. In this paper I show that Kant’s account of intuition is the focus of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant in his Die Frage nach dem Ding, since Heidegger interprets Kant’s treatment of intuition as a delimiting of (...) the modern mathematical tendency to determine everything out of pure reason alone. I argue that this interpretation is at the basis of Heidegger’s appropriation of Kant’s synthetic a priori in this work, the aim of which is to take this notion away from the sphere of the objects of mathematical physical science, and place it in the realm of everyday experience. I claim that Heidegger thinks that this move can only be accomplished by removing universality and necessity from Kant’s a priori. Finally, I show that Heidegger’s appropriation of Kant’s synthetic a priori goes together with and illuminates his understanding of transcendence as das Zwischen, ‘the between us and things’. RESUMO É consenso geral que o pensar de Kant influenciou fortemente o pensar de Heidegger. Porém, há ainda muito trabalho a fazer para se conseguir apreciar essa influência plenamente. Um tema crucial para conseguir expor a relação entre esses dois autores é o rol que ambos dão ao transcendental. Neste artigo, vou mostrar que o tratamento que Kant faz da intuição é o foco da interpretação que Heidegger oferece acerca de Kant em sua obra Die Frage nach dem Ding, dado que Heidegger interpreta o jeito como Kant trabalha a intuição como uma delimitação da tendência matemática moderna a determiná- lo tudo pelo só uso da razão pura. Argumento que essa interpretação está na base da apropriação que Heidegger faz do sintético a priori kantiano nesta obra, cujo fim é tirar essa noção fora da esfera dos objetos da ciência físico- matemática e posicioná-la no reino da experiência cotidiana. Sustento que Heidegger pensa que isto só pode ser alcançado ao eliminar a necessidade e a universalidade do a priori kantiano. Finalmente, mostro que a apropriação que Heidegger faz do sintético a priori kantiano vai junto e ilumina sua compreensão da transcendência como o das Zwischen, ‘o entre nós e as coisas’. (shrink)

Compatibilism combines an externalist view of mental content with a doctrine of privileged self‐knowledge. The essay presents a reductio of compatibilism by arguing that if compatibilism were true, we would be in a position to know certain facts about the world a priori, facts that no one can reasonably believe are knowable a priori. Whether this should be taken to cast doubt on externalism or privileged self‐knowledge is not discussed. Consideration is given to the ’empty case’—the case in (...) which a thinker expresses what he takes to be a genuine thought concerning a natural kind but where there is in fact no relevant natural kind, so that the putative natural kind term fails to refer. It is argued that, in such a case, on an externalist conception of natural kind terms, the thinker is deluded in taking himself to be expressing a complete thought, and that such delusions are not compatible with privileged self‐knowledge. (shrink)

In the Bayesian framework, a language learner should seek a grammar that explains observed data well and is also a priori probable. This paper proposes such a measure of prior probability. Indeed it develops a full statistical framework for lexicalized syntax. The learner's job is to discover the system of probabilistic transformations (often called lexical redundancy rules) that underlies the patterns of regular and irregular syntactic constructions listed in the lexicon. Specifically, the learner discovers what transformations apply in (...) the language, how often they apply, and in what contexts. It considers simpler systems of transformations to be more probable a priori. Experiments show that the learned transformations are more effective than previous statistical models at predicting the probabilities of lexical entries, especially those for which the learner had no direct evidence. (shrink)

Cet article porte sur la notion de description (Beschreibung) chez Marty. L’article débute par l’étude de la distinction entre psychologie descriptive et génétique chez Brentano, non seulement dans les cours donnés à Vienne dès 1887, mais également dans la Psychologie du point de vue empirique. L’article se concentre ensuite sur la reprise martyienne de cette distinction. Si Marty, fidèle à la pensée de son maître, en reprend les principales conclusions dans ses propres travaux de psychologie, il étend de manière originale (...) la distinction entre recherches descriptives et génétiques à la philosophie du langage, notamment à la « sémasiologie » (Semasiologie) ou « théorie de la signification » (Bedeutungslehre). L’article se clôt sur une discussion des critiques adressées par Husserl à la philosophie du langage de Marty. (shrink)

This book is a major attempt to reconcile the empirical basis of linguistic science with the a priori nature of philosophical reasoning. Its purpose is to show how the methods and findings of linguistic science, especially of transformational grammar, can be used to cast light upon central problems of analytic philosophy. After dealing with recent objections to the use of linguistic techniques in philosophy, the author shows, with great force and clarity, how these techniques can be applied to (...) such problems as the analysis of singular terms, the concepts of fact, event, and causality, and the meaning of the word "good.". (shrink)

É a metafísica uma ciência a priori ou a posteriori’? Suárez e a fundamentação da metafísica Resumo: Contra a interpretação de François Courtine, Rolf Darge afirma que para Francisco Suárez a metafísica é uma ciência que trata do ente entendido não como aquilo que pode ser objeto para a mente humana, mas como aquilo que é apto a existir de fato. A metafísica seria uma ciência real, entre outras razões, porque ela é uma ciência a posteriori. Este artigo pretende (...) verificar melhor a afirmação de que a metafísica de Suárez é uma ciência a posteriori. Pois, se de fato for assim, a interpretação realista que Rolf Darge oferece da metafísica de Suárez adquire maior plausibilidade. Palavras-chave: objeto da metafísica; empirismo; realismo. Is metaphysics an a priori or an a posteriori Science? Suárez and the foundation of metaphysics. Abstract: Against the interpretation of François Courtine, Rolf Darge affirms that for Francisco Suárez metaphysics is a science that deals not with being as that which can be an object for the human mind, but with being as that which is apt to actually exist. Metaphysics would be a real science, among other reasons, because it is a posteriori science. This article aims to verify the claim that Suárez's metaphysics is a posteriori science. If this is so, the realistic interpretation that Rolf Darge offers of Suárez's metaphysics acquires greater plausibility. Key-words: object of metaphysics; empiricism; realism. La métaphysique est-elle une science a priori ou a posteriori? Suárez et le fondement de la métaphysique. Résumé: Contre l'interprétation de François Courtine, Rolf Darge affirme que pour Francisco Suárez la métaphysique est une science qui traite de l'étant compris non comme ce qui peut être un objet pour l'esprit humain, mais comme ce qui est susceptible d'exister réellement. La métaphysique serait une vraie science, entre autres raisons, car c'est une science a posteriori. Cet article vise à mieux vérifier l'affirmation selon laquelle la métaphysique de Suárez est une science a posteriori. S'il en est ainsi, l'interprétation réaliste que propose Rolf Darge de la métaphysique de Suárez acquiert une plus grande plausibilité. Mots-clés: objet de la métaphysique; empirisme; réalisme. Data de registro: 16/09/2021 Data de aceite: 20/10/2021. (shrink)

Due to the famous methodenstreit it is often well argued that Menger’s approach to social sciences can be seen as anti-historical, as according to him pure empirical studies are insufficient to establish a firm economic theory. By suggesting that some theorems have to precede historical studies, Menger may be seen as a representative of the a priori tradition in scientific method. The modern method in the mainstream of economic thinking is also to a large extent anti-historical and a (...) class='Hi'>priori, but because of its lack of realism and extensive reliance on very limiting assumptions. The main strength of the Mengerian anti-historical approach is lesser faith in imaginary constructs, implying a higher degree of realism in theorizing. (shrink)

This article tries to make a contribution to a concrete eidetic of thinking by studying the first nine years of Hegels philosophical development in perspective of the question : Which are the origins and how passed the „prehistory” of his later System ? In Tübingen Hegels thought circles round the ideal of a free, noble and happy nation, of which he means to have discovered the -alas ! - lost prototype in the greek paradise. The political and aesthetic-religious nature of (...) this ideal nation is characterized by spontaneous humanity and freedom. Bern is the period of Hegels revolt. On religious level he makes a first effort to play Jesus off against the positivity of the Churches ; on politic-ethical level his philo: ophy of alienation comes into existence. For the more and more growing sharp antithesis between Mastery and Servitude, Nature and Freedom, Freedom and History, God and Man, Hegel tries to find a solution in the glorification of a revolutionary and heroic „Sollen”. The newness of the fragments Hegel wrote in Frankfort , consists chiefly in an implicit „Logic" that manifests itself at once in Hegels analysis of a number of historic-existential phenomena. In virtue of the basic categories, which this logic contains, „the ideal of his youth reflects itself” - to use Hegels own words - in a reflexive „system”. Ideal, fundamental logic and system are, however, - each one in his own, respectively „mythical”, „logical”, „systematical" way -the transcriptions of a preceding or „a priori” interpretation of existence on the ground of fundamental desires and existential options, that can be revealed to a certain extent by an „existential psychoanalysis”. Hegels thought is rooted in the nostalgia for a terrestrial „salvation” : the union through feeling with the maternal Universe by which inner harmony and „beingwith-oneself” is reached. Some beginnings of criticism are addressed to the pre-philosophical options which are the source of inspiration of Hegels first philosophy. His desire for „Beruhigung” excludes every real Transcendent ; the Feeling of Frankfort and the Reason-Knowledge of Jena deny the existence of every Mystery, that is bigger than Man ; Hegels dialectic is an effort to conquer every tragical moment of life by human power within this world ; his analysis of love fail to appreciate the own character of human individuality and community ; Hegels triad is the résumé of a monism of thought, no real Trinity. (shrink)