Results for ' theory of belief'

969 found
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  1.  84
    A Structuralist Theory of Belief Revision.Holger Andreas - 2011 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 20 (2):205-232.
    The present paper aims at a synthesis of belief revision theory with the Sneed formalism known as the structuralist theory of science. This synthesis is brought about by a dynamisation of classical structuralism, with an abductive inference rule and base generated revisions in the style of Rott (2001). The formalism of prioritised default logic (PDL) serves as the medium of the synthesis. Why seek to integrate the Sneed formalism into belief revision theory? With the hybrid (...)
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  2.  67
    On theories of belief bias in syllogistic reasoning.Jane Oakhill & Alan Garnham - 1993 - Cognition 46 (1):87-92.
  3.  35
    Bain's Theory of Belief and the Genesis of Pragmatism.Aaron Zimmerman - 2022 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 57 (3):319-340.
  4.  42
    A Theory of Belief for Scientific Refutations.Louis Narens - 2005 - Synthese 145 (3):397-423.
    A probability function on an algebra of events is assumed. Some of the events are scientific refutations in the sense that the assumption of their occurrence leads to a contradiction. It is shown that the scientific refutations form a a boolean sublattice in terms of the subset ordering. In general, the restriction of to the sublattice is not a probability function on the sublattice. It does, however, have many interesting properties. In particular, (i) it captures probabilistic ideas inherent in some (...)
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  5.  33
    Ramsey’s Theory of Belief.Monika Gruber - 2022 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 14 (2).
    One of Frank Ramsey’s crucial contributions to philosophy is his theory of belief. Ramsey deals with the notion of full belief in “Facts and Propositions,” as well as that of degrees of belief in “Truth and Probability.” In his posthumously published manuscript OnTruth, Ramsey analyses beliefs and emphasizes the essential role of agent’s actions in his theory. In this paper, I follow Ramsey’s thoughts as they developed in consecutive essays all evolving around the concept of (...)
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  6. A planning theory of belief.Sara Aronowitz - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):5-17.
    What does it mean to hold a belief? Some of our ways of speaking in English suggest that to hold a belief is to have something in your mind: beliefs are things we acquire, defend, recover, and so on (Abelson, 1986). That is, believing is a matter of being in a state of having a thing. In this paper, I will argue for an alternative: believing is something we do. This is not a new suggestion. For instance, Matthew (...)
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  7. Hume's Theory of Belief.Michael M. Gorman - 1993 - Hume Studies 19 (1):89-101.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume's Theory of Belief Michael M. Gorman Belief is a key concept in Hume's philosophy, and yet Hume's statements aboutbeliefappear to be hopelesslyinconsistent.1 Various solutions have been offered, from saying that Hume is incorrigibly confused to saying that his theory ofbeliefchanged over the course of his career. This article will focus on the question ofthe nature ofbelief and show that Hume's theory is in (...)
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  8.  74
    Bridging Ranking Theory and the Stability Theory of Belief.Eric Raidl & Niels Skovgaard-Olsen - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (6):577-609.
    In this paper we compare Leitgeb’s stability theory of belief and Spohn’s ranking-theoretic account of belief. We discuss the two theories as solutions to the lottery paradox. To compare the two theories, we introduce a novel translation between ranking functions and probability functions. We draw some crucial consequences from this translation, in particular a new probabilistic belief notion. Based on this, we explore the logical relation between the two belief theories, showing that models of Leitgeb’s (...)
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  9. The Stability Theory of Belief.Hannes Leitgeb - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (2):131-171.
    This essay develops a joint theory of rational (all-or-nothing) belief and degrees of belief. The theory is based on three assumptions: the logical closure of rational belief; the axioms of probability for rational degrees of belief; and the so-called Lockean thesis, in which the concepts of rational belief and rational degree of belief figure simultaneously. In spite of what is commonly believed, this essay will show that this combination of principles is satisfiable (...)
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  10. Axiomatic characterization of the AGM theory of belief revision in a temporal logic.Giacomo Bonanno - 2007 - Artificial Intelligence 171 (2-3):144-160.
    Since belief revision deals with the interaction of belief and information over time, branching-time temporal logic seems a natural setting for a theory of belief change. We propose two extensions of a modal logic that, besides the next-time temporal operator, contains a belief operator and an information operator. The first logic is shown to provide an axiomatic characterization of the first six postulates of the AGM theory of belief revision, while the second, stronger, (...)
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  11.  62
    Four Ways in Which Theories of Belief Revision Could Benefit from Theories of Epistemic Justification.Gordian Haas - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (2):295-316.
    Belief revision theories aim to model the dynamics of epistemic states. Besides beliefs, epistemic states comprise most importantly justificational structures. Typically, belief revision theories, however, model the dynamics of beliefs while neglecting justificational structures over and above logical relations. Despite some awareness that this approach is problematic, how devastating the consequences of this neglect are has not yet been fully grasped. In this paper, I argue that taking justificational structures into account could solve four well-known problems of (...) revision. (shrink)
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  12.  92
    A paraconsistent theory of belief revision.Edwin D. Mares - 2002 - Erkenntnis 56 (2):229 - 246.
    This paper presents a theory of belief revision that allows people to come tobelieve in contradictions. The AGM theory of belief revision takes revision,in part, to be consistency maintenance. The present theory replacesconsistency with a weaker property called coherence. In addition to herbelief set, we take a set of statements that she rejects. These two sets arecoherent if they do not overlap. On this theory, belief revision maintains coherence.
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  13.  54
    Delusions and theories of belief.Michael H. Connors & Peter W. Halligan - 2020 - Consciousness and Cognition 81:102935.
  14. Some features of theories of belief.John M. Vickers - 1966 - Journal of Philosophy 63 (8):197-201.
  15. Bilgrami’s Theory of Belief and Meaning.Gary Ebbs & Akeel Bilgrami - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):613.
  16.  14
    A syntactic theory of belief and action.Andrew R. Haas - 1986 - Artificial Intelligence 28 (3):245-292.
  17.  92
    The Role of Reason in Hume's Theory of Belief.A. T. Nuyen - 1988 - Hume Studies 14 (2):372-389.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:372 THE ROLE OF REASON IN HUME'S THEORY OF BELIEF Much has been written on Hume's theory of belief, yet problems of interpretation remain as serious as ever. The most pervasive and persistent problem relates to the role reason plays in Hume's conception of belief. When Hume says that belief is a matter of feeling, does he mean to say that reason has (...)
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  18.  55
    The paradox of belief instability and a revision theory of belief.Byeong D. Lee - 1998 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (4):314-328.
    The epistemic paradox of 'belief instability' has recently received notable attention from many philosophers. Understanding this paradox is very important because belief is a central notion of psychologically motivated semantic theories in philosophy, linguistics, and cognitive science, and this paradox poses serious problems for these theories. In this dissertation I criticize previous proposals and offer a new proposal, which I call a 'revision theory of belief'. ;My revision theory of belief is in many respects (...)
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  19.  10
    A foundational theory of belief and belief change.Alexander Bochman - 1999 - Artificial Intelligence 108 (1-2):309-352.
  20.  23
    The paradox of belief instability and a revision theory of belief.Byeong D. Lee - 1998 - Dissertation, Indiana University, Bloomington
    The epistemic paradox of 'belief instability' has recently received notable attention from many philosophers. Understanding this paradox is very important because belief is a central notion of psychologically motivated semantic theories in philosophy, linguistics, and cognitive science, and this paradox poses serious problems for these theories. In this dissertation I criticize previous proposals and offer a new proposal, which I call a 'revision theory of belief'. -/- My revision theory of belief is in many (...)
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  21. Ramsey's theory of belief and truth.Brian Loar - 1980 - In David Hugh Mellor (ed.), Prospects for Pragmatism: Essays in Memory of F P Ramsey. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 49--69.
  22.  57
    Religion as belief, a realist theory: a commentary on Religion as Make-Believe, A Theory of Belief, Imagination, and Group Identity.Joseph Sommer - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    Van Leeuwen’s Religion as Make-Believe, A Theory of Belief, Imagination, and Group Identity argues that religious and political beliefs are fundamentally different from mundane, factual beliefs and represent a cognitive attitude more akin to imagining. To ground this difference, Van Leeuwen proposes four principles defining factual beliefs: ‘involuntariness’ mandates that people cannot choose what they believe; ‘no compartmentalization’ says that factual – but not religious – beliefs guide behavior in all domains; ‘cognitive governance’ requires that inferences be readily (...)
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  23.  14
    The Relational Theory of Belief [a Reply to Mark Richard].Stephen Schiffer - 1990 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 71 (3):240-245.
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  24. Husserl’s Theory of Belief and the Heideggerean Critique.Jeffrey Yoshimi - 2009 - Husserl Studies 25 (2):121-140.
    I develop a “two-systems” interpretation of Husserl’s theory of belief. On this interpretation, Husserl accounts for our sense of the world in terms of (1) a system of embodied horizon meanings and passive synthesis, which is involved in any experience of an object, and (2) a system of active synthesis and sedimentation, which comes on line when we attend to an object’s properties. I use this account to defend Husserl against several forms of Heideggerean critique. One line of (...)
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  25. The Importance of "Mere Conception" in David Hume's Theory of Belief.Catherine Elaine Kemp - 1995 - Dissertation, State University of New York at Stony Brook
    Belief is a species of mere conception, and is modifiable, rather than bivalent (believing or disbelieving). The attendant-impression theory of transformation of conception into belief expresses the moral dimension of one and the same thing, of which the manner-of-conception (without attendant impression) theory of the transformation refers to the epistemic dimension of that same thing. These two aspects of the transformation of conception into belief point to an ambiguity in Hume's use of the term IDEA: (...)
     
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  26. Extensionalist Semantics and Sententialist Theories of Belief.Stephen Schiffer - 1987 - In Ernest LePore (ed.), New directions in semantics. Orlando: Academic Press.
     
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  27.  24
    Hume’s theory of belief in the Treatise - ‘Force’ and ‘Vivacity’.Sunny Yang - 2018 - Modern Philosophy 12:59-82.
  28.  33
    6 The Standard Theory of Belief Revision: AGM.Gordian Haas - 2015 - In 4 Minimal Verificationism. De Gruyter. pp. 113-134.
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  29.  19
    A Theory of Knowledge and Belief Change - Formal and Experimental Perspectives.Masaharu Mizumoto - 2011 - Hokkaido University Press.
    This work explores the conceptual and empirical issues of the concept of knowledge and its relation to the pattern of our belief change, from formal and experimental perspectives. Part I gives an analysis of knowledge (called Sustainability) that is formally represented and naturalistically plausible at the same time, which is claimed to be a synthesized view of knowledge, covering not only empirical knowledge, but also knowledge of future, practical knowledge, mathematical knowledge, knowledge of general facts. Part II tries to (...)
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  30.  19
    Hume’s theory of belief in the Treatise - ‘Force’ and ‘Vivacity’.양선이 ) - 2018 - Modern Philosophy 12:59-82.
  31. The frame problem and theories of belief.Scott Hendricks - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 129 (2):317-33.
    The frame problem is the problem of how we selectively apply relevant knowledge to particular situations in order to generate practical solutions. Some philosophers have thought that the frame problem can be used to rule out, or argue in favor of, a particular theory of belief states. But this is a mistake. Sentential theories of belief are no better or worse off with respect to the frame problem than are alternative theories of belief, most notably, the (...)
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  32. A Test for Theories of Belief Ascription.B. Frances - 2002 - Analysis 62 (2):116-125.
    These days the two most popular approaches to belief ascription are Millianism and Contextualism. The former approach is inconsistent with the existence of ordinary Frege cases, such as Lois believing that Superman flies while failing to believe that Clark Kent flies. The Millian holds that the only truth-conditionally relevant aspect of a proper name is its referent or extension. Contextualism, as I will define it for the purposes of this essay, includes all theories according to which ascriptions of the (...)
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  33.  18
    Wittgenstein’s 1913 Objections To Russell’s Theory of Belief.Rosalind Carey - 1998 - The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 32:14-18.
    In what follows, I give a dialectical reading of his dismissal of metaphysics and of Wittgenstein's objections to Russell in 1913. I argue that Wittgenstein must be read as advocating no particular theory or doctrine — that is, philosophy is an activity and not a body of truths. Furthermore, this insistence is thoroughgoing. Put differently, a dialectical reading must be applied to one's own thought and talk. Characteristically, this sort of dialectical philosophy begins with the question, Is there any (...)
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  34. The 'fido'-fido theory of belief.Stephen Schiffer - 1987 - Philosophical Perspectives 1:455-480.
  35. Three Problems for Richard’s Theory of Belief Ascription.Theodore Sider - 1995 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):487 - 513.
    Some contemporary Russellians, defenders of the view that the semantic content of a proper name, demonstrative or indexical is simply its referent, are prepared to accept that view’s most infamous apparent consequence: that coreferential names, demonstratives, indexicals, etc. are intersubstitutable salva veritate, even in intentional contexts. Nathan Salmon and Scott Soames argue that our recalcitrant intuitions with respect to the famous apparent counterexamples are not semantic intuitions, but rather pragmatic intuitions. Strictly and literally speaking, Lois Lane believes, and even knows (...)
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  36. Belief, Truth and Knowledge.David M. Armstrong - 1973 - London,: Cambridge University Press.
    A wide-ranging study of the central concepts in epistemology - belief, truth and knowledge. Professor Armstrong offers a dispositional account of general beliefs and of knowledge of general propositions. Belief about particular matters of fact are described as structures in the mind of the believer which represent or 'map' reality, while general beliefs are dispositions to extend the 'map' or introduce casual relations between portions of the map according to general rules. 'Knowledge' denotes the reliability of such beliefs (...)
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  37. A doubt about the normative theory of belief.David Pugmire - 1972 - Mind 81 (324):584-586.
  38.  23
    On the Nature of ‘Force and Vivacity’ in Hume’s theory of Belief. 양선이 - 2008 - CHUL HAK SA SANG - Journal of Philosophical Ideas 28:315-346.
  39.  59
    The Laws of Belief: Ranking Theory & its Philosophical Applications, by Wolfgang Spohn.A. C. Paseau - 2017 - Mind 126 (501):273-278.
    The Laws of Belief: Ranking Theory & its Philosophical Applications, by SpohnWolfgang. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. xv + 598.
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  40. Religion as Make-Believe: a theory of belief, imagination, and group identity.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2023 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
    We often assume that religious beliefs are no different in kind from ordinary factual beliefs—that believing in the existence of God or of supernatural entities that hear our prayers is akin to believing that May comes before June. Neil Van Leeuwen shows that, in fact, these two forms of belief are strikingly different. Our brains do not process religious beliefs like they do beliefs concerning mundane reality; instead, empirical findings show that religious beliefs function like the imaginings that guide (...)
  41.  82
    A Theory of Knowledge and Belief Change: Formal and Experimental Perspectives, by Masaharu Mizumoto: Japan: Hokkaido University Press, 2011, pp. v + 298, ¥7500.Jeff Dunn - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):413-415.
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  42.  3
    Networks of beliefs: An integrative theory of individual- and social-level belief dynamics.Jonas Dalege, Mirta Galesic & Henrik Olsson - forthcoming - Psychological Review.
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  43. A problem for Russellian theories of belief.Gary Ostertag - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 146 (2):249 - 267.
    Russellianism is characterized as the view that ‘that’-clauses refer to Russellian propositions, familiar set-theoretic pairings of objects and properties. Two belief-reporting sentences, S and S*, possessing the same Russellian content, but differing in their intuitive truthvalue, are provided. It is argued that no Russellian explanation of the difference in apparent truthvalue is available, with the upshot that the Russellian fails to explain how a speaker who asserts S but rejects S* can be innocent of inconsistency, either in what she (...)
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  44. Believing and Acting: Voluntary Control and the Pragmatic Theory of Belief.Brian Hedden - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (4):495-513.
    I argue that a attractive theory about the metaphysics of belief—the prag- matic, interpretationist theory endorsed by Stalnaker, Lewis, and Dennett, among others—implies that agents have a novel form of voluntary control over their beliefs. According to the pragmatic picture, what it is to have a given belief is in part for that belief to be part of an optimal rationalization of your actions. Since you have voluntary control over your actions, and what actions you (...)
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  45. An Argument Against Fodorian Inner Sentence Theories of Belief and Desire.Adam Pautz - manuscript
    One of Jerry Fodor’s many seminal contributions to philosophy of mind was his inner sentence theory of belief and desire. To believe that p is to have a subpersonal inner sentence in one’s “belief-box” that means that p, and to desire that q is to have a subpersonal inner sentence in one’s “desire-box” that means that q. I will distinguish between two accounts of box-inclusion that exhaust the options: liberal and restrictive. I will show that both accounts (...)
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  46.  43
    Deriving properties of belief update from theories of action.Alvaro Val & Yoav Shoham - 1994 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 3 (2):81-119.
    We present an approach to database update as a form of non monotonic temporal reasoning, the main idea of which is the (circumscriptive) minimization of changes with respect to a set of facts declared “persistent by default”. The focus of the paper is on the relation between this approach and the update semantics recently proposed by Katsuno and Mendelzon. Our contribution in this regard is twofold:We prove a representation theorem for KM semantics in terms of a restricted subfamily of the (...)
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  47.  85
    (1 other version)Ramsey's psychological theory of belief.Patrick Suppes - 2004 - In Maria Carla Galavotti (ed.), Cambridge and Vienna: Frank P. Ramsey and the Vienna Circle. Dordrecht: Springer Verlag. pp. 35-53.
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  48. Some evidence against narrow causal theories of belief.Stephen P. Stich - 1983 - In From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief. MIT Press.
     
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  49.  32
    A Mental Files Theory of Mind: How Children Represent Belief and Its Aspectuality.Michael Huemer - 2023 - In Teresa Lopez-Soto, Alvaro Garcia-Lopez & Francisco J. Salguero-Lamillar (eds.), The Theory of Mind Under Scrutiny: Psychopathology, Neuroscience, Philosophy of Mind and Artificial Intelligence. Springer Nature Switzerland. pp. 35-70.
    The standard view on explicit theory of mind development holds that children around the age of 4 years start to ascribe beliefs to themselves and others. At this age they begin to master FB tasks in which they have to ascribe a mistaken belief to someone else. The emerging competence in FB tasks goes hand in hand with the developing ability to master various tasks that also require the understanding of different perspectives, like the alternative naming game, false (...)
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  50. The Laws of Belief: Ranking Theory and its Philosophical Applications.Wolfgang Spohn - 2012 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Wolfgang Spohn presents the first full account of the dynamic laws of belief, by means of ranking theory. This book is his long-awaited presentation of ranking theory and its ramifications.
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