Forty years have now passed since the periodical Voprosy filosofii [Problems of Philosophy] was born. Its first issue was sent to the press on the last day of July 1947. By August, readers already had in their hands this issue of the new philosophical journal, the lack of which had been quite keenly felt throughout the country. The first issue took up 31.5 printer's sheets and marked the beginning of the production of the second Marxist philosophical periodical in the (...) history of our country. Earlier, between 1922 and 1943, the philosophical journal Pod znamenem marksizma [Under the Banner of Marxism] was published in the Soviet Union; under the difficult conditions of the war this journal in a sense shut itself down unnoticed: no one abolished it. (shrink)

There has been no uniform conception of philosophy in the West. The Greek conception differs very much from that of Kant, and Kant's philosophical thought is in turn altogether dissimilar from that of a man like Ayer. However, there are certain broad characteristics which distinguish the philosophy of European culture from philosophies of Hindu and Chinese cultures. Within the same culture, of course, there are a number of clear-cut directions. It may, for example, be pointed out that philosophy, as conceived (...) in Germany, Spain, and Italy, differs very much from the philosophy that has evolved in Britain and Scandinavian countries. There are, certainly, exceptions. Britain has produced Bradley and Whitehead; and Denmark, Kierkegaard. Still we are not far wrong in thinking that there is something which distinguishes the philosophy of one tradition from that of another. This difference is inevitable because philosophical activity takes place not in a vacuum but within a historical setting. History is influenced by the geography of the country and the racio-cultural patterns that have been established. Again, foreign impacts produce currents of far-reaching change in habits of thought as well as action. To cite an instance, but for the German influence sweeping through Coleridge, the Cairds, and Green, Bradley or Bosanquet would be unexplainable. I will therefore assume that the philosophy of a tradition can be taken as a historic and continuous phenomenon with a special genius of its own and, perhaps, a destiny as well. (shrink)

When it comes to questions about alternative visions for philosophical engagement, Heidegger’s work makes for an interesting case study, especially if we focus on his texts from the turbulent 1930s. As a shortcut into this contested territory, it is instructive to examine Heidegger’s anti-journalistic gestures, centered on the question whether this animosity is bound to drive a wedge between, or rather prompt a re-approximation of, philosophy and public scholarship. To render this programmatic concern more specific, the present essay aims to (...) reassess Heidegger’s profile by considering his account of language as the “most dangerous of goods” bestowed on humans. This theme can serve as an expedient starting point for scrutinizing philosophers’ self-understanding as daring explorers in pursuit of profound insights into the human condition, and their ability to balance excitement and sobriety. (shrink)

The growing literature on philosophical thought experiments has so far focused almost exclusively on the role of thought experiments in confirming or refuting philosophical hypotheses or theories. In this paper we draw attention to an additional and largely ignored role that thought experiments frequently play in our philosophical practice: some thought experiments do not merely serve as means for testing various philosophical hypotheses or theories, but also serve as facilitators for conceiving and articulating new ones. As we will put it, (...) they serve as ‘heuristics for theory discovery’. Our purpose in the paper is two-fold: to make a case that this additional role of thought experiments deserves the attention of philosophers interested in the methodology of philosophy; to sketch a tentative taxonomy of a number of distinct ways in which philosophical thought experiments can aid theory discovery, which can guide future research on this role of thought experiments. (shrink)

The scales across which physical properties exist are vast and subtle in their effects on particular systems placed locally on such scales. For example, human experiential access is restricted only to partial segments of the mass density, size, and temperature scales of the universe. I argue that philosophers must learn to appreciate better the effects of physical scales. Specifically, thought experiments in philosophy should be more sensitive to physical scale effects, because the conclusion of a thought experiment may be undermined (...) by unintentionally ignored scale effects, and the changes required to obtain the foreground state of affairs in a thought experiment might require unacknowledged scale-spanning changes to the contextual background. I discuss four philosophical thought experiments: Putnam's Twin Earth and Brain in a Vat, Searle's Chinese Room, and Chalmers's Zombies Without Qualia. I close by briefly defending the greater interest and importance of physical possibility over logical possibility. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.1 (2001) 145-146 [Access article in PDF] Nicholas Jolley. Locke. His Philosophical Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Pp. 233. $55.00, cloth; $19.95, paper. One of the main aims of this lean and clearly set out book is "to argue for the fundamental unity of Locke's thought" in the Essay concerning Human Understanding. Thus while it deals with many of the usual (...) 'central themes' (ideas, knowledge, freedom, personal identity, etc.), this Locke is more ambitious than are other general surveys of the Essay. Another, related aim of the book is to defend Locke against charges of inconsistency. Here, it is successful in many instances. But even as sympathetic a reader as Jolley has to admit several times that there are in Locke's text "elements of inconsistency," positions that are "hard to reconcile" with each other, and "tensions" if not contradictions.For the most part Jolley's exposition follows the structure of the Essay, beginning with "the origin and nature of ideas," going through the various topics from Book II, then moving to themes in Book III ("Classification and Language") and ending with an account of Book IV ("Knowledge and Faith"). He proceeds by giving brief expositions of Locke's arguments on the issues at hand, sometimes reflecting on alternative readings, and considering objections to, and defences of Locke. There is some discussion of other major seventeenth-century philosophers, and there are—fairly general—references to the corpuscular philosophy and to Aristotelianism. But on the whole, Jolley does not burden his account with much historical context, focusing instead on individual "issues" and arguments concerning Locke's own text.Yet, sometimes Jolley's discussion of Locke's arguments leaves the reader with statements that require considerable elaboration. For example, in his treatment of Reid's critique of Locke's account of personal identity (according to which Locke's theory is inconsistent with the transitivity of identity), he ends his discussion by simply stating that "it is not obviously foolish to question whether the transitivity relation holds for identity over time" (121). Foolish or not, what is obvious is that more needs to be said to make this suggestion plausible, both in itself and as part of a reading of Locke.At other times Jolley's expositions are not as clear as they might be and remain unconvincing. Thus, in defending Michael Ayers's much debated view that all Lockean ideas are of the nature of mental images, he concedes that it is difficult to accommodate Locke's ideas of reflection (i.e., ideas of mental operations) to this reading. Yet he defends it, saying that Locke interprets the imagist programme "with some latitude." But if ideas of reflection are excluded, it would seem rather difficult to persist with the claim that Locke "is indeed an imagist." This relates to another issue that is much discussed in Locke scholarship: the notion of what Locke calls "substratum" or "pure substance in general." As Jolley reports, Michael Ayers has argued that 'substratum' does not stand for a bare particular but must be understood in the light of Locke's doctrine of real essence: real essence and substance are not to be equated but they pick out the same thing. Thus, according to Ayers, when Locke draws attention to our ignorance of both substance and real essence, he is not preaching agnosticism at two distinct metaphysical levels. Jolley rejects this reading. But while he points out, rightly in my view, that substratum concerns our thinking about objects, in places he appears to accept that the notion is a metaphysical one, for he holds (against Ayers) [End Page 145] that the distinction between substratum and real essence does concern different metaphysical levels (73). Locke himself is clear enough about the status of the "notion of pure substance in general." When he introduces it (II.xxiii.2), he does so as part of his account of how complex ideas of substances are formed: the notion is part of our ideas of particular kinds of substances. Now this notion cannot be derived... (shrink)

In the exmanination of the intellectual life, including the history of philosophy, at the turn of the centuries in Slovakia it is illuminating to see this period from the perspective of modernization. Not only it discerns still unknown aspects of the historical events of that time, but it also sheds a new light on those, which were due to ideological reasons neglected or overestimated and even glorified. The modernization in Slovakia, although belated, less cretaive and more imitating, brought about the (...) structuralizationa and the institutionalization of the Slovak society, contribu_ting to its rapid development. In philosophy it gave rise to the plurality of new streams and ideas, and many discussions and disputes concerning the future deve_lopment of philosophy, the problems of science and religion, truth and faith, morals etc. It thus hepled in creating new presuppositions for the development of philosophy in Slovak society. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend the viability and importance of conceptual analysis to philosophical inquiry. My argument proceeds in two steps. In a first step, I argue that we rely on the notions guiding how we do and would apply our terms in order to evaluate the counterfactual conditionals we find at the heart of philosophical thought experiments. In a second step, I argue that our notions determine what the relevant terms mean in our mouth. In order to defend the (...) resulting neo-descriptivist semantics, I put forth an epistemic argument for descriptivism—the argument from communication. I conclude that philosophical thought experiments are exercises in conceptual analysis. (shrink)

The problem of formation of the Ukrainian ethnic group is based on the analysis of processes of morality and morality formation. Let's pay attention first of all to the general tendencies of formation and formation of mentality. In terms of the study of the concept of "mentality" revealed fundamental differences between such concepts as "people", "ethnos", "nation", "national character".

The author points to the power of traditionalism in Slovak cultural – spiritual milieu and to the rise of the intellectual modernity in the Slovak thought in 17th – 20th centuries . There is a continuity of alternating between tradition and modernity. The problem of this philosophy remains “idolatrism”. Regarding the problem of receptivness, the author points to the theoretical and methodological standpoints of structuralism with its principle of immanence. In conclusion the author examines the problem of the marginality of (...) “national” philosophy. (shrink)

Tra le diverse proposte ermeneutiche capaci di dare valore alla critica che Christian August Crusius rivolge al razionalismo leibniziano-wolffiano ce n’è una che pone al centro dell’attenzione la relazione che intercorre tra antropologia e teodicea. Il discorso crusiano intorno all’uomo svolge al suo interno il ruolo di fondamento esplicativo della risposta alla questione del male in un mondo voluto da Dio. La teodicea viene così considerata per quello che è in primo luogo: l’espressione di una visione incentrata sull’essere razionale finito, (...) sulla creatura umana. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Present Trends of French Philosophical ThoughtAlexandre Koyré and Paola ZambelliThe paper that is published here for the first time was read to the Graduate Faculty of the New School for Social Research by Alexandre Koyré, probably during one of his first trips to the United States as a visiting professor in the fall of 1946 or in the fall of 1950. 1 Given its content and the secondary literature (...) he quoted, the paper seems to go back to the end of 1946, when eight lectures were announced in the Bulletin of the New School, 2 but Koyré probably read only the first of them, deciding to postpone the later ones, because the other subject chosen for his 1946 seminars at the New School (“Les philosophes et la machine”) gained more interest and grew longer. He came back to the New School in 1950 to give some lectures on existentialism [End Page 521] in France, but this time he was the guest of Horace Kallen. 3 But we read in this paper that Koyré had spoken in a series of seminars organized by Albert Salomon. It was determined that Koyré should speak on a broad subject—not only on Sartre’s existentialism, but also on French philosophical trends in general in the first year after the Second World War. His American listeners were obviously interested in hearing about Sartre, Camus, Merleau-Ponty, and the development of the new existentialist school in France.The result was that Koyré prepared a long paper—one that began by mentioning philosophers who had died in the War and the Resistance and concluded with an analysis of Sartre’s ontology and ethics. In the archives of the Centre Koyré in Paris there are three originals of this paper: a longer manuscript which, though earlier in date than the other two, is more complete and provides the basis of my edition, and two shorter typescripts, possibly prepared by the author’s typist with a view to publishing the piece in an American journal. In the first of the two typed versions several sentences, names, and words are missing in the typescript but were inserted into the text by an unknown hand. The second of the typescripts is complete in these points, but its preparation was interrupted for unknown reasons, and the copies (an original and two carbons) bear a final handwritten note: “Le texte s’arrête là.” Happily, the present manuscript version continues to the paper’s original conclusion.Perhaps Koyré, having temporarily mislaid the last pages of the manuscript among his many notes, decided not to publish the paper. 4 The omission from the [End Page 522] body of his published work is regrettable, since this is one of the few papers in which Koyré took a position on contemporary philosophical problems. On the basis of his deep knowledge of Husserl’s and Heidegger’s philosophies, he was able to give a serious interpretation of Sartre. In discussing Sartre, Koyré predominantly used Sartre’s polemical lecture L’exis-tentialisme est un humanisme, read, and published in 1946 as a response to Catholic and Marxist critiques. This was certainly a simpler text than the bulky but more authoritative L’être et le néant. And perhaps it was to avoid taking this latter work in his suitcase that Koyré—as he often did—prepared a selection of fundamental passages for his American trip, copying them first in French and then making what was their first translation into English (published below in an appendix).No doubt, after five years of exile, Koyré wished to familiarize himself with the work of contemporary thinkers, both French and German. Indeed, he had already been doing this, since just before the lecture in New York, Koyré took part in a private debate with Jean Wahl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Georges Blin, Maurice de Gandillac, and Gabriel Marcel on the subject of Heidegger’s philosophy. The last two speakers, together with Koyré himself, published their papers from the exchange in a journal and later in a volume introduced by Wahl. In his contribution Koyré emphasized Heidegger’s ideas of “concern [Sorge, souci]” and of “being unto death [zum Tode sein],” writing... (shrink)

Translation of “De transcendentale critiek van het wijsgeerig denken en de grondslagen van de wijsgeerige denkgemeenschap van het avondland” by Herman Dooyeweerd (1941), Philosophia Reformata 6 (1), pp. 1–20.

In a number of recent discussions of non-standard, Philosophy programs vaarious ages have been identified as the focus for spontaneous or exceptional interest in philosophising. Such claims, supporting a particular population as naturally suited to philosophical inquiry, are based as often as not, on anecdotes that exhibit telling instances of philosophical activity. Needless to say, such motivated activity occurring spontaneously and outside of a formal classroom may occur in many contexts and at various ages. If professional educators egar to support (...) philsophical programs on the basis of the naturalness of the philosophical enterprise are to warrant their interest on the basis of claims to age-appropriateness, some reasonable attempt at gathering empirical data is required. We offer the questionaire on the following pages as a probe to be used by interested educators and others. (shrink)

TGiulio Preti, born in Pavia (Italy) in 1911 and dead in Djerba (Tunisia) in 1972, represents one of the most subtle Italian thinkers of the latter half of the twentieth century. After graduating in 1933 discussing a thesis about The Husserl’s historical significance, he connected more and more to the Antonio Banfi’s lesson of critical rationalism and he elected him as his master. Starting from Banfi’s The principles of a reason theory (1927), Preti studied in depth the program of historization (...) of the Kantian transcendental both in books such as Idealism and positivism (1942), and in Praxis and empiricism (1957), in Rhetoric and logic (1968), and then in his numerous essay studies, later collected in fundamental posthumous volumes, Philosophical essays (1976, 2 vol.). Preti’s decisive problem is the following question: how is it possible to historicize human knowledge without a relativization? According to Preti, in order to answer this question, it is necessary to acknowledge the objectivity of scientific knowledge. The objective knowledge mustn’t be confused with an absolute knowledge or, least of all, with a subjective, or toutcourt relative, knowledge. Therefore it is necessary to avoid either opposite poles, but specular, in which the different epistemologicaltraditions of the last century are, on the contrary, stopped. In Preti’s opinion, the objectivity of knowledge arises from the eidetic, linguistic and operative structures, within the limits of which develops a determinate form of human scientific knowledge. In other words: every scientific knowledge, structured into a particularscientific theory and relating to a particular technological heritage, consists of a precise theoretical-practical horizon, that determines, with Husserl’s words, a specific “ontological region”, or, with Bachelard’s words, a specific “ontogenesis”. So Preti recovers the heuristic rule of the Kant’s transcendental reason. Nevertheless, unlike Kant, Preti believes the aprioristic structures of our ideas always have a conventional and historical foundation. In this way, the Kantian a priori changes into an historical and relativistic a priori. Certainly in Kant’s opinion an historical and relativistic a priori would have looked like a “round-square”, an authentic contradiction, a pure logical impossibility. According to Preti, on the contrary, this paradoxical aspect is the true distinctive feature of scientificknowledge objectivity, which has no more any eternal or absolute value, but is always built by men born to die and is always bound to determinate historical forms of civilization. Starting from these assumptions, Preti builds, in this way, a research programme on the possibility to individualize a form of “critic ontologism”, which hasn’t any more connection with the claims and the traditional metaphysical structures of the “Being qua Being”. On the contrary, Preti thinks the only “being” we can rationally talk about is the one constituted within the different cognitive ambits. Philosophy then must be able to develop a “meta-reflection” on different knowledge elaborated by single sciences. According to Preti, in fact, philosophy is the formality of human culture, it is, in other words, a form of self-reflection by the human culture about itself. Therefore philosophy has no more any privileged subject, but it must be always able to reflect, with great theoretical humility, on the different cognitive forms, in order to study languages, structures, methods, extension and limits of the human knowledge. In this way Preti’s “critic ontologism” is a kind of historical-objective transcendentalism, able to study the different configurations of the technical-scientific heritage produced by mankind during his history. (shrink)

Ali Bey Huseynzade, one of the prominent representatives of Azerbaijan's literary, cultural, social-political, and philosophical thought in the 20th century, was the first publisher of the political-Turkism movement in Azerbaijan. He was a distinguished political figure, talented scientist, thinker, and publicist, and holds a unique place in the history of the Azerbaijani people. Over time, there is an increasing need to deeply comprehend and study the magnificent artistic works created by Ali Bey Huseynzade. Throughout his life, Huseynzade dedicated his prolific (...) writing to the research and promotion of pan-Turkish spiritual values, fighting with all the strength of his brilliant talent for the progress of the Turkic people. He played an important role in the formation of the theoretical-philosophical foundations of the Azerbaijani national idea, striving for reforms in public and cultural life and artistic consciousness through his rich creative output. With his famous "Threefold Formula"-"Turkification, Islamization, Modernization" - he contributed to the formation of the ideology of Azerbaijanism. He advocated for the necessity of abandoning sectarian divisions and uniting all Muslims under the umbrella of a single religion-Islam. In his article titled "What is Young Turkism?", he explained the essence of the Turkish reform movement and expressed his views in many articles published in newspapers and magazines, arguing that Ottoman Turkish should become the common language of all Turks. Having spent more than 30 years of his life in exile, Ali Bey’s complex and turbulent life path was marked by political and cultural struggles aimed at the unity and wholeness of the Turkic world. The article emphasizes the significance of national-democratic values, highly relevant today, and their reflection in Azerbaijani philosophy and social-political thought. It also highlights the necessity of the establishment of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic as the first historical embodiment of the national-democratic statehood ideology, which began in the early 20th century. Ali Bey Huseynzade’s multifaceted activities and his intellectual contributions, not only for Azerbaijani Turks but for the entire Turkic world, affirm the relevance of the subject as he remains a valuable thinker on a broader scale. (shrink)

Je m’efforcerai de donner plus de poids aux doutes de Pascal Engel relatifs à deux affirmations de Timothy Williamson dans Philosophy of Philosophy: que les expériences de pensée philosophiques portent sur une possibilité métaphysique par opposition à une possibilité conceptuelle, et que le raisonnement contrefactuel joue un rôle crucial pour atteindre les conclusions modales pertinentes dans les arguments fondés sur des expériences de pensée. Dans le premier cas, je soutiendrai qu’à moins de comprendre la notion de conceptuel dans un sens (...) psychologique, il est difficile de saisir la différence entre des expériences de pensée qui « portent sur des concepts » ou possibilités conceptuelles et des expériences de pensée qui « portent sur des êtres réels » ou possibilités métaphysiques. Dans le second cas, je soutiendrai qu’il n’est pas clair que les contrefactuels sont des prémisses indispensables dans des arguments fondés sur des expériences de pensée ou que le raisonnement contrefactuel prend l’avantage sur le raisonnement déductif ordinaire pour atteindre des conclusions modales. (shrink)

Any criticism that can be made of philosophy necessarily implies knowledge of the nature of its symbolic structures. Accordingly, in this paper, I argue that the reflective value of philosophy in the understanding of reality must start by taking into account the peculiar features of the symbolic elements, which compose and support its epistemic structures. The representative core of these elements is, to that extent, the philosophical concept. Through it, as I will try to bring to light, the human mind (...) acquires an ideal coupling between thought objects and the act of thinking itself, which in turn differs from that of other forms of knowledge. The question remains, however, whether such unity always carries a sense of reality and what its nature is. (shrink)

Turning to the history of philosophical thought, I am surprised by the question what is knowledge? I am surprised because usually we do not reflect on our own knowledge; it appears to us as something obvious. And yet this question has disturbed people since the beginning philosophical thinlung. Moreover, at the time knowledge appeared as a subject full of aporiasintellectual difficulties and obvious contradictions of judgment. This led to the humiliating doubt that man could know anything about the world in (...) which he lived and, thus, exposed, so to speak, the painful nerve of the cognitive aspirations of human reason. (shrink)

In the field of the history of Chinese philosophy, there are still a number of tasks that need to be done in clearing up the chaos and restoring order, in purging the poison spread by Lin Biao and the "gang of four," in overcoming the influence of the ultraleftist line. How was it that the "gang of four" was able to revise the history of Chinese philosophy and use the slogan of "evaluating the Legalists and criticizing the Confucians" as a (...) justification of their schemes to usurp the authority of the Party? This is related to the fact that we have not yet been able to truly use the viewpoint and methodology of Marxism to establish a scientific history of Chinese philosophy. After Liberation, important successes were obtained in the study of the history of Chinese philosophy, but it cannot be denied that the attacks and destruction of the ultraleft line on this field were severe and that even today our minds are still bound by a number of restrictions. In certain of the works published previously, due to the influence of the ultraleftist tide, class struggle was a label and the struggle between materialism and idealism was a simple formula. Such phenomena clearly violated the demands of Marxism for "concrete analysis of concrete situations." We definitely must liberate thought, break through prohibitions, shatter these restrictions, and really try to engage in concrete analysis of philosophical thought from past history. (shrink)

The article analyzes the general history of the formation of the phenomenon of sacred, as well as its potential for research in the context of the history of philosophical thought. Within the framework of the existing trends in the study of the sacred, it is customary to analyze the phenomenon either in its narrow subject specialization, or in the context of individual disciplines with which it finds a connection. At the same time, the phenomenon is not fully considered as a (...) separate phenomenon that exerts and undergoes internal and external changes within the framework of general secular trends in the development of mankind. It is assumed that this situation develops due to insufficient research of the phenomenon within the historical context. The author believes that this problem can be solved with the help of historical reconstruction of the phenomenon, analyzing it indirectly, through the connection with monotheistic religions and pagan cults. (shrink)

The paper deals with the problem of nation in Slovak philosophical thought in the first half of the 20th century on the cultural, social and political background of that period. The author emphasizes the impact the modernization ideas had on the theoretical attitudes of some authors in this field. These developments resulted in a permanent conflict between the traditionalist and the modernization conceptions, characteristic of the period. She focuses particularly on the attitudes of the Christian-catholic conservative line, represented by the (...) Christian nationalism of J. Tiso, Š. Polakovi?, as well as on the the views of moderate Christian intellectuals as contrasted to the modernization attitudes of Slovak defenders of the idea of czechoslovakism. (shrink)