We apply a method analogous to the eikonal approximation to the Maxwell wave equations in an inhomogeneous anisotropic medium and geodesic motion in a three dimensional Riemannian manifold, using a method which identifies the symplectic structure of the corresponding mechanics, to the five dimensional generalization of Maxwell theory required by the gauge invariance of Stueckelberg's covariant classical and quantum dynamics. In this way, we demonstrate, in the eikonal approximation, the existence of geodesic motion for the flow of mass in a (...) four dimensional pseudo-Riemannian manifold. These results provide a foundation for the geometrical optics of the five dimensional radiation theory and establish a model in which there is mass flow along geodesics. We then discuss the interesting case of relativistic quantum theory in an anisotropic medium as well. In this case the eikonal approximation to the relativistic quantum mechanical current coincides with the geodesic flow governed by the pseudo-Riemannian metric obtained from the eikonal approximation to solutions of the Stueckelberg–Schrödinger equation. The locally symplectic structure which emerges is that of a generally covariant form of Stueckelberg's mechanics on this manifold. (shrink)

Dans le cadre du programme « Eikon : la vie des portraits grecs » financé par l’Agence nationale de la recherche, ont été poursuivis les travaux entamés à Délos en 2013 au cours de deux campagnes d’étude sur le site et au Musée. Études des supports de statues-portraits conservés sur le site (Fr. Herbin) Sur le site, l’objectif de la mission était de terminer l’inventaire des supports de statues-portraits. Seuls les blocs portant une dédicace ainsi que des semelles pour statue(s) (...) en bronze ou... (shrink)

This paper examines the relationship between the speaker and the paintings that he ostensibly describes in a series of descriptions in the “Eikones” of Philostratus the Elder (1,20-22). As a close reading of these descriptions in the order in which they occur in Philostratus’ text reveals, the initially distanced attitude of the speaker develops into an immersion in the world of the painting, which in turn gives way to a distanced description. The symmetrical change in the relationship between the speaker (...) and the paintings overrides the boundaries between the three descriptions under consideration and suggestively underlines the erotic allure of Olympus, the ‘protagonist’ of the central description. At the same time, it should be noted that the words the speaker addresses to the painted Olympus feature allusions to their status as part of a written text. Moreover, the description immediately following the series 1,20-22 draws attention to the potentially dangerous power of immersion. (shrink)

The ontic conception of explanation, according to which explanations are "full-bodied things in the world," is fundamentally misguided. I argue instead for what I call the eikonic conception, according to which explanations are the product of an epistemic activity involving representations of the phenomena to be explained. What is explained in the first instance is a particular conceptualization of the explanandum phenomenon, contextualized within a given research program or explanatory project. I conclude that this eikonic conception has a number of (...) benefits, including making better sense of scientific practice and allowing for the full range of normative constraints on explanation. (shrink)

Given the eikonal equation σ i=1 3 (∂ψ/∂x i ) 2 =n′ 2, we investigate the geometric structure that underlies the law of propagation of the wavefronts ψ(x 1,x 2,x 3) —ct=0. It turns out that Huygens' principle for the propagation of wavefronts is given in terms of a contact structure. Wavefronts are carried into wavefronts by contact transformations. As regards the wave-particle duality principle that arises in quantum mechanics, there is a natural geometric structure, a symplectic manifold (M 2n (...) , Ω), which “unifies” Fermat's principle and the eikonal equation (Huygens' principle). (shrink)

Two different methods of approach, currently under investigation, are suggested for calculating the eikonal function corresponding to quark-quark scattering at very high energies and small momentum transfers. These methods illustrate the realistic, dynamical complexities inherent in QCD scattering problems.

We solve the problem of formulating Brownian motion in a relativistically covariant framework in 3+1 dimensions. We obtain covariant Fokker–Planck equations with (for the isotropic case) a differential operator of invariant d’Alembert form. Treating the spacelike and timelike fluctuations separately in order to maintain the covariance property, we show that it is essential to take into account the analytic continuation of “unphysical” fluctuations.

Moving from the problem of defining how medieval speculation conceived the aesthetic dimension of art, this essay purposes an insight into the aspects that describe the peculiarity of the Byzantine conception of beauty and art. Surpassing the noetic perspective established by Platonic thought – shared also by Western medieval philosophy – according to which beauty is an intelligible model subsisting in itself as an autonomous entity, the Byzantine proper vision conceives beauty as a divine energy. The implications of this perspective (...) lead us to investigate its connection with some of the most original achievements of Byzantine speculation, such as hypostatic ontology, theology of deification, eikonic thinking, and especially sophianic gnoseology, which permit us to overcome the dichotomy of the intelligible and the sensible domains of reality. (shrink)

This article examines Gilles Deleuze’s concept of the simulacrum, which Deleuze formulated in the context of his reading of Nietzsche’s project of “overturning Platonism.” The essential Platonic distinction, Deleuze argues, is more profound than the speculative distinction between model and copy, original and image. The deeper, practical distinction moves between two kinds of images or eidolon, for which the Platonic Idea is meant to provide a concrete criterion of selection “Copies” or icons (eikones) are well-grounded claimants to the transcendent Idea, (...) authenticated by their internal resemblance to the Idea, whereas “simulacra” (phantasmata) are like false claimants, built on a dissimilarity and implying an essential perversion or deviation from the Idea. If the goal of Platonism is the triumph of icons over simulacra, the inversion of Platonism would entail an affirmation of the simulacrum as such, which must thus be given its own concept. Deleuze consequently defines the simulacrum in terms of an internal dissimilitude or “disparateness,” which in turn implies a new conception of Ideas, no longer as self-identical qualities (the auto kath’hauto), but rather as constituting a pure concept of difference. An inverted Platonism would necessarily be based on a purely immanent and differential conception of Ideas. Starting from this new conception of the Idea, Deleuze proposes to take up the Platonic project anew, rethinking the fundamental figures of Platonism (selection, repetition, ungrounding, the question-problem complex) on a purely differential basis. In this sense, Deleuze’s inverted Platonism can at the same time be seen as a rejuvenated Platonism and even a completed Platonism. (shrink)

Review of Sandu Frunză, O antropologie mistică. Introducere în gîndirea Părintelui Stăniloae. București: Eikon, 2016. 176 pag.

The use of fictional models is extensive and rewarding in modern science. This fact captured the attention of philosophers of science, who are focusing on questions such as the following: is it possible for a fictional model to be explanatory? And, if so, in virtue of what is such a fictional model explanatory? In this paper, I discuss these questions in relation to the realism vs. anti-realism debate in philosophy of science. I focus on work developed by Alisa Bokulich who (...) has argued for the explanatory role played by fictional models, claiming that it can be accommodated by realism in ‘a broad sense’. To this end, Bokulich introduced what she called ‘an eikonic conception’ of explanation, as opposed to the so-called ‘ontic’ conception. This move, Bokulich claims, allows non-causal explanations to be acceptable to a modified version, as opposed to a ‘naïve’ brand of realism. Roughly, a fictional model can capture aspects of reality if it manages to act as a proxy for a theory targeting a physical system. As Bokulich explains with the example of James Clerk Maxwell’s use of mechanical models, this is due to structural correspondences between a model and a theory at a certain level of abstraction. However, Bokulich does not explain how the model grasps reality. In this paper, I fill this missing piece of the puzzle. While I agree with Bokulich on the explanatory function of fictional models, I shall invoke her reading of Maxwell’s work to draw a different conclusion. Specifically, I argue that structural correspondences at various levels form what I call ‘a ladder of abstractions’ which connects aspects of a target system to the corresponding depths of descriptions. Modifying in these terms the scope of ‘representing a system’, I suggest that Bokulich’s proposed modification of realism is obviated. (shrink)

En Sofista, Platón revé algunos puntos clave de su teoría del conocimiento, tales como la teoría de las Formas y la noción de imagen (eídolon). Según algunos intérpretes (Ringbom, Palumbo, Deleuze, Audouard), este diálogo contendría la decisiva novedad de que entre conocimiento verdadero y conocimiento falso hay una notable paridad: ambos recurren a imágenes, el verdadero al eikón y el falso al eídolon (según diálogos anteriores, la imagen está reservada a las formas inferiores de conocimiento, lindantes con lo apariencial y (...) lo falso). En este trabajo me propongo discutir estas interpretaciones. No hay duda de que Sof. revisa el estatuto de las imágenes falsas, no obstante creo que no llega a establecer la aludida equiparación entre ambos tipos de conocimiento. Incluso en este diálogo -argumentaré- el conocimiento verdadero continúa funcionando de un modo cualitativamente distinto respecto del falso, sin recurrir a imágenes o haciéndolo lo menos posible. (shrink)

This paper examines whether a firm’s financial performance is associated with superior environmental, social and governance scores in emerging markets of multinationals in Latin America. The study addresses the current research gap on this issue; it develops hypotheses and tests them by applying linear regressions with a data panel drawn from the Thomson Reuters Eikon™ database to analyse data on 104 multinationals from Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru between 2011 and 2015. The results suggest that the relationship between the (...) ESG score and FP is significantly statistically negative. Furthermore, in examining environmental, social and governance separately to accurately determine each variable’s relationship to multilatinas’ FP, the results reveal a negative relationship. Finally, the empirical analysis provides evidence for a moderating effect of financial slack and geographic international diversification on the relationship between ESG dimensions and firms’ FP. This study furthers understanding of the relationship between ESG dimensions and FP for the Latin American business context. (shrink)

The present study investigates the relationship between technology director, internationalisation, and firm performance, assuming the beneficial effect of digital-sustainable corporate governance reforms. We implied the presence of a technology director on the board and empirically examined its impact on firm performance. In addition, we also test business internationalisation as a mediator between the technology director on the board and firm performance. The empirical findings rely on the data retrieved from the S&P Dow Jones Sustainability Index 2019 for 115 top sustainable (...) EU firms and the Thomson Reuters Refinitiv Eikon database. The results reveal a significant positive relationship between the technology director's presence on the board and firm performance. We also find business internationalisation mediates the relationship between the technology director's presence on the board and firm performance. Overall, we try to lay a foundation for a digitally aware board and its impact on important firm decisions. (shrink)

I compare Plato’s and Husserl’s accounts of the non-original appearance and the original with a focus on their methodologies for distinguishing between them and the phenomenological—i.e., the answer to the question of the what and how of their appearance—criteria that drive their respective methodologies. I argue that Plato’s dialectical method is phenomenologically superior to Husserl’s reflective method in the case of phantasmata that function as apparitions. Plato’s method has the capacity to discern the apparition on the basis of criteria that (...) appeal solely to its appearance, whereas Husserl’s method presupposes a non-apparent primitive distinction between the original qua primal impression and the phantasm as its reproductive modification. On the basis of Plato’s methodological superiority in this regard, I sketch a reformulation of the Husserlian approach to appearances guided by the original interrogative context of Plato’s dialectical account of the distinction between true and false appearances, eikones and phantasmata. (shrink)

Ovidiu Pecican, România si Uniunea Europeanã, Eikon, Cluj-Napoca, 2003.

In den folgenden Überlegungen wird der Frage nachgegangen, welchen Status die Unterscheidung zwischen Sinnlichkeit und Begriff in der Philosophie Husserls hat und inwiefern sie für die Herausarbeitung eines ästhetischen Wissens fruchtbar gemacht werden kann. Husserl formuliert in den Ideen I das „Prinzip aller Prinzipien“ für die Philosophie, „daß jede originär gebende Anschauung eine Rechtsquelle der Erkenntnis sei, daß alles, was sich uns in der ‚Intuition’ originär (sozusagen in seiner leibhaften Wirklichkeit) darbietet, einfach hinzunehmen sei, als was es sich gibt, aber (...) auch nur in den Schranken, in denen es sich da gibt[...].“1 Eine Anschauung ist also die subjektive Erscheinungsweise eines Gegenstandes: Etwas erscheint mir „als“ etwas, d.h. das Selbstsein der Sache ist nicht ein ‚ansich’ Sein, sondern eine „subjektive[], situationsgebundene[] Gegebenheitsweise.“2 Es gibt eine Korrespondenz zwischen der Gegebenheitsweise – dem ‚Wie’ des Erscheinens – und dem Gegenstandsart bzw. dem Gegenstandssinn – dem ‚als Was’ der Gegenstand vermeint ist. Sinnliche und kategoriale Anschauungen konstituieren die Form der Gegenständlichkeit: die sinnliche aus den „Auffassungsstoffen“, die kategoriale aus den „Auffassungsformen“. Sie sind nicht getrennte Bereiche in der husserlschen Phänomenologie, sondern sind durch ein Fundierungsverhältnis3 aufeinander bezogen: Laut den Logischen Untersuchungen ist eine kategoriale Anschauung4 ein durch eine sinnliche Wahrnehmung fundierter intentionaler Akt;in der kategorialen Anschauung erfüllen sich die „kategorial geformten Bedeutungen“.5 Im Unterschied zur sinnlichen Anschauung ist die kategoriale Anschauung durch einen „Überschuss in der Bedeutung“ charakterisiert, denn „nur die in []einem ‚Begriff‘ vereinten Merkmalbedeutungen terminieren in der Wahrnehmung“.6 In seinen späteren Überlegungen erkennt Husserl aber, dass das Kategoriale auf das Nichtkategoriale, auf das Vorprädikative bzw. die passive Synthesis hinweist. Im Folgenden wird daher die These vertreten, dass diese Anerkennung einer passiven, vorkategorialen, ursprünglichen Sinnstiftung und die darauf aufbauende sich stets fortbildende Sinnbildung des identischen Gegenstandes im kontinuierlichen Wahrnehmungsverlauf dem Gegenstand einen sinnlichen Überschuss aufprägt, den die kategoriale Wahrnehmung nicht einzulösen vermag. Diesem Überschuss liegen spezifische Wissensformen zugrunde, die nicht mehr ganz im Sinne Husserl, sondern in Anknüpfung an Platons Politeia als eikasía (Vermutung: den Bildern, eikones, entsprechend) und pístis (Hinnahme, Überzeugung) bestimmt werden können. Im letzten Teil des Vortrages wird schließlich ein auf dem Boden der Lebenswelt aufbauendes Fundierungsverhältnis zwischen ästhetischem und wissenschaftlichem Wissen vorgeschlagen. (shrink)

Review of Ioan Chirilă, Model, Chip, Sens, București: Editura Eikon, 2017.

Opaqueness of pp collisions is evaluated at three CERN-ISR energies. Comparisons with predictions of the factorizable eikonal models and the scaling hypothesis are made. It appears that results are in favor of the factorizable models.

An icon is part of the visible world, moreover, of things that are visible in a second degree. It is not only a sensitive thing, but a sensitive image of a sensitive entity. As an eikon, it is located in a platonic sense among the lowest degree of the doxa, and within the lowest degree of the scale of being. However it is not a simple sensitive and illusory representation of God, such as one criticized from a Kantian point of (...) view. The profound sense of an icon lies in its opening towards the invisible. An icon tries to capture the invisible. How is this meeting point of the visible and the invisible entangled? Can an icon really allow us to “see” the invisible or is it only a profanation of the invisible? It is my aim to analyze those questions in the following article. (shrink)

La pensée de Ricardo Sánchez Ortiz de Urbina n’a cessé de s’approfondir, sans toujours laisser le temps à ses lecteurs de reprendre leur souffle. La halte que représente « Que diez años es mucho… », dut ainsi être accueillie avec soulagement et reconnaissance! Situé à mi-parcours entre les écrits proprement stromatologiques et ceux qui donneront naissance à Orden oculto (2021), ne laissant rien pressentir des plus récentes percées, ce texte néanmoins rassemble avec patience et rigueur des années de réflexion sur (...) le sens d’une philosophie qui s’opère au niveau de l’eikôn et du microscopique, sans renoncer à son caractère systématique. Il constitue un préalable nécessaire à la bonne compréhension de l’épistémologie phénoménologique que RSOU bâtira quelques années plus tard. Surtout, il fournit un complément indispensable à ce que nous nous proposons d’appeler sa « perspective stromatologique » : celle qui entend révéler, dans la Sache, une diversité de couches (stromata) tenues ensemble par une structure « foliatile », la superposition ou le millefeuille des niveaux ainsi articulés. Seulement une philosophie des stromata phénoménologiques ne fait pas encore un monde. D’autres paramètres conceptuels sont requis, plus englobants ; qui n’avaient peut-être encore jamais fait l’objet d’un traitement systématique sous la plume de Ricardo. Le risque de confusion entre ces termes est désormais conjuré. (shrink)

The Western cultural archetype of Narcissus experiences a significant turning point in the 1400s, thanks to Leon Battista Alberti’s work. Indeed, the myth evolves from being a subject embodying a taboo in the Antiquity to become the glance that generates the image; in so doing this myth assumes the rank of science and philosophy. Alberti does not follow Pliny’s reading of Ovid’s Metamorphosis, but handles Philostratus’s version; with his visual description he represents in the “Eikones” the darting glance towards the (...) water. The rendering of this image anticipates the notion of centric ray, on which Alberti establishes his perspective’s theory based on the diaphanous nature of “velum”. The art of painting is compared to an “open vitreous and translucent window”. Narcissus does not see the water, so to say, but the image, as well as the painting’s observer instantly grasps the iconic value of it, rather than the material support. Because of this immediacy, the art of painting becomes the terrain of revelation: it makes clear the emerging progressive visibility of “something”, thus concurring with philosophy; better, the art of painting overtakes philosophy with the simple representation of polysemous complexities. This is the new art of painting, in which “there is nothing that is not philosophy”. Furthermore, in this synthetic role of representation in which the icon becomes all one with the spectator – in addition to the centric ray and to the orthogonality of the vision, topics already analyzed by the author in previous studies – consists an outstanding resemblance between Alberti and Cusanus. The two philosophers show their synergy in exploring a new anthropology. From this point of view can be read Alberti’s explanation, often misinterpreted, of Narcissus’ transformation into a flower: a synthesis between “imaginatio” and “executio”, or inactiveness versus activeness. Among all Narcissus’ portrayals of that time, it would be useful to consider the Pseudo Boltraffio’s version of London; this rendering applies thematically Alberti’s theory in its essential aspects, introducing it within Leonardo Da Vinci’s circle of artists. (shrink)

This paper traces the development of a deliberate and intense emphasis on visuality in literary representation of the second through fourth centuries C.E., resulting in a new cultural phenomenon: attributing the characteristics and functions of images to living persons. Calling on a range of sources from Lucian's Eikones to the Life of St. Daniel the Stylite and recent scholarship in art history and critical theory, the paper analyzes a series of interfaces between verbal and visual representation in terms of an (...) active transaction between viewer and viewed to construct meaning and establish and communicate social power. (shrink)

Radu Carp, Dacian Gratian Gal, Sorin Muresan, Radu Preda, Principles of Popular Thought. Christian Democratic Doctrine and Social Action, Eikon: Cluj, 2006.

L’objectif de ce texte de Ricœur est de relier mémoire et narrativité en prenant appui sur l’exemple de l’architecture. « J’adopte, écrit le philosophe, la définition la plus générale de la mémoire – celle que l’on trouve dans un petit texte d’Aristote précisé-ment intitulé De la mémoire et de la réminiscence, et qui reprend d’ailleurs des nota-tions, en particulier de Platon dans le Théétète, concernant l’eikôn, l’image: « rendre présent de l’absence », « rendre présent de l’absent » ; ainsi (...) que la notation qui dis-tingue deux absents : l’absent comme simple irréel, qui serait donc l’imaginaire, et l’absent-qui-a-été, l’auparavant, l’antérieur, le proteron. Ce dernier est, pour Aristote, la marque distinctive de la mémoire quant à l’absence: il s’agit donc de rendre pré-sente l’absence qui-a-été. J’ai trouvé une grande complicité de pensée aux deux ex-trêmes de notre histoire de l’Occident, entre les Anciens − avec cette idée de l’absence rendue présente et de l’antériorité − et un propos de Heidegger, auquel je tiens beau-coup, quel que soit mon éloignement de son idée de l’être-pour-la-mort: la pensée qu’il faut dédoubler notre concept du passé en ce qu’il appelle le révolu, le vergangen, et ce-qui-a-été, le gewesen. Du même coup, on rend justice à la définition des Anciens, car l’auparavant-rendu-présent est doublement marqué grammaticalement: il n’est plus, mais il a été. Et il me semble que c’est la gloire de l’architecture de rendre pré-sent non pas ce qui n’est plus mais ce qui a été à travers ce qui n’est plus. ». (shrink)

L’objectif de ce texte de Ricœur est de relier mémoire et narrativité en prenant appui sur l’exemple de l’architecture. « J’adopte, écrit le philosophe, la définition la plus générale de la mémoire – celle que l’on trouve dans un petit texte d’Aristote précisé-ment intitulé De la mémoire et de la réminiscence, et qui reprend d’ailleurs des nota-tions, en particulier de Platon dans le Théétète, concernant l’eikôn, l’image: « rendre présent de l’absence », « rendre présent de l’absent » ; ainsi (...) que la notation qui dis-tingue deux absents : l’absent comme simple irréel, qui serait donc l’imaginaire, et l’absent-qui-a-été, l’auparavant, l’antérieur, le proteron. Ce dernier est, pour Aristote, la marque distinctive de la mémoire quant à l’absence: il s’agit donc de rendre pré-sente l’absence qui-a-été. J’ai trouvé une grande complicité de pensée aux deux ex-trêmes de notre histoire de l’Occident, entre les Anciens − avec cette idée de l’absence rendue présente et de l’antériorité − et un propos de Heidegger, auquel je tiens beau-coup, quel que soit mon éloignement de son idée de l’être-pour-la-mort: la pensée qu’il faut dédoubler notre concept du passé en ce qu’il appelle le révolu, le vergangen, et ce-qui-a-été, le gewesen. Du même coup, on rend justice à la définition des Anciens, car l’auparavant-rendu-présent est doublement marqué grammaticalement: il n’est plus, mais il a été. Et il me semble que c’est la gloire de l’architecture de rendre pré-sent non pas ce qui n’est plus mais ce qui a été à travers ce qui n’est plus. ». (shrink)

Iconomie est un mot-valise dans lequel on entend d’une part l’icône ( eikôn, c’était l’un des noms grecs pour l’image) et d’autre part l’économie, cette oikonomia qui désignait la bonne gestion des échanges. Mais l’iconomie dont il sera question ici s’inscrit dans ce que, après et d’après Marx, il faut bien décrire comme un supermarché esthétique, en y repérant ce que Walter Benjamin nous a aidé à concevoir comme une sensibilité innervée.

The work aims to briefly present some points of Paul Ricoeur's analysis, especially The Living Metaphor in his Study I Between Rhetoric and Poetics carried out by the philosopher in the study mentioned above, divided into five parts: 1- The unfolding of rhetoric and poetics. 2- The common core of poetics and rhetoric: "the epiphora of the name". 3- An enigma: metaphor and comparison (eikõn). 4- The "rhetorical" place of the lexis. 5- The "poetic" place of the lexis. Based on (...) the analysis of Ricoeur's text on the subject, and with the help of reference commentators, we seek to introduce the reader in a didactic way to the discussion and points of view on linguistic hermeneutics in the contemporary period, highlighting the contribution of Ricoeur's thought. Where the philosopher discusses the place of metaphor in the field of language, exploring its historical evolution from classical rhetoric to a broader and more transformative poetic approach. He presents metaphor not only as a stylistic ornament, but as a linguistic operation that enables the creation of new meanings. (shrink)

Paul Ricœur develops his phenomenological-hermeneutical theory of memory in his seminal Memory, History, Forgetting, and several preliminary studies to his monumental book.[1] As its title indicates, the monograph treats memory in conjunction with forgetting and history, placed within a wider horizon of what could be termed an ethics of forgiving. For the purpose of this article I will focus on the problems of memory and forgetting, ignoring history for the most part. Similarly, I do not explicitly deal with the more (...) specific issue of collective memory, which marks a transitional step from a proper phenomenology of memory to the epistemological problems of history and historiography. Even though the three main objects of Ricœur’s study are firmly interlinked, leaving aside history does not impinge on its general line of thought since the most fundamental problems of Ricœur’s discussion on history are imported from his discussion on memory, most notably that of the Greek eikon – representation. Rather than to engage in a wide-ranging ethical discourse, my aim is to focus on a more basic critique of Ricœur’s understanding of narrative, and the role he assigns to it in his theory of memory. -/- I argue that Ricœur’s Aristotelean-structuralist notion of narrative runs into problems when confronted with narratives which do not comply with its notions of order and synthesis. In addition, despite its pervasiveness in his theory, narrative is not adequately scrutinized by Ricœur. That my critique implies severe consequences for his ethics should become obvious, even though an analysis of what exactly these consequences entail must remain outside of this study. For the purpose of this article, it is enough to know these two points: first, that Ricœur’s theory of memory and forgetting is constitutive for his theory of history, which in turn functions as a critical remedy to our often unreliable memories; and second, that this dialectical relation between memory and history is situated within an ethical horizon. (shrink)

“Jesus” constitutes the main element of Christian life. Therefore, Christianity is perceived as a Jesus-centered religion. This perception, from the birth of Jesus to his resurrection, clearly reveals itself both in the Christian faith, Christian worship and Iconography. Because, according to Christians, the birth of Jesus is the beginning of the salvation of mankind. The birth of Jesus, which contains a process, was celebrated as a Christmas Festival in Christianity. Christmas is a combination of the words “Noiono, Noio, Neos” and (...) the concepts “hed, hel, Helios”. These words mean “first day, new day of the month” or “new sun”. Today, Christmas has an important place in Christian life as folkloric. In this component, Santa Claus, pine tree and turkey have an important role. The birth of Jesus was reflected in iconography. The birth scene of Jesus was included in the iconography, and it was one of the icons of the twelve yortou (dodekaorthon). In this context, icons are important (especially for Orthodox Christians). The concept of icon comes from the Greek words “eikon, eikein”. In the iconography the birth of Jesus have the birth of Mary, the visit of Elizabeth, the dream of Joseph and the angel to Joseph, the census, the birth of Jesus, the good news of the shepherds and the worship of Kings. The concepts related to icons within these stages were analyzed. In this article, the importance of birth of Jesus in Christian life and iconography is revealed. Then, the birth of Jesus as a holiday has been discussed. And this birth was interpreted in iconographic terms. (shrink)

Review of Sandu Frunză, Experien ţa religioasă în gîndirea lui Dumitru Stăniloae. O etică relaţională. 2nd edition, București: Eikon, 2016, 262 pag.

플라톤(Plato, BC. 428~347)의 철학은 존재론이다. 그의 존재론의 시작에는 우주의 본성에 관한 탐구 활동이 포함된다. 그에 따르면 우리가 별들과 태양 그리고 하늘을 바라 볼 수 있는 것은 신이 우리들에게 눈을 준 혜택이며 이 혜택의 기능이 철학(Philosophia)을 할 수 있는 기능이 된다고 말한다. 그렇다면 이 본다는 것의 상응은 무엇인가? 이것이 모상(eikon)이기에 앞선 설명들 즉, ‘그럴듯한 이야기’(eikotes logoi, wahrscheinlich)이다. ‘그럴듯한(είκώζ)’의 그리스어가 내포하고 있듯이 ‘είκώγ’는 ‘그림’을 뜻한다. 이런 유비(類比) 관계(analogia)를 통해 그는 최고의 선(善)을 ‘그림’에 대한 ‘선분(線分)의 비유’로 상승시켰다. 그에게 최고의 선(善)은 수(數)이며, 신이 우리에게 (...) 준 눈의 기능으로 우리는 수를 기하학을 통해 배울 수 있게 되는 것이다. 그러므로 플라톤의 철학의 언어는 변증법의 언에만 국한되는 것이 아니다. 그가 그림을 사용한다는 것은 철학의 합법적인 언어놀이가 된다. 따라서 논자는 그의 ‘그럴듯한 이야기’의 기본 범주로서의 그림을 통해 철학에 그림이 어떻게 적용되고 있는 가를 고찰하고자 한다. 또한 그의 우주론은 현대의 우주론 다시 말해, 일반상대성 이론을 특징짓는 4차원의 기하학을 내포하고 있음을 밝히고자 한다. (shrink)

Résumé L’image sert à la fois de preuve et d’ argument en faveur de l’unité substantielle entre Dieu, dont Victorinus affirme qu’il n’est pas substance, et le Fils qui a substance, forme et subsistance propres. L’image est ainsi une preuve d’existence pour ce qui ne peut pas être connu autrement. Victorinus y fait appel dans l’analyse de l’engendrement et dans la structure des relations trinitaires, en s’appuyant sur la visibilité des existants. La référence princeps pour l’image comme preuve d’existence se (...) trouve dans un passage du Timée. Mais l’image entre dans la démonstration de la consubstantialité aussi comme un argument qui associe l’acte et la substance, l’existant et l’essence, l’être et la species, sur le modèle dialectique de la puissance et de l’acte. Une application similaire se retrouve chez Plotin qui fait de l’image l’enveloppe de visibilité ou de luminosité des choses, comme une sorte de présence hypostatique participante au principe substantiel des choses. Ces deux fonctions de l’image vont ensemble et ne peuvent pas être séparées, bien qu’elles relèvent en réalité de deux genres d’image ( eikôn-imago et eidos-species ) aussi distincts que leurs fonctions sont différentes sur le plan ontologique et métaphysique. (shrink)

English and Portuguese Between the 5 th and the 6 th centuries A. D., the Neoplatonic school of Alexandria, where the philosophical didactic follows a specific cursus studiorum , is opened also to the Christian students. D espite some divergences of religious (but also of economical and of political) natures, and after some violent events which occur in the Egyptian city, the Alexandrian school is linked to its contemporary Neoplatonic school in Athens. And indeed t he Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy, (...) i.e. t he introductory lectures discussed by an Anonymous professor in order to present the characteristic of Platonic philosophy, show that the method of teaching Plato is still the same. According to the Neoplatonic exegetical tradition, the text emphasizes that the dialogical artefact fashioned as a cosmos by Plato is a paideutic instrument with a purpose to look away from the sensible and to guide towards the intelligible. Plato, through dialogues, eikones of the invisible, does not create illusions, but contributes to the practice of ‘assimilation’ by filling the writings with greater contents. KEY-WORDS : Plato, Prolegomena , analogy, visible cosmos, invisible cosmos. Entre os século V e VI d.C., a escola neoplatônica de Alexandria, onde a didática filosófica segue um preciso cursus studiorum , é aberta também aos estudantes cristãos. Não obstante algumas diferenças de natureza religiosa (mas também econômica e política), e em seguida a alguns violentos acontecimentos que golpeiam a cidade egípcia, a escola de Alexandria permanece ligada à contemporânea escola neoplatônica ateniense. E, de fato, os Prolegomena à filosofia de Platão, isto é as lições introdutórias dadas por um professor anônimo para apresentar as características da filosofia platônica, mostram que o método de ensinar Platão é ainda o mesmo. Seguindo a tradição exegética neoplatônica, o texto sublinha que o artefato dialógico, plasmado como um cosmo por Platão, é um instrumento paidêutico que tem o objetivo desviar o olhar do sensível e guiar rumo ao inteligível. Platão, através dos diálogos, eikones do invisível, não cria ilusões, mas contribui para a prática da “assimilação” preenchendo os escritos de maiores conteúdos. PALAVRAS CHAVES: Platão, Prolegomena , analogia, cosmo visível, cosmo invisível. (shrink)

Inhalt: Alexander BÖHLIG: Vorwort. Der Manichäismus und das Christentum. Bemerkungen zur Metaphysik in Gnosis und Philosophie. Die Bedeutung des CMC für den Manichäismus. Mani und Platon - ein Vergleich. Wolfgang FAUTH: Manis anderes Ich. Gestalthafte Metaphysik im Kölner Mani-Kodex. Syzygos und Eikon. Edgar FRÜCHTEL: Platonismus und Christentum. Einige Bemerkungen zu Zeit und Zeitlichkeit in der Platonica Theologia des Marsilius Ficinus. Einige Bemerkungen zum Bild des Seelenwagenlenkers. Carl-A. KELLER: Gnostik, Urform christlicher Mystik. Christoph MARKSCHIES: Die Krise einer philosophischen Theologie.

Theodor Damian, Implicatiile spirituale ale teologiei icoanei Ed. Eikon, Cluj, 2003.

The analysis of the Helmholtz equation is shown to lead to an exact Hamiltonian system describing in terms of ray trajectories, for a stationary refractive medium, a very wide family of wave-like phenomena (including diffraction and interference) going much beyond the limits of the geometrical optics (“eikonal”) approximation, which is contained as a simple limiting case. Due to the fact, moreover, that the time independent Schrödinger equation is itself a Helmholtz-like equation, the same mathematics holding for a classical optical beam (...) turns out to apply to a quantum particle beam moving in a stationary force field, and leads to a system of Hamiltonian equations providing exact and deterministic particle trajectories and dynamical laws, and containing the laws of Classical Mechanics in the eikonal limit. (shrink)

The notion of 'symbol' in Eriugena's writing is far from clear. It has an ambiguous semantic connection with other terms such as 'signification', 'figure', 'allegory', 'veil', 'agalma', 'form', 'shadow', 'mystery' and so on. This paper aims to explore into the origins of such a semantic ambiguity, already present in the texts of the pseudo-Dionysian corpus which Eriugena translated and commented upon. In the probable Neoplatonic sources of this corpus, the Greek term symbolon shares some aspects of its meaning with other (...) words inherited from the ancient tradition, such as synthēma , eikōn , homoiotēs. Some of them, such as eikōn and homoiotēs, belong to the field of images and are associated with linguistic semantics in the Neoplatonic commentaries not only to Plato but also to Aristotle's logical works. Among the late ancient Neoplatonists, particular attention is paid to Proclus and to his use of the term agalma. In fact, the textual history of this word seems to be a privileged perspective from which to reconstruct the Neoplatonic semantic blending of symbol and image, as well as the main role played by linguistic issues in this conflation. (shrink)

In his well-known essay, ‘What Is a Sign?’ (CP 2.281, 285) Peirce uses ‘likeness’ and ‘resemblance’ interchangeably in his definition of icon. The synonymity of the two words has rarely, if ever, been questioned. Curiously, a locus classicus of the pair, at least in F. M. Cornford’s English translation, can be found in a late dialogue of Plato, namely, the Sophist. In this dialogue on the myth and truth of the sophists’ profession, the mysterious ‘stranger’, who is most likely Socrates’ (...) persona, makes the famous distinction between eikon (likeness) and phantasma (semblance) (236a,b). For all his broad knowledge in ancient philosophy, Peirce never mentioned this parallel; nor has any Peircean scholar identified it. There seems to be little problem with eikon as likeness, but phantasma may give rise to a puzzle which this paper will attempt to solve. Plato uses two pairs of words: what eikon is to phantasma is eikastikén (the making of likeness [235d]) to phantastikén (semblance making [236c]). In other words, icons come into being because of the act of icon-making, which is none other than indexicality. Witness what Peirce says about the relationship between photographs and the objects they represent: “But this resemblance is due to the photographs having been produced under such circumstances that they were physically forced to correspond point by point to nature.” (Ibid.) Thus the iconicity which links the representamen (sign) and its object is made possible not only by an interpretant, but also by idexisation. Their possible etymological and epistemological links aside, the Peircean example of photographing and the Platonic discussion of painting and sculpturing in the Sophist, clearly show the physio-pragmatic aspect of iconicity. The paper will therefore reread the Peircean iconicity by closely analysing this relatively obscure Platonic text, and by so doing restore to the text its hidden semiotic dimension. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:American Journal of Philology 123.3 (2002) 513-516 [Access article in PDF] Deborah Tarn Steiner. Images in Mind: Statues in Archaic and Classical Greek Literature and Thought. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001. xviii + 360 pp. 28 black-and-white figures. Cloth, $39.50. The production of sculpture in metal, stone, and other materials was a craft that virtually disappeared from the Greek world for several centuries after the end of the Bronze (...) Age. Small, solid cast bronze figurines reappeared in the ninth century B.C.E., but it was not until the middle seventh century that the first large-scale stone statues of women and men were created. From that point on, freestanding and architectural sculpture played a central role in Greek society and its artistic expression. While the stylistic evolution of Greek sculpture has been traced many times, in this provocative and ambitious book, Deborah Steiner sets out to examine, from a literary standpoint, "how archaic and classical Greek poets, philosophers, dramatists, and historians introduce statues as cognitive and hermeneutic devices in their texts" (xi). The investigation leads her to analyze what the statues "looked like, how they functioned," and "what they were credited with doing." The resulting book "aims to tell two stories, one about objects, the other about texts, and to show how each proves crucial to the other." The examination is somewhat lopsided, since the intellectual use of the visual material is given far greater emphasis than the statues themselves.The book is divided into five lengthy chapters and an epilogue. The first chapter, "Replacement and Replication," focuses on the physical resemblance of statues to people but not their inner natures. Chapter 2, "Inside and Out," examines, instead, the ways that a statue's exterior can relate more or less exactly to its inner truth. Chapter 3, "The Quick and the Dead," suggests that statues, by their very inertia, closely resemble the dead and therefore mediate in our imagination between the two states. Statues as erotic (or anti-erotic) art objects form the subject of chapter 4, "For Love of a Statue." The fifth and final chapter, "The Image in the Text," returns to the literary relation of sculpture to the production of memory: the similarity between victory odes and victors' statues, funerary epigrams and monuments, and the creation and regulation (on both the social and political levels) of honorary statuary and decrees. The retrospective epilogue is followed by twenty-eight black-and-white illustrations: Most of them depict well-known pieces of sculpture, but there are also several photographs of vase paintings and one of a drachma.In all the chapters, Steiner continually draws attention to the multivalent aspects of statues. The Greeks developed and applied a large and nuanced vocabulary to describe different types of image that embody differences only [End Page 513] poorly translated by our term, "statue": agalma, eidolon, eikon, kolossos, xoanon, and sema. Most of these have provoked extended discussion among modern scholars. The functions that statues played are even more diverse: they could serve as replacements for the absent or deceased individual, as votive offerings, as cult images, as commemorative monuments, as apotropaic devices, as protective symbols, as minatory agents, and occasionally as deadly entities (some statues could madden their viewer and even kill those who abused them or their creators by toppling over). They were also focusing devices that could evoke a wide range of emotional responses, from pity to lust. As exempla they served to instruct, and some could speak with their own voices, sometimes comically (e.g., the herms in Attic comedy) or poignantly through the words inscribed on their bases (e.g., the famous lines of Phrasikleia, the dead maiden who will never be a bride). The repeated use of the first person by funerary figures is particularly evocative. The inscriptions on other figures (like the very early Mantiklos Apollo statuette) make it clear that images could serve as bargaining chips with the gods for past services rendered or debts owed for the future.Other statues defy simple categorization—the Athena Parthenos, for example... (shrink)

Since its origin, Greek philosophy has made an attempt to rationally determine what the 'divine', object of myth and religious practice, really is. In the present article we examine Proclus's project of a philosophical theology. First, by determining its object (theion) : the absolute One and the henads, secondly by distinguishing its method (logos) from other forms of theological discourse : symbolic-mythological, eikonic and oracular. Finally, we explain how Proclus came to understand the logical discussion in the Parmenides of Plato (...) as the perfect system of scientific dialectical theology, a philosophical 'hymn of the generation of the gods'. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Journal of Aesthetic Education 40.4 (2006) 89-103 MuseSearchJournalsThis JournalContents[Access article in PDF]Philosophical AestheticsDonald Phillip VereneIs there an aesthetics of philosophy? Does philosophical discourse have a foundation in sense and sensibility? If the answer to these questions is affirmative and there is in some sense a philosophical aesthetics, what conclusions might be drawn for philosophical education?Put another way: Does philosophy require the power of the imagination and the product (...) of this power-image? Or is philosophy the product of the pure concept, the rational idea? Does philosophical reason rest upon a logic that resides in thought alone that is expressed essentially in principles and arguments disconnected from images and sentiment?The Philosophical ImaginaryThe French philosopher Michèle Le Doeuff says:Whether one looks for a characterization of philosophical discourse to Plato, to Hegel or to Bréhier, one always meets with a reference to the rational, the concept, the argued, the logical, the abstract. Even when a certain coyness leads some authorities to pretend that they do not know what philosophy is, no agnosticism remains about what philosophy is not. Philosophy is not a story, not a pictorial description, not a work of pure literature. Philosophical discourse is inscribed and declares its status as philosophy through a break with myth, fable, the poetic, the domain of the image. 1Le Doeuff continues:If, however, one goes looking for this philosophy in the texts which are meant to embody it, the least that can be said is that it is not to be found there in a pure state. We shall also find statues that breathe the scent of roses, comedies, tragedies, architects, foundations, dwellings, [End Page 89] doors and windows, sand, navigators, various musical instruments, islands, clocks, horses, donkeys and even a lion, representatives of every craft and trade, scenes of sea and storm, forests and trees: in short, a whole pictorial world sufficient to decorate even the dryest "History of Philosophy." 2Le Doeuff points to Hegel's work as an example of the claim that the sole form of philosophy is thought. Yet the works of Hegel, like those of Plato, are full of images. Plato and Hegel are masters of metaphor. One can say of them what Aristotle says in the Poetics, that "the greatest thing by far is to be a master of metaphor. It is the one thing that cannot be learnt from others and it is a sign of genius. For the right use of metaphor requires an eye for similarities in dissimilars." 3 Despite his mastery of metaphor, in the Republic Plato uses his doctrine of eidos to criticize the power of eikon to present truth. Hegel, in the Phenomenology, uses his doctrine of the Begriff to claim that the Bild cannot produce the science of the absolute. Plato and Hegel say one thing in their texts, but in the texts themselves they do another. Plato's dialogues are filled with metaphors and likely stories from the Ring of Gyges to the metaphor of the Sun to the tale of Atlantis, as are Hegel's works, from the "night in which all cows are black" to the phrenological skull to the owl of Minerva that flies only at the falling of dusk.How are we to comprehend the extremes of philosophical doctrine on the one hand and the discourse that expresses it on the other? Is the discourse simply the outer shell of the doctrine, inessential to its truth, or does the doctrine itself require for its truth all that is needed for its proper statement?I wish to seek the answer to this by connecting Plato to Hegel, using Vico as an intermediary, in particular Vico's conception of la sapienza poetica (poetic wisdom) and his conception of the universale fantastico (imaginative universal). My claim is that philosophical discourse, as well as philosophy itself, depends upon an aesthetic that cannot be overcome by reason, that there is a philosophical imaginary that necessarily accompanies philosophical rationality. The concept, the idea, always has a shadow, a doppelgänger through which... (shrink)