Traditionally transcendental logic has been set apart from formal logic. Transcendental logic had to deal with the conditions of possibility of judgements, which were presupposed by formal logic. Defined as a purely philosophical enterprise transcendental logic was considered as being a priori delivering either analytic or even synthetic a priori results. In this paper it is argued that this separation from the (empirical) cognitive sciences should be given up. Transcendental logic (...) should be understood as focusing on specific questions. These do not, as some recent analytic philosophy has it, include a refutation of scepticism. And they are not to be separated from meta-logical investigations. Transcendental logic properly understood, and redefined along these theses, should concern itself with the (formal) re-construction of the presupposed necessary conditions and rules of linguistic communication in general. It aims at universality and reflexive closure. (shrink)

Science in a new sense arises in the first instance from Plato's establishing of logic, as a place for exploring the essential requirements of "genuine" ...

This project is in the first place an attempt to clarify what transcendental logic is and how Kant uses it in order to achieve his goals. I use two keys in unlocking transcendental logic: Kant's philosophy of mathematics and his account of modality. I argue that Kant's categorical separation of philosophical and mathematical cognition in his reflections on method is too sweeping and undifferentiated to account for his practice in transcendental logic. On the basis (...) of an examination of what it would take in order to sustain Kant's claim for the peculiarity of modal judgments---their subjective syntheticity---I argue that the positive claims that transcendental logic makes regarding objects are legitimated by the construction of an object as such, whose concept is provided by the sum total of the categories. I suggest that the schemata play a role analogous to that of the a priori constructed figure in a mathematical proof and provide a reconstruction of the Transcendental Doctrine of the Capacity of Judgment which makes sense of Kant's decision to label the modal principles 'postulates' in the precise sense of the Euclidean mathematicians. Part Two argues that Kant's practical philosophy is grounded on something which deserves to be called a transcendental logic every bit as much as the logic that we find in the Critique of Pure Reason. Instead of being based upon our capacity for theoretical judgment, in which we refer a concept to an ontic object via intuition, practical transcendental logic is based upon our capacity for practical judgment , in which we refer a concept to a deontic object via feeling. I show how the central arguments of Kant's practical philosophy rely implicitly upon the construction of a good will as such, which plays a semantic role analogous to that of the object as such in theoretical philosophy. One part of my case is contained in the demonstration that 'good' functions as a practical modal concept and that predications of goodness have a peculiar logical form, analogous to that exhibited by theoretical predications of existence. (shrink)

In this paper, I reflect on the idea, hinted at by Kant in a footnote to §16 of the B- Deduction that is not often discussed (KrV B 134n.), that transcendental logic is the ground of logic as a whole. This has important repercussions for the way we should see the role of transcendental logic with respect to the question of truth as well as the nature and scope of transcendental logic in relation (...) to cognition, and in relation to general or formal logic as such. To illustrate one of the ways in which transcendental logic is fundamental to our way of thinking, I address an issue that is brought up by Kant’’s counterfactual claim at B 132 that if a representation is not accompanied by an ‘‘I’’ thought, it is ‘‘either impossible’’ or at least ‘‘nothing for me’’, suggesting to some recent commentators that by the former Kant means the impossibility of thinking contradictory thoughts. Unlike these commentators, I do not think Kant is saying here that we cannot think contradictory thoughts. To believe he is betrays a misunderstanding of the metaphysical nature of transcendental logic, or so I shall argue. It is because transcen- dental logic is a metaphysical logic that Kant can claim that transcendental logic grounds even the whole of logic, including the possibility of thinking contradictory thoughts. (shrink)

This essay presents Husserl’s Formal and Transcendental Logic (1929) in three main sections following the layout of the work itself. The first section focuses on Husserl’s introduction where he explains the method and the aim of the essay. The method used in FTL is radical Besinnung and with it an intentional explication of proper sense of formal logic is sought for. The second section is on formal logic. The third section focuses on Husserl’s “transcendental (...) class='Hi'>logic,” which is needed to make Husserl’s conception complete, i.e., to understand what makes Besinnung radical, how the proper sense of formal logic has been reached and how all this relates to transcendental constitution of an object in the world. Husserl’s work is connected to his context (in exact sciences) and the relevance of his views for the contemporary approaches is discussed. (shrink)

The infinite judgement has long been forgotten and yet, as I am about to demonstrate, it may be urgent to revive it for its critical and productive potential. An infinite judgement is neither analytic nor synthetic; it does not produce logical truths, nor true representations, but it establishes the genetic conditions of real objects and the concepts appropriate to them. It is through infinite judgements that we reach the principle of transcendental logic, in the depths of which all (...) reality can emerge in its material and sensible singularity, making possible all generalization and formal abstraction. (shrink)

The book addresses two main areas of Kant’s theoretical philosophy: the doctrine of transcendental idealism and various central aspects of the arguments from the Metaphysical and Transcendental Deductions, as well as the relation between the deduction argument and idealism. -/- Among the topics covered are the nature of objective validity, the role and function of transcendental logic in relation to general or formal logic, the possibility of contradictory thoughts, the meaning of the Leitfaden at A79 (...) and the unity of cognition, the two-steps-in-one-proof interpretation and categorial instantiation, categorial illusion, Strawson’s transcendental argument, the persistently perplexing question of the derivation of the categories, and the relation between apperception, objectivity, judgement, and idealism. -/- With regard to idealism in particular, the focus is on the metaphysical two-aspect interpretation and its problems, on the merits and demerits of the controversial phenomenalist reading of Kant’s idealism, and on the topic of subjectivism and epistemic humility. -/- In all of the aforementioned topics, the book presents wholly novel interpretations compared to the standard or mainstream interpretations. (shrink)

In this paper I try to show how transcendental logic can be interpreted in light of the distinction between apophantics and formal ontology. Despite the non-Kantian origin of these concepts, my contention is that they can reveal the scope of Kant’s argument regarding the distinction between formal and transcendental logic and the thesis that transcendental logic has a pure a priori content. While common approaches interpret this a priori content of transcendental logic (...) as the content pure forms of aesthetics give, we stress that this content is the a priori concepts of object which are embedded in the logical form of judgments. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with how best to explicate the connection between Kant’s transcendental logic and Hegel’s dialectical logic. After very briefly detailing Robert Pippin’s influential account of the Kant-Hegel relationship, I offer a basic criticism of his transcendentalist interpretation of Hegel. I argue that while this works well against Pippin’s reading, there is still space to regard Hegel as doing transcendental philosophy. What is crucial here is that Hegel’s rejection of transcendental idealism does not (...) obviously rule out the possibility of Hegel being bound to transcendental philosophy itself. I proceed to show how this is possible, by differentiating the project of transcendental argumentation and the project of making transcendental claims. I argue that Hegel endorsed the latter project and not the former project. I go on to claim that one can regard Hegel’s argument for an immanent conception of infinity, and his use of Spinoza’s ‘All Determination is Negation’ principle as legitimate examples of Hegel doing transcendental philosophy in a non-orthodox Kantian manner. To put my point bluntly, Hegel is a transcendental philosopher to the extent that he is committed to identifying transcendental claims – this does not commit him to either transcendental argumentation or working within Kant’s constraints. If this is a more compelling interpretation of the Kant-Hegel relationship than the Pippinian school of thought, then it seems we can cash out the positive relationship between Kant and Hegel in a more nuanced manner. (shrink)

This paper argues that Kant's idea for a new kind of logic is bound up with a very specific strategy for obtaining truth criteria, where he takes Christian Wolff to have failed. While the First Critique 's argument against any universal criterion for empirical truth has almost always been treated as extraneous to the main concerns of the Transcendental Analytic, I argue that Kant inserted it at an important juncture in the text to illustrate a signal difference between (...) traditional logics and transcendental logic. Namely, while a criterion of truth as correspondence cannot be provided by traditional logics, since they cannot, in Kant's view, identify an object determinately and distinguish it from others, transcendental logic overcomes that particular barrier. The key to the improvement is to be found in how Kant modifies Wolffian order and “transcendental truth”, while still retaining them as central elements of his project. Once we have reconstructed Kant's strategy, we also gain a new perspective on Kant's puzzling assessments of his relation to Berkeley. (shrink)

These lectures are the first extensive application of Husserl's newly developed genetic phenomenology to perceptual experience & to the way in which it is connected to judgments & cognition. Students of phenomenology will find this work indispensable.

It is often claimed that the structure of the Transcendental Logic is modeled on the Wolffian division of logic textbooks into sections on concepts, judgments, and inferences. While it is undeniable that the Transcendental Logic contains elements that are similar to the content of these sections, I believe these similarities are largely incidental to the structure of the Transcendental Logic. In this essay, I offer an alternative and, I believe, more plausible account of (...) Wolff’s influence on the structure of the Transcendental Logic, one that puts the focus on his empirical psychology rather than his logic. In particular, I argue that the structure of the Transcendental Logic is deeply indebted to a conception of purity that Wolff introduces in his empirical psychology and that this conception sheds more light on the overall structure of the Transcendental Logic than the accepted view. In section one, I outline two conceptions of purity found in Kant and trace them to similar views in Wolff. In section two, I turn to Kant’s views about logic as they are expressed in the Critique and argue that it is best to interpret Kant’s taxonomy of logic on its own terms rather than reading it through its terminological similarities to aspects of the Wolffian tradition. In section three, I argue that the second of the two conceptions of purity identified in section one is central to the structure of the Transcendental Logic. In doing so, I argue against the widespread view that this section of the Critique is modeled solely on what Kant calls pure general logic as opposed to both pure and applied general logic. I then conclude by briefly reviewing my account and considering some of its broader implications for our understanding of Kant. (shrink)

In the present paper, i propose, first, to present some aspects of what we may call a type of "phenomenology" of the image contained in the Berlin lectures on transcendental logic – notably, in the second of these courses in Berlin. Second, i would like to return to the problem of the relationship between logic and philosophy, starting from these indications with regard to the "image", and, if possible, outline some parallel with certain theses on the same (...) subject from the Jena years. Finally, in what i consider a novelty concerning these lessons, i would like to conclude my exposition by raising the question of the foundational character of Fichte’s project. (shrink)

Translator's Preface LA LOGIQUE DE HUSSERL, etude sur "Logique for- melle et logique transcendentale" the original of the present translation, was published ...

In this article, I re-examine Kant’s many senses of cognition, thought, and object in order to better understand his account of logic, and, in particular, transcendental logic. In laying out the multiple and conflicting ways Kant defines each of those terms, the relation between transcendental logic and pure general logic can be revealed as analogous to, and, indeed, linked to, the isomorphism that exists between the categories of the understanding and the logical forms of (...) judgment, which are equivalent if one ignores the manifold of intuition. This means transcendental logic is a general logic, even as a logic of (some) cognizing. (shrink)

It is well known that the notion of transcendental logic has a prominent role in both Kant’s and Husserl’s theories of knowledge. The main aim of the present paper is to study the links between formal and transcendental logic in Husserl on the one hand, and the links between general logic and transcendental logic in Kant on the other. There is a debate about the proper relation between transcendental logic and general (...) logic in Kant’s philosophy. By means of our definition of transcendental logic, mainly drawn from Husserl’s analyses, we will try to offer an appropriate interpretation of Kant’s view. (shrink)

본 논문의 목적은 칸트의 『순수이성비판』의 「선험론적 논리학」의 서론을 보다 선명하고 정합적으로 이해하는 데 있다. 이를 위해 본 논문은 칸트의 선험론적 논리학의 고유성을 두 가지로 제시한다. 하나는 칸트의 선험론적 논리학은 ‘기관으로서의 논리학’을 향한 비판을 통해 정립한 ‘규준으로서의 논리학’이라는 점이다. 칸트에게 논리학은 질료적 확장을 위한 기관이 아니라, 오직 사고형식의 평가를 위한 규준이자, 비판이다. 다른 하나는 칸트의 선험론적 논리학은 단지 ‘순수 사유의 형식’만을 다루는 일반논리학과 달리, ‘경험적 사유의 형식’을 자신의 고유한 대상으로 삼는다. 그리고 칸트에게 ‘경험적 사유의 형식’은 지성의 대상과의 관계맺음의 형식으로 파악된다. 이러한 (...) 두 가지 고유성을 통해 칸트의 선험론적 논리학은 개념에서 경험적 사유의 형식으로서 자기의식 (통각)을 대상으로 갖고, 판단에서 그것으로서 도식과 종합판단의 원칙을 대상으로 갖는다. 그리고 추론에서 그것은 사변이성의 올바른 사용이 없다는 점에서 성립이 불가능하고, 다만 비판으로서만 작용하게 된다. (shrink)

Even if the concept of organization is increasingly recognized as crucially important to (philosophy of) biology, the fear of thereby collapsing into vitalism, understood as the metaphysical thesis that “life” involves special principles irreducible to (and that perhaps even run counter to) the principles governing the physical order, has persisted. In trying to overcome this tension, Georges CanguilhemCanguilhem, G. endorsed an attitudinal form of vitalism. This “attitudinal stance” (a term coined by Charles Wolfe) shifts the issue of organization away from (...) ontological commitments regarding the nature of things as they are in themselves, in favor of epistemologicalEpistemology issues concerning the stance of the knowing subjectSubject. However, it is based on some epistemological tenets that deserve further examination. Firstly, in spite of its anti-Cartesian spirit, the attitudinal stance implicitly relies on a CartesianCartesianism perspective on the relation between subject and object. Secondly, it rests on the idea that some objects can meaningfully be identified as persisting individuals—living organisms—in a way in which others cannot, even if it denies that the capacity to be meaningfully identified as such reflects an actual property of them. This chapter outlines a possible alternative viewpoint that takes these challenges to heart by developing a co-constitutive picture of the relation between subject and object—a picture based on Georges Canguilhem’s own theory of judgment, but supplemented by Immanuel KantKant, I.’s transcendental logic. Most fundamentally, it is argued that the (self-)organization of living beingsLiving beings draws attention to and is structurally intertwined with the (self-)organization of the thinking subject’s rational (i.e., logical, conceptual, judging) capacities. (shrink)

The centerpiece of the Analyses is a translation from the German of notes for a series of lectures given by phenomenologist Edmund Husserl in the early twenties, which is to say some eighty years ago. Husserl designated the topic of the lectures 'transcendental logic'. In this context, the term, 'transcendental', is not to be understood in some mystical sense, but rather in a Kantian sense: pertaining to the conditions of possibility of experience. Likewise, the term, 'logic', (...) is not to be taken in the narrow sense of formal logic, but rather in the very general sense it had for Platonic dialectic: a concern with normative guidelines and critical assessment of the possibility of truth. The topic of the lectures is succinctly characterized by Husserl as 'a universal theory of science, and at the same time, a theory of science in principle,' where the latter means 'the science of the a priori of all sciences as such' (p. 1). (shrink)

Engaging with Kant’s transcendental logic seems to be a question of mere scholarly historical interest today. It is most commonly regarded a mixture between logic and psychology or epistemology, and by that, not a serious form of logic. Transcendental logic seems to be of no systematical impact on the concept of logic. My paper aims to disclose a different account on the endeavour of Kant’s transcendental logic in particular and of the (...) “Critique of Pure Reason” (CPR) in general. Kant’s fundamental question is in a revolutionary way aiming to ground the character of necessity of knowledge, which means to justify the claim that thinking in accordance with the forms and principles of formal logic does not lead to sheer tautologies or an unsolved contradiction, but to knowledge that is objectively valid. In a first part, I shall demonstrate the necessity and the significance of this new fundamental question of the CPR with respect to its genesis out of pre-Kantian metaphysics. A brief outline of Kant’s answer to this question, with special emphasis on his revolutionary new comprehension of logical form, will be given as well. A second part shall open up a perspective that lies beyond Kant’s standpoint with reference to Nietzsche and eventually to Hegel. I will answer the question: What knowledge do we achieve about being or actuality by means of formal logic? I will argue that Kant shows that formal logic is the logic of all technical-practical conduct but also, at least indirectly, the limitation of the technical-practical knowledge and its legitimate sphere of application. (shrink)

In the book, the decisive, foundational role of transcendental apperception for logic and transcendental philosophy in Kant is corroborated. The book contains many implicit connections with modern logic that could help a logician with a philosophical interest to gain a deeper insight into the origins and foundations of concepts such as object, truth, analyticity, identity, contradiction, judgment, existence, reference, quantification and others, as well as into the foundations and possible general features of logic. In distinction (...) to the book, this review emphasizes the objective validity of analytic judgements and the foundational role of hypthetical and disjunctive forms of a judgment in Kant. (shrink)

Comparative study of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophical systems of classical India and phenomenology of modern West.

Artykuł jest próbą scharakteryzowania platońskiego idealizmu według wykładni Hermanna Cohena – filozofa w Polsce niemal zapomnianego; założyciela, a zarazem czołowego, obok Paula Natorpa i Władysława Tatarkiewicza, przedstawiciela marburskiej szkoły neokantyzmu. Tok analiz obejmuje cohenowskie tezy postawione przez filozofa w epistemologicznej pracy Platons Ideenlehre und die Mathematik. Postulaty, do których odwołuje się Cohen wiążą refleksję nad klasycznym idealizmem oraz statusem platońskiej idei z refleksją logiczno-matematyczną i zagadnieniem sichere Hypothesis jako hipotezy pewnej – hipotezy o statusie aksjomatu. W następstwie badań okazuje się, (...) że określenie roli matematyki: arytmetyki i geometrii, staje się nieodzowne w zrozumieniu idealizmu zarówno starożytnego Platona, jak również nowożytnego Kanta. Obaj, Platon i Kant, akcentują znaczenie apriorycznej myśli, logiki czystego myślenia, logicznego rozumowania, poznawczej władzy intelektu, nauki oraz krytycyzmu jako drogi poznawczego, a zarazem kształtującego charakter, postępowania podmiotu poznającego Przeprowadzony w artykule wywód, zakorzeniony w historyczno-filozoficznych analizach problemu, w podsumowaniu jest także próbą określenia znaczenia platońsko-neokantowskiego idealizmu dla współczesnych zagadnień naukowo-filozoficznych. (shrink)

According to the leading commentators and the author himself, Edmund Husserl's Formal and transcendental Logic is the most important work on phenomenological logic ever written. Nonetheless, it has, in general, gained far less attention than theLogical Investigations and the Ideas on a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy. In particular, the argument of § 1 of the Logic, namely, that it is fruitful to start with the meanings of the expression “logos” in order to develop a genuinely (...) transcendental logic, has received virtually no consideration. This paper takes a step towards filling this empty space by analyzing and criticizing the argument of § 1 as a problem to which (a) solution(s) must be found: First, it offers an introduction to the problem per se, which is one of the relationship between speech and reason; second, it tries to bring the given senses of “logos” to a higher grade of conceptual clarity and distinctness than that in the text; third, it attempts to decide whether and how far these senses of the word can be documented according to principles of Classical philology; fourth, it endeavors to determine exactly the relationship between the meanings of “logos” in § 1 and the senses of “logic” in §§ 1–107; finally, it strives to show that, with respect to the account of the relationship between speech and reason provided by Husserl in the Logic, there is, at best, a conflict and, at worst, a contradiction between the strategy outlined in § 1 and the tactics adopted in § 2ff. Throughout, the paper reads Husserl's “descriptions” as ‘arguments’ for his positions, thereby avoiding any of the obscurity sometimes infecting work in “Continental philosophy”. (shrink)