This article is focused on the consideration and critique of some of the ideas exposed by the contemporary reflection on the normative models for a new international order. First, it discuses Rawls argumentative strategies, in which it is exposed the cosmopolitan idea of the transformation of the world order, beginning from the global economic justice requirement. Second, it demonstrates that the approach of Pogge’s global justice is insufficient because although he formulates a global redistributive proposal, it does not touch the (...) problem concerning the transformation of the relational power system within the current capitalist order. Lastly, it presents Cristina Lafont’s proposal for a human rights pluralist model, and considers, critically, her perspective for a regulatory-oriented world economic politics, within the new discourse on human rights. (shrink)

I am skeptical of our ability to predict, or even forecast, the future—of human rights or any other important social practice. Nonetheless, an understanding of the paths that have brought us to where we are today can facilitate thinking about the future. Thus, I approach the topic by examining the reshaping of international ideas and practices of state sovereignty and human rights since the end of World War II. I argue that in the initial decades after the war, (...) international society constructed an absolutist conception of exclusive territorial jurisdiction that was fundamentally antagonistic to international human rights. At the same time, though, human rights were for the first time included among the fundamental norms of international society. And over the past two decades, dominant understandings of sovereignty have become less absolutist and more human rights–friendly, a trend that I suggest is likely to continue to develop, modestly, in the coming years. (shrink)

The terms “sovereignty” and “state” are used very loosely in scholarly literature. “State sovereignty” is central to many scholarly disciplines and controversial real case scenarios, including territorial disputes; pandemics; arms, drug and human trafficking; terrorism; and the flow of refugees. Unsurprisingly, when academics apply the term “state sovereignty” disagreements can be expected. This paper reviews a series of conceptions pertaining to “state sovereignty” and proposes a shift from the current unidimensional understanding to (...) a multidimensional approach. This is because state sovereignty is an intricate concept that includes several pluralisms, such as agents and the roles they play in their interrelations (e.g. individuals, communities and states), contexts (i.e. domestic, regional and international), realms (e.g. factual, normative and axiological) and modes of existence (i.e. ideal, natural, cultural and metaphysical elements and features). Hence, this paper argues that different understandings on state sovereignty are not due to ontological discrepancies but relate to either epistemological choices because different scholars and scientific disciplines are interested in a particular pluralism pertaining to state sovereignty rather than the concept as a whole, or to axiological choices tightly linked to individuals, communities and/or states often ignored or undisclosed views and perceptions. By applying a multidimensional approach and taking into account two variables—time and space—the paper explains why the different conceptions on state sovereignty are connected with value judgments that still refer to the same concept applied to the object or subject of study (ontology) but from particular epistemological presuppositions often hidden, ignored or neglected. (shrink)

Social liberals and liberal nationalists often argue that cosmopolitans neglect the normative importance of state sovereignty and self-determination. This paper counter-argues that, under current global political and socio-economic circumstances, only the establishment of supranational institutions with some (limited, but significant) sovereign powers can allow states to exercise sovereignty, and peoples? self-determination, in a meaningful way. Social liberals have largely neglected this point because they have focused on an unduly narrow, mainly negative, conception of state sovereignty. (...) I contend, instead, that we should more closely consider the positive aspects of sovereignty, understood as the capacity to maintain internal problem-solving capacities and make meaningful discretionary choices on a range of national issues. (shrink)

This article takes issue with the common view that cosmopolitan normative commitments are incompatible with recognition of state sovereignty as a basic principle of international law. Against influential cosmopolitans, who at best ascribe a derivative significance to the sovereignty of states, the article argues that state sovereignty is not only compatible with, but also essential to the recognition of individuals as units of ultimate concern. The argument challenges a problematic distributive conception of justice underlying many (...) cosmopolitans’ support for reforms of the international legal order towards a system where respect for basic human rights is the only criterion for political legitimacy. An alternative relational conception of justice makes it possible to see why there is an internal connection between the rights of individuals and the rights of states. The argument adds up to a novel defence of the so-called domestic analogy, which regards the territorial integrity of states as an internationa... (shrink)

In Chapter 5 of Liberalism’s Religion, Cécile Laborde considers the freedom and autonomy of religious associations within liberal democratic societies. This paper evaluates her central arguments in that chapter. First, I argue that Laborde makes things too easy for herself in dismissing controversies over the state’s legitimate jurisdictional authority. Second, I argue that Laborde’s view of when associations’ ‘coherence interests’ justify exemptions is too narrow. Third, I consider how we might develop an account of judicial deference to associations’ ‘competence (...) interests’. (shrink)

THERE IS A RELATIVE DEARTH OF THEOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTION TO PRESENT-day discussion about the status of territorial borders. Secularist discourse tends to divide between "partialists" and "impartialists." Partialists work with an ideal of states as distinct cultural communities, which justifies priority for the interests of citizens over refugees. Impartialists work with an ideal of states as cosmopolitan agents, which takes into account equally the interests of citizens and refugees. The aim of this essay is to show how selected biblical texts help (...) to rethink these categories and offer different, theologically informed ways of construing the meaning of borders. The need for an "ethic of answerability" is established and initial suggestions are given as to how this approach might be developed. (shrink)

An important question for liberal political theory is whether its account of political morality is compatible with religious political thought. This paper examines one aspect of that broad question, namely the compatibility of the Christian pluralist tradition with liberalism's account of state sovereignty. According to Cécile Laborde, a central commitment of liberalism—and perhaps its most radical—is the claim that the state possesses a form of sovereignty that she dubs ‘competence-competence’. This refers to the state's meta-jurisdictional (...) authority to decide the areas of competence of associations within it. The Christian pluralist tradition, in contrast, emphasises the independent authority of various kinds of social groups and the external limits this places on the state. The paper argues that, despite appearances to the contrary and the claims of many pluralist thinkers, these two views are compatible. It does so through a detailed examination of the two main strands of Christian pluralism, namely subsidiarity and sphere sovereignty, and by comparing pluralists’ and liberals’ approaches to the regulation of religious groups. (shrink)

Review. Cosmopolitanism, state sovereignty and international law and politics: a theory. Routledge, London and New York, 2023, pp. 216.

State sovereignty is often thought to be absolute, unlimited. This paper argues that there is no such a thing as absolute State sovereignty. Indeed, absolute sovereignty is impossible because all sovereignty is necessarily underpinned by its conditions of possibility—i.e. limited sovereignty is the norm, though the nature of the limitations varies. The article consists of two main sections: the concept of sovereignty: this section is focused on some of the limitations the concept (...) of sovereignty itself presents; and a historical account of the notion of sovereignty as it was used in the Ancient Times. The particular focus on early notions of a modern concept such as sovereignty has to do with the fact that this early notion has been anthropomorphised with societal evolution. Therein, the current concept of State sovereignty embraces the same limitations it had in its ancient form as a non-fully developed conceptual idea. The implications of understanding State sovereignty as limited rather than absolute are several, both directly and indirectly. A main immediate consequence is that sovereign States can cooperate together, limit their sovereignty and still be considered sovereign. (shrink)

The issue of biopiracy has attracted considerable attention in recent years. The Convention on Biological Diversity adopted a principle of state sovereignty over biological resources and the genetic information contained within those resources to address this issue. It is argued that this principle has not been adequately justified and that there are other solutions to the issue of biopiracy, based on different theories of justice, that deserve greater consideration. These alternatives include the common heritage of mankind principle and (...) the global commons principle. (shrink)

This article defends state sovereignty as necessary for a form of popular sovereignty capable of realising the republican value of non-domination and argues it remains achievable and normatively warranted in an interconnected world. Many scholars, including certain republicans, contend that the external sovereignty of states can no longer be maintained or justified in such circumstances. Consequently, we must abandon the sovereignty of states and reconceive popular sovereignty on a different basis. Some argue sovereignty (...) must be displaced upwards to a more global state, while others advocate it be vertically and horizontally dispersed to units below, across and above the state. Each group offers a related vision of the European Union to illustrate their proposals. Both these arguments are criticised as more likely to produce than reduce domination because neither can sustain a form of popular sovereignty capable of instantiating relations of non-domination. This article proposes the alternative of a republican association of sovereign states that allows sovereign states and their peoples to mutually regulate their external sovereignty in non-dominating ways. This alternative proposal provides a more plausible and defensible means for sustaining the requisite kind of popular sovereignty in contemporary conditions and a more appropriate vision of the European Union. (shrink)

A genealogical account of state sovereignty explores the ways in which the concept has emerged, evolved, and is in decline today. Sovereignty has a theological foundation, and is deeply bound up with the idea of God, in particular a voluntarist God, presented as being capable of intervening directly in the world. Religious conflicts in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries forced the separation between religion and politics, and opened the space for the emergence of a national state (...) endowed with sovereignty which has dominated the world until now. Today’s rise of international and transnational obligations challenges the conventional understanding of state sovereignty, which cannot account for the normative density of the global order and the corresponding decline of state-based political authority. In order to explain that, I contrast two competing understandings of state sovereignty: a static one and a dynamic one. The static understanding regards sovereignty as absolute within the state territory. The dynamic understanding regards sovereignty as evolutionary: according to this account, the state is just one possible form that sovereignty can take. I conclude by suggesting that the dynamic understanding of state sovereignty is better suited to explaining the decline of state sovereignty. (shrink)

Este artículo reseña: Jorge E. NÚÑEZ, Cosmopolitanism, State Sovereignty and International Law and Politics: A Theory, Routledge, London, New York, 2023, 216 pp.

As the world has increasingly embraced globalization, temptations to encroach on traditional boundaries of state sovereignty for reasons of self-interest mount. Argumentation studies provide an important lens for examining the public discourse used to justify such moves. This essay examines the Bush administration’s strategic use of the definitional processes of association and dissociation to build its public case for regime change in Afghanistan. After exploring how the Bush administration’s early rhetoric after 9/11 failed to actually provide the Taliban (...) a choice to remain in power, the essay reveals three combinations of the terrorism/state relationship that functioned as an argument by definition to gain support for the US campaign to overthrow the regime. (shrink)

ExcerptHuman rights organizations for the past few decades have generally attempted to promote international law against the principle of state sovereignty in order to establish human rights norms worldwide. This approach presumes the universality of human rights is in fundamental opposition to the principle of sovereignty because this principle can be used by governments to shield themselves from outside criticism. By contrast, the U.S. State Department’s Report of the Commission on Unalienable Rights has outlined an approach (...) that emphasizes not just the compatibility between universal human rights and state sovereignty but even their dependence on each other.1 We see the results of this clash in the response to the Report by Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch and one of the expert witnesses during the commission’s proceedings.2 He sees in the Report’s foregrounding of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights “a frontal assault on international human rights law” because it shifts attention away from international law and toward more informal documents such as the Universal Declaration, which lays out a set of goals rather than legally binding commitments. (shrink)

The question of political sovereignty must at all times be of acute academic interest, since it is practically impossible to say anything about the state without implying something about sovereignty, or vice versa. Political theory has very generally found this conception central to its inquiry; but in recent years the notion has been thrown into sharp relief by political events . In Fascism and Nazism the doctrine of state sovereignty is “made flesh” in startlingly substantial (...) forms. These modern incarnations of Leviathan , and their threat to much which has come to be deeply valued, give unprecedented importance to an age-long discussion. Political theory is not to-day, if it has ever seemed, a simply academic issue, or an “arm-chair” branch of philosophy. Not all of those who carry through revolutions, who build barricades and defend them with their lives, have a clear philosophical theory of the state; but powerful beliefs and motives they certainly have; and it daily becomes more manifest that unless the world is content to allow its political future to be determined more and more by obscure visceral impulses or crude economic motives a more intense effort to achieve and to apply true beliefs in the political field is imperative. (shrink)

How can sovereignty provide the premises to think outside of sovereignty? In other words, how is it possible to perceive of resistance to sovereignty which itself is deemed to have been caught up in the double bind of sovereignty? With a critical appraisal of theories on the ‘state of exception’ in conversation with Robert Jungk’s consideration of the ‘nuclear state’, I account for the nuclear state of exception which has acquired sovereignty in (...) several nations in the post-Second World War scenario, before going on to consider ‘spaces of exception’ to it. I then provide a critical appraisal of studies of resistance. Using the case of a public hearing on the Koodankulam nuclear power plant in south India, I account for how ways of conceptualizing contestation and challenges in the shadows of sovereignty can be pursued in what I describe as a case of ‘sovereignty without hegemony’. (shrink)

This article discusses indigenous rights within the context of global governance. I begin by defining the terms “global governance” and “indigenous peoples” and summarizing the rights that are most important to indigenous peoples. The bulk of this article studies the global governance of indigenous rights in three areas. The first example is the creation of the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. A second example involves violations of indigenous rights brought before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. (...) A third case looks at a relatively new international regime created by indigenous peoples themselves—the Inuit Circumpolar Council. I conclude by using theories of sovereignty to assess the relative successes and failures of indigenous efforts to secure their rights. (shrink)

Reading and writing must be more than passive processes of mimetic display; rather, they should offer a platform for psychological transformations across race and gender. Thus literary sovereignty vis-à-vis ownership of creative expression and representations of self can be reclaimed. This essay offers close analysis of contemporary Australian Indigenous literature to explore the sovereignty of feminist psychologies. Does creative writing reflect a strengthening of female Indigenous psychologies, and how might this implicate race relations and the decolonization of textual (...) worlds? These questions are inspired by Alexis Wright's most recent novel The Swan Book where she writes about “the quest to regain sovereignty over [her] own brain.” This article will explore the term craziness in a metaphorical sense: looking at whether rejecting dominant white culture equates to psychological sovereignty, improved mental well-being, and better race relations in imaginary realms. Indigenous characters in Wright's The Swan Book and Marie Munkara's Every Secret Thing may appear “crazy” for living in a state of indifference, but paradoxically, it is this state of “craziness” or indifference that empowers them to find psychological peace and resist assimilation. Seeking psychological sovereignty means assuming a position so averse to patriarchy and colonization that it renders transformation in imaginary worlds, and urges transformation in the psyches of white readers too. (shrink)

Most contemporary political theories of sovereignty – from Giorgio Agamben to Achille Mbembe – have argued that the emergency powers claimed by the Bush administration under the auspices of the War on Terror epitomized what Carl Schmitt calls a state of exception. If so, I argue, perhaps it is time for new visions of sovereignty to emerge, ones attendant to the eccentricities of the present conjuncture. Occupy Wall Street and the Arab Spring are but two obvious examples (...) of counterpublics that seem to have presented new modalities of sovereign life worth reflecting upon. Hardly states of exception, these are scenes of sovereignty that are more fraught and precarious, more democratic. I argue that the theories of sovereignty of George Bataille and Frantz Fanon may hold clues for coming to terms with these new sovereign scenes. Though often under-emphasized in the scholarly literature on Bataille and Fanon, for both thinkers sovereignty is a condition of existence, an expression of a surreal mode of esthetic experience and poetic beauty. I argue that drawing attention to the comparison of the political thought of Bataille and Fanon, and especially to the value of surrealism for contemporary political theory generally, holds promise for those of us interested in challenging the Schmittian consensus. At stake is a refreshed understanding of sovereignty, not as norm or exception, but as a condition of political life lived by everyday subjects caught in a surreal state in-between. (shrink)

Critical legal scholarship has recently turned to consider the form, mode and role of law in neoliberal governance. A central theme guiding much of this literature is the importance of understanding neoliberalism as not only a political or economic phenomenon, but also an inherently juridical one. This article builds on these conceptualisations of neoliberalism in turning to explore the wider historical, cultural and sociological contexts which inform the production of neoliberal authority. The papers in this collection were first presented at (...) the symposium ‘Forms of authority beyond the neoliberal state’, held at the Griffith Law School in December 2017. They consider the role of the corporation, the site of the university, the politics of debt, the genre of prestige television, and the archic sources of state violence, in order to imagine forms of authority which lie beyond neoliberalism as an ideology and a set of practices, and the ensemble of institutions which constitute the neoliberal state. The contributions draw on social theory, philosophy, cultural studies, legal geography and political theology in exploring new possibilities for cultivating judgement through and beyond the sovereign, political and aesthetic terrains of neoliberal governance. (shrink)

Arguing that the state and its people stand in a fiduciary relationship, Sovereignty's Promise puts forward a bold new account of political authority and its legal limits. In doing so it presents a fresh argument for common law constitutionalism and a novel theoretical framework for understanding the requirements of the rule of law.

This is a controversial work of applied legal theory, addressing urgent contemporary questions about law and the state, about the character of the UK as a state, and about the juridical character of the European Union.

In prosecuting the war on terror, the Bush Administration asserts that the protections inherent in state sovereignty do not apply to state sponsors of terrorism. I examine three elements of normative arguments to assess the administration's policies. The administration sought to delegitmize terrorism by underscoring the uncivilized nature of terrorist acts. It sought to link the war on terror to efforts to prohibit the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and to frame the invasion of Iraq (...) as central to this war. Finally, the administration proposed new international standards of behavior by arguing that state sponsors of terrorism should be held accountable for terrorist acts planned on their territory, and by seeking to link the protections against intervention inherent in the sovereignty norm to this behavior. Despite initial support for delegitmizing terrorism, the US attempt to frame the war on terror as linked to WMD and Iraq met with skepticism, and it faced fierce competition from alternate frames with regard to Iraq. Finally, the invasion of Iraq stimulated resistance to US policy on normative grounds, with particular concern about the consequences for the sovereignty norm. (shrink)

This article examines the Islamic concept of takfīr as it is used in secular-pluralistic contexts, within a larger delegitimizing discourse against terrorism. I argue that this takfīr as deployed by “liberal” Muslims, functions to legitimate the state’s use of coercive force. Furthermore, the secular state may in turn draw upon these discourses to co-opt the right to determine authentic Muslim identity. However, in doing so the state is forced to enter into a religiously discursive space. Takfīr notably (...) becomes the site of contention over secular state sovereignty for determining the value of life, where religious individuals both challenge and affirm this sovereignty. This reveals the dynamics in the relationship between secular conceptions of sovereignty and religion, as it pertains to the justification of violence. (shrink)

While the immediate aim of Walter Benjamin’s famous essay, “Critique of Violence,” is to provide a critique of legal violence, commentators typically interpret it as providing a further critique of state violence. However, this interpretation often receives no further argument, and it remains unclear whether Benjamin’s essay may prove analytically relevant for a critique of state violence today. This paper argues that the “Critique” proves thusly relevant, but only on condition that it is developed in two directions. The (...) first direction is conceptual, and consists in an explanation of the necessary relationship between states and violence. This explanation is found by appealing to a concept not cited in Benjamin’s text, but which, I argue, remains its implicit basis: sovereignty. According to this conceptual development, state violence is the necessary result of the state's attempt to maintain its sovereign law at the expense of emancipatory struggles to generate non-sovereign law. The second direction is genealogical, and consists in destabilizing the modern belief that justice is best served through the judicial channels of a sovereign state. Here I employ Michel Foucault’s genealogical research to demonstrate the historical contingency of state justice and, by extension, the possibility of a justice beyond the state. (shrink)

States are believed to be the paradigmatic instances of legitimate political authority. But is their prominence justified? The classic concept of state sovereignty predicts the danger of a fatal deadlock among conflicting authorities unless there is an ultimate authority within a given jurisdiction. This scenario is misguided because the notion of an ultimate authority is conceptually unclear. The exercise of authority is multidimensional and multiattributive, and to understand the relations among authorities we need to analyse this complexity into (...) its different aspects. Instead of ultimate authorities we can have actors endowed with superior authority over others in one regard, but not necessarily in another. And this limited superiority is sufficient for resolving conflicts. There is no need for ultimate authorities. Having discarded the notion of sovereignty we can embrace a different conception of legitimate authority, one that is not interested in the pedigree of actors, but in their capacity to serve its subjects. If states wish to retain their central role in the domain of political authority, they will have to earn it. (shrink)

The framing of the debate concerning sovereignty in terms of the dualism of retention or rejection conceals the floating character of sovereignty and constrains the capacity of the state to mutate, adapt and respond adequately to the diverse and complex processes which range in, through and above it. The paper develops the idea of floating sovereignty by putting forward four main propositions: (i) sovereignty's historical entanglement with statehood makes it unsuitable for non‐state political organisations; (...) (ii) although the state has been the necessary condition for sovereignty, the latter is no longer necessary for the evolution of the state; (iii) the traditional ideological function performed by sovereignty, namely the legitimation of state power, could be performed by other organizing principles which prioritize governmental efficiency over territorial extent and democratic criteria over nationalist ones; (iv) this means that the state will no longer be in a position to command the loyalty of its citizens but it would have to purchase it through its capacity to meet social needs, to fulfil its basic functions and through the normative qualities of its institutions and policies. Three institutional designs in core areas of ‘high politics’, that is, the fields of determination of nationality, immigration policy and foreign and security policy show how floating sovereignty could be implemented. (shrink)

Indicators of food sovereignty and food democracy center on people having the right and ability to define their food polices and strategies with respect to food culture, food security, sustainability and use of natural resources. Yet food sovereignty, like democracy, exists on multiple and competing scales, and policymakers and citizens often have different agendas and priorities. In passing a ban on the use of genetically-modified seeds in agriculture, Jackson County, Oregon has obtained some measure of food sovereignty. (...) Between 2016 and 2017 ethnographic research was undertaken in rural Southern Oregon where local community and State of Oregon priorities regarding the use of GMO crops are in conflict. This article presents ethnographic research findings about the expression and negotiation of multiple food sovereignties by civil society in rural southern Oregon and the State of Oregon via democratic processes. In particular, these findings illustrate the effects of socio-political power dynamics on local and state acts of food sovereignty, democracy and agrifood policy by analyzing what the different expressions of food sovereignty reveal for its implementation at the local level. (shrink)

Considers the problems of sovereignty through the work of Rousseau, Arendt, Foucault, Agamben, and Derrida.